Antipolitika

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

YUGOSLAVIA

Antipolitika

We do not have classics or founders whose portraits we hang from the walls, those made out of bricks, or mental ones, all the same. We tear down the walls, and we avoid idolatry like the plague.

Bakunin and comrades did not found the anarchist movement, nor did they synthesize its principals in pure intellectual contemplation. On the contrary, the anarchist movement grew out of the wing of the International Workers Association (also known as the First International) which consisted of proletarians who didn't even call themselves anarchists in the beginning. Bakunin did not join the International as an anarchist, he became one influenced by the practice and vision that was already being done and developed by those proletarians.

These people, at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century already had a strong vision of the possibility of a new world based on solidarity and mutual aid. In that vision, the International was a revolutionary organization, but also an embryo of a new society within the shell of the old world, it was simultaneously organized and imagined as a global network that was supposed to organize and coordinate the whole of social and communal life—a kind of an anti-state.

This indicates to us that anarchist thought came to be as a reflection of practice. But, in order for our movement to breathe freely and truly be alive, it is necessary for practice and analysis to always reflect one another, forever changing, in continuous movement.

Those whose vision didn't go beyond the idea of "socialist" parties that seize state power, did not understand this movement: for them, it was "apolitical" because of its indifference towards the participation in parliamentary politics. But, in reality, something completely different was the case.

As we refuse the legitimacy of the state, as an institution which with violence secures the existence of an exploitative system, so do we refuse "politics" as a separated sphere of life, one dealt with by specialists. We are interested in life, and in order for us to live and breathe freely, the sphere of the political needs to be dismantled—same as with the state/capital/patriarchy.

Anti-politics is life without walls and fences, it is our heart, and the new world we carry inside it.

People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints, such people have corpses in their mouths.

Raoul Vaneigem

Fight to maintain this feeling for organization and do not allow it to be destroyed by those who think that anarchism is a doctrine which has nothing to do with real life. Anarchism is the opposite of sectarianism and dogma. It perfects itself in action.

Nestor Makhno, adressing
B. Durruti and F. Ascaso

The anarchists are not promising anything to anyone.

Maria Nikiforova

No theory, no ready-made system, no book that has ever been written will save the world.

Mikhail Bakunin

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Image on the front cover: 9th Congress of The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1969

Image on the back cover: Protest after the murder of Patris Lumumba, Belgrade, 1961.

Each issue of this journal will have two versions one english and the other in what we call "our language", also known as serbian, croatian, montenegrian, bosnian. All standards of our language are used in Antipolitika.

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Yugoslavia
a State or a Revolutionary Community?

In an attempt to review the project of socialist Yugoslavia from an anarchist perspective, it would perhaps be enough to say that it was a state and in such a very simple way reduce the whole analysis to one short sentence. Of course, this would be an oversimplified understanding of the project that lasted more than 45 years and created a series of myths nurtured both by the left and the right which still today represents a part of the basis for their actions. We often hear that it is necessary to turn our backs to the past and concentrate on the future, but it is exactly the relation towards the past that determines what will the present and future be like. In the post-Yugoslav context, myths have a strong echo and influence on current happenings, whether they refer to real or imagined events.

The starting point and the motivation for this issue of Antipolitika wasn't a search for the causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia or any kind of justification for that or any other regime. Yugoslavia was, as I said in the beginning, simply a state. It kept the continuity of statehood and institutions, whether we speak of Austro-Hungary, Kingdom of Serbia, Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Montenegro, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and in the end, socialist Yugoslavia - the topic of this issue. When we take a look at the chronology of institutions of statehood in this region, we can see that everything continued, despite the wars, regime breakups, and occupations; the continuity of the State was ensured in every moment, and, of key importance for our antiauthoritarian position, not once was it put in question on a mass level. Everything that exists today has its starting point - legislative, institutional and even in terms of the cadre - in all previous regimes. In some way, we always speak of the continuation of the project of the State (and of Capital, without which it cannot survive); what exact name it has, and which ideological pattern it adopts, are more questions of the current strategy of the reproduction of existing relations of power, rather than of a more essential difference.

Socialist Yugoslavia, speaking in very general terms, for one group represents an age of darkness, and for others an unquestionable age of welfare. At the same time, these two positions see themselves as the only possible ones. You are either in one or the other camp. It is not possible to think outside of the context of the State. «It is not realistic.» Despite that, in the early nineties, anarchists from Croatia and Serbia as a part of the project *Preko zidova nacionalizma i rata* (*Over the walls of nationalism and war*, a newspaper published in the February of 1994) have clearly stated their view of every State, and also recognized the continuity of the State:

> The Yugoslav state had to fall apart; as any other system of «real socialism,» it too represented a dictatorial, bureaucratic, authoritarian regime of abolished freedoms. Virtual freedom, characteristic to «our» country relative to other Eastern-European countries, was nothing but a mere farce; the baton was ready for anyone who would rebel against it. The much-praised self-management system was nothing but an illusion; were the working people able to freely associate, produce, exchange goods for their own benefit? Of course not.
>
> On the other hand, we must not have illusions about the Western capitalist deceit, which is no better: the «free» market is a lie manufactured by the interests of the powerful and the rulers, based on a rabid competition, exploitation of the individual against individual, and of nature. It brings wealth and privileges to the minority, and coercion, poverty, and hunger to the majority.
>
> With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, many bureaucrats were left without those who fed them, and those who strive for power figured out how to realize their dirty goals: new nationalist states were formed out of the desire for power of old and new rulers, and their growing appetites produced the war. They are those who produced the image of the enemy aggressor (Albanian, Serbian, Slovenian, Croatian, Muslim...) with the help of the media. As it was socialism before, now nationalism is the ideological screen behind which they hide their lust for power. (*Preko zidova nacionalizma i rata*, issue 1, February, 1994.)

Texts in this issue speak clearly that these assertions had a firm basis, nationalism was not a new thing on the (post)Yugoslav territory, self-management was but a borrowed idea that never came to life, nor was that possible inside a State and market economy, and the rebellions against the regime were frequent, and, which is of interest to us here, they were authentic worker and peasant struggles, a class conflict, that continued despite a formal change of the character of the regime.

Of course, we cannot reduce this analysis to a reinforcement of post-fascists who see every critique of the previous regime as a justification for their villainous ideas. On the contrary, we need to say here that the struggle against fascism, partizan resistance, and in general the resistance to deplorable ideas, is something that we should view with all due respect. Many of our comrades, grandmothers and grandfathers, have participated in that struggle in an attempt to defend their lives and create a better world. Many went quiet after that struggle, continued to live as they could (just like they did before the war), and some of them continued that struggle and their conflict with the State and Capital, like Zorkine, Kristl and Ćopić, whose texts we publish in this issue. These are only some of the voices that tell us that the struggle for a better world is never over, as long the State and capitalism exist. The fact that the socialist government saw a revolutionary and communist critique as a threat says a lot of the character and structure of the "revolution". Here the events of June of '68 are of special interest, when the state apparatus, its spokespersons, and prosecutors "opened fire" in the media on the students and those who supported the demonstrations. Today we can recognize the same pattern: political enemies are demonized, and they are attacked using all means, and in the end eliminated, if circumstances allow it. This is the practice of "democratic" and "undemocratic" systems alike, despite it sometimes appearing that the state apparatuses function differently.

The resistance to the State politics was reflected also in the critique of the social position of women, whose organization «Antifascist Front of Women» dissolved «itself» (in 1953) because it became «too political». This organization, founded during the People's Liberation Struggle, became redundant because women were supposed to find a «place where they belonged», and this was surely not in political activism. The regime has changed, but some of the basic social divisions haven't. Gender roles have continued to determine social position, just as class division has. Later, this relation of the society towards women provoked a strong reaction through the founding of the feminist movement, which continues and adds to this struggle to present day.

When speaking of social and class aspects of Yugoslav politics, often in the focus of everyday conversations, as well as in serious discussions, we find the question of social care, housing policy, health care, and related questions as some kind of Yugoslav specificity. This is a common misconception, because this was not a specificity but a

policy that was simultaneously developed in the Western versions of capitalism, and not only in the socialist ones. State and capital found themselves, after WW2, to be in a position in which they needed to find a solution for the accumulated social problems, that is, a way to circumvent the revolution. For example, the United Kingdom had a very similar system of social housing as Yugoslavia did (and it remains to this day, unlike in the post-Yugoslav territory), health care was nationalised and everyone got the right to access free public health care, railways were nationalised, and, just before WW2, so were the mines. In short, nationalisation of public services, as well as of private business, was a practice in both East and West, whenever this was of strategic importance, because this preserved social peace. We can say that Yugoslavia in that era followed the trends of European social policy, and sometimes was behind in social policy.

It is interesting to observe that the most of social policies and practices in the post-Yugoslav territory disappeared without «a shot being fired». While the West still needed to buy social peace with a policy of social care for the population, newly founded states had a new tool in their hands: nationalism. In the new situation everything could be justified with a national interest, including the cutting of social rights, because they had a «communist legacy». What is additionally interesting in this situation is that the leading nationalist party in Croatia, HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – Croatian Democratic Community), was composed of 70.000 former members of the Communist League of Croatia and was the main advocate of such policy. In respect to the cadre, the continuity of statehood was preserved, which speaks of the adaptable character of those who make the regime and enforce state policy, whatever the current ideology may be.

Nationalism is not a new weapon in the hands of states. We shouldn't kid ourselves and presume that Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic community in which inter-national, or inter-ethnic differences and conflicts had disappeared. In the very foundations of the new Yugoslavia, «the solution of the national question» was built in, the Yugoslav government saw its own inner structure as a solution for the «national question», with the creation of nation-states (republics) which made the federation (in addition of autonomous provinces) and with this the idea of a nation based on ethnic belonging never ceased to be present.

This idea of «soil and blood» or «one people, one nation, one country», survived despite the declarative «brotherhood and unity», which was surely present for a large number of people, but not necessarily for the governments of the republics. One of the interesting examples of this direction is the language policy which was a point of conflict for the almost entire time of the existence of Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that Yugoslavia didn't have an official language, Croatian/Serbian had an advantage in relation to other languages (Macedonian, Slovenian, Albanian, Hungarian and many other less present languages). The position, name, and the standard of Croatian and Serbian, although they are different versions of the same language, was a matter of constant discussion and later of conflict which at a couple of instances culminated and caused nationalist tensions in the country. Although these disputes were often of an academic character, their importance shouldn't be understated - it was exactly a segment of academics who played an important role in the preservation and buildup of nationalist ideology. Along with that, we shouldn't forget that the standardization of language is one of the key tools in the formulation of «national identity». In such a way, also in the respect to the question of language, republican authorities decided in which language will they publish their official documents.

In the end, it was the governments of the republics who represented the foundation for nation-states which would declare their independence in the 1990's and continue to base their politics primarily on nationalism.

We shouldn't forget to mention socially widespread "internal racism», if it can be called like that, primarily directed towards the Albanian and Roma populations. Both questions have a very complex history and causes which are deeply rooted in society, but, it is also a matter of racism supported by state policy that continued through several regimes. In a relatively short period, a «historical conflict» and a racist relation were produced, that seemed to be present «since always».

Despite that, we cannot speak of a completely closed society, which speaks of interesting contradictions in which we used to live. Yugoslavia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, it had a strong cooperation and exchange with «third-world» countries, so for example student exchange was encouraged by official politics, which made the university cities places in which it was common to meet people from other parts of the world, without, at least not open, racism.

This also meant as a cultural exchange, and it was exactly the terrain of culture which was the terrain of contradictions. In the first years of the establishment of the socialist government, strict limits of cultural politics were established, a Soviet model was followed, but this era of strict socialism didn't last for long. After the resolution of the Informbureau in 1948 and the breakup with the Soviet Union, the situation started to change. This change was accelerated and confirmed but the speech of Miroslav Krleža at the Third Congress of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia in 1952, in which he advocated for the freedom of art and critically spoke of "Party art" and the Stalinist concept of "engineers of the soul". Although changes in the art itself were already happening, this opened the way for "l'art pour art". This enabled free and (for the most part) unchallenged development of modern art. Art became an area of critique, although still a controlled area, but the possibility of a critique was far larger than in other areas of social life. In exactly this rift there came to be a series of films, books, art, actions etc. which can be called a culture of resistance. It is uncertain if it was considered not dangerous by the regime, or if the reach of it was seen as far shorter than the echo of a potential ban, which could be concluded if we consider the reaction to the appearance of punk and new wave.

"Western" music, like jazz, shortly after the break with USSSR became accessible, and soon rock n' roll became an integral part of the cultural production. We can freely say that in Yugoslavia Western trends were followed, so the musical scene had all genres and sub-genres of music, including the appearance of punk, which ruffled a few feathers and made a political case of one subculture. The first reaction of the authorities was repression, because the new rebellious subculture was different from everything up to that point. But, after the first shock and a repressive reaction, it became clear that it would be dangerous to ban punk, so the youth cultural centres, and the Alliance of the Socialist Youth which ran them, opened their doors and gave spaces for rehearsals, concerts. State record companies (therefore, the mainstream) started to publish records. The rebellion was put under the control. Of course, not completely, because bands found a way to send their massage through overstating the slogan of the League of Communists, the State, and their ideology, and even by glorifying the police. So, for example, the verse "there is no better than our police" survived the regime change and generations of punks. The irony of slogans that a few people believed in became a punk message. Of course, the story of punk in Yugoslavia is deeper and demands a wider approach - not only a short reflection, especially if we speak of the part of the scene which went beyond the mainstream and had the characteristics of a counter-culture.

In the end, this analysis of Yugoslavia from an anarchist point of view only partially encompasses the whole series of questions, and each of them could fill a book. That being said, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that, as it was stated in beginning of the text: Yugoslavia was a state, and every state is based on violence which protects power and capital, and as such should disappear.

Language and Politics in Ex-Yugoslavia

Will Firth

For a newly formed state in a turbulent postwar situation, questions of language and linguistics are often less important than consolidating an army and administration, securing the borders, ensuring communications, producing essentials such as grain, coal, steel, electricity, and so on. This was the case when the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was formed in 1946. Parliamentary elections had been held in November 1945, at which the communist-led National Front secured all the seats, and a government of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was established in 1946. After reforms in 1953, Yugoslavia experimented with ideas of economic decentralisation and self-management, where workers had input into the policies of their factories and shared a portion of any surplus revenue. The Party's role in society shifted from holding a monopoly of power to being an ideological leader. As a result, the name of the Party was changed to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In 1963, the country itself was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Language and power

These changes show that linguistic and semantic considerations were enmeshed with the political dynamics of wielding and maintaining power. The ideological language of the early Yugoslav period bore many of the traits of the discourses and diatribe in other state-socialist countries. Black-and-white, authoritarian terms such as "enemies of the people" were in common use in the immediate postwar years, when the country was ruled with the same Stalinist ruthlessness as other East Bloc states and the liquidation of real or imagined opponents was an almost daily occurrence. Following the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist Information Bureau, the country began to take an independent course in world politics, shunning the influence of both West and East. Estrangement from the Soviet Union was used to obtain US aid via the Marshall Plan, and Yugoslavia founded the Non-Aligned Movement and went on to play a leading role in it. The ideological language of the 1940s and 50s gradually began to mellow.

A noteworthy ploy in the early Yugoslav period was the codification of the Macedonian language, a long-term process which culminated in 1944 and was implemented in the years that followed. Ever since the collapse of Ottoman power in the Balkans, the historical region of Macedonia had been hotly contested territory, and its division between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria resulted in the First Balkan War (1912-13) and Second Balkan War (1913). Bulgaria was a Nazi ally for most of the Second World War and occupied a large part of Macedonia. After the expulsion of Axis forces from the southern Balkans in 1944, the largely communist and pro-Yugoslav partisans were able to gain control. Instituting a nominally separate language in the new Socialist Republic of Macedonia, as part of Yugoslavia, was a way of cementing that power and countering Bulgarian influence. The Macedonian idiom was widely considered a Bulgarian dialect until 1944. The new Macedonian standard language for use in the media, administration, schools, etc., was based on the dialects around the cities of Prilep and Veles, some distance from the eastern part of the country whose dialects bear more resemblance to Bulgarian, and a version of the Cyrillic alphabet was adopting which is based strongly on Serbian rather than Bulgarian. The definition and drafting of a language can be seen as an important element of "nation-building" in the interests of those in power. Bulgarian and Macedonian are mutually intelligible to a high degree today, but the existence of a discrete and internationally recognised Macedonian language and nation is ultimately a product of the power dynamics of the 1940s.

Yugoslavia became increasingly integrated into the world economy, with large Western corporations producing in the country, raw materials being sold for the world market, large numbers of Yugoslav citizens working abroad (and often sending money back home), and international corporations marketing their goods in Yugoslavia – including "cultural" products such as popular music. These influences found their way into language to a greater extent than in more isolated state-socialist countries.

Many specialists consider Yugoslav policy towards minority languages to have been exemplary. Although three quarters of the population spoke Serbo-Croatian, no single language was official at the federal level. A range of community languages enjoyed official status in the constituent republics and provinces, e.g. Hungarian, Ruthenian, Slovak and Romanian in Vojvodina; Albanian, Turkish and Romany in Kosovo; Italian in Croatia, etc. A total of sixteen languages were used by newspapers, radio stations and television studios, fourteen were languages of tuition in schools, and nine at universities. As a state born out of the struggle of a multi-ethnic partisan movement, this was arguably a fair and progressive recognition of the country's linguistic diversity. The Yugoslav People's Army was the only institution of national significance that used Serbo-Croatian as the sole language of command.

However, this legal equality could not disguise the de facto dominance of Serbo-Croatian. As the language of almost 75% of the country's 22 million inhabitants, and of the centre of power in Belgrade, it functioned as an unofficial lingua franca. It was a compulsory subject in all schools, whereas relatively significant smaller languages such as Slovenian, Macedonian and Albanian were not taught outside the respective region at all. Their status was correspondingly low.

On a personal note, I was stunned to see the absolute disinterest and unveiled loathing of young linguistics students at the University of Zagreb (Croatia) in 1988-89 when they were required to take a semester course in Macedonian. As if it was an imposition for them, cool cats from a northwestern metropolis, to have to learn the "primitive" idiom of some deep-south Balkan backwater.

The Serbian variant of Serbo-Croatian, with

twice as many speakers as the Croatian variant, enjoyed the greatest prestige. The army used the Serbian form of the language in issuing commands.

Serbo-Croatian

Any look at language policy in Yugoslavia must deal predominantly with Serbo-Croatian. This South Slavic language was spoken as a native tongue by almost three quarters of the population – and as a second language by much of the rest.

A language with a gamut of different dialects and variants, Serbo-Croatian was effectively standardized by Croatian and Serbian writers and linguists in the mid-19th century in the Vienna Literary Agreement, which met with broad acceptance. There were slightly different Serbian and Croatian standards from the outset, although both were based on the same subdialect (Shtokavian). From 1918, Serbo-Croatian served as the official language of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The idea of linguistic standardisation often stems from the striving to create a nation and is thus a firm component of many nationalisms. Every state aspires to intervene in language and transform linguistics from a descriptive discipline into a normative doctrine that would mould language rather than recording and studying it the way it is, free and ever mutable in everyday use.

Through the subsequent fifty years of socialist Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian language policy amounted to a balancing act, adjusting policy and key terminology in order to maintain an equilibrium. Allowing a degree of inner diversity while maintaining the stance that it was still a uniform language served the interest of the existing system.

In 1954, major writers, linguists and literary critics, backed by the major cultural institutions Matica srpska in Serbia and Matica hrvatska in Croatia, signed the Novi Sad Agreement. Its core tenet was that "Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins share a single language with two equal variants that have developed around Zagreb (western) and Belgrade (eastern)". The agreement insisted that the Latin and Cyrillic scripts have equal status, and also that the two main pronunciation models (Ekavian and Ijekavian) be on par. It stipulated that "Serbo-Croatian" should be the name of the language in official contexts, while the names "Serbian" and "Croatian" could be retained in vernacular use. Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska were to work together on a dictionary, and a mixed committee of linguists was tasked with preparing an orthography to codify spelling. During the 1960s, both books were published simultaneously in Ijekavian Latin in Zagreb and Ekavian Cyrillic in Novi Sad. A unitarian spirit prevailed – a polycentric model of linguistic unity.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically diverse region of Yugoslavia and people there needed a command of both scripts. One example of how this worked in practice was provided by the main Sarajevo daily newspaper *Oslobođenje* (Liberation), which was published in Latin one day and Cyrillic the next.

As early as the 1950s, the communist leader and later dissident Milovan Đilas advocated a shift away from central planning towards more economic autonomy. His arguments for greater democratic input into decision-making ultimately led him to criticise the one-party state itself and rigid party discipline; he suggested the retirement of state officials whom he saw as abusing their power and blocking the road to reform. Particularly in the northwest of the country, the 1960s were marked by a gradual emancipation from the Stalinist policies followed after World War II. Major reforms in the mid 1960s introduced elements of a market economy, and a phase of democratisation in the League of Communists between 1966 and 1969 saw a bigger role given to its organisations in the individual republics and provinces.

Arguably as part of this general move towards greater regional autonomy – and also rooted in a long-standing awareness of Croatian particularities – Croatian intellectuals published a "Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language" in 1967, which centrists in Belgrade perceived as a separatist affront. The Matica hrvatska challenged the Novi Sad Agreement and the common orthography and started work on its own, which was published in 1971 as the *Croatian Orthography Handbook*. The book was promptly banned as part of the clampdown on the "Croatian Spring" in 1971 but was published abroad in 1972.



The vying of different currents in the statist political mainstream found linguistic expression in various fields. In the 1980s, for example, there were increasing objections to the language being called Serbo-Croatian (or even Croato-Serbian), not least in Croatia. Awkward constructs emerged to take account of these sensibilities in the late Yugoslav period, e.g. dictionaries and reference works referring to "the Croatian or Serbian language" in their titles. What would a foreigner with no knowledge of the complex linguo-political situation think when a crucial definition contains the ambiguous word "or"?!

Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslavia as a geopolitical buffer between East and West, the fragmentation of ex-Yugoslavia's territory has been accompanied by a process of linguistic "Balkanisation". Thus the dominant discourse in Serbia and Croatia today is that they are two, albeit closely related languages. Bosnian has likewise been established as an official standard in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Montenegro a separate standard (including two new letters!) has been introduced and recognised by the International Organization for Standardization as a separate language. This move by the marginally dominant pro-Western camp in Montenegro is one of many tools in an ongoing geopolitical campaign to consolidate a separate Montenegrin identity and, ultimately, to check Serbian influence.

Not much has changed in a purely linguistic sense. Many of these alterations are declarative in nature, reflecting policy at a superstructural level. Despite the centripetal developments of the last two decades, the differences between the variants of Serbo-Croatian are still generally less than between the international variants of English, for instance.

To sum up with the words of the scholar Branko Franolić (1980): "Language policy in Yugoslavia consists of a series of alternations between centralist and pluralist tendencies. These tendencies are always present, only their relative emphases change. Language planning in Yugoslavia is an outgrowth from and instrument of political decision-making and overall social planning."

The future

It is easy to criticise these developments, particularly in retrospect, and considerably harder to sketch a positive vision of linguistic policy and practice in this part of the world. Respect for diversity should be a key concern, and language must no longer be used as a tool for nationalist or power-political manipulation.

An encouraging thrust in this direction is the "Declaration on the Common Language" presented in early 2017 after preparatory regional conferences held by open-minded authors and journalists in Podgorica (Montenegro), Split (Croatia) , Belgrade (Serbia) and Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Its anti-nationalist theses present a counterpoint to the post-Yugoslav mania of exclusionism and the "nationalism of small differences".

Misogynist language is another ingrained problem in the Balkans (as in many other countries). Male violence, macho culture and the depreciation of unpaid domestic work are foundations of the authoritarian and patriarchal societies we live in – and correspondingly are reflected in language. But many individuals are challenging these structures on a daily basis and trying hard to avoid modes of communication that are sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, etc. This awareness and this struggle are good preconditions for whatever "macro-linguistic" solutions and definitions are adopted in future.

WR: Misteryes of the Organism

Beyond the Liberation of Desire



Anarchism, crushed throughout most of the world by the middle of the 20th century, sprang back to life in a variety of different settings. In the US, it reappeared among activists like the Yippies; in Britain, it reemerged in the punk counterculture; in Yugoslavia, where an ersatz form of "self-management" in the workplace was the official program of the communist party, it appeared in a rebel filmmaking movement, the Black Wave. As historians of anarchism, we concern ourselves not only with conferences and riots but also with cinema.

Of all the works of the Black Wave, Dušan Makavejev's *WR: Mysteries of the Organism* stands out as an exemplary anarchist film. Rather than advertising anarchism as one more product in the supermarket of ideology, it demonstrates a method that undermines all ideologies, all received wisdom. It still challenges us today.

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The struggle of communist partisans against the Nazi occupation provided the foundational mythos for 20th century Yugoslavian national identity. After the Second World War, the Yugoslavian state poured millions into partisan blockbusters like *Battle of Neretva* and other sexless paeans to patriotic self-sacrifice. These films depicted a world of moral binaries: heroism versus cowardice, austerity versus indulgence, communism versus fascism.

At the same time, Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 set the stage for the Yugoslavian experiment with socialism to take its own road. Geopolitically, Yugoslavia represented a third power alongside the Eastern and Western Blocs; economically, "self-management" was official government policy; socially, Yugoslavia supposedly offered a more tolerant and egalitarian alternative to US capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism.

Makavejev set out to test the limits of Yugoslavian permissiveness. Exploring the variants of Marxism, he found a road not taken in the works of the Austrian psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich. A protégé of Sigmund Freud, Reich had founded the German Association for Proletarian Sexual Politics (Sex-Pol) to promote sexual liberation; in books like *The Mass Psychology of Fascism,* he sought to identify the role of psychological factors in the rise of authoritarianism. Hounded out of the Communist Party by pro-Soviet puritans and driven from Europe by the Nazi seizure of power, Reich fled to the United States. He died in prison, having spent the final years of his life as a crank promoting orgone accumulators, cloudbusters, and other pseudoscientific inventions, convinced he was still the target of "red fascist" persecution as the Food and Drug Administration burned his books.

Traveling to the United States in Reich's footsteps, Makavejev interviewed Reich's remaining disciples and recorded footage of therapists, artists, and entrepreneurs associated with what Reich had dubbed the sexual revolution. Returning home, he filled out the material with clips from Soviet propaganda films like *The Vow* and shot a fictional sequence of his own.

The fictional sequence forms the backbone of *WR*'s unconventional plot*,* dividing the film into two "Sex-Pol" shorts. The first 25 minutes is ostensibly a documentary about Wilhelm Reich and his legacy in the US, captioned "May 1, 1931, Berlin"—when Reich's original Sex-Pol might have made this film, in the alternate universe Makavejev concocts. The remainder of the film, captioned "May 1, 1971 Belgrade," is set in an imagined Yugoslavia, in which the protagonist, Milena,[1] attempts to implement Reich's philosophy as a form of orthodox party communism.

WR: Mysteries of the Organism earned cult status when it was first screened in 1971, but the socialist authorities set out to suppress it almost immediately. The film was banned in Yugoslavia for a decade and a half.[2] Makavejev himself was driven into exile in the West following a complaint brought against him by veteran partisans.

Speaking to an interviewer in 1995, Makavejev attributed the banning of *WR* to the continuing influence of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia. Yet the capitalist West was ultimately no more supportive of his iconoclastic filmmaking. In view of his tribulations on both sides of the divide, we can see that the repression Makavejev exposed and experienced was not confined to a single national context, but characterizes every nation under capitalism and communism alike.

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"There is nothing in this human world of ours that is not in some way right, however distorted it may be."

This quotation, which Makavejev attributes to

1 Compounding the (faux) documentary aesthetic of *WR,* all the main characters with the exception of the Russian, Vladimir Ilich, are named for the actors who play them. "Excuse me," Vladimir Ilich interjects at one point, "this is a photo montage, isn't it?"
"No, it's authentic," answers Milena.

2 In summer 1971, political figures and "cultural workers" attended a special screening of *WR* in Novi Sad in order to decide whether to ban it. Some 800 people attended. The screening was interrupted by both applause and booing; the atmosphere was electric during the subsequent discussion.

Many people supported the film. The critic Petar Volk defended the freedom to criticize, insisting that Makavejev shouldn't be seen as "a typical anarchist, nor a typical artist, anti-artist, communist, anticommunist." He insisted that every work of art is political, but that even when art criticizes, it shouldn't be seen as hostile.

Most political figures spoke against *WR.* One said, "The film placed all of the ideologies of the world in the same hole, including the ideology of self-management. Some have tried to defend it here, saying that the struggle against every dogmatism shouldn't accept any dogma. I agree with that. But we have to say where we are, on which side, for what ideology. Fascism and anti-fascism, Stalinism and anti-Stalinism do not go together…"

Another: "I think this is a real political diversion and an attack on things we consider holy, such as Lenin, such as a communist red flag, our movement, our efforts and the victims we sacrificed and still sacrifice for that. This is throwing mud on all of those holy things…" Still another said that if Petar Volk showed up among his workers with his long hair, they would throw him out head first.

Even after this debate, the Commission for Cinematography allowed the film, but the public prosecutor banned it the following month. The ban was lifted only in 1986.

Even after this, the Commission for cinematography allowed the film, but the next month public prosecutor banned it (July 1971). The ban was lifted only in 1986.

Wilhelm Reich, is the key to understanding the whole film. Setting out to expose the distortions that repression has inflicted on humanity, Makavejev presents one of the 20th century's fiercest denunciations of authoritarianism. Yet his ultimate motives are compassionate and affirmative. He is like a physician trying to diagnose the ailments afflicting the patient and the medical profession at once; this is why the film can appear so self-contradictory.

Given two ostensibly opposing positions, Makavejev always refuses to take sides, instead revealing the common threads that connect them. Then he introduces a third possibility as a counterpoint to the first two, and this serves as a point of departure for a new opposition to be transcended via the same method. In this way, he undermines and transforms the binaries that were essential to both Yugoslavian cinema and Cold War politics.

Beginning with Marxism and the (puritanical, repressive) Soviet Union on one side and capitalism and Western (commodified, exploitative) sexual liberation on the other, Makavejev takes the teachings of Wilhelm Reich as the basis for an imagined Yugoslavia representing a communist model for sexual liberation.[3] Then he mounts a critique of sexual liberation *as ideology,* portraying an alternative communism in which sexual liberation could be as *repressively realized* as workers' liberation was under Tito.

Like the Dadaists before him, Makavejev presents his critique via collage: montage is his answer to dialectics. He juxtaposes his documentary footage from the US with propaganda films from the Soviet Union, communist China, and Nazi Germany, along with his own fanciful Yugoslavian propaganda film. It is as if the viewer is switching between several different channels with both the soundtracks and the themes bleeding over from one to the next; each transition complicates and intensifies the web of associations.

For example, following a portrait of the conservative townspeople in the part of Maine where Reich settled, Makavejev cuts back to the streets of New York City, presenting Andy Warhol starlet Jackie Curtis promenading through the bright lights of the business district with her boyfriend. Over this scene, Makavejev dubs a radio commercial: "You own the sun with Coppertone." The US is at once a bastion of small-town conservatism and a land of freedom in which sexual difference manifests as the commodification of the self on the market of identity. Provincial intolerance alongside the *repressive tolerance* of the metropolis—what Herbert Marcuse called "repressive desublimation."

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The protagonist of the sequences set in Yugoslavia is Milena, an apostle of Wilhelm Reich's

3 "I've been to the East, and I've been to the West, but it was never like this!" Vladimir Ilich says of Makavejev's Yugoslavia.

Makavejev's trialectics: Milena, protagonist of WR, both dead and alive, and director Dušan Makavejev

prescriptions for sexual liberation. Milena is the ideologue incarnate: passionate and doctrinaire, she has substituted *advancing the party line* for the actual fulfillment of her program. We see her reading Reichian propaganda, smoking a cigar à la Sigmund Freud, and sitting in her orgone accumulator while her housemate, Jagoda, makes love.

Milena's voice in the film is also Reich's voice, but behind that, it is Makavejev's voice—the voice of a Yugoslavian making a documentary about Reich. Milena is Makavejev's double, a dogmatic sendup of his own interest in Reich's ideas as an emancipatory program—and of Yugoslavia's dalliance with Marxism. Milena's martyrdom is an allegory of Reich's persecution and exile, foreshadowing Makavejev's own misfortunes in his homeland and then in the West.

In the most famous scene of *WR,* Milena steps out onto the balcony of her apartment to harangue her neighbors in a sequence that channels the greatest Soviet propaganda films. "Socialism must not exclude human pleasure from its program!" she declaims to proletarian applause, a demagogue of sexual freedom. "The October Revolution was ruined when it rejected free love!" (The camera cuts to her housemate Jagoda, who gasps "War of liberation!" as she tries—playfully?—to escape her male lover.) "Frustrate the young sexually and they'll recklessly take to other illicit thrills… political rallies with flags flying, battling the police like pre-war Communists! What we need is a free youth in a crime-free world!"

Clad in a mini-dress and an army jacket, Milena builds to her climax. "Sweet oblivion is the masses' demand! Deprive them of free love and they'll seize everything else! That led to revolution. It led to Fascism and Doomsday!" At first viewing, it could appear that Milena is championing sexual liberation. In fact, she is laying out a prescription for *repressive desublimation* as a vaccine against revolution.

The scene ends like a classic partisan film, with everyone singing a Yugoslavian folk song together—and suddenly, the film cuts to a rally in Beijing at which tens of thousands of people are raising Mao's little red book in the air in unison. Stalin, glamorized in a Soviet propaganda film, strides out to the tune of a zither: "We have demonstrated our ability not only to destroy the old order, but to build in its place a new socialist order."

This is the problem—how order succeeds order, the dictator replacing the Tsar just as Oedipus replaced his father. The film cuts to a scene in which an inmate in a mental hospital is undergoing electric shock therapy, and the zither resumes, driving home the association between patriarchal leadership, state power, and the institutional enforcement of mental health. The norms of sexual liberation are no more liberating than the norms of Marxism, which are no more liberating than the norms of capitalism.

***

As the movie shifts into high gear, Milena goes to see a Russian figure skating troupe perform. She and her housemate are in the company of two young soldiers: "Consider yourself protected by the Yugoslav People's Army," one says flirtatiously.

"But who will protect me from you?" Milena's housemate responds.

Milena is not impressed by low-ranking Yugoslavian soldiers. She sets her sights on the star Russian figure skater. He is nationalistic manhood personified; the stage makeup of his profession only accentuates his icy masculinity. When she approaches him backstage for an autograph, he recites his answers directly out of a Communist Party phrasebook. His name is Vladimir Ilich—an overt reference to Lenin.

Milena's attraction to Vladimir Ilich underscores the point that our current desires will not necessarily lead us out of the order that produces them. ("You are locked into your suffering," sings Leonard Cohen, "and your pleasures are the seal.") Earlier in the film, we hear Jackie Curtis describe her lover Eric as "an American hero" while Tuli Kupferberg prowls Manhattan with a toy machine gun, aping a US soldier. At the opening of the movie, Kupferberg[4] intones, "He who chooses slavery—is he a slave still?"

Milena takes Vladimir Ilich back to her apartment to introduce the haughty Russian to the ideas of her mentor, Wilhelm Reich. "His name is World Revolution," she explains, giving

4 Kupferberg was an anarchist, a pacifist, and a member of the subversive New York City rock band, the Fugs.

us another way to decode the title of the film. "He teaches that every nice person like you and me hides behind his façade a great explosive charge… A great reservoir of energy that can be released only by war or revolution."

"In me? Me too?" interrupts Milena's housemate, having stripped naked. "Love and crime. Give me some."

At this moment, to the sound of a madcap Balkan horn line, Milena's ex-lover, the lumpen-proletarian Radmilović, comes smashing through the wall like a cartoon superhero out of Deleuze and Guattari.[5] Radmilović functions as a sort of Shakespearean fool: because he is a sexist, drunken lout, he can say and do things that would otherwise be inadmissible in Yugoslavian film. When we first encounter him, he is barricading a road; he accuses a BMW driver of being a member of the red bourgeoisie. Makavejev puts his own anarchistic ideas in the mouth of a communist caricature of an anarchist in order to save the authorities the trouble of having to caricature him themselves—a comic lampoon of a timeless socialist tactic.

Interrupting the conversation about Reich, Radmilović cheerfully hustles Vladimir Ilich into a wardrobe and commences nailing it shut. Milena is mortified: "Free the People's Artist!"

The Id traps the Superego in the closet: turnabout is fair play!

***

The scene returns to New York, where Nancy Godfrey is preparing to make a plaster cast of New York entrepreneur Jim Buckley's phallus. While Godfrey massages Buckley to erection, we see Milena reading aloud from Lenin's *The State and Revolution,* in which Lenin quotes Engels:

> "The proletariat needs the state, not in the interests of freedom, but in order to subdue its enemies, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist."

In other words, the state (the concentration of power and authority in the hands of a few) is to create the conditions for freedom (the distribution of power and agency to all on a horizontal basis). "Kill for Peace" by The Fugs kicks in on the soundtrack, a comparably oxymoronic program.

As Godfrey packs plaster around Buckley's erection, the soundtrack shifts to Czech classical composer Bedřich Smetana's patriotic theme, "The Moldau." Smetana's composition connects naturalism and nationalism, evoking the reverence with which male sexual potency is venerated in patriarchal society. The camera cuts briefly to Jackie Curtis paying obeisance at a Catholic shrine; the virginal saint above her is holding a skull. Briefly, we glimpse Milena releasing Vladimir Ilich from the wardrobe.

In the plaster casting scene, Makavejev is depicting the reduction of living sexuality to a commodity, an inert representation. What seems like a celebration of manhood and male power is actually a substitution paramount to castration: the inorganic for the organic, the artificial for the real, the rigid for the flexible, the statue of the hero for the flesh of the human being. Those who seek patriarchal status and political power willingly make this exchange, not understanding that these supplant rather than supplement their personhood.

The classic example of this is Lenin's corpse, preserved in Red Square for workers to file dutifully past. Posters around the USSR blazoned Vladimir Mayakovsky's words: "Even now, Lenin is more alive than the living." Raised to superhuman status as an icon, Lenin not only ceased to be a living, breathing human being—he also drained others of life and freedom.[6]

When the duplication of Buckley's organ is complete, *WR* jumps back to the Soviet propaganda reel, equating Stalin with the ersatz phallus. "Comrades, we have successfully completed the first stage of communism!" Stalin proclaims, joining everyone in applauding his own declaration.

This is Makavejev at his bitterest. Stalin's "first stage of communism" is the reduction of life to inorganic matter—the substitution of duplicate for original, of ideology for experience, of program for desire, of permanence for presence, of power for pleasure, of nation for people. The film cuts to a man in a straitjacket slamming his head against a wall over and over to the sound of another communist hymn: "We thank the Party—our glorious Party—for bringing happiness to every home."

At a time when the Yugoslavian government relied on filmmaking as one of the chief means of promoting patriotism and obedience, Makavejev was a mutineer turning his weapon against



5 For a chilling example of how "non-statist micro-politics" of affective subversion can be reappropriated for the project of repression in the same way that revolutionary communism became the state religion of totalitarian nations, consult Eyal Weizman's "Walking Through Walls," in which he relates how the Israeli Defense Force employed concepts from *A Thousand Plateaus* by Deleuze and Guattari to strategize assaults on Palestinian refugee camps.

6 "Every fury on earth has been absorbed in time, as art, or as religion, or as authority in one form or another. The deadliest blow the enemy of the human soul can strike is to do fury honor. Swift, Blake, Beethoven, Christ, Joyce, Kafka, name me a one who has not been thus castrated. Official acceptance is the one unmistakable symptom that salvation is beaten again, and is the one surest sign of fatal misunderstanding, and is the kiss of Judas."

-James Agee, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men,* quoted in Myron Sharaf's biography of Wilhelm Reich, *Fury on Earth.* Sharaf appears in *WR* in the documentary material.

his superiors. Today, when access to the means of media production has become so widespread, it's difficult to grasp how forcefully subversive this was in 1971.

***

The argument thus formulated, *WR* speeds towards its catastrophic conclusion.

Milena and Vladimir Ilich are walking through a snowy park together. Finally, they kiss, and, as the soundtrack swells with plaintive violins, Vladimir Ilich soliloquizes about Beethoven:

> Nothing is lovelier than the *Appassionata.* I could listen to it all day! Marvelous, superhuman music! With perhaps naïve pride, I think, "What wonders men can create!" But I can't listen to music. It gets on my nerves!
>
> It arouses a yearning in me to babble sweet nothings, to caress people living in this hell who can still create such beauty. But nowadays, if you stroke anybody's head, he'll bite your hand off! Now you have to hit them on the head. Hit them on the head mercilessly, though in principle we oppose all violence!

At the culmination of this speech, he strikes Milena for attempting to touch him.

These words, of course, are straight from Lenin's mouth, via Gorky's memoirs of the Great Leader. As the ultimate *homo politicus,* Lenin feared eruptions of strong feeling. From the perspective of the tactician, all sentiment should be strategic, all raw energy should be channeled into rationalized systems. In place of spontaneous expressions of love for humanity, merciless violence.

Mikhail Bakunin, the revolutionary anarchist, is also remembered for his love of Beethoven's music. Yet he never fled from his passions. In Paris, he lived with a pianist so as to hear Beethoven every day. Shortly before the final uprising of the revolutions of 1848, Bakunin went to hear his favorite composition, the 9th Symphony, performed in Dresden; afterwards, he was accused of burning down the opera house in which it had been performed. In 1876, at the conclusion of his life, he set out on one last journey to visit the pianist one more time: "All this will pass away," Bakunin confided to him, "but the Ninth Symphony will remain."[7]

In the contrast between these two Russian revolutionaries, we see two fundamentally different ways of relating to the tides of emotion that surge through us. On Lenin's side, we see control, austerity, order, violence. On Bakunin's side, freedom, indulgence, excess, passionate love, the river bursting its banks.

Shocked at his own aggression, Vladimir Ilich entreats Milena to forgive him. Furious, she responds:

> You love all mankind, yet you're incapable of loving one individual, one single living creature! What is this love that makes you nearly knock my head off? You said I was as lovely as the revolution. But you couldn't bear the "Revolution" touching you!

Milena's indictment of Vladimir Ilich is Reich's indictment of Lenin and Hitler and Stalin; it is Makavejev's indictment of Tito and of all patriarchal power and personality structure. It's also one of the fiercest expressions of disillusionment with state socialism to reach us from the 20th century.

As Milena concludes her speech, Vladimir Ilich embraces her, remorseful and abashed. They make love.

Then, unhinged by postcoital shame, he kills her, beheading her with an ice skate, the emblem of his profession. It is not safe to sleep with patriarchy.

***

The movie concludes with two powerful gestures of affirmation and forgiveness.

We see Milena's disembodied head on an autopsy tray. As the camera zooms in past the forensic investigators, her head comes to life and addresses us, describing the outcome of her liaison with Vladimir Ilich, "a genuine Red Fascist."

7 Beethoven's 9th Symphony also figures prominently in Makavejev's films *Man Is Not a Bird* and *Sweet Movie.*

"Comrades!" she proclaims, indomitable even in death. *"Even now I am not ashamed of my communist past."*

This is Milena speaking for Wilhelm Reich, but it is also Makavejev speaking—and through him, it is Yugoslavia speaking, and the entire 20th century. Milena's refusal to feel shame about her fate is Makavejev blessing humanity: all our clumsy efforts to free ourselves, all the revolutions and liberation struggles that ended in dictatorship and dogma, all our human frailty. *There is nothing in this human world of ours that is not in some way right, however distorted it may be.*

Then the camera cuts to Vladimir Ilich, her murderer. Utterly bereft, he is staggering through the snow, his hands soaked in blood, recoiling in horror from himself. Imagine if all the dictators, mercenaries, and rapists in the history of the world suddenly came to understand all the harm they have done, experiencing in full the tragedy they have inflicted.

Makavejev has Vladimir Ilich sing "François Villon's Prayer" by Russian singer Bulat Okudzhava, whose recordings were suppressed in Russia at the time:

> Before the earth stops turning
> Before the lights go dim
> To each one, Lord, I pray thee
> Grant what is needful to him…
>
> To the one whose hand is open
> Grant rest from charity
> A gift of remorse to Caine
> But also, remember me…
>
> Oh Lord, thou art all-knowing
> I believe in Thy wisdom then
> As the fallen soldier believes
> That in heaven he's alive again…
>
> As all men must believe
> They know not what they do…
> Grant to each some little thing

And remember, I'm here too.

"And remember, I'm here too," entreats Vladimir Ilich, begging for an impossible absolution at the end of a century of holocausts. *"Remember, I'm here too,"* repeats Okudzhava, and we see Milena's smile become Reich's.

In giving remorse to Caine, Makavejev implores us to compassion—not just for Milena, Reich, himself, and all who have suffered at the hands of authoritarians, but also for Lenin, for Stalin, for Tito and Eisenhower, for all of humanity locked in cycles in which we do harm to those we love. This is Makavejev's answer to the moral binaries of the partisan blockbuster.

***

Speaking about *WR* years later, Makavejev reflected:

> You can die from freedom, like you can die from too much fresh air, if you are not used to it… I think that over-controlled people have very good reasons for saying that freedom is dangerous. When over-controlled people relieve their irrationalities, they often become chaotic, narcissistic, murderous, or suicidal because they just can't stop.

This implies that the proper road to liberation is a carefully managed process in which the free expression and satisfaction of sexual desire can be properly moderated. In other words, repressive desublimination. But can you really die of too much fresh air?

As so often occurs, the tale is wiser than the teller. It's not too much freedom that kills Milena and makes Vladimir Illich into a murderer. Radmilović, the representative of chaos and irrationality, does no harm to anyone, and almost succeeds in quarantining Vladimir Ilich. The problem is not too much freedom, but too much control, too much certainty, too much doctrine. The realization of any totalizing system brings all its flaws and fault lines into relief, magnifies them—like the USSR—to the size of continents.

***

We can read *WR* as a simple allegory of 20th century international relations: smitten with the USSR, Yugoslavia throws herself at him, only to be betrayed. But if we read Vladimir Ilich as a symbol of patriarchal nationalism, it appears that Makavejev foretold the civil war of the 1990s twenty years in advance.

Like Milena, Yugoslavia was murdered, torn apart by authoritarian currents that had never been rooted out by the sham self-management of state socialism. Just as no dictatorship can create the conditions for the liberation of humanity, in the final analysis there is no such thing as an anti-fascist state. The same seeds of fascism and civil war lurk within all nationalisms, within all valorizations of power and duty. Every nation will be a time bomb like Yugoslavia until we disassemble all of them down to their deepest foundations, which are rooted deep within ourselves.

Should we attribute Yugoslavia's collapse to an excess of id or a surfeit of superego? Did the nationalist wars that tore up the country represent unfettered desire giving rise to violence, or were they caused by the forces that have always distorted and repressed desire? Was the problem too much freedom on the scale of the nation—or too much despotism on the molecular level, the scale of the individual?

How we answer these questions will determine how we respond to nationalist violence in the 21st century: whether we understand it as an excess interrupting the present order or as the purest manifestation of that order. Is desire itself the problem, to be controlled with laws and interventions from transnational military bodies? Or is *control* the problem, which we can only undermine from the bottom up by means of autonomous subversion and transgression? Is the solution a greater nationalism—Yugoslavian rather than Serbian and Croatian, for example—or to abolish all forms of nationalism once and for all?

And how can we set out to do that without replacing nationalism with another dogma, another ideology? Makavejev's methodology and compassion give us a point of departure.



On the terrain of capital
Labour and gender regimes in Yugoslavia

1. A note on the Yugoslav gender regime

In 1947, painter Stjepan Lahovski painted a self-portrait in gouache under the title *Demonstration - Self-portrait as a comrade in a procession* (Ilustration 1). He said, "That's me, an old woman (baba)[1] in an overcoat, a headscarf and military boots." The author, who throughout his opus was involved in making self-portraits painted in different styles and techniques, taking over "the vesture of a certain historical style", thought of himself as not being courageous and not having a sense for struggles and wars. Thus, in various self-portraits he sought to compensate for some qualities he did not have, such as youth and courage. Why then he portrays himself like an old woman in a scarf? Although his statement accompanying the picture can be understood as a mocking of old women participants of demonstrations, the painting still tells a lot about the models of depicting courage in that period. In addition to the famous heroic depictions of female Partisan as some kind of Amazons with guns in their hands, the depictions of women during the period of the People's Liberation Struggle, as well as in the postwar period, included also images of old women with headscarves depicted as they learn to write, as they participate in elections and perform shock work, as we can see in the numerous illustrations in the *Woman in the Struggle* magazine[2] (Ilustations 2, 3, 4). In its editorials, this magazine explicitly expressed the goal of creating and disseminating new models of femininity, which is in line with the very reason for the emergence of this "organ of the struggle".

After the war, the position of women was more drastically changed than that of men, creating the need for a more precise creation of the character(s) of "new" women in order to consolidate them to the right place in the new society. The Partisan is not only an Amazon or a Spartan, but bent and stiff. However, persistent, hard working and brave. The figures of heroes and heroines aimed to be associated with an ethic of hard work, and gradually the heroism of work became the most prominent social value that replaced the heroism of the struggle. In the imagery of that time, women appear as heroes of socialist work, women in peasant cooperatives, women cutting the woods or working on afforestation. Although the organizers of the Anti-Fascist Front of Women (AFŽ) were mostly educated ur-

1 He uses the word "baba", which can be an offensive way to reffer to old women and generally to women.

2 The organ of the Anti-Fascist Front of Women which was issued from 1943 to 1974, but changing its name into *Women* in 1957.



Picture 1. Stjepan Lahovski; Demonstration (Self-portrait as a female comrade in a procession), 1947.

ban women, and among the "ordinary" fighters were women from the towns, the heroines represented were almost always as villagers, often shepherds. Besides the fact that this contrast (nescient villager oppressed by rural patriarchal relations→strong, emancipated fighter dedicated to the building of a new society) more explicitly emphasizes the transformative effect of the participation in the People's Liberation Struggle, the character of an illiterate shepherd or an old woman makes the woman a kind of *tabula rasa* in which it is easier to incribe any desirable meaning. On the other hand, the urban intellectual differs much more from the traditional ideal of womanhood, and it can also bear associations of bourgeois habits, values and lifestyles typical of the urban middle class from which she probably originates. By using the figure of a female comrade in a military overcoat and a headscarf for a self-portrait, Lahovski does two things: 1) he clears himself of his "negative" attributes - bourgeois lifestyle, cowardice, inadequate masculinity, "homosexuality" and the decadence and laziness associated with it[3]; and 2) shows that certain characters of the new woman – Partisans and heroines of labour - have in some way become iconic - symbols of certain values for the depiction of which certain recognizable models were always used. The fact that Lahovski somewhat ironically appropriates such a representation of women for the exploration of his own identity, already in 1947 suggests that the figure of the heroin of labour would quickly become emptied of its content.

Namely, after the end of the war and post-war reconstruction, a large number of women returned to their traditional gender roles. The representation of women in politics and workplaces radically decreases after 1950, and women's representations, especially in women's magazines such as *The World* (Svijet), but also in *Women in the Struggle*, became very similar to those from Western popular culture. This resemblance stems from a desire to present an image of prosperity, and the modern housewife in a comfortable interior who is not forced to work for money is certainly part of that image of well-being.

It is indisputable that a certain number of women in Yugoslavia have been given the possibility of "abandoning" their traditional roles through labour and participation in political bodies. It is also unquestionable that the general position of workers in Yugoslavia was more favourable then than it is today in ex-Yugoslavian countries. For these reasons, among today's feminists in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and elsewhere, Yugoslavia is celebrated as a period of emancipation of women through labour. Graphics inspired by Yugoslavian depictions of Partisan women and heroines of labour[4] are used as visuals for feminist groups and protests, Yugoslav slogans are used as well, works of art are made (see ilustration 6), fanzines and scientific papers are produced (for example, an interview with the researcher of female workers in Yugoslavia, Chiara Bonfiglioli, with the nostalgic title *Remembering labour*), banner with the words "Give us back our factories" are carried on the International Women's Day marches, and individuals proudly point out that being workers is their primary identity.

Of course, from the current perspective of greater unemployment, and the marginalisation of woman that derives from it, a society that has celebrated women as workers seems very romantic. However, in our view, the glorification of women's toil in the fields and forests, or on some idiotic repetitive jobs in factories, is not only questionable, but also grotesque if what we have in mind is a perspective of liberation. The purpose of this text is not to prove with statistics and other indicators that most of the women in Yugoslavia did not experience emancipation through labour, but try to show that the labour that existed in Yugoslavia and the social relations that derived from it were not liberating for anyone, women included. The aim is not only to criticize the patriarchy of the Yugoslav society and to state that despite the "good intentions" and the efforts of the political system, women were not emancipated because of the survival of patriarchal forms from the past. Rather, it is to discuss the idea that it is the persistence of capitalist forms of production that fixed women and gender non-normative persons in a position of oppression.

The perspective from which we approach the subjects of work and gender is the following: everywhere we are forced to live the misery of a gendered life, and labour is one of the mechanisms that drives and maintains this misery because it needs gender for its functioning. The social character of commodity production requires and reproduces certain types of property, requires the existence of families with traditional gender roles, the existence of violence against women and all who deviate from gender and sexual norms, etc. One of the central elements of capitalism is the process of the strict separation of work[5] which creates value and which is remunerated in money, and work that does not create value and which is generally not remunerated in money[6]. The second type of work is the so-called reproductive work, ie all the work that serves to maintain the lives of productive labour: household work, emotional, sexual work, etc. These two types of work are interdependent, but gender – gendered language, gender roles, gender-based violence against women and queer persons etc. - has a constitutive function for capitalism in maintaining the distinction between these two types of work. The "productive" workforce must have a privileged position in relation to the "non-productive", although it depends on "non-productive" reproductive work in order to be able to put its workpower at the disposal of capital and to allow the extraction of surplus value. This privileged position is created by attributing certain characteristics to the productive and the unproductive workforce. These attributes (activity, strength, determination, etc. for productive workers, and tenderness, caring, lack of rationality, lack of strength and lack of will for non-productive workers) are gendered and naturalized, which means that they are considered essential characteristics of people with certain bodies – the characteristics of unproductive work are attributed to people whose bodies are assume to have the potential to bare children, although the realization of this possibility is not crucial. The extraction of the surplus value is therefore a gendered process. The private, household sphere is itself the product of labour, as it is also the domestic violence against women, as well as street violence against queers and trans persons whose function is to maintain and naturalize gender roles. Among other things, this violence keeps and controls the rhythm of work, as it keeps female workers in the home.

Picture 2. Đuro Tiljak: Peasant woman carrying weapons, Žena u borbi, 1945.

3 During the war, non-normative sexual behaviour was under strict control and was harshly punished. In 1951, male "homosexuality" was criminalized, and the official rhetoric associated it with the remains of the ousted bourgeois society and depicted gay men as a threat to the a new socialist society because of their decadence, corruption of youth and laziness (see Figure 5). Thus, certain non-normative sexualities are associated with a certain work ethic, or in this case, the lack thereof. In addition to this official position, there was also the view that the condemnation of different sexual behaviour was the remains of bourgeois morals. However, the persecution of gay men continued until 1977, when consensual relations were decriminalized in Montenegro, Vojvodina, Croatia and Slovenia. Nevertheless, gay people continued to be pathologized in the official medical discourse. From the late 1970s to the 1980s, positively intoned articles on LG themes started to appear in pop-cultural magazines. The first positive shift in the field of science was the book *Framed by One's Own Sex* by Marijan Košiček released in 1986, in which the author combines liberal ideas about tolerance with socialist ideas of egalitarianism and invites other physicians and scientists to depatologize and normalize "homosexuality". We have no knowledge of the experiences of persons of other sexual and gender identities in Yugoslavia.

4 A special term was used for workers who performed shock work - udarnik and udarnica.

5 For this separation, Roswitha Scholz uses the concept of value dissociation.

6 This work is valorised when it is performed by the state. This is one of its crucial functions of the state which is most intensively managing reproductive work in times of crisis.

Picture 3a. Women on voluntary work, Žena u borbi, 1946.

Introducing more people in the society to formal labour just means expanding the relations of slavery, and it does not make a significant difference to these "new" workers since the logics of the factory already lives in the sphere of the home and the family. In this essay, we do not just want to state that in Yugoslavia the basic elements of the capitalist mode of production are retained and that, over time, they were not overcome but strengthened. What we want to emphasize is that without destroying the basic elements of the capitalist mode of production, we cannot work on changing the material conditions outside the sphere of production that will lead to the transformation of the position of women and all of us who deviate from gender norms.

2. The Yugoslav ideology of labour and progress

In Yugoslavia, relatively little was written about the very nature of labour[7]. The issue of labour is most often approached in discussions about the self-management system. However, these discussions rarely touch questions of the very elements of production. It can be said that in these discussions, social relations are viewed from the perspective of class, rather than from the perspective of categorial interpretation[8] represented here. While the class perspective implies a critique of capitalism from the perspective of labour, the categorial critique problematizes labour itself within capitalism. While the first attributes an almost ontological character to labour and sees it as an instrument in the hands of the working class which is at the same time constitutive of that class as a subject of revolution, the other perspective approaches labour as a historically specific form inherent to capitalism that produces abusive and enslaving social relations, and that, therefore, should be destroyed. From these different perspectives, completely different understandings of the sources of oppressive social relations and how they are to be overcome are derived. From the perspective of categorial interpretation, as long as there is the value form, abstract labour and the separation of work that generates surplus value from the work that does not create it, which were indisputably the characteristics of production in Yugoslavia, all labour, even when it is administered in a "rational" manner by workers themselves, is the materialized expression of abstract labour, which we want to destroy. Because of these fundamental differences between the approach of most Yugoslav authors and our approach, it is relatively difficult to enter into some fruitful discussion. Nevertheless, we will try to briefly present some of the topics that appeared in the discussions about labour.

Let us start with the official position on the issue of labour of the high-ranking state officials - Edvard Kardelj, since March 1945, the vice-president of the federal government and then the minister of foreign affairs, and Mijalko Todorović, AVNOJ councillor, AVNOJ presidency member and performer of many other political functions - whose approach to labour can be said to be characterized by economic and technological determinism. According to Kardelj, the liberation of labour means that everyone has the "right to work and freely choose a job". Labour must be free from political management and be at "scientific service of technics". Mijalko, in turn, in the text *The Liberation of Labour* from 1965, advocates free market[9], and celebrates socialist self-management from the perspective of greater efficiency and productivity of labour and higher living standards of the workforce, which he shows with data on the trends of the gross domestic product and national income and then he compares the average annual rates of productivity growth with those of capitalist countries.

What is interesting about Todorovic is that he refers to the desire of some people to immediately eliminate the value form[10], although in his text it is not indicated with whom was he debating and how much was that perspective actually present. He believes that it is good that it is recognised that the value form exists in socialism as well. Nevertheless, he still feels that it is bad that in the actual planning, these concepts are still used idealistically and bureaucratically. According to him, economic planning in socialism must count with the value form and manage it. He maintains that the desire to abolish the value form immediately ("as soon as we take power") is romantic, idealistic and even religious, although it is a realistic ultimate goal based on scientific knowledge. The tendency to change society according to "dreams" and "books", he believes, exists where material-productive forces are lagging behind. For him, on the one hand, the idealistic wish to abolish the value form immediately, leads to a strong bureaucracy, and on the other, adhering to the laws of commodity production, leads to the glorification of liberal-capitalist forms which are perceived as natural forces. For him, the "bureaucratic" and "liberal-bourgeois" or "bourgeois-anarchist" orientations arise from the objective contradictions of the transition period. He considers that in the first fourteen years, Yugoslavia has consistently applied the Marxist-scientific orientation and he advocates that a scientific-socialist view should dominate in public discussions.[11]

Picture 3b. Women on voluntary work, Žena u borbi, 1946.

Another author who in a way recognizes the logic of the value form is Zoran Vidaković, who,

7 At least this can be deduced from the literature we have gathered for this essay.

8 A term used by Moishe Postone.

9 According to him, the rise of the standard of living is also reflected in the "diversity and variety that the free initiative of direct producers and the direct voluntary influence of consumers and other users and stakeholders impose and ensure, unlike the administrative-centralist planning and monopoly dictates of every kind." He also advocated the elimination of the small-scale peasant economy.

10 He uses the sintagm 'zakon vrijednosti' which literally translates as the law of value. However, we will use "the value form", as it is more accurate.

11 In the text *The Liberation of Work or the Liberation of the Working Class?* (a chapter of the book *Social Conflicts - A Challenge to Sociology*, Official Gazette, 2008, the first issue of 1983 was banned) Nebojša Popov commented Kardelj's and Todorović's attitude towards labour: "The specificity of this variant of the ideology of labour lies primarily in the fact that it wants to distinguish itself from both capitalism and Stalinism, but ends up standing half way between both. Its protagonists would like to dismiss the Stalinist command over labour characterized by the elements of the pre-war mode of production ... but without letting the political monopoly from their hands, as they would also like to legalize bourgeois economic relations, but without a classical property monopoly and without parliamentary democracy. This creates a mixture of ideas combining pre-bourgeois political, and bourgeois economic relations. In any case, the prospect of socialism becomes blurred, even unthinkable. The economic and political emancipation are so apart one from the other that the social emancipation becomes unimaginable." Popov further points out that the goal of ending the class society is lost in sight, and that the ideology of the liberation of work becomes a barrier to the liberation of the working class. In the words of Fredy Perlman from the text *The Birth of the Revolutionary Movement in Yugoslavia* from 1969, the social organization advocated by Kardelj, Todorovic and others is "... a distribution system that can be summed up with a slogan "from everyone according to their possibilities, to each according to their market success, a slogan describing a system of social relations widely known as capitalist production of goods rather than socialism."



Picture 4. Žena u borbi No 2, 1950, cover.

in the text *Two Approaches to Protest Suspensions of Work (Strikes)*, essentially wants to reconcile the capitalist mode of production with the realization of the interests of the workers. He says that the logic of production of surplus value contains this tendency for someone to have proprietary monopoly, and that management led by the interests of the workers would be irrational because it is not compatible with the production of surplus value. According to him, striking workers use their "half-power" to preserve "backward ways of work and production" and, in this way, they oppose the processes of modernization and rationalization if those processes fail to affirm their rights. He argues that the idea that the development of production is in contradiction with the interests of workers can only be "challenged by the evidence that the realization and unification of workers' interests in the process of self-management decision-making may have a rational character also from the standpoint of the development of production, material progress and value-oriented production that meet the needs of the workers." As an evidence for this claim, he stresses that among the strike demands are also demands for a more rational production, more efficient organization of work, improved research and scientific work, better technological and economic integration and planning, faster development of production, etc. However, he does not say how many such demands were presented, nor the source for his claim.

In the text *Sociological Aspects of Dizalienation in the Conditions of Self-Menagement and the Distribution "According to the Individual Quantum of Labour"*, Dragomir Drašković writes about labour from the point of overcoming alienation. Although he emphasizes that alienation is present in the transition period, he claims that socialist self-management is the first step towards dizalienation. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that this does not mean that social ownership over production means that alienation is abolished, and that the first appearance of self-management has freed human labour of rental relations. As another mechanism that promotes dizalienation, Drašković states the principle of distribution according to the "individual quantum of labour" from Marx' *Critique of the Gotha Program*[12].

According to him, if producers are involved in the redistribution of the surplus, or if the surplus does not become profit appropriated by the capitalist, then we cannot speak of alienation in Marx' sense. "(...) The distribution according to the quantum of labour that has so far been carried out in accordance with the established rules and internal norms in the working collective, must be such that it implies a scientifically proven value of the object, of the operation or part of the operation, that is, of the value of the reified labour, so that every worker has a clear perception about that social value. Money as an equivalent of that invested labour will be less alien, and the monopoly understood as an economic necessity in the process of liberation of labour and man, ie dizalienation, will

12 "However, the distribution according to the individual quantum of labour and the system of self-management within the economic unit create a favourable social atmosphere in which the reified human labour, the labour as a measure of a certain value of goods, no longer appears as a power aliens to the producer, though some forms remain, albeit modified, adapted to the needs and the spirit of the system of free distribution of income, which carry the elements of alienation (money) and which as such opposes the producer whom he sees as an unvanquished mean of exchange, as something alienated."

be inadequate 'to be able to prevail over others.' "[13]

As in many other texts, the central idea in Draskovicć's text is that social ownership of the means of production, as well as the "rational" and "scientific" management of them can gradually lead to liberation. However, the existence of private property which is here considered to be one of the primary problems of capitalist societies, is not the cause of the subordinate position of the workforce, but the consequence of the capitalist mode of production. That is why collective ownership, in this case state ownership, is only a form of private property. The state here is an external abstraction that overshadows a society of scattered producers that continue to act in accordance with all principles of commodity production. The awareness of the existence of these principles and their supposedly scientific mastery does not at all bring society closer to their abolition. This kind of reasoning sees the principle of commodity production as some natural force which only needs to be understood and mastered, and it will no longer be a source of alienation. However, it is questionable if tt is possible to put Marx' theory of commodity production in the service of building socialism and dizalienation since the elements of capitalist production which this theory explains are inseparable from their function in capitalism. In addition, the idea of thedistribution according to the individual quantum of labour, implies the notion that everyone should contribute to society by working, which implies the idea that work as such is something good and useful for both the individual and the society. However, there is no essence of work to be liberated, or that will appear once the capitalist does not appropriate surplus value. Likewise, there is no use value that will be freed within socialism for the benefit of all people, but this is a purely analytical term - the opposite of the exchange value. Furthermore, there are no pre-ideological needs of people that can only be met by useful things if we rationally control the production.[14] Labour, value (use and surplus value), needs, etc., are concepts that relate to a historically specific mode of production, and as such, they are not partially or fully usable to conceive a society that strives to overcome this mode of production.

Two texts that are critical towards the at the time dominant ideas about labour and its liberation are the texts *The Liberation of Work or Liberation of the Working Class* by Ljubomir Tadić from 1962.[15], and the text *Protest Suspensions of Work Yesterday and Today* by Olga Kozomara from 1968. Tadić approaches the subject from a more theoretical perspective, while Kozomar discusses strikes as evidence of the poor social position of manufacturing workers.

Tadić emphasizes that the bourgeois society is the first economic formation based on free labour, and that free labour does not exclude alienated work. "The ideology of labour is a typical bourgeois ideology, ... Since the essence of man is in that very activity itself, the worker (proleterian) expresses the whole meaning of human enslavement. His existence as a worker and the existence of labour as an economic category of the commodity economy personify the relations of the bourgeois society and represent a sure indicator that human emancipation has not been completed." He uses the term state capitalism and emphasizes that with state ownership over production means, labour does not lose the character of a commodity. ".. And it is precisely labour 'determined by trouble and external expediency' is the labour within the framework of the bourgeois society in the so-called transition period from capitalism to communism. However, misfortunes and necessities should not be proclaimed virtues or freedoms, for the liberation of labour does not exclude but presupposes wage slavery. As a heritage of bourgeois civilization, therefore, it can not, in itself, be a socialist goal. "

Tadić emphasizes the goal of abolishing labour as a "class characteristic and as an economic category," but says that it will only be achieved if affiliated producers through self-management organizations organize their production on the basis of a planned economy from bottom to top, but without state-bureaucratic mediation and management. Although Tadić emphasizes the necessity of overcoming labour, he still sticks to the idea of associated producers who organize the production themselves as a step towards this goal. But the question is: production of what? From the positions of labour, including labour in self-management, the qualitative content of production has no different social role than content of production from the standpoint of capital. There is no common discussion on the meaning of people's activity here. If concepts like employment, surplus workers, unemployment, etc. appear, this means that

13 Quoted from Jovanov, Neca, 1979. *Workers' Strikes in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1958 to 1969*, Zapis, Belgrade

14 In *The Mirror of Production*, Jean Baudrillard says that Marx did manage to denaturalize capital, labour and private property, but failed to denaturalize the useful purpose of commodities as a function of needs.

15 It was also published in the book *Order and Freedom*, Kultura, Belgrade, 1967



Osuđena grupa homoseksualaca

Pred Okružnim sudom u Zagrebu održana je glavna rasprava protiv grupe homoseksualaca iz Zagreba. Optuženi su svojim razvratnim načinom života vršili štetan utjecaj na omladinu, te su neke mladiće u pubertetu naveli na put razvrata i besposličarenja.

Osim toga, svi su se optuženi kao ostaci propalog buržoaskog društva ispoljavali kao neprijatelji današnje naše društvene stvarnosti. Nekoliko njih pripremali su se na bjegstvo u inozemstvo.

Okružni sud osudio je Mirka Belušića na 6 godina lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom i na gubitak biračkog prava u trajanju od jedne godine. Miroslava Kratkovića na pet i po godina lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom i na gubitak biračkog prava u trajanju od dvije godine. Boleslava Strzeszevskog na 5 godina lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom i na gubitak biračkog prava u trajanju od 1 godine, Ivicu Horvatića na 5 godina lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom i na gubitak biračkog prava u trajanju od 2 godine, Vladimira Radnića na 3 godine lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom Zlatka Hervoića na 2 godine lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom i Vladislava Kršana na godinu i 6 mjeseci lišenja slobode s prisilnim radom.

Picture 5. from Narodni list, 25.02.1950.

no autonomy of production can exist.

Discussing the issue of strikes, which was for a long time a controversial issue in the Yugoslav society, Kozomara says that the strike is a form of class struggle of the subordinated class which is the object of power, and she points that the very fact that the proletariat is forced to use the strike as a way of political struggle tells us that he is actually the object, and not the subject of power. She underlines that the inequalities in the Yugoslav society are increasing and that the cause of strikes is mainly the inequality of income, although this is not just a matter of economic distribution, but also of distribution in the political sense, or, in other words, a matter of the social position of the working class.[16]

16 "It is, however, possible to prove that the working class responds to the slowing down of the overcoming of class relations which is reflected in 1) the suppression of the working class to the positions of the object of power; 2) the breaking up of the unity of the working class, and 3) supporting the tendency towards technocracy instead of socialist democracy, a tendency very pronounced today in the world and, among other things, expressed in the attitudes that many problems are unique to all industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist. This tendency [technocracy] is, in Yugoslavia, also expressed in statistical comparisons justifying any social injustice. "

In addition, Kozomara polemicized with attitudes such as those of Todorović and Kardelj, according to which the success of self-management is measured by quantitative indicators such as the number of unemployed[17], Yugoslavia is compared with capitalist countries, while remuneration for labour is applied in accordance to market success. She states that sometimes labour stimulation is applied through the differentiation between workers by competitive working conditions, which she considers to be a characteristic of capitalist societies, rather than socialisms which is based on solidarity. Kozomara considers that the organizational form of the unions also contributes to the disintegration of the proletariat, as some unions protect the interests of the workforce of some areas, others the interests of a branch of production, some on ideological grounds, eg nationalist, etc. She cites examples of cases where those who produce higher surplus value, have higher incomes than those who produce something useful, just because they do not produce surplus value. She believes that these technocratic tendencies are opposed to the building of socialist relations, and that the existing political structures such as the League of Communists and the Alliance of Trade Unions, which were quite passive and volatile in this regard, could not eliminate these tendencies.

Apart from the texts we have reviewed, there are still a number of texts dealing with production and self-management, especially in the context of the debate on strikes. The texts we have mentioned vary according to whether they are, and in what way, critical to the idea of liberation of labour and are critical of the existing system of self-management. Almost all texts are nominally critical of the state and bureaucracy, but it is only a mandatory element of every text and statement after the "break with Stalinism". In addition to the mantra of the critique of bureaucracy, in many texts there is also the mantra of the "contradictions of the transition period" which provides answers to all illogical attempts to reconcile official socialist ideology and the capitalist mode of production that has never really been called into question.

The idea of the abolition of labour appears only in the text of Ljubomir Tadić. However, he does not see the abolition of labour as an immediate task in overcoming capitalism. Since all of these approaches come from a class perspective, the horizon of their ideas is the concept of socialism as a more rational, scientific, just and humane application of industrial capitalism. But the realization of the interests of the proletariat as a revolutionary subject realized in socialism, is not coextensive with the demands of destroying capitalism.

17 Apropos unemployment, she believes that "surplus labour" both as a term and as a phenomenon, should not be present in the socialist economy.

Labour, value, technology and industrial production can not be neutrally appropriated for revolutionary purposes. To put labour under the control of workers or the state only means to generalize it and expand it as a social relation. Work is not part of the "human nature" and, more importantly, it is not a principle opposed to capital. Because the social antagonism of labour and capital takes place on the terrain of capital, on the terrain of commodity production. Governing labour from the perspective of abolishing capital is absurd, since labour as a process, implies abstract labour, the value form, and the strict separation of labour that produces surplus value from the one that does not produce it. Workers who manage the production process manage themselves as commodities, they own themselves as property. Whether self-menaged or not, collective or not, labour within the commodity production system remains the same, and it needs gender as one of the mechanisms that reproduces the social relations that it necessitates.

3. The ideology of labour and gender relations

At the end of the 1940s, AFŽ's Main Board discussed the desirable visual identity of the Yugoslav woman. It was concluded that women in the Russian print were badly dressed, giving the impression that this was a need for socialism, and that, on the contrary, Yugoslavia wanted to present joy, beauty and diversity. In other words, women must remain women - different from men; creatures who amaze and regenerate the male worker with their beauty and delight, while they are themselves workers and consumers if necessary. Like in other capitalist countries, the gender regime in Yugoslavia is not singular and monolithic - it varies over time and between classes. However, at the same time it presents people with contradictory requirements on how to perform a model of a given gender. Like the models which were presented to Yugoslav women, today's girls and women are also sometimes presented with pictures of women as fighters for social justice, sometimes as workers, sometimes like cute house creatures who like cooking, practicing yoga, and commenting on series - or whatever the current ups and downs of capitalism require from them, and that can be presented as emancipating. Like the Yugoslav women yoked in the struggle and the construction of the state by unsparing toil, and then as housewives and consumers, today's feminists and leftists - the glorifiers of Yugoslav workers - are also yoked in the tireless activist work of rescuing marginalized groups, warning on these and that social problems and the revitalization of the bureaucratised workers' unions. At the same time, they are involved in the various low paid jobs of reproductive work for society and in the presentation of images of stylized combat femininity. Though the dedication to such tasks is certainly noble, if it is mediated by a state or NGOs, it leads to, among other things, characteristic political positions: these activists are often nominally against capitalism, but at the same time they are in favour of many social forms that support or constitute it: the state, the civil society, NGOs, parties, hierarchy, gender, the family, exclusive romantic relationship ... Their horizon is essentially the same as that of the Yugoslav ideologists - capitalism, but more just. And in order to make it more just and to overcome the crises of reproductions less painfully, we have to work tirelessly.

In our not so systematic search we have not found texts from the Yugoslav period that are critically related to labour from a gender perspective, apart from the text of Blaženka Despot, *The Women's Question and Socialist Self-management* from a book with the same title, published in 1987. Like other authors before her who were in any way critical towards labour (except for Tadić), Despot does not move from the model according to which labour is a tool in the hands of the workers, and it is a force opposed to capital. In addition, she considers positive that in self-management socialism, unlike ethatist socialism, producers rationally regulate their relations with nature, as well as gender and family relations.

Although her text is positively inclined towards self-management socialism as opposed to ethatist socialism, while writing about ethatist socialism, Despot describes its characteristics in terms of the women's issue. These characteristics can, in effect, be applied to Yugoslavia as well. She points out that dogmatic and Stalinist Marxism vulgarly reduced the women's question to the question of class, which led to the women's question not being raised at all. The fact that the woman's question always stands under quotation marks means that this issue is not considered to be relevant, but it is rather seens as a particular issue whose solution is passively left to the classless society of the future. She empha-

Picture 6. Adela Jušić: We long for work and toil, in collaboration with Andreja Dugandžić, 2015, collage on a wall, Tuzla.
Part of the text:
Where are you headed threadbare and barefoot, and who do you work for?
When comrade Tito says "we need more help" – we will help!
Women of Tuzla and Kreka work without rest. They consider this work as their own need and duty. But they can barely manage to keep up, because the choirs and duties are multiplying from all sides.
Women of Tuzla exceeded their commitments.
Our backs are tired, but our faces radiate with the joy of socialism.
The forest work is also done by women. We see women working on the repairs of bridges, construction of houses, well repairs, repairs of toilets, repairs of houses in the workers' centers, planting forest seedlings, the forest holdings and loading coal. To these tasks, women contributed 5,563 working days. The total amount of the overall work was 14,085 working days.

sizes that when the women's issue is resolved in a normative way - with laws that, on the one hand, promote women's equality in the economic and political spheres, and on the other, encourage female care for the family by advocating support for employed mother without at the same time worrying about the employed father - this means that the patriarchal division into the private and public sphere is reinforced even more. Most importantly, Despot emphasizes that the subordinate position of women in ethatist socialism stems from the relations of production themselves, and not from the survival of patriarchal patterns from the past:

"Everyday forms of discrimination against women are considered as remnants in the consciousness of people, that have no basis in the new mode of production. ... The way of emancipation in ethatist socialism is therefore generality. Its generality towards the working class, in terms of everyday working conditions, is in the brutal takeover of the forces of production of capital, primarily science and technology. Since this science and technology have been invented as part of different production relations, rental relations, for another purpose – creating profits - they produce alienation; dizalienation is seen in production relations, the domination of the general over the particular, of politics over the economy. The abstraction of this generality necessarily assumes the authoritarianism of the division of labour stemming from the scientific organizations of labour, authoritarian relations among people, authoritarian relations of individuals towards the state, bureaucracy, the technocracy, authoritarian relations of men towards women. ... The authoritarian production of material life necessarily corresponds to an authoritarian family and an authoritarian socialization of personality. So the women's question cannot only not be solved, but not even posed, since the patriarchal family with patriarchal morality and the division of labour is the precondition for such a production of life. ... So the circle closes: authoritarian production seeks an authoritarian family, as an authoritarian family socializes authoritarian people, who in their special interest are assimilated to the general interest of the state and the party. Such a way of production of life is considered necessary, the emancipation of the working class for the time being, and a complete emancipation of the classless society will come tomorrow. Socialist morality is considered as the cement of such a society, which is based on the patriarchal family morality, on the authoritarian and productivist morality. "

Although Despot says all this when describing etatist socialism, if one reads between the lines it can be seen that all of it can be said for Yugoslavia. Still, in Despot's writing, like in the writings of many other authors, the failure of the potential for the liberation of women in Yugoslavia is attributed to the survival of patriarchal forms of the past: "... in Yugoslavia there is no feminism that would go beyond the class issues of the working class. ... Women, who most strongly feel the authoritarian pressure in their lives, represent a powerful potential for the fulfilment of the culture of socialist self-management. But only the most empowered women are ready for this today ... Women will be able to be more involved in institutional forms of self-management only when society becomes free from patriarchal mortgages."

The women's question in Yugoslavia has been subordinated to the class issue since the very beginning. According to the Communist Party, it had to be solved with the achievement of the people's socialist rule. The war and postwar period were marked by the mass mobilization of women, through the Anti-fascist Front of Women, through reproductive work extended to the whole society (care for the wounded, the children, the illiterate, etc.) and free shock work on labour actions. Mass voluntary labour on labour actions are soon replaced by paid industrial work. With the aim of institutionalizing the heroism of labour, in 1948, a system of special acknowledgments for labour was introduced: hero worker[18], champion of socialist work, hero of socialist labour of the people's republic, hero of socialist labour of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY); meritorious agriculturist, meritorious cooperative agriculturist, prominent cooperative agriculturist of the people's republic, prominent cooperative agriculturist of the FPRY; for working collectives: hero collective, collective champion of socialist labour, collective champion of socialist labour of the people's republic, collective champion of socialist labour of the FPRY; for cooperatives: cooperative high yield fighter, meritorious cooperative, cooperative champion of the people's republic, cooperative champion of the FPRY.

In her speech at the AFŽ Croatian congress in June 1945, Kata Pejnović summarized the following tasks of this organization: 1) strengthening brotherhood and unity, cleaning the country from the remains of fascism, 2) consolidating the people's power, 3) building and restoring the homeland by developing wide-ranging initiatives, finding new labour methods, changing people's relations towards work, 4) raising young generations, taking care of children, assisting health services and the Yugoslav army, and 5) combating illiteracy. For the new rule to be strengthened, it was necessary to work "heroically" and to transfer this new work ethic of infinite toil to new generations. Women needed to become the new massive labour force and to raise new generations of pliable labourers.

However, after the ideological conflicts and economic stagnation in the 1950s, the criticism of bureaucratization, state ownership and state management of production became regular parts of the official ideology. Therefore, in 1952, the market mechanism was introduced in most manufacturing and sales spheres. The indications of these ideological and social changes have been noted in the work of the AFŽ since 1950, at their third congress in which the focus is shifted from heroic labour to maternity and child protection issues, and employment is promoted as the basis for equality. As is well-evident in women's magazines from the 1950s, patriarchal-consumer patterns begin to dominate women's social position, which is not surprising for a society in which labour heroism is suddenly equated with market success.

Another contribution to Despot's claim that the patriarchal division to the private and public sphere was reinforced is the fact that workers needed to pay for the state services that were supposed to "socialize" reproductive work! - pay for them as market services if they could afford them. Furthermore, the users of these services were mostly middle-class families. As it can be seen in the documentary film by Krešo Golik, *From 3 to 22*, many working class families had to leave small children alone at home while they were working, and known are the experiences of people who were tying their children to radiators. For the idea that a woman as an emancipated citizen, thanks to her purchasing power, freely buys and consumes these services on the market of "newly achieved" women's rights, it is certainly an element and indicator of capitalist relations of production that push reproduction into the private sphere. An additional indicator is that there was no word about the abolition of the family in Yugoslavia. The possibility to freely sale their own workpower and to freely purchase support services for performing reproductive work were the greatest reaches of the "emancipation" of women, by which emancipation, in the words of Tijana Okić, "was reduced to a contractual, wage form".

This is manifested in the position of women which is equivalent to the position of women in other capitalist countries: since 1950, mass layoffs and female labour force have been reported, the strengthening of the gender division of labour in the household, the feminisation of lower paid occupations and industry sectors (textile, tobacco, services). In addition, many resources were distributed through memberships in work organizations: meal coupons for restaurants, apartments, winter holidays, healthcare, scholarships, loans, etc., and women were largely unemployed. Self-management in the case of Yugoslavia meant the introduction of the

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market competition between the factories and firms, which necessarily meant a more unfavourable position for women.

4. Against work and against gender

The goal of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, neither before the war nor after it, was not the struggle against capitalism. Work essentially remains wage labour, which plays an important role in the reproduction of a system that manages human resources with gender regimes characteristic for capitalism. Although based on existing literature, the relationship between labour and gender could only be discussed based on the position of women, what we wanted to do was to consider how damaging and anachronistic is to celebrate the Yugoslav labour regime, especially from a contemporary gender-critical perspective. During the postwar period, the moral of hard work was a feature of both capitalist and socialist countries, and the experience of Yugoslavia only structurally cemented the identification of workers, labour parties and many leftists with the position of labour. In other words, with the position of capital. The other complementary aspect of the moral of hard work is the moral of the family with strictly regulated gender roles, as evidenced in Yugoslavia by the criminalization and pathologization of gay men and lesbians who accused of perversion and idleness, that is, of a defective and undisciplined attitude towards sexuality and work, respectively, for being a threat to social reproduction.

What does the glorification of Yugoslavia and of labour, from the part of contemporary feminists and leftists, mean in today's context of the labour crisis? What does the celebration of female toil mean to us today? What is it that we need to build today with heroic labour? At the present moment countries develop different programs of employment, subsidies and other measures that should alleviate the existing instability, and various NGOs, including feminist and LGBTI, try to engage with various unemployable subjects and bring them into the world of labour through various campaigns and policy proposals: women, queer people, young people without experience, elderly people, homeless people, people with disabilities, chronic illnesses, etc. In the context of these sad efforts there is a nostalgic view of the false image of the Yugoslav labour society and the position of women in it, for which we believe that it undoubtedly leads to perspectives which strengthen the role of the state as well as of the labour and gender terror. For modern capitalism calls for more flexible, but still gender-specific identities, so the "progressive" labour policy and "progressive" gender-related policies (gender equality, legal gender recognition, etc.) continue to control and manage different subjects in accordance with already established gender concepts. These progressive policies do not suggest ways of life that are different from the existing system. Their aspirations are limited to clearing the ground and establishing a dialogue with power in order to overcome the economic crisis in a more equal and decent manner. People need to stay busy - so labour has to be fairer and more enjoyable, and women, queers and various "unproductive" subjects need to have the impression that they are too, because of their working status, citizens and that they participate in decision-making. The modern crisis does not create unemployed people only among the unskilled and the "hard-to-employ", but also among those who crave for managerial positions and who, in the forms of social work students, NGO-careerists, socially engaged artists, young union associates, etc. want to educate, manage and govern the workers, or some of their construct of workers, in order to create some fictional functions and positions. There is no greater pleasure for them than to say, when speaking about some social group, that "they are workers too", or for some social problem that "it is a class question", as if those statements themselves are solving something. What these statements achieve is that they reduce people to a pliable and controllable entity that they will be able to represent by their NGOs and parties, according to the well-known leftist recipe of the "avant-garde" that manages the production and the state during the "transition period".

That is why they continue to impose Yugoslav workers who toiled for the state and the party as role models. However, let's consider the possibility that refusing to identify with the figure of the worker, or by refusing to identify with labour, could lead to the rejection of other social roles, such as gender roles, that are here to functionally structure our lives and move us away from our cravings and affinities. In addition to the refusal of labour in the "productive sphere", of course, there has to be also a rejection of the work in the non-productive, reproductive sphere, ie the rejection of the state and its role of enabling the reproduction of labour by codifying and managing the heterosexual household. For, as a maintainer of the division of the capitalist mode of production into productive and unproductive work, gender requires continuous reproduction through violence, and the state is there to support this violence.

Because of the role that gender and the state have in the capitalist mode of production, our struggle against labor and gender cannot have the characteristics of labor struggles for a better position in the production system. As long as we strive to participate in the dialogue with power, and politicize our struggle by seemingly associating with the working class and proclaiming our issues class issues, as long as we resort to rationalist and democratic demands for political equality, as long as we strive for representation by the parties, trade unions and NGOs, we remain in the field of capital.

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

Proletarians of the world – who washes your socks?[1]

From female Partisans to Comrade Woman

The Feminist Movement in Yugoslavia 1978-1989

Marijana Stojčić

A key milestone in the development of feminist movements in former Yugoslavia was the international conference "Comrade Woman: The Women's Question. New Approach?" in the Student Cultural Centre (SKC) in Belgrade in 1978, organized by women from Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana. This was the first feminist event of the second wave of feminism in Eastern Europe.

The impact of second wave feminism in the 1970s in the space which we now call former Yugoslavia coincides, on the one hand, with a serious crisis of political legitimation of the Yugoslav socialist project and the constitution of a specific group which in basic class terms we can locate as a new middle-class[2]. On the other hand, at the height of the welfare state in the West, the crisis of the old left and the workers' movement in the classical sense, as well as the rise of new social movements gathered around a critique of the statism, authoritarianism and paternalism of the welfare state, led to demands for more flexible social relations, freedom of life-styles, and personal self-realisation. In general terms, one can easily discuss whether the new social movements introduced new forms of politics, or whether the change was more subtle, in terms of orientation, organization, and activities[3], in the new social context in which the movements found themselves, considering "the ever decreasing extent of explicit class-based identification, the lack of support of political parties organized to represent *class interests*, and the politicization of identities such as gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity and nationality previously marginalized in conventional politics[4]". The success of welfare states in the West had already become normalized, with that model judged successful in terms of the provision of material goods and social security, together with a significantly higher level of political freedom in comparison with the countries of real-socialism. The old left had identified itself with wide-ranging economic demands which had more or less been achieved or were on the road to being achieved. The framework of class struggle had seemed to be too limited in terms of a critique of the inequalities, lack of freedoms, and exclusions which still persisted. To the forefront came other forms of societal repression – primarily gender and race which, historically, workers' movements had routinely relegated to second place.

Although in the space which today we term former Yugoslavia, a tradition of women's organizing existed already in the 19th century, but from the (self-)abolition of the Anti-Fascist Women's Front (AFŽ) in 1953 to the conference "Drug-ca Žena", the women's question completely disappeared from the public sphere. The position of women in 19th century Serbia, as well as in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the first half of the 20th century, did not differ significantly from the position of women elsewhere in the world nor in terms of the problems that they wished to see resolved.[5] Historically, the women's movement also developed in the Yugoslav space through women's societies whose main activities in the beginning were linked primarily to humanitarian work and aid to the poor, particularly to women and children. For many middle- and upper-class women it was precisely advocacy for the poor and oppressed which constituted the first phase of their engagement in favour of their own kind. Insofar as any of these organizations contained some feminist ideas, these remained secondary or were neglected completely. In Austro-Hungaria from the second half of the 19th century, many women's societies were active, initially organized on a national or a confessional basis. The creation of an organization within the frame of one nationality often led to the formation of the same or similar organisations by other nationalities. It is important to emphasise that one can find a significant number of ecumenical actions in virtually all women's humanitarian organisations. Moreover, amongst the membership of a single national humanitarian organisation, one can find members of other nationalities. Until World War I across the whole of Yugoslavia, there was a wide network of women's humanitarian organisations co-operating with each other.[6]

After World War I a new state was created in the Balkans – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (which became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). The position of women varied greatly according to nationality and religion. Legal regulations also differed greatly. Until the start of World War II, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia found itself in the group of underdeveloped capitalist countries with high dependence on an agrarian economic structure: in 1931, 76% of all economically active persons worked primarily in agriculture, forestry and fishing, and only 11% in industrial and craft activities[7]. Based on the same census, 44.6% of the population was illiterate, including 56.4% of women over 10 years old compared to 32% of men.[8] The majority of women lived in villages where heavy physical work was combined with reproductive labour and exposure to various forms of violence.[9] Although the situation of women varied greatly based on nationality and religion, as well as on the country where they lived prior to the formation of the new state, all women shared the experience of dramatic gender-based legal and social inequalities.[10] In the words of Jelena Petrović, economic and political inequality was reflected in: „Differential political and civic rights (the right to vote, ownership, inheritance and so on), a very limited choice of professions (teachers, lower grade civil servants – typists, telephonists, cashiers, available to a small number of women, or else textile workers, workers in the tobacco industry, and of course, maids), exploitation (significantly lower pay than

1 This text is an extended version of the text "*Proleteri svih zemalja - ko vam pere čarape?* - Feministički pokret u Jugoslaviji 1978-1989", published in 2009 in "Društvo u pokretu – Novi društveni pokreti u Jugoslaviji od 1968. do danas". Đorđe Tomić, Petar Atanacković (eds.), *Društvo u pokretu – Novi društveni pokreti u Jugoslaviji od 1968. do danas*, Novi Sad: Cenzura, 2009.

2 Danilo MRKŠIĆ, *Srednji slojevi u Jugoslaviji*. Beograd: Istraživački centar SSO Srbije, 1987, 72-92.

3 Kejt NEŠ (Kate Nash), *Savremena politička sociologija-Globalizacija, politika i moć*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2006, 117-122.

4 Ibid, 132.

5 As Ljubica Marković suggested: „Feminism announced itself here in the beginning of the 1970s, zam se kod nas javlja početkom sedamdesetih godina, as an echo of the braoder women's liberation movement, which had taken root as an idea across Europe in the 1960s, and partially accepted in the United States. Its origins here can be traced to the start of work on social change and the new social programme developed by Svetozar Marković. With other reformist ideas from the new social movements, the idea of women's emancipation was accepted from the Russians, from his teacher Černiševski, which were copied and spread in our part of the world". Ljubica MARKOVIĆ, *Počeci feminizma u Srbiji i Vojvodini*, Belgrade: Narodna misao, 1934, 4.

6 For more on the history of the women's movement inour territorites before World War II, see: Neda BOŽINOVIĆ, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku*, Belgrade: Devedesetčetvrta: Žene u crnom, 1996, 20-127.

7 *O privrednoj aktivnost žena Jugoslavije od 1918. do 1953.* from Lydia SKELVICKY, *Konji, žene, ratovi*, Zagreb: Druga - Ženska infoteka, 1996, 93.

8 For a detailed mapping of the household structure of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, see: Ibid, 93-96 i 103-107.

9 For more on the position of women in the inter-war period, see: Vera ST. ERLICH, *Jugoslavenska porodica u transformaciji, studija u tristotine sela*, Zagreb: Liber, 1971.

10 Throughout its existence, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia never had a single Civic Code, but rather had six separate legal systems under the strong influence of accepted religious organisations that adopted its own rules on marriage and divorce. Women did not exist as legal subjects in any of these six jurisdictions. The only exception was in criminal law were women were recognized as having reduced capacities. SKELVICKY, *Konji, žene, ratovi*, 88 i 90. For more on the position of women in the countries which, in 1918, made up the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929), see:: BOŽINOVIĆ, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku*, 91- 103.

men in the same jobs, in the worst jobs, at the same time performing all housework, and in villages undertaking hard seasonal work), private ownership of women (by their fathers, and subsequently husbands, especially in rural areas in which, according to the 1931 census, 76% of the population lived), the cultural exclusion of women and their exclusion from public life (with rare exceptions, 'femininity' was tolerated in the public sphere as a kind of innate handicap), and so on."[11] Nevertheless, between the two World Wars, a large number of women's associations and journals were working, diverging ideologically, from socialist to clerico-fascist, functioning more or less legally according to changes in the wider political situation.[12] Generally, between the two World Wars, one can distinguish women's organisations in terms of two broad currents – those in the framework of the workers' movement and those which were a separate civic movement. On a number of occasions (such as in the collective action campaigning for the right to vote in 1935), joint activities eroded ideological differences. On the initiative of the Serbian National Women's Federation (*Srpska naroda ženskog saveza*) founded in 1906, at their first Congress in Belgrade in 1919, a NATIONAL WOMEN'S FEDERATION OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES (*NARODNI ŽENSKI SAVEZ SRPKINJA, HRVATICA I SLOVENKI*) was formed. The Federation gathered together all national, educational and humanitarian societies, around 200 in total, on a single wide platform which implied work on the development of humane, ethical, cultural and feminist basis – both social and national in character. The Federation joined the *International Council of Women (ICW)*, actively participating in its work and adapting to the international feminist standards of the day, advocating for women's education, the right to vote, and equality between women and men in all aspects of social life. Later, the Federation became the Yugoslav Women's Federation (*Jugoslovenski ženski savez*).

With the start of World War II, women's organisations stopped working, but a significant number of women were actively included in the fight to liberate the country through participation in armed actions and in the background.[13] From the networks of women's organisations which formed in all of the liberated territories and in some of the unliberated ones, emerged the Anti-Fascist Women's Front (*Antifašistički front žena* AFŽ) in 1942. The first AFŽ conference was held from 5 to 7 December 1942 in Bosanski Petrovac, attended by Josip Broz Tito, which was of great symbolic value. The conference has been considered as an historic milestone in the struggle for women's equality and pointed to the contribution of women in the liberation struggle: "90% of everything that our army does today can be credited to our heroic Yugoslav women». In addition, the aims of AFŽ did not stop with victory over the occupier but also focused on the struggle to finally realise women's emancipation.[14] Considering the role of the AFŽ, Lydia Sklevicky suggested that it had two main sets of inter-related tasks. The first concerned the national liberation movement in general, including support to the military (collecting food, material goods, voluntary work, and so on), and organizing life in the background and ensuring normal life in the liberated territories, including the implementation of all aspects of social policy (care of the wounded, children, and those unable to support themselves). The second set of tasks for the AFŽ related to the political and cultural emancipation of women and their inclusion on an equal basis in the National Liberation Struggle (NOB) and in the building of a post-war society.[15] Already at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) in 1940, when two women were elected to the Central Committee, Spasenija Babović and Vida Tomšič, both future Presidents of AFŽ, the resolution which Tošić developed in her speech was adopted, namely that "all party organisations devote most attention to work among women", and that these efforts should actively involve men as well.[16] These were joined by hitherto unrealized demands of earlier women's, civil and workers' movements in the programme of the Communist Party: "for the protection of maternity, for the elimination of dual morality in public and private life, for economic equality and for the recognition of the right to vote„[17]. The education of women was a particularly important precondition for achieving equality. As Sklevycki stated: "The AFŽ devoted a large part of its activities in that direction, and we can distinguish between a number of levels on which this task was accomplished. At an elementary level, it encompassed literacy courses and general education as a supplement to political education –including writing in the women's press and promoting it being read was, in fact, an invitation for the creation of a new, activist, identity".[18] The AFŽ Press played an important role in all of this. As Gordana Stojaković has suggested, in the period between 1942 and 1945 in the parts of Yugoslavia where the national liberation movement existed, some 30 periodicals were published aimed at women, and within the framework of AFŽ and the KPJ.[19] It can be stated that the Anti-Fascist Women's Front was the channel through which women articulated their demands for equality with men in all aspects of society. For a majority of women, participation in resistance to fascism and the liberation movement, together with participation in the "organs of national government" which were elected during the war, marked the beginnings of their politicization and constitution as a political subject.

After the war, along with numerous tasks which the AFŽ set itself in terms of the building and reconstruction of the country, at the centre of its attention was the endeavour to ensure that the entire post-war legal system was based on the principle of women's equality and against attempts to maintain gender discrimination. Yugoslav women participated for the first time in elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1945. A large percentage of women participated in those elections, confirmed by data presented at the Third AFŽ Congress, which suggested that the female participation rate was 88%.[20] The 1946 Constitution confirmed women's equality in all spheres of societal life. The Constitution merely confirmed, or rather raised to the level of Constitutional Law, the rights of women that had already been acquired. In this case, the Constitution did not bring about the practice of equal electoral rights between men and women, but rather these

11Jelena PETROVIĆ, „Društveno-političke paradigme prvog talasa jugoslovenskih feminizama", *ProFemina*, 2/ 2011, 63.

12 Ibid, pp. 59-80. For the history of women's organizing in Yugoslavia between the two World Wars, see: BOŽINOVIĆ, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku*, 104-133; SKELVICKY, *Konji, žene, ratovi*, 79-81.

13 Referring to Jera Vodušek-Starič, Mari Žanin Čalić suggests that NOB in May 1945 had around 800,000 armed men and women. Žanin ČALIĆ, *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku,* Belgrade: Clio, 2013*,* 207. During the war a total of 305,000 fighters lost their lives, and 425,000 were wounded. Ibid, 209. It is estimated that Yugoslavia at the time of World War II had around 100,000 women fighters, 25,000 died, 40,000 were wounded, and 3,000 survived but with severe disabilities. 90 women were proclaimed heros. *Žena u privredi i društvu SFR Jugoslavije, osnovni pokazatelji*, Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1975, 3.

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15 SKELVICKY, *Žene, konji, ratovi*, 25-28.

16 Ljubinka ČIRIĆ-BOGETIĆ, „Odluke Pete zemaljske konferencije KPJ o radu među ženama i njihova realizacija u periodu 1940-1941. godine", in: Zlatko Čepo and Ivan Jelić (eds.), *Peta zemaljska konferencija KPJ: zbornik radova*, Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1972, 94. Web: http://www.znaci.net/00003/661.pdf (14. 9. 2017)

17 PETROVIĆ, „Društveno-političke paradigme prvog talasa jugoslovenskih feminizama", 76.

18 SKELVICKY, *Konji, žene, ratovi*, 30.

19 Gordana STOJAKOVIĆ, *Rodna perspektiva novina Antifašističkog fronta žena (1945-1953)*, Novi Sad: Zavod za ravnopravnost polova, 2012, str. 37- 38. The AFŽ publishing system was hierarchically based with *Žena danas* as a monthly publication which carried axiomatic messages from the leaders of the middle and lower committees of AFŽ, and all other publications based on the presented framework explored realities at the macro- (political plans) and micro-levels (everyday life) which they themselves were also contributing to in terms of new roles for women. The presentation of women as active agents in the transformation of the socio-economic context in factories, in the fields, and in agricultural co-operatives was a characteristic of the post-war AFŽ press in the perdio from 1946 to 1950. At the same time, important roles of women continued to be within the economy of care, as well as in the role of mothers (of their own children and of children who were without parents) Ibid, 169-173. See also: Ksenija VIDMAR-HORVAT, *Imaginarna majka – Rod i nacionalizam u kulturi 20. stoljeća*, Zagreb: Sandorf and Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, 2017, 45-58.

20 "Politika", 28 October 1950 based on Vera GUDAC – DODIĆ, „Položaj žene u Srbiji (1945–2000)", u *Žene i deca - Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka,* (ed.) Latinka Perović, Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006, 35.



principles arose from this practice.

In all laws which were subsequently adopted, this principle was strictly adhered to. The principle of equality, promoted as one of the central principles planned by the new state, reflected the radical revolutionary position in relation to class, gender and national inequality. As well as education, women's economic independence was seen as a prerequisite for women's emancipation. Women and men were equal, more than anything, as members of the working class. As Gordana Stojaković quotes: "the socialist ideology of emancipation of women was not looked at outside of the system of workerism (the working class) because measures of women's emancipation, above all, were developed in relation to labour rights."[21] Immediately after the war, with the need to speed up the modernization of the country, negative attitudes about the inferiority of women were treated not only as indicators of social, but also political, backwardness. In this way, the question of inequality between men and women was posed as a social and political question which, if left unresolved, would render the transformation of society in a new revolutionary direction impossible. At the same time, in this period through the AFŽ, the so-called 'women's question', however insecure and partial it seemed, gained an independent status, where women became agents in their own emancipation and, at the same time, active subjects in the building of a new socialist society.

Here one has to bear in mind that the idea of the economic independence of women, as a fundamental precondition for her emancipation on the basis of socialist emancipatory ideology, was understood primarily in terms of the realization of the rights of women in the workplace. After the war, this did not derive only from the ideology of the authorities, but also from the necessity of engaging as many people as possible in the post-war reconstruction of a country in ruins, and later in terms of the ambitious demands of the five-year plan. It was from this imperative for both the state and the AFŽ that as many women as possible be employed and included in different forms of agricultural activities, as well as in those activities which in pre-war Yugoslavia had employed exclusively or primarily men. The period immediately after the war was one of intensive social reconstruction and of struggle for the meaning of the new social (and gender) order, in which war heroism was replaced by worker's heroism. It was necessary to both stabilize socialism and rebuild a destroyed country. Some 400,000 people remained homeless, and war damages amounted to some 2.3 billion US dollars. The first period looked at from an economic perspective in the period of centralized administrative management (1945–1952), marked by a complex system of austerity measures (coupons for rationing consumption) and of production (The First Five-Year Plan, 1947–1951). Immediately after the war, the UN and the United Nations Re-

21 Gordana STOJAKOVIĆ, „Antifašistički front žena Jugoslavije (AFŽ) 1946–1953: pogled kroz AFŽ štampu", in: *Rod i levica*, Lidija VASILJEVIĆ (ed.), Ženski informaciono-dokumentacioni trening centar (ŽINDOK), Belgrade, 2012, 13.

lief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) donated to Yugoslavia goods (mainly food) worth approximately 416m. USD.[22] In the first decade of the post-war reconstruction of society women had reserved workplaces as female workers – shock workers, and women were meant to participate at the same level as men in collective actions. On the one hand, poverty and rationing were additional motivations for women to compete for the status of shock worker in order to ensure additional coupons for food, clothing and textiles[23]; on the other hand, the intensive agitation of the AFŽ primarily through the press worked on the construction of women-workers as crucial protagonists in the successful realization of the socialist project. The struggle was not framed only as a struggle for emancipation but also as a struggle to realise the formidable five-year plan (from 1947 to 1951). Women were mobilized on many levels: activated through labour actions, attending literacy classes, as well as sewing classes, as workers and shock workers, while, in parallel it was expected of them that they would continue to care for the household. State policy used the figure of the New Woman as the symbolic carrier of modernization[24], and women's visibility in the socio-cultural sphere of the new state was meant to mark the progress made in the new realities. As Ksenija Vidmar-Horvat suggested, to understand the complex socialist gender politics and its definition of women's role in socialism, it is important to pay attention to three underlying fields: the sphere of work, marital and family life and relations with children, with the socialist project invoking radical change in all three fields comparted to the bourgeois subjugation of women.[25]

Socialist democracy in the Yugoslav case was primarily understood as economic democracy based on national equality and social equality. A personal contribution to the country's construction, the ability to manage the production process, and thus the process of social modernization, meant

22 Igor DUDA, "Uhodavanje socijalizma", *Refleksije vremena 1945. – 1955,* Zagreb: Galerija Klovićevi dvori, 2013, 25.

23 Coupons r1 and r2 for workers, and coupon 0 for everyone else, whilst peasants had no right to coupons. In addition, r1 coupons could be used in a variety of shops, unlike r2 coupons. Renata JAMBREŠIĆ KIRIN, "Žene u formativnom socijalizmu", *Refleksije vremena 1945. – 1955*. (ur.) Jasmina BAVOLJAK, Zagreb: Galerija Klovićevi dvori, 2012, 193.

24 See JAMBREŠIČ-KIRIN, "Moderne vestalke u kulturi pamćenja Drugog svjetskog rata", ", in *Dom i svijet*, (ed.) Sandra PRLENDA, Zagreb: Centar za ženske studije, 2008,19-54.

25 VIDMAR HORVAT, *Imaginarna majka – Rod i nacionalizam u kulturi 20. stoljeća*, 46. On the political representation of motherhood see: ibid, 46-67. On the politics of motherhood see also: Rada DREZGIĆ, *„Bela kuga" među „Srbima". O naciji, rodu i rađanju na prelazu vekova,* Belgrade: Albatros Plus: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2010, 17-51.

that one became an agent, an autonomous subject of one's own progress. The worker had a central role in the construction of "the cosmopolitan, internationalist, modern and supranational identity of a Yugoslav citizen in the period of socialism"[26]. When it came to the question of women, socialist ideology did not regard the emancipation of women outside of the workerist system (the working class). As Ksenija Vidmar Horvat has pointed out, as "female comrades" ("*drugarice*") women were an integral part of the proletariat who were not considered for any additional special rights separable from the rights they enjoyed and demands they formulated as part of the working class. Gender discourse in the SFRY mainly focused on the role of women in nationalised industries, with the traditional model being largely retained in aspects of private family life (marriage, motherhood, gender roles). Within the socialist model there were attempts to harmonize and integrate functions of a worker with those functions which women carried out in the private sphere with a particular accent on motherhood. Although the state introduced measures which were meant to facilitate the connections between the public (the sphere of work and political engagement) and the private (primarily in terms of motherhood such as paid maternity leave, practically free kindergartens, a hot meal for children in schools, and so on[27]), the standpoint that women as a social group were indistinguishable from men prevailed.[28] The "self-abolition" of the Anti-fascist Women's Front in 1953[29] marked the abolition of the autonomy of the so-called women's question, and was a step backwards in terms of returning women to the household sphere, resulting in the political pacification of a large number of women[30] and the end of the intense interest in

26 Tanja PETROVIĆ, *Yuropa – Jugoslovensko nasleđe i politike budućnosti u postjugoslovenskim društvima*, Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga, 2012, 158 (footnote).

27 According to the Decree on the Protection of Empoyed Pregnant Women and Nursing Mothers (Uredbe o zaštiti zaposlenih trudnih žena i majki dojilja), 90 days of maternity leave were envisaged and, in some cases, a shortened four hour working day was possible until the child reached the age of three. Employed mothers who were breastfeeding were allowed to stop work every three hours, in order to breastfeed the child, a right which could be used for six months after the birth. Maternity leave was compensated to the level of a full salary. Mothers who were single parents or whose children had additional needs and who worked a four-hour day were compensated for 75% of their income. In later stages of social development, the period of paid maternity leave was extended on a number of occasions, up to one year after the child's birth. GUDAC-DODIĆ, „Položaj žene u Srbiji (1945-2000)", 37.

28 VIDMAR HORVAT, *Imaginarna majka – Rod i nacionalizam u kulturi 20. stoljeća*, 47-49.

29 AFŽ as a special women's organization was abolished at the IV Congress in 1953. Various organisations and societies who were concerned with questions of interest to women united as the Federation of Women's Associations of Yugoslavia (Savez ženskih drustava Jugoslavij, out of which was formed the Conference for the Social Activities of Yugoslav Women (Konferencija za društvenu aktivnost žena Jugoslavije) in 1961 in Zagreb. It worked under the auspices of the Federation of the Socialist Working People of Yugoslavia - SSRNJ (Savez socijalističkog radnog naroda Jugoslavije). Neda Božinović, a Partisan of the time, amongst other things in charge of Partisan Monuments 1941 (*Partizanske spomenice 1941*) and an active member of AFŽ after the war, noted that "the decision to abolish AFŽ, or rather to found the Federation of women's societies, was experienced by a large number of delegates as a downgrading of women's organisations and or women themselves. Many activists from AFŽ reacted to the decision by stopping their work completely. … After a while, women, particularly in villages, confronted women leaders with the accusation "you abolished our AFŽ!". They told of how men would taunt them "enough of yours" or "it's finished, it's finished" or "it's no more". They recalled how man still had, constantly, their cafes, their football, even their People's Front, whereas women had nowhere to get together, and longed for conversations about their "women's questions". BOŽINOVIĆ, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku*, 174.

30 The participation of women in decision-making bodies from the end of the war was constantly falling. The 1949-50 elections for National Councils there were two thirds as many women as there were for the elections two later. Already by 1963 in the Federal Assembly the proportion of women was 15.2%. Six years later it had fallen to 6.3%. *Žena u privredi i društvu SFR Jugoslavije, osnovni pokazatelji*, 4; BOŽINOVIĆ, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u 19 i 20 veku*, 249.

31 Vjekoslav KOPRIVNJAK, „Uvodnik u temat", *Žena*, 4–5/ 1980, 10.

32 The participation of women in the total of those employed in the social sector showed a constant increase: in 1945 it was 29.3%, in 1982 it had reached 36.5% and in 1986 it was 38.0%. This trend is comparable to those in developed European countries. However, the particpation rate of women in the totla employed ranged considereably in different parts of the country. While in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, it reached 45.8%, in SR Croatia 40.9%, whilst in SR Macedonia it was 34.7%, SR Montenegro 35.6% and in the Socijalist Autonomous Territory of Kosovo it was 22.1%. Statistics from *Izveštaja SFRJ o primeni konvencije o ukidanju svih oblika diskriminacije žena (Report of Yugoslavia for the CEDAW)*, June 1983. p. 18 and SGJ for 1986, „Statistički bilten SZS" no. 15777, 1986, according to Slobodanka NEDOVIĆ, *Savremeni feminizam - Položaj i uloga žene u porodici i društvu*, Belgrade: Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2005, 108.

33 After World War II the number of illiterate population older than 10 constantly fell; according to the 1948 census there were 26.7% illiterate people, the rate for men was 15% and for women 37.5%. By 1981, the rate of illiterate people was 10.8%, but there were four times as many illiterate women as men; in the 1991 census the percentage fell to 6.2% but, again, the percentage of women was higher, at 6.2%, compared to a rate of 2,2% for men. Sanja ĆOPIĆ, "Položaj i uloga žene u društvu - Socio-ekonomske osnove položaja žene u društvu" u Sanja ĆOPIĆ- Brankica GRUPKOVIĆ et al., *Žene u Srbiji - Da li smo diskriminisane?*, Belgrade: Sekcija žena UGS *Nezavisnost*: ICFTU CEE Women's Network, 2001, 29.

34 Women are equal to men in all spheres of state, economic and socio-political life» (Žene su ravnopravne sa muškarcima u svim oblastima državnog, privrednog i društveno-političkog života"), Constitution of the Federation of Yugoslavia 1946, Article 24. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Hana%20Vestica/Downloads/aj_10_02_10_txt_ustav1946.pdf (15.09. 2017).

35 Based on statistics published in *Bilten SZS* (no. 1181 from 1981) on salary levels of those employed based on gender and qualifications for 1976, Slobodanka Nedović writes: „The average personal income of women is lower than that of men (with the same level of qualifications) in every category of work except in water management. In industry the difference ranges from 11% in the group of unqualified workers, to 33.8% in the group of qualified workers, 32.6% amongst the most highly qualified, and 21.7% amongst those educated to university level, all to the advantage of men. The data point to the existence of a direct form of discrimination against women, who find it harder to obtain managerial positions, wait longer for promotions and generally have fewer opprtunities for more complex, responsible and, therefore, higher paid, positions. It is an unwritten rule that even in work places were women

changing gender relations in the family and society. Henceforth, the women's question would be treated as an integral part of the class question, which is then presented as the key social question on which everyone should focus. Simplified somewhat, starting with the view that the basis of social injustice lies in unequal economic distribution (the typical example of which is class inequality), the resolution of the class question is meant to lead to the simultaneous solution of "the women's question". Formulated slightly differently: "Starting from the Marxist position that the emancipation of women can only be achieved through the realization of 'associations of free labour', the women's question became an integral part of the class question". As the class question was felt to have been resolved in Yugoslavia, it followed that it could be asserted that "women today are formally equal in our society".[31]

The period from 1950 to 1970 was a period of economic prosperity and an increasing standard of living in the SFRY; and from the 1960s of open borders and an overall liberalization of society, with a constant increase in the number of women included in the labour market.[32] As stated earlier, paid work and education of women (regulated by very advanced legal provisions) were seen as the most important factors in the emancipation of women.[33] Yugoslav women first participated in elections for the Constitutional Council in 1945. The 1946 Constitution confirmed women's equality in all aspects of social life.[34] In all laws which were passed later this principle was strictly respected. According to the Marriage Law [1946], the position of women and men in marriage was equalised, the Family Law of 1947 equalised the rights of children born in and out of wedlock, the Law on Social Insurance introduced social protection against all risks, including paid maternity leave and the right to old age pension under the same conditions for men and women, even though women tended to retire earlier. The right to abortion was secured in a 1951 law. The 1974 Constitution guaranteed the right to give birth for free, and from 1977 abortion was permitted with no restrictions up to ten weeks of pregnancy. Yugoslavia in those days had legislation which was in accordance with all international conventions which pertained to the position of women.

At the same time, there were significant differences in the level of development of the Yugoslav republics, in terms of opportunities and quality of life, between the developed and underdeveloped republics, and between rural and urban parts of the country. After the 1974 Constitution, there emerged different legal provisions around particular issues in different Yugoslav republics. Despite progressive legal provisions and proclamations about the equal status of men and women, the realities of everyday life were different.[35] The mass involvement

of women in the economy of socialist Yugoslavia gave rise to a new situation in which women were active in regular work, as socio-political workers, and at home. On the other hand, the social and political engagement of women began to reduce in the 1950s. Even then, an AFŽ activist noted the rise in attitudes such as "now that we have built socialism women can return to the home and bring up the children"[36], and a weakening of the ideological enthusiasm to challenge patriarchal understandings, earlier sharply condemned as backward and counterrevolutionary[37]. According to Stojaković, some of the reasons can be found in the fact that there was no longer a need for a large engaged workforce. In addition, with the introduction of self-management, pressure on enterprises to show positive results led to a reduction in subsidies for social protection institutions (kindergartens and nurseries) and the dismissal of lower qualified workers (a group still dominated by women).[38] Furthermore, mass migration into the cities was not accompanied by adequate measures to ensure that women from rural households could become more employable in city surroundings[39], leaving them structurally outside of the public sphere, and without the possibility of achieving economic independence and relief from the burdens of childcare. Once the already achieved socialised care of children and mothers[40] became too expensive, leaving paid work was, for part of the female population, also a way out of the dual burden of responsibilities – in the work place and at home. Although some attempts were made to open household services for women, very few were able to take advantage of this.[41] A similar situation arose when restaurants serving communal food were opened; their users were predominantly single men.[42] In a survey carried out in June 1956 by the magazine "Praktična žena" (Practical Woman), one of the women surveyed wrote this: "You say that my working day lasts 13 hours. Thanks a lot! For me it lasts almost 18 hours. Am I exaggerating? I would love you to be in my place… First, I am on my feet for 8 hours, working hard. And then cooking, washing, cleaning and so on. Double working time, four times going to work and back. And my husband will not even bring his clothes to be washed, nor go to the market when he has time». Another account is, also, highly illustrative: «I often hear a customer at the counter … Four years I have not been to a Trades' Union meeting … I am still at the level I was (if not lower) when my first child was born». For many, the solution was the return of women to the home as the place where they 'naturally' belonged. Or in the words of another woman surveyed: „Now it's like this: if you want to be good at your work you have to abandon your family; if you run the house well then you don't perform well at work. It's better then that you completely return to the family. Or that men take over those responsibilities. And we are really not for that. Do not misunderstand me! I am not in favour of this, it's just that that's how it is for me. Women protest but I doubt that that they will get any help." [43] Mitra Mitrović, amongst other things, a pre-war communist and one of the influential members of the AFŽ until it was abolished, wrote bitterly about all this: „And maybe there is no question – all at once a huge gap has emerged: from full civilization to full discrimination. There is nothing unusual about this. It is like moving from complete riches to complete poverty, or from a fully developed country to complete backwardness. But it seems that here, regarding this problematic, even more than race or class, the enslavement is more abominable, more complicated, because it does not just depend on the powerful, it does not only concern foreign or faraway lands, the rich or the white people, but those closest to us, individual people, fathers and brothers, even sons, who cannot escape from the perceptions and prejudices imposed upon them, that have become an integral part of life, customs and household order".[44] Already in the 1950s in the press it is possible to detect a different trend than

make up the majority of the workforce, the majority of managers will be men." Slobodanka NEDOVIĆ, *Savremeni feminizam - Položaj i uloga žene u porodici i društvu*, Belgrade: Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 110.

36 GUDAC-DODIĆ, „Položaj žene u Srbiji (1945–2000)", 64.

37 Karl KAZER, *Porodica i srodstvo na Balkanu, Analiza jedne kulture koja nestaje*, Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2002, 441.

38 STOJAKOVIĆ, *Rodna perspektiva novina Antifašističkog fronta žena (1945-1953)*, 69

39 Anđelka MILIĆ, , „Preobražaj srodničkog sastava porodice i položaj članova", in: *Domaćinstvo porodica i brak u Jugoslaviji: društveno-kulturni, ekonomski i demografski aspekti promene porodične organizacije*, Anđelka MILIĆ, Eva BERKOVIĆ, Ruža PETROVIĆ (eds.), Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta, 1981, 157.

40 See: Sanja PETROVIĆ-TODOSIJEVIĆ, „Analiza rada ustanova za brigu o majkama i deci na primeru rada jaslica u FNRJ", in *Žene i deca - Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka*, (ed.) Latinka Perović, Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006, 176-187.

41 Vera GUDAC DODIĆ, *Žena u socijalizmu - Položaj žene u Srbiji u drugoj polovini XX veka*, Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006, 107.

42 Ibid, 108.

43 For all three quotes taken from the survey „Kako da se pomogne zaposlenoj ženi" (*Praktična žena*, June, 1956) I am grateful to Jelena Tešija who drew them to my attention.

44 Mitra MITROVIĆ, *Položaj žene u savremenom svetu*, Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1960, page 8.

that which was prevalent during the war and initial post-war years. While the themes in magazines during and after the war mainly concentrated on the national liberation struggle, and the political situation, it also explored the new role and equal status of women, firstly in war, and subsequently in the reconstruction of the country, and from the 1950s a cult of femininity and beauty, *haute couture* and fashion news, dropped after the war, were again revived. Domestic illustrated and fashion magazines began to be published carrying fashion news and photographs, imitating Western examples.[45] Daily newspapers gradually developed their *women's sections*, namely female-oriented content primarily offering tips for running the household, hygiene, and fashion and make-up. The presentation of women as subjects, young and old, from urban and rural areas, educated and literate who, through personal dedication, can do things for themselves in terms of women's rights and the public good (whether in active women's roles or in the economy of care) which dominated after the war, was gradually replaced by a reaffirmation of traditional female gender stereotypes. The staple themes of the women's press at the end of the 1950s, included home as the centre of well-being and the body as a symbol of open sexuality and direct seduction.[46]

It is important to note that this process of reaffirming traditional gender stereotypes occurred gradually and never unambiguously. It was marked by numerous contradictions and oscillations between efforts for women's emancipation and the perpetuation of gender essentialism, illustrative of the ambivalence of Yugoslav socialism in terms of the position of women. The circumstances of entry into World War II, and after that participation in the development and reconstruction of the country had offered, for a majority of women, a road towards politicization and political subjectivity. Their participation was a necessary condition for this to happen. The official position throughout Yugoslav socialism was that women's right to work and to participation in political life was an indisputable fact of war and revolution. It is important to bear in mind that the Partisan struggle for liberation from Nazi occupation was one of the basic myths, promoted through films, books, music and official documents. The value of women's active participation in struggle and work in the background represented an important aspect of socialist rhetoric.

At the same time, women's dual role, as a worker and mother, as the one primarily responsible for reproduction and the family, was never questioned. This inevitably led to a dual burden for women. It can be said that women's two roles – as a "socialist worker" in the public sphere (and in official discourse) and Western consumerist ideas of femininity in the private sphere, came to merge together and fuse. The dominant ideology of everyday life became consumerism. The ideal role model for women was one who successfully balanced being a caring mother, a housewife, a partner and an employed woman, without compromising on her beauty, sexual attraction and femininity. On the other hand, there was no longer any meaningful feminist movement, nor any critical problematisation of gender roles in society. Violence against women as an issue was also completely absent from the public sphere.

The presentation of Yugoslav women as "liberated" and "westernized" truly reflected the experience of women in the middle- and upper-class from urban surroundings; the experience of the majority of women and men from rural and semi-urban regions never fitted into this mythological picture of social progress. This gap between the centre and periphery is also crucial to understanding the position of women who organized the conference, as well as the subsequent development of feminist groups and movement in Yugoslavia. The mid-1970s was a time when second-wave feminism entered the Yugoslav space. A generation of young educated women from urban centres, such as Zagreb and Belgrade, formed the nucleus of the new feminist movement of the early 1970s. These women had access to education and employment, but had experienced the difference between the proclaimed equality between men and women and the realities of everyday life: sexism in the private sphere, on the labour market and in terms of academic careers. On their travels to Western Europe and the USA, they became acquainted with feminist movements and feminist theories, and the new feminist movement in Yugoslavia would not have been possible without the turmoil of '68, as well as the intense intellectual debates on Marxism and alternatives to capitalism and Stalinism in leftist dissident circles (gathered around the journals "Perspektive" and "Praxis" as well as the Korčula summer school), which had been taking place since the early 1960s.[47]

45 Radina VUČETIĆ, *Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka*, Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2012, 32-40.

46 Neda TODOROVIĆ-UZELAC, *Ženska štampa i kultura ženstvenosti*, Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1987, 113-133.

47 As Božidar Jakšić formulated it: "They [... students] also had access to books and texts of critical intellectuals in the East and the West. The works of Herbert Marcuse, for example, one of the intellectual founders of the New Left, was published in Serbo-Croatian from 1965 on. Other works of philosophers from the Frankfurt school were alsowidely published. In the magazine *Praxis*, which was edited by university professors in Belgrade and Zagreb, the discourses of the New Left were discussed.35 At an annual summer

This is visible in terms of the student demands from 1968. The student movement articulated its demands within the framework of so-called ideology, pointing to the gap between the proclaimed values and the disappointing reality of socialism.[48]

In Portorož in 1976, the Croatian Sociological Association organised a symposium on the social situation of women and the development of the family in Yugoslav self-managed society which marked the beginnings of contemporary Yugoslav feminism. One of the participants of the symposium was Žarana Papić who later, in 1978, together with Dunja Blažević (then director of SKC) and Jasmina Tešanović, organised in the Student Cultural Centre (SKC) in Belgrade the conference "DRUG-CA ŽENA. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup?" ("Comrade Woman: the women's question – a new approach"). The Student Cultural Centre was, at that time, despite being state financed, the centre of all alternative cultural events. As Chiara Bonfiglioli has noted, referring to the words of Rada Iveković: "Political dissidents and leftist groups would meet there, but also scientists and artists, foreign and domestic, interested in art, literature, philosophy, everything".[49] This meeting is considered to be the beginning of the development of the feminist movement in then Yugoslavia. Its significance was a result of bringing together women who, albeit individually and separately, were already concerned with feminist theory across socialist Yugoslavia, as well as feminists from elsewhere in Europe.

The original programme had two parts: a meeting of Yugoslav feminists (from 24 – 26 October), and a second part which is remembered as a crucial moment. The conference was attended by around thirty foreign particpants from the whole of Europe and around twenty particpants from Yugoslavia, mainly from Zagreb and Belgrade. Among them were Helen Cixous, Hatz Garcia, Nil Yalter, and Christine Delphy from France, Jill Lewis, Helen Roberts and Parveen Adams from the UK, Dacia Maraini, Carla Ravaioli and Chiara Saraceno from Italy, Ewa Morawska from Poland, Judith Kele from Hungary, Alice Scwarzer, Nadežda Čačinović-Puhovski, Slavenka Drakulić-Ilić, Đurđa Milanović and Vesna Pusić from Zagreb, Nada Ler-Sofronić from Sarajevo; Silva Mežnarić from Ljubljana and Rada Iveković, Anđelka Milić, Jasmina Tešanović, Lepa Mlađenović and Sonja Drljević from Belgrade. However, many others came to the conference from Yugoslavia and abroad who were uninvited or unannounced. Given that some who were announced failed to attend (or at least their names are missing from the participants' list), it is relatively difficult to say with certainty how many participants attended, female and male. Chiara Bonfiglioli suggests that overall there were around eighty attendees. She reports on the words of Dragan Klaić which beautifully capture the atmosphere of those days: „I will tell you what for me was very important, as the first conference of its kind, with a feminist agenda, which tried to gather people from Zagreb, from Belgrade, from the whole of Yugoslavia and from abroad. There were around eighty people on those two days. It was an attempt by a feminist core to escape from a very narrow intellectual circle, to attract young people and get some media attention. It was fascinating to bring all those people from abroad, with very different perspectives. It was very dynamic and polemical, albeit slowed down because of translation. From Italian to English, from English to Serbo-Croatian, German, French, Spanish. … I remember eighty people sitting for two days there, socializing in the evenings and questioning each other with the utmost curiosity."[50]. As well as discussions, part of the programme consisted of exhibitions and film projections by women artists and directors. The themes which were discussed at the conference can be gleaned from the contents of the reader prepared by Žarana Papić. It included marxist and socialist feminist texts (texts by Alexandra Kollontai, Evelyn Reed and Sheila Rowbotham, feminist analyses which combined marxism and psychoanalysis by Shulamit Firestone and Juliet Mitchell, Luce Irigaray's theory of sexual difference, as well as texts from the feminist movement in Italy by Manuela Fraire and Rosalba Spagnolleti). The texts of domestic authors mainly concentrated on analysing Yugoslav society from a feminist viewpoint, as well as questions regarding the relevance and applicability of feminism in a socialist society. At the conference there were discussions on patriarchy, identity, sexuality, language, the invisibility of women in culture and science, as well as the everyday lives of women, discrimination against women in the public and private spheres, women's dual burden, violence against women, and on the survival of traditional patriarchal roles despite normative solutions which guaranteed equality. For the first time, a critical review was presented on the resolution of women's issues in Yugoslavia. The critique was feminist, but not anti-socialist.[51]

Differences in understanding and experience were also revealed between domestic and foreign guests. Domestic participants had academic backgrounds without any experience in practical academic work. This was one of the crucial differences in relation to guests from abroad. In addition, they did not present themselves as *a priori* against the system, but they drew attention to how that society in reality differed from its proclaimed values. All these differences were visible throughout the conference, particularly in discussions with participants from Western Europe. The experience from '68 and the vain hope that hierarchical relations between men and women could be abolished through a mass movement[52] made Western guests much

school on the Croatian island of Korčula near Dubrovnik, critical intellectuals including Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Lesek Kolakowski and Ernest Mandel were frequent guests. Every year between 1964 and 1974, hundreds of Yugoslav students were able to participate in discussions with them." Božidar Jakšić "Praxis i Korčulanska ljetnja škola. Kritike, osporavanja, napadi", cited in Boris KANZLEITER, Krunoslav Stojaković, "1968 in Jugoslawien. Studentenproteste zwischen Ost und West" in *1968 in Jugoslawien. Studentenproteste und kulturelle Avantgarde in Jugoslawien, 1960-1975*. Bonn: Dietz-Verlag, 2008, (translated into English), 15.

48 Ibid, 13.

49 Chiara BONFIGLIOLI, „Belgrade, 1978: Remembering the conference *Drugarica Žena. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup? / Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?* Thirty years after", MA thesis 2008, Utrecht University, Faculty of Arts - Women's Studies, 2008, 51.

50 „I will tell you, for me it was very important as it was the first conference type event with feminist agenda trying to bring people from Belgrade and Zagreb and elsewhere in Yugoslavia together, plus a lot of people from abroad. There were some eighty people there in these two days. So the core feminist group was trying to go from this very small intellectual circle a little bit broader, bring some younger students and get some media attention. It was an exploration and an agenda settinf meeting, and much of networking... and it was fascinating to get all these people from abroad, all of quite different orientations. It was very dynamic and polemic, but of course all slowed down by translations. So there was Italian to English, English to Serbo-Croatian, German, French, Spanish... (...) So I remember 80 people sitting there two days and socialising in the evening hours and questioning each other with utmost curiosity." BONFIGLIOLI, „Belgrade, 1978: Remembering the conference *Drugarica Žena. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup? / Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?* Thirty years after", 53-54.

51 Dragan Klaić: „You have to understand that we were criticising Yugoslav self- management socialism as such. We were criticising the sexist elements of the Yugoslav's system with which we identified in general. In that sense it wasn't a radical critique of Yugoslav socialism... These were progressive leftist intellectuals, but anti-dogmatic, critical, especially of the official Yugoslav ideology and the ideological jargon and the ideological fasade, but not anti-socialist... and with a steady critical analysis of capitalism, as well". Cited in BONFIGLIOLI, „Belgrade, 1978: Remembering the conference *Drugarica Žena. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup? / Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?* Thirty years after", 100.

52 An exceptionally good example of this can be seen in Helke Sander's film *Subjective Factor (Der subjektive Faktor)* from 1981. This is a semi-autobiographical review of the period between 1967 and 1970 which Helge spent in West Berlin, where she studied at the *Deutsche Film und Fernsehakademie*. She was actively involved in the student movement of '68 and was one of the founders of *The Action Council for the Liberation of Women* (*Aktionsrat zu Befreiung der Frauen)* in 1968. The film includes her speech in

more critical not only with regard to the possibility of women's freedom through 'formal' emancipation – liberal emancipation through laws, as well as regarding Marxist theory of the liberation of women through class struggle. The conference, somehow, situated Yugoslavia between the West and its feminist debates, and Eastern Europe where no one had heard of feminism, other than with regard to «ugly lesbians».[53] From a Western feminist perspective, Yugoslav feminists were not radical enough. From the perspective of domestic particpants, guests from the West were in no way adequately informed about the situation in Yugoslavia, and occasionally, were condescending and pretentious. One of the sources of the disagreement was the lack of understanding of foreign particpants that many of the themes which preoccupied the feminist movement in the West (such as divorce or abortion rights) were not on the agenda in Yugoslavia because of the progressive regulatory and legal framework. In addition, at that time there was no feminist movement in Yugoslavia[54], and the women who organised the conference did not represent any kind of „Yugoslav woman" across the entire territory of Yugoslavia. The position of women in Yugoslavia differed significantly not only in regard to education and the possibility of travelling, but also in terms of which part of Yugoslavia women lived and whether this was an urban milieu or not. One of the other important points of disagreement was the participation of men in the conference. In the Belgrade conference a significant number of men were present. This was problematic for a large part of the Western feminist participants. These, particularly French and Italian feminists, understood the participation of men in the conference as the usurpation of women's space. In contrast, the majority of local particpants supported the presence of *feminist friendly* men in the meeting. Dacia Maraini remembers tensions at the end of the first day, when Italian delegates protested against the fact that a male sociologist[55] spoke about repression against women. They were opposed by the organisers, clarifying that both men and women have to fight discrimination, and that they were against any kind of discrimination on the basis of gender differences.[56]

From today's perspective, one can freely state that „DRUG-CA ŽENA. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup?" made history. Not only did in bring back prohibited themes – feminism in the public sphere – and was the first critical framework for resolving the „woman's question" in then socialist Yugoslavia, but primarily because of the impact it had on participants, both female and male[57], and on the later development of feminism and feminist groups. It emboldened participants to believe in themselves and begin to work openly in the public sphere, and, as such, is the foundational event of the entire later development of the feminist movement in this region. The conference was a milestone in the subsequent development of feminist groups. Quickly after the conference Lidija Skelvicky, Rada Iveković and Slavenka Drakulić formed a group *Žena i društvo* in Zagreb under the auspices of the Croatian Sociological Association. After the return of Sofija Trivunac from Zagreb, a group of the same name was formed in Belgrade in 1980, within the Student Cultural Centre. In contrast to the Zagreb group which mainly focused on theoretical work and whose audience for round tables was mainly academic, the Belgrade group discussed their own experiences and worked on self-empowerment. In round tables at SKC every Wednesday, a different theme was discussed[58]. As Lina Vušković remembers: "The choice of themes was very broad and we did not pursue any particular strategy or sequence except when the questions became too broad. We organized a large number of round tables on sexuality (which were very well attended, especially when a psychoanalytic perspective was included), reproductive rights, the role of Christianity, the position of women at work, rape, aesthetic racism, women's writing, language and gender, the patriarchal mystification of scientific language, the analysis of Serbi-

September 1968 at a conference of the Socialist Student Association where she attacked the secist attitudes of her male counterparts. After the Association refused to discuss feminist demands and patriarchy in their own organization, the Action Council for the Liberation of Women decided to throw tomatoes at men speaking from the podium.

53 Ewa Morawska: "So you have here three phases: the West with its bubbling feminist debates and and legal adjustments; Yugoslavia with its very vibrant interest in what's going on in the West, and Eastern Europe where nobody heard of feminism and whatever they heard was „ugly lesbians". Cited in BONFIGLIOLI, „Belgrade, 1978: Remembering the conference *Drugarica Žena. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup? / Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?* Thirty years after", 78.

54 Ibid, 86.

55 The sociologist in question is Slobodan Drakulić

56 BONFIGLIOLi, „Belgrade, 1978: Remembering the conference *Drugarica Žena. Žensko pitanje. Novi pristup? / Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?* Thirty years after".

57 Rada Iveković: "Before the conference we did not exist. *We happened during that conference.* We did not know each other, Zarana put all of us together, and we were not a group. We hadn't the awareness that we could represent something. During that conference we understood that we were many, and that each one of us did some feminist work, a bit of research, of critique." Cited in Ibid, 86.

58 For a detailed programme of events at SKC,see: Marina BLAGOJEVIĆ (ur.), *Ka vidljivoj ženskoj istoriji: Ženski pokret u Beogradu 90-tih*, Belgrade. Centar za ženske studije, istraživanje i komunikaciju, 1998, 49- 60.

an national narratives, an analysis of children's literature, the impact of children's toys and games in determining gender roles …"[59] Co-operation with feminists from other parts of the country, especially from Zagreb, was very intense. Rada Iveković, Slavenka Drakulić, Jelena Zupa, Biljana Kašić, Vesna Kesić, Katarina Vidović, Slavica Jakobović, Vesna Pusić and others regularly came to Belgrade. In round tables at SKC for nigh on three years, guests included those who did not exclusively focus on feminism, but whose work was connected to the problematic of women's emancipation (Vesna Pešić, Nebojša Popov, Lino Veljak…). The round tables were open to both men and women.

From the middle of the 1980s, women only groups were formed. In Ljubljana, the first women's group LILITH was founded in 1985, and the first lesbian group Lilith LL in 1987. Lepa Mlađenović in 1986 in Belgrade re-formed and re-founded the feminist group *Žena i društvo*. Recalling that period, Lepa Mlađenović writes: "Another turning point in the development of feminism and the women's movement was the date of the founding of the SOS hotline for women and children victims of violence (*SOS telefona za žene i decu žrtve nasilja*). After the first ten years of elaborating upon and discussing the dimensions of women's subordination, activists emerged who felt the need to actually work with women directly. Feminists understood that male violence against women traversed all women's lives and that the development of services for women should begin with the SOS telephone hotline to give a space to women who have survived violence to have their experiences witnessed and believed. The first SOS telephone was established in Zagreb in 1988, followed by Ljubljana in 1989 and Belgrade in 1990. These SOS helplines had identical names, their rules of working and principles were discussed in the same workshops, and in the first women's camps we spent summers together – the exchange of mutual learning led to a precious kind of feminist politics of solidarity during the wars when political regimes emerged based on the nationalist exclusion of others".[60] Many of the contacts between women (now from the former Republics) which were established and developed in the 1980s, continued during the wars even though maintaining these links was difficult and dangerous.

At the end of the 1980s, in 1987 to be precise, the first Yugoslav feminist meeting was held in Ljubljana. This was followed by meetings in Zagreb and Belgrade, and the last meeting "Good girls go to heaven, bad girls go to Ljubljana" which was

59 Lina VUŠKOVIĆ, Sofija TRIVUNAC „Feministička grupa *Žena i društvo*"in Ka vidljivoj ženskoj istoriji: Ženski pokret u Beogradu 90-tih, (ed.) Marina Blagojević, Belgrade. Centar za ženske studije, istraživanje i komunikaciju, 1998, 47- 48.

60 Lepa MLAĐENOVIĆ, *Počeci feminizma ženski pokret u Beogradu, Zagrebu, Ljubljani*. Available at: http://www.womenngo.org.rs/content/blogcategory/28/61/#zena_i_drustvo (25.09. 2009).

held in Ljubljana in 1991, shortly before the country disintegrated in blood. The wars posed new questions and problems for the women's movement. Virtually all the particpants in the "Drug-ca Žena" conference remained active, engaged further in the opposition to wars and nationalisms in the 1990s. From the 1990s, the women's movement has been closely linked to the anti-war movement. The feminist critique of the socialist system which began in 1978 was followed by the critique of the nationalist states which emerged in this region in the 1990s.

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

Yugoslav workers' self-management

Emancipation of workers or capitalist division of labor?

Lila

It was probably because of the system of self-management why I became particularly interested in Yugoslavia and its successor states. Coming from a western country, workers self-management which characterized the Yugoslav economic reproduction seemed amazing to me. Workers should have had most of the power in every factory and the whole economy, as well as the local administration, was organized like this. Direct democracy in practice, workers decide about their fate – impressive. Living for several years in Ex-Yugoslavia, reading more about self-management and talking with (former) workers about their experience certainly changed my picture. Without a doubt, self-management did not live up to its expectations.

In the following text, I want to trace the idea and the development of Yugoslav self-management during the time of the "real existing socialism" and add a perspective of workers, which I got through discussing the topic with them. I believe that workers had better working conditions and officially more rights to influence the decision making in the factory in comparison to the situation of workers in western capitalist and eastern "communist" countries during that time; or, if we compare, it was certainly much better than their situation today in the Ex-Yugoslavian countries. Nevertheless, the system of workers' self-management was still a system that reproduced hierarchical and class-relations, similar to the ones in capitalist states or in socialism. When we talk about the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management, it has to be remarked that it was in constant change and development during its four decades of existence. Its' architecture inside factories and its embedment into the economic system underwent perpetual transformations. Beyond that, the ideological foundation of Yugoslavia, the influence of the State, in and outside of the factories, as well as the impact of a gradual liberalizing economy, are essential to understanding workers self-management.

Workers self-management in Yugoslavia came to life after the Second World War. With the takeover of power by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia[1], the economic transformation of Yugoslavia was initially oriented on the model of the Soviet Union. The nationalization of private property was introduced, later seen as the precondition for self-management. Nevertheless, Yugoslavian political elites neglected the role Stalin anticipated for Yugoslavia. A "third way", the countries self-positioning between the socialist and the capitalist blocks, was the outcome of this discontent between the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaders. Yugoslav political elites presented workers self-man-

1 The Communist Party was renamed in 1952 into the „League of Communists". As part of the break-up with Stalin, the Communist Party was reformed and decentralized. In every republic and autonomous region a separate League of Communists was founded, but they were still linked to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

agement as a specific model to distinguish oneself from the Soviet Union, while moving closer to the West. In Yugoslav propaganda workers self-management was presented as a consequence of the break-up between Tito and Stalin in 1948, but built up on the experiences of Second World War, during which the Partisans practiced some kind of self-management in the liberated areas. Criticizing the Soviet model as bureaucratic, the system of self-management was introduced as the "true" implementation of Marxist and Leninist principles. While companies in state-ownership were seen as hierarchically organized and fully penetrated by the State, self-management was shown as a step towards the "withering away of the State". It was, therefore, the "true" way to socialism. In 1963, state property was transformed into social property – a construct of property that belonged to "everybody and nobody" or to the "working people". By seeing state property and private property as obsolete forms, social property was supposed to belong to the society as a whole. Nevertheless, the overall goal was the modernization of the society and the economy with the normative goal of an industrial development in a workers society.[2]

Through time, workers' decision making rights on the normative level were increased in the factories. Beyond that, the influence of the State was slowly reduced, while market mechanisms were gradually extended. In 1952, central planning by the State concerning buying and selling was annulled. It was left to every factory where to purchase and to sell their goods, depending on their abilities and economic performance. Also in the beginning, nearly 95% of the investments was controlled by the State, in 1961 the workers' collective had most of the authority over their investments. This aspect and the introduction of individual wages in each factory had a big influence on the inequality of workers. Workers were now paid according to the "result of their work". Even though wage differences did not develop much in the same factory, they emerged between different branches or even on a national scale.[3] Therefore, the system enforced on one side the competition between the workers collectives, while on the other side there was also a competition between workers for higher paid jobs.[4] Factories in more profitable branches could pay higher wages, while in unprofitable and State-subsidized factories the wages were generally low. While some workers could not even pay for their daily expenses others could live a decent life. It was in addition common that a part of the workforce was employed for seasonal work or had a short term working contract, as it was in the interest of the factory to create profits.

The political elites answered to the decline in production and the high trade balance deficit in the beginning of the 1960s with a further liberalization of the Yugoslav economy. Especially through the economic reforms in 1964 many banks were given the rights to grant capital investments, taxes on profits were reduced, foreign investment into Yugoslavia was allowed and many prices were not set anymore by State authorities. A year later, the reduction of trade barriers were aimed to promote foreign trade so that Yugoslavia could position itself within the world market. However, the expectations of prosperity were not met. On the contrary: foreign imports flooded the country, economic performance declined and unemployment became a rising problem. As a consequence many unemployed left the country. With the new constitution in 1974, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia became even more institutionalized. Depending again on cheap western credits, foreign imports increased gradually. As a consequence of the oil-price shock in the end of the 1970s, interest rates rose. Yugoslavia found itself in a tremendous crisis. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fond pressured Yugoslavia into austerity measures. Many workers lost their jobs, salaries were frozen or tied to the productivity of the factory. A high inflation rate led to the impoverishment of a large part of the society. The dissatisfaction with the economic situation brought many workers to the streets. While at the end of the 1980s social demands were articulated, later the support for the Socialist Party of Serbia under Slobodan Milošević with its nationalist program was in the center of workers protests in Serbia, which were called the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution.[5]

One consequence of the "socialist" economy that used capitalist means were regional differences, which influenced the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia were more wealthy, while the southern region of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the autonomous

2 Lohoff, Ernst (1996): Der Dritte Weg in den Bürgerkrieg. Jugoslawien und das Ende der nachholenden Modernisierung. Bonn: Horlemann-Verlag. Edition krisis. pg. 46.
3 Höpken and Sundhaussen emphasized that wage differences in a company was not higher than 1:2,6 between the lowest and the highest skilled worker even until the early 1980s. Sundhaussen, Holm; Höpken,Wolfgang (1984): Handbuch Band 6, pg. 187.
4 Woodward (2003): The political economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia. http://www.socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5793#.WibPEHBulkU
5 The League of Communist Serbia was in 1990 transformed into the Socialist Party of Serbia.

region of Kosovo belonged to the poorest. It was in the interest of the republics - as their received revenues from the companies - that profits would be kept there. Even though the State established programs of capital distribution to poorer regions, large differences in terms of industrialization, investments and unemployment developed. This gap was never shut, but even developed further during the years. While in Slovenia the national product per capita in 1951 was 170% above the Yugoslav average, in 1981 it rose to 198%. In Kosovo, during the same period these numbers declined. In 1951, Kosovo national product per capital was 44,1% of the Yugoslav average while thirty years later just 30%.[6] An equal development amongst the different regions was therefore not achieved.

Having a closer look at workers' self-management on the shop-floor, the constant re-modeling of its' structures and ideological underpinning are an attribute that characterizes the system. Introduced in 1950, workers' self-management was closely linked to the State. Even though this system was imposed from "above" and not fought by workers in social struggles, it has to be noted that it was influenced by trade unions coming from the shop floor.[7] Workers' councils, elected by the workforce of every factory, were introduced in each factory and had initially an advisory function to the general manager. The director was imposed by State officials and had still most of the power in the factory. He[8] could use a veto against the decisions of the workers' council. As Unkovski-Korica noted, the Yugoslav elites imposed self-management not just to position oneself between the two blocks, but also to push back wage claims of workers. Besides, they were satisfied with the first results of self-managed factories as it increased productivity.[9] In 1965 the law changed. Directors were now elected by the workers' collective for four years and were under the directive of the workers' council. Therefore, the workers' council was supposed to be the highest decision making organ in the factories with most of the power. Even though the workers' collectives had now the possibility to select between different candidates for the appointment of the director, he had to be a member of the League of Communists. In 1976, the system of workers' self-management was again largely changed. With the introduction of smaller administrative units, the so-called "Basic Organizations of Associated Labor" (Osnovne organizacije udruženog rada), the influence of workers on decisions should have been increased. Smaller units of large sized factories were now split and set to perform as individual entities. Through contracts, factories were supposed to negotiate about their production with other companies which was intended to ensure the control of economic system by the workers. This system never really lived-up to its expectations.

The participation of workers in the self-management factories during the four decades of workers self-management changed within its' development. It was mostly in the 1960, that workers were actively participating. The number of meetings of the workers councils was high (24,3 meetings per year) and each meeting lasted about three to four hours. Afterwards, the number decreased as well as the attendance of the workers. It even further declined in the 1970s and 1980s. In the beginning,

6 Lohoff, pg. 78
7 Unkovski-Korica, Vladimir (2017): The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia. From World War II to Non-Alignment. London: I.B. Tauris, pg. 89
8 Here I intentionally use the male pronoun because it was mostly men who occupied higher positions in the factories. See the numbers below.
9 Unkoviski-Korica, pg. 98

workers discussed the functioning and organization of self-management. It was of everyone's interest to figure out how to make the system work. There was also a kind of sense of belonging induced by self-management mechanisms that fostered participation. Later, the working conditions and the living situation of workers, salaries or the investment into the factories capacities were frequent topics in workers councils. Yugoslav scholars explained the drop in participation with a kind of adjustment to the system.[10] But it was also the experience of disillusionment that workers encountered in the factories. The promises of a system of workers control in the factories were never fulfilled. It was mostly the management and directors who were actively participating in the meetings of the workers councils and directly and/or indirectly decided about the development of the factory. This trend was even more visible during the 1960s, when business knowledge was more valued. Beyond, managers and directors had most of the information, so a knowledge hierarchy influenced the decision making in the factories. Scholars emphasized that workers on the shop floor – mostly in the beginning after the installment of workers self-management – did not have access to education and therefore did not have knowledge about their rights. Furthermore, they were used to a patriarchal system of decision making. For women, workers' self-management was not – similar to other areas of social life – a place for emancipation. Even though women had a higher rate of employment than in capitalist countries, it was mostly men who were elected in the workers councils.[11] On one side, because women experienced a kind of "triple burden" of labor, participation in decision making and reproductive labor. On the other side, male networks were present in factories. Besides, women were less represented in higher positions in the factory. At the end of the 1970s, around 6% of general managers in factories were women, while in 1987 this number slightly rose to 6,43%.[12]

Talking to workers who experienced self-management in factories at the end of the 1980s, they mostly expressed disillusionment about the functionality of the system. Many explained that decisions in the factories were made by the general managers who were influenced by the League of Communists. They stressedth at the decisions were not made in the workers councils, but "somewhere else". Sociological accounts on the question mostly coincide with what workers remembered. Members of the League of Communists had most of the power in factories. They made a significant part of the management.[13] This does not seem to be a paradox, as the membership was nearly for everybody a precondition for a higher position in the factory. Nevertheless, the relation between managers and the political elites did seem conflictive. While managers criticized the system as ineffective, decision making would take too long and legal rights would have been insecure, political elites feared the influence of successful managers, as they were in a position of power.[14]

The "socialist" system of workers self-management was, therefore, filled with contradictions and could not live up to promises made by the Socialist elites. These discrepancies came to light through the high numbers of strikes. Within the normative framework of self-management, strikes were seen as highly contradictory within a system where workers decided about their fate and had the power: "Workers cannot strike against themselves." But even though strikes were not forbidden, but also not allowed in Yugoslavia, they were mostly neglected in the public discourse. From 1958 until 1969 already 2000 strikes occurred. Afterwards, this trend did not decline. Around an average of 150 workers were involved in a strike.[15] As Jovanov stresses, workers were mostly unsatisfied with their wages, or in minor cases felt a kind of dissatisfaction with how their work was valued. Moreover, they criticized their minor position in the economic or public sphere and their influence on political decisions. It seems also interesting that these strikes lasted mostly not longer than one day. The political elite had an interest in quickly ending them. As they were seen as contradictory to the system of workers self-management, a public discussion would challenge the system. Therefore, workers demands were quickly fulfilled. Some of the workers, however, feared being labeled as a "politicaly suspicious worker" and were therefore afraid of strikes in general or had an interest in quickly ending them.[16]

The strikes in general could also be seen as an indicator for the class division within the Yugoslav society: mainly workers in the production sector showed their discomfort, while workers with a better social status, workers in banks, public administration, or in foreign trade companies, did not tend to strike. It was not just wages but also other forms of economic discrimination workers in the production sector experienced. One example is the access to housing. Housing was a right for every worker and should have been implemented by the company. However, workers on the shop floor mostly waited longer for a flat or a housing loan than e.g. workers in public administration.[17] Also, managers and other higher skilled workers within a factory had privileged access. Even though a system was installed which should favor workers in need, this was not always fulfilled in practice. It was mainly argued that the labor of higher skill workers seemed more important for the success of the factory and therefore they should be granted with better working and living conditions.[18]

Today there is not much left of workers' self-management. Workers talk disappointedly about the self-management aspects of the Yugoslav system. Even though workers positively emphasize the welfare system, which was also granted by the factory and the former more comradely atmosphere on the shop-floor, they did not feel like the ones who decided in the factory. At the end of the 1980s, public discourse about workers' self-management changed. It was seen as one of the causes for the economic crisis. Workers were blamed for not working efficiently enough, because it was hard to dismiss them from their job, or they were presented as lazy or stealing from their workplaces. Also, workers experienced a decline in their living conditions due to the crises. This was - as well - one of the reasons why they welcomed the privatization of "their" factory, which meant at the same time a decline of their formal decision making rights. The media and political elites presented privatization of the socially owned factories as a means for achieving better working results and therefore higher wages. Even though workers today think differently about privatization, associate it to a further decline of their living conditions, the loss of their jobs and/or the development of a capitalist elite which is closely connected to the State, they mostly do not refer to workers' self-management as an alternative. It is either seen as inefficient and/or widely connoted with an autocratic regime.

The Yugoslav system of workers' self-management did not achieve to resolve the contradictions between capital and work as the ideological concept promised. Competition was always an inherent factor of the Yugoslav system of self-management that prevented an egalitarian and equal society. Also within factories, equality was not achieved. Managers and general managers were still highly influential and it was not workers who took over the control. Even though I do not agree with the thesis that the system of workers' self-management was determined to collapse and with it Yugoslavia as a whole, the system created inequalities – regionally and among the working class itself. The constant liberalization of the Yugoslav economy deepened this. Class division was therefore a deep-rooted part of the system and prevented it from becoming a project of emancipation of workers and other parts of society.

10 Supek, Rudi (1986): Probleme und Erfahrungen der jugoslawischen Arbeiterselbstverwaltung. In: Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev; Haberl, Othma Nikola; Höpken, Wolfgang (eds): Jugoslawien am Ende der Ära Tito. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. 159-185, pg. 166.

11 In the 1970s and 80s, around 33% of the workforce was female but this differed greatly within Yugoslavia. Bonfiglioli, Chiara (2014): Gender, Labour and Precarity in the South East European Periphery: the Case of Textile Workers in Štip. In: Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 1(2), 7 – 23, pg. 8

12 Gudac–Dodić, 2006, pg. 75-76 quoted in: Marija Radoman: Restauracija kapitalizma i položaj žena. Neoliberalni oblik kaptialističke regulacije i radna prava žena u Srbiji. In: Vesić, Darko et.al. (eds): Bilans Stanja - Doprinos Analizi Restauracije Kapitalizma u Srbiji. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Southeastern Europe. 83-144. pg. 147

13 Novakovic, Nada (1990): Samoupravna moć u radnoj organizaciji. In: Janićijević, Milosav; Bolcić; Silvano, Topić, Lidija; Davidović, Milena; Novaković, Nada (Hrsg.): Novi pravci promena društvene strukture Jugoslavije. Belgrad: Institut društvenih nauka. 147 – 170, pg. 151

14 Sirc, Ljubomir (1979): The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Management. London. pg. 186

15 Neca Jovanov: Dijagnoza samoupravljanja. 1974-1981. pg. 179

16 See Jovanov, pg. 193

17 Jovanov, pg. 191

18 Archer, Rory (2016): 'Paid for by the Workers, Occupied by the Bureaucrats': Housing Inequalities in 1980s Belgrade. In: Archer, Rory; Duda, Igor; Stubbs, Paul (eds): Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism, Abingdon: Routledge.

Paul Zorkine (Pavle Vrbica)

Guillaume Lenormant

Born on 8 April 1921 in Cetinje (Montenegro), died 22 July 1962 in Bourganeuf (Creuse), lawyer, libertarian communist.

Son of Pero Vrbica, bank director and of Zorka Petrovitch, Pavle Vrbica was from a quite politicized family (his grandfather had translated Marx into Serbo-Croat), He became politically active when he was studying law at Zagreb university. Militant with the Communist Youth, he fought against its Stalinist trend and was excluded from the organization by request of a man who would, many years later, become one of the leaders of the Tito regime, theoretician of autogestion, then dissident from that same regime: Milovan Djilas.

Pavle Vrbica then dedicated himself to the antifascist struggle. In 1939, he volunteered to defend Czechoslovakia against the Hitlerian invasion. Back at the university of Zagreb, he joined a student antifascist resistance network. In 1942, contributed, among other activities, to *Dynamit*, a periodical published in Montenegro and scarcely distributed, its main editor having been arrested early.

His adherence to anarchism seems to date from that period, where in one of his leaflets, he refers to Bakunin. He was arrested, incarcerated and tortured by the Ustashi. During a transfer to Montenegro, he escaped and joined a resistance maquis. Towards the end of the war he crossed the Adriatic with a few comrades and joined the Allied troops in Italy. When the war ended, he was a non-commissioned officer in the RAF. After the Liberation, Pavle Vrbica refused the honorary posts and positions of power which he was offered by the new communist regime . He soon became a political refugee in Italy, then in France.

Jail and maquis life left their marks on him and he suffered from tuberculosis. For several years, he had to stay in a sanatorium in the Black Forest (Baden-Württemberg). It is only in the early fifties that he was able to come to Paris to study Oriental languages and political science. At the school of political science, Pavle Vrbica met Roland Breton, who soon became an inseparable friend and with whom he then joined the Fédération anarchiste (FA). In 1952, they formed the group Troisième front (third front) and immediately positioned themselves in the libertarian communist trend of the FA. Until 1954, they contributed many articles to *Le Libertaire* under a common pseudonym: Paul Rolland.

At the same period, the man who henceforth adopted the name Paul Zorkine (the pseudonym comes from his mother's maiden name) made two attempts at creating a group of Yugoslavs in exile: a short-lived Fédération anarchiste balkanique, followed by the group Khristo Botev.

The group Troisième front being too small in numbers, Paul Zorkine and Roland Breton then joined the Sacco et Vanzetti group (5th and 6th arrondissements of Paris), one of the pillars of the libertarian communist trend within the FA, which included among others Léo Emery, Serge Ninn and Giliane Berneri. Shortly after, this group renamed itself Kronstadt. Paul Zorkine was one of the writers of the article "Le vrai sens d'une rencontre" ("the true meaning of an encounter", 18 September 1952), cowritten with Serge Ninn and Roland Breton. This article was to lead to a break-up between *Le Libertaire* and the group of surrealists that contributed to it.

After the transformation of the FA into the Fédération communiste libertaire (FCL), Paul Zorkine and the Kronstadt group dissociated themselves from the FCL's national committee. In the Mémorandum Kronstadt, they denounced the methods of Georges Fontenis and his fraction, named Organisation Pensée Bataille. With the publication of the Mémorandum, the Kronstadt group openly became dissident. At a meeting in Mâcon on 30-31 October and 1 November 1954, a few groups that disagreed with the national committee of the FCL (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Mâcon, Kronstadt) created a network, les Groupes anarchistes d'action révolutionnaire (GAAR). In 1955, the GAAR became autonomous and eventually turned into an organization independent from the FCL, In March 1956, they published the first issue of their review, *Noir et Rouge*. In line with the FCL, the GAAR supported the Algerian struggle for independence. Upon a request by Guy Bourgeois, from the GAAR, Paul Zorkine supplied the Lyon network led by Jean-Marie Brochier with the necessary equipment to set up a clandestine printing house.

In May 1961, a section of the GAAR — including the Kronstadt group — decided to join the FA recreated by Maurice Joyeux and Aristide Lapeyre and to form within it a libertarian communist trend called Union des groupes anarchistes communistes (UGAC). Paul Zorkine and his comrade Henri Kléber then took part, on behalf of the UGAC, in the editorial board of *Le Monde libertaire*, where they clashed with Maurice Joyeux in particular. The UGAC's attempt to place libertarian communism once again at the heart of anarchism was on the whole a failure.

In 1955 Paul Zorkine had married Jacqueline Caresmel, with whom he had two children. He died in July 1962 in a car accident. Roland Breton wrote about him: "He was a Mediterranean more than a Slav. Always dressed up to the nines. […] He had a great sense of humour, was very observant, critical. […] Before all he was a man of the word. He could charm with his speech which, together with his presence, one couldn't ignore."

SOURCES: Lettre de Walter (GAAR) au CIRA, 1959 — Nécrologie de Paul Zorkine dans *Le Monde libertaire,* 1962 — lettre de Roland Breton à Laurent Vrbica — Georges Fontenis, *Changer le monde, Histoire du mouvement communiste libertaire 1945-1997,* éd. Alternative libertaire/Le Coquelicot, 2000 — Maurice Joyeux, *L'Hydre de Lerne,* éd. du Monde libertaire, 1967 — Collectif, *L'Insurrection algérienne et les communistes libertaires,* Alternative libertaire, 1992.



The myth of workers councils under Tito

Paul Zorkine (1959)

Introduction

The Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Berlin uprising, the Polish events and, in general, the failures of stalinism in Eastern as well as in Western Europe, have brought back the question of workers councils back to the forefront of revolutionary activity.

It is not our intention to relate the history of workers councils, which already exist during the French revolution as "Conseils des communes", during various revolutionary movements in 1848, then, during the Commune, up until the first soviet of the Putilov factory in St Petersburg in 1905, the first soviet congress in June 1917, the Kronstadt soviet against the bolshevik dictature in 1921, the "Republic of Councils" at the end of WW1 in Hungary, in Germany, in Austria, at both ends of the Adriatic: in Pola and in Cattaro, in Spain and in China, to witness a last fit, in 1956, in Budapest.

One will point out that we forget in that list the Yugoslavian workers councils.

It is not, let's confess it right away, an oversight: for us, the creation of "workers councils" by the Yugoslavian government only represent a new mystification of the working class by the bureaucracy. Dangerous:

- for the Yugoslavian workers, for whom it compromises a revolutionary institution which had remained – until then - "clean" (one could oppose to the Party the idea of workers councils)
- for "a certain European left" that clings to the "Yugoslavian example" and the slogan of Tito's government: "Transfer of the factories to the workers!" as the only solution still possible between capitalism and stalinism.

Which is why it is important to scrutinise the real content of the "Yugoslavian experience" and its consequences.

"Standard" of living or socialism can't ignore the stomach

It is with the law of April 1st 1952 that the new salary system came into effect in all the economic enterprises in Yugoslavia. Until that date, salaries were fixed by governmental decree.

The creation of a new industry of equipment goods, the investments renewed annually served mostly the growth and strengthening of the bureaucratic apparatus, of the State, of the "new class". This effort translated for the working class into a constant diminution of their living standards and consumption to roughly 4 or 5 times below the living standards, not that great, of French factory workers. For farmers, "socialist edification" meant the compulsory purchase by the State, at derisory prices, of 82% of their products. Such a policy led the country to economic catastrophe. After the breaking off between of the SKJ and Moscow, the ruling class, freed from the obligation of docilely executing the soviet directives in State's organisation and economy, found itself obligated to make important concessions to the farmers as well as to the working class. This is how farmers reconquered the freedom to freely decide the nature of their production, and the compulsory purchase of their products was progressively abandoned.

The concession granted to the working class was the creation of factory workers councils. The official propaganda states that the workers themselves decide of the level of their salary and the distribution of the factory earnings. This workers' participation to the management of the enterprises was to put an end to the continual lowering of the workers' standard of living. Because here is, finally, the question: what does the government offer us as a means to get out of this miserable situation? Will "workers' involvement in the management of the enterprise" put an end to the continuous lowering of the workers' standard of living?

The national revenue or the inequality of the cake slices

It is the law which fixes every year the plan for the whole of the production and distribution of goods within the Yugoslavian state. It is therefore the Parliament which decides in the end, after a vague consultation of trade unions, cooperatives, etc. It is true that the plan does not set the nature and the quantities of products to manufacture, to deliver, but the "compulsory minimum use of the production capacities". This "minimum" is for agriculture of 105%, to reach the planned production and pay for the magic chimerical transformation plan of an agricultural country into a highly industrialised one – investment: 17.7% of the national revenue – and to bring peace of mind to the new ruling classes – the army, the armament, the State's administration: 45.4% of the net national revenue… The part for the "wage earners" in all this? Well! In the revenue produced by industry and mining, to cite only this example, it is only 14.9%. This part is fixed in advance by the plan which, outside of the "minimum use", fixes the global pool of salary to be spent for this level of use. The first elements to determine the salary pool are the production rules and the optimum personnel: how many employees and workers are iessential to "run" the enterprise at X% of its production capacity?

By fixing in advance the level of use of enterprises, the state determines the quality and volume of the production.

By fixing the global pool of salaries, he State ensures that the consumption and standards planned for the employees will not be exceeded. Within this global pool, the employees share it within themselves as they see fit and arrive docilely to a sort of auto-exploitation and, even, self-punishment (we quote "Borba"):

> "The global pool of salaries (the sum paid to the whole of the staff) will be diminished by each non justified work absence… This means that the whole collective must stand against those of its members who will try to diminish the global salary pool by creating unjustified costs".

The whole Yugoslavian working class should transform into "pointeau", warden, overseer. Because the key word is: "Lowering the production costs" or, rather nastily "we will not share the gains with the lazy!". Indeed, the salaries are fixed in such a way that they enable employees to satisfy their most elementary needs. But these salaries being only a part of the income of a wage-earner, one holds out the possibility to receive the second slice, taken from the global pool. It is the yearly statement of account of an enterprise which must show the part of everyone into the sharing of gains. The simplest way to achieve an increase in the profitability of the enterprise is to lower production costs and increase the productivity of every worker. In reality, all these measures happen to the detriment of the worker, worsening the conditions in which he works and asking for an ever increasing effort, physical as well as psychological. Especially, when the road between the production chain and the directing offices where the benefits are "shared" is long… Long, and it passes through the State coffers which cover the "social contributions" by taking from enterprises gross revenues. By "social contributions" we mean not "national insurance and such" but ALL of the spending planned by the State to cover the costs of administration, the army, and investments. Before, then, being able to receive the second slice of their salary, as in "their share of the companies' profit", Yugoslavian workers have to generate by the sale of their products: the amount of their salary and the amount of their contribution to the State's coffers in the form of "social contributions". It is evident that enterprises work out their prices, "social contributions" included. Can we allow ourselves to offer competitive prices (the Yugoslavian market is a free market) within which is included such a heavy cost? The risks of a bad economic climate, the Yugoslavian worker shares it with his employer – the State –

or, at the very least, with the Finance minister whom he becomes complicit with… if we believe the law of April 1st 1952?

What is certain is that the more technically advanced an enterprise is, the more higer its percentage of costs and the more its workers' collective will find itself in the obligation to diminish the salaries pool, if it wants to be competitive. This trick by the Yugoslavian "Communists" to force factory workers to lower their wages is picturesque enough! What do our Western "Titoists" think about this?

And the added value?

Well! It changed its name… This is called in "socialist" Yugoslavia the "State's slice". Here it is: frank and precise. The new added value created by labour are divided in 2 slices: salaries pool (the workers' slice) and the added value (the State's slice). Besides, the enterprise, completely bereft of financial means, is effectively controlled by the State, and its assets are only numbers in the accounts of the State's bank. If the law of April 1st 1952 pretends that the workers have a role in the management of the country's industrial capital, it cannot hide that they have no say in the management of the financial capital, which totally dominates the former. And the participation of the State in the sharing of the added value created by the unplanned production increases is controlled by a special tax, which an enterprise that exceeds its minimum production must pay. A sinking fund guarantees the renewal of equipment and, in case the plan does not foresee it, the enterprise must create its own investment fund, reserve fund and social fund.

The net profit only starts after having sufficiently contributed to those funds… after having given to the State what the State asks for in "social contributions".

DESPITE HEAVY PRESSURE, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE YUGOSLAVIAN RULING CLASS TO OBTAIN THOSE REVENUES UNDER THE PURELY BUREAUCRATIC DIRECTION OF PRODUCTION. IT IS THROUGH THE "WORKERS COUNCILS" THAT THE YUGOSLAVIAN BUREAUCRACY MEANS TO ENSURE THE DESIRED REVENUES AND THE COMPLICITY OF THE WORKING CLASS.

"Factories to the workers"

Therefore here are the fundamental principles on which rest the Yugoslavian workers councils – we summarize:

- profitability: no economic enterprise can live from public subsidies, but on the contrary it must be able to cover via its income all of the running costs and pay to the State the targets of the plan.
- Profit-sharing: the workers and employees working in an enterprise must be interested in its success, meaning the amount of their salaries must be determined by the profitability of the enterprise.

How we gave "the factories to the workers"

All enterprises are property of the "People" (read: of the State), The "people" who works there does not have any rights upon the enterprise, the government can remove its hands off at any time under any excuse of "public interest". So, a worker can be fired from "his" enterprise – and even the whole of the employees (including the workers council). The workers council working in an enterprise is there only to keep it "running" under a number of "sine qua non" conditions:

- amortization of machines and equipment (or restitution),
- acquisition of new tools of production, buildings, means of production, equipment (investments),
- State property must therefore grow every year,
- pay all the taxes prescribed by the State,

This proves that in the "Titoist" system and under cover of the "workers councils", OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION IS KEPT SEPARATED FROM THE PRODUCERS and that, to speak clearly, YUGOSLAVIAN WORKERS ARE STILL WAGE-EARNING EMPLOYEES. They can neither dispose of the means of production, nor of the fruit of their labour, nor steer the production, nor decide the mode of distribution.

Without those four factors, for us, there is no socialist economy.

Enterprises management

The Yugoslav system differentiates from traditional State capitalism in terms of "workers' co-management"

An economic enterprise is, in principle, led by "workers councils", ie by the entire staff that works there. All these individuals have the same rights in the accomplishment of their tasks as members of the council, whatever theirwork in the enterprise and regardless of the level of their salraries. Yes, all – which is very democratic – EXCEPT THE

DIRECTOR. Because it is him, the Director, who decides even of the composition of the "workers council", insofar as IT IS HIM WHO EMPLOYS AND SACKS THE STAFF. So, all of the staff can be changed during the course of the year but, legal trick, the council does not cease to exist and is comprised of staff working at any given moment in time. The central point stays the Director, he reason for this being simple: it is him – and not the council – who represents the owner of the enterprise: The State. We cannot better qualify or define the role of the director than the law itself:

> "The Director leads production and all the affairs of the enterprise. The workers and staff are responsible in front of the Director of the accomplishment of their task. The Director represent the enterprise towards the state and the other enterprises" (Law fro june 18 1950, article 8)

The Director is a member of the management committee but, something rather curious, the law places him above this committee:

> "If the Director finds that a decision by the management committee does not correspond to the law, to legal requirements and TO THE ORDER OF THE COMPETENT STATE AUTHORITIES, he is obliged to immediately alert those authorities and to suspend the execution of the management committee's decision while until that the competent state organism takes the definitive decision" (article 40 of above law)

It must be understood that THE DIRECTOR IS NOT THE COMMERCIAL MANAGER NOR THE TECHNICAL DIRECTOR OF THE ENTERPRISE, which could have just about justified his power. According to "Borba" (official newspaper of the SKJ in issue dated: 13/2/52), out of 763 directors of economic enterprises in Yugoslavia, 186 had some technical knowledge, but 702 were active members of the SKJ. Which explains many things and compels this newspaper to defend them against the reproach of incompetence, of uselessness for the enterprise.

> "All those directors have well understood that THEIR ESSENTIAL DUTY is to be faithful to the Party and that the authority of the State has named them to these posts mostly to reward the militants and the fighters they have been..."

"Borba" states that "the authority of the people" has a need for such directors, as "they are the best guards of possessions" which this "popular authority" owns. But, as a guard is not sufficient, we have reinforced the security with the presence of he "economic police" in each enterprise. It is this presence of police squad which gives Yugoslav factories an air of barracks (or of prisons, which is only slightly different). It is the police which enforces rules, discipline and immediate execution of the directors' orders. In front of each Yugoslav factory is a policeman. Even the "lefty" Western tourists cannot possibly not see it. What they don't see is an "apparatus of internal security" that Yugoslav workers called in their slang, the "tzynkarosh" (rat, snitch), one must know the worker's attitude towards "the good socialists" and also his mentality and political concepts. This type of surveillance was the task of the SKJ members working in the enterprise. But

they are not numerous enough and rarely possess the technical knowledge to check iwhether a worker is "sabotaging" the work. To ensure this task, the State's economic board seeks persons able at this type of work within the members of the collective. There exists specialised technical colleges where the Tzinkar are trained. They are not therefore miserable little informers like as we have in Western factories, but a real institution, well organised, with technical training – a sort of non-commissioned officers of the industry. Besides having the privilege of a guaranteed employment (in some enterprises their number has increased up to 10% of all employees!) the "Tzinkars" are put forward in priority onto the lists of candidates for the workers councils...

Here are the conditions in which the collective elects every year the workers Council, composed of 15 to 120 members (in enterprises with less than 30 workers and staff, the collective in its entirety constitutes the workers council). Its role? According to the law it

- Approves the base plans and the final account of the enterprise,
- validates the conclusions relating to the management of the enterprise and the realisation of the economic plan,
- states the rules of the enterprise with approval from the competent State's body
- performs the division of the part of accumulated capital, being available to the enterprise

The ordinance number 45-280 dated February 22nd 1945 instituting the "Comités d'entreprise" in France, gives the following definition of its social and economic role:

> "The enterprise committee ensures or controls the management of all social works… must be consulted on questions concerning the organisation, the management and the general running of the enterprise… must be informed of the profit made by the enterprise and can put forward suggestions as to how they could be used..."

But we don't want to make comparisons. Our goal was to dismantle the myth of the Yugoslav "Workers Councils", which a certain left takes for a model of a revolutionary institution. We want, based on the facts invoked, to state that workers cannot control the management of the economy without disposing of the essential rights of freedom of speech, of meeting, of organisation: THAT THE IDEA EVEN OF WORKERS COUNCIL IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE APPARATUS; that – each time we have tried to make the two coexist (State – workers council) – it was never the State who "withered" but, on the contrary it was the State that absorbed the Councils,

What is left of them in Yugoslavia?

Birth of a Revolutionary Movement in Yugoslavia

Fredy Perlman (1969)



"*Heretics are always more dangerous than enemies," concluded a Yugoslav philosopher after analyzing the repression of Marxist intellectuals by the Marxist regime of Poland*. (S. Stojanovic, in Student, Belgrade, April 9, 1968, p. 7.)

In Yugoslavia, where "workers' self-management" has become the official ideology, a new struggle for popular control has exposed the gap between the official ideology and the social relations which it claims to describe. The heretics who exposed this gap have been temporarily isolated; their struggle has been momentarily suppressed. The ideology of "self-management" continues to serve as a mask for a commercial-technocratic bureaucracy which has successfully concentrated the wealth and power created by the Yugoslav working population. However, even a single and partial removal of the mask spoils its efficacy: the ruling "elite" of Yugoslavia has been exposed; its "Marxist" proclamations have been unveiled as myths which, once unveiled, no longer serve to justify its rule.

In June 1968, the gap between theory and practice, between official proclamations and social relations, was exposed through practice, through social activity: students began to organize them-

selves in demonstrations and general assemblies, and the regime which proclaims self-management reacted to this rare example of popular self-organization by putting an end to it through police and press repression.

The nature of the gap between Yugoslav ideology and society had been analyzed before June 1968, not by "class enemies" of Yugoslavia's ruling "revolutionary Marxists," but by Yugoslav revolutionary Marxists — by heretics. According to official declarations, in a society where the working class is already in power there are no strikes, because it is absurd for workers to strike against themselves. Yet strikes, which were not reported by the press because they could not take place in Yugoslavia, have been breaking out for the past eleven years — and massively (Susret, No. 98, April 18, 1969). Furthermore, "strikes in Yugoslavia represent a symptom of the attempt to revive the workers' movement." In other words, in a society where workers are said to rule, the workers' movement is dead. "This may sound paradoxical to some people. But it is no paradox due to the fact that workers' self-management exists largely 'on paper'..." (L. Tadic in Student, April 9, 1968, p. 7.)

Against whom do students demonstrate, against whom do workers strike, in a society where students and workers already govern themselves? The answer to this question cannot be found in declarations of the Yugoslav League of Communists, but only in critical analyses of Yugoslav social relations — analyses which are heretical because they contradict the official declarations. In capitalist societies, activities are justified in the name of progress and the national interest. In Yugoslav society, programs, policies and reforms are justified in the name of progress and the working class. However, it is not the workers who initiate the dominant projects, nor do the projects serve the workers' interests:

"On the one hand, sections of the working class are wage-workers who live below the level necessary for existence. The burden of the economic reform is carried by the working class, a fact which must be openly admitted. On the other hand, small groups unscrupulously capitalize themselves overnight, on the basis of private labor, services, commerce, and as middlemen. Their capital is not based on their labor, but on speculation, mediation, transformation of personal labor into property relations, and often on outright corruption." (M. Pecujlic in Student, April 30, 1968, p. 2.)

The paradox can be stated in more general terms: social relations already known to Marx reappear in a society which has experienced a socialist revolution led by a Marxist party in the name of the working class. Workers receive wages in exchange for their sold labor (even if the wages are called "personal incomes" and "bonuses"); the wages are an equivalent for the material goods necessary for the workers' physical and social survival; the surplus labor, appropriated by state or enterprise bureaucracies and transformed into capital, returns as an alien force which determines the material and social conditions of the workers' existence. According to official histories, Yugoslavia eliminated exploitation in 1945, when the Yugoslav League of Communists won state power. Yet workers whose surplus labor supports a state or commercial bureaucracy, whose unpaid labor turns against them as a force which does not seem to result from their own activity but from some higher power — such workers perform forced labor: they are exploited. According to official histories, Yugoslavia eliminated the bureaucracy as a social group over the working class in 1952, when the system of workers' self-management was introduced. But workers who alienate their living activity in exchange for the means of life do not control themselves; they are controlled by those to whom they alienate their labor and its products, even if these people eliminated themselves in legal documents and proclamations.

In the United States, trusts ceased to exist legally precisely at the point in history when trusts began to centralize the enormous productive power of the U. S. working class. In Yugoslavia, the social stratum which manages the working class ceased to exist in 1952. But in actual fact, "the dismantling of the unified centralized bureaucratic monopoly led to a net of self-managing institutions in all branches of social activity (nets of workers' councils, self-managing bodies, etc.) From a formal-legal, normative, institutional point of view, the society is self-managed. But is this also the status of real relations? Behind the self-managed facade, within the self-managed bodies, two powerful and opposed tendencies arise from the production relations. Inside of each center of decision there is a bureaucracy in a metamorphosed, decentralized form. It consists of informal groups who maintain a monopoly in the management of labor, a monopoly in the distribution of surplus labor against the workers and their interests, who appropriate on the basis of their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy and not on the basis of labor, who try to keep the representatives of 'their' organization, of 'their' region, permanently in power so as to ensure their own position and to maintain the former separation, the unqualified labor and the irrational production — transferring the burden to the workers. Among themselves they behave like the representatives of monopoly ownership... On the other hand, there is a profoundly socialist, self-governing tendency, a movement which has already begun to stir..." (Pecujlic in Ibid.)

This profoundly socialist tendency represents a struggle against the dependence and helplessness which allows workers to be exploited with the products of their own labor; it represents a struggle for control of all social activities by those who perform them. Yet what form can this struggle take in a society which already proclaims self-organization and self-control as its social, economic and legal system? What forms of revolutionary struggle can be developed in a context where a communist party already holds state power, and where this communist party has already proclaimed the end of bureaucratic rule and raised self-management to the level of an official ideology? The struggle, clearly, cannot consist of the expropriation of the capitalist class, since this expropriation has already taken place; nor can the struggle consist of the taking of state power by a revolutionary Marxist party, since such a party has already wielded state power for a quarter of a century. It is of course possible to do the thing over again, and to convince oneself that the outcome will be better the second time than the first. But the political imagination is not so poor that it need limit its perspectives to past failures. It is today realized, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, that the expropriation of the capitalist class and its replacement by "the organization of the working class" (i.e. the Communist Party), that the taking of national-state power by "the organization of the working class" and even the official proclamation of various types of "socialism" by the Communist Party in power, are already historical realities, and that they have not meant the end of commodity production, alienated labor, forced

labor, nor the beginning of popular self-organization and self-control.

Consequently, forms of organized struggle which have already proved themselves efficient instruments for the acceleration of industrialization and for rationalizing social relations in terms of the model of the Brave New World, cannot be the forms of organization of a struggle for independent and critical initiative and control on the part of the entire working population. The taking of state power by the bureau of a political party is nothing more than what the words say, even if this party calls itself "the organization of the working class," and even if it calls its own rule "the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" or "Workers' Self-Management." Furthermore, Yugoslav experience does not even show that the taking of state power by the "organization of the working class" is a stage on the way toward workers' control of social production, or even that the official proclamation of "workers' self-management" is a stage towards its realization. The Yugoslav experiment would represent such a stage, at least historically, only in case Yugoslav workers were the first in the world to initiate a successful struggle for the de-alienation of power at all levels of social life. However, Yugoslav workers have not initiated such a struggle. As in capitalist societies, students have initiated such a struggle, and Yugoslav students were not among the first.

The conquest of state power by a political party which uses a Marxist vocabulary in order to manipulate the working class must be distinguished from another, very different historical task: the overthrow of commodity relations and the establishment of socialist relations. For over half a century, the former has been presented in the guise of the latter. The rise of a "new left" has put an end to this confusion; the revolutionary movement which is experiencing a revival on a world scale is characterized precisely by its refusal to push a party bureaucracy into state power, and by its opposition to such a bureaucracy where it is already in power.

Party ideologues argue that the "new left" in capitalist societies has nothing in common with student revolts in "socialist countries." Such a view, at best, is exaggerated: with respect to Yugoslavia it can at most be said that the Yugoslav student movement is not as highly developed as in some capitalist countries: until June, 1968, Yugoslav students were known for their political passivity, pro-United States sympathies and petit-bourgeois life goals. However, despite the wishes of the ideologues, Yugoslav students have not remained far behind; the search for new forms of organization adequate for the tasks of socialist revolution has not remained alien to Yugoslav students. In May,1968, while a vast struggle to de-alienate all forms of separate social power was gaining historical experience in France, the topic "Students and Politics" was discussed at the Belgrade Faculty of Law. The "theme which set the tone of the discussion" was: "...the possibility for human engagement in the 'new left' movement which, in the words of Dr. S. Stojanovic, opposes the mythology of the 'welfare state' with its classical bourgeois democracy, and also the classical left parties — the social-democratic parties which have succeeded by all possible means in blunting revolutionary goals in developed Western societies, as well as the communist parties which often discredited the original ideals for which they fought, frequently losing them altogether in remarkably bureaucratic deformations." ("The Topic is Action," Student, May 14, 1968, p. 4.)

By May,1968, Yugoslav students had a great deal in common with their comrades in capitalist societies. A front page editorial of the Belgrade student newspaper said, "the tension of the present social-political situation is made more acute by the fact that there are no quick and easy solutions to numerous problems. Various forms of tension are visible in the University, and the lack of perspectives, the lack of solutions to numerous problems, is at the root of various forms of behavior. Feeling this, many are asking if the tension might be transformed into conflict, into a serious political crisis, and what form this crisis will take. Some think the crisis cannot be avoided, but can only be blunted, because there is no quick and efficient way to affect conditions which characterize the entire social structure, and which are the direct causes of the entire situation." ("Signs of Political Crisis, Student, May 21, 1968, p. 1.) The same front page of the student paper carried the following quotation from Marx, on "the veiled alienation at the heart of labor": "...Labor produces wonders for the rich, but misery for the worker. It produces palaces, but a hovel for the worker. It produces beauty, but horror for the worker. It replaces labor with machines, but throws part of the workers backward into barbarian work, and transforms the other part into machines. It produces spirit, but for the worker it produces stupidity and cretinism."

The same month, the editorial of the Belgrade Youth Federation journal said, "...the revolutionary role of Yugoslav students, in our opinion, lies in their engagement to deal with general social problems and contradictions (among which the problems and contradictions of the social and material situation of students are included). Special student problems, no matter how drastic, cannot be solved in isolation, separate from the general social problems: the material situation of students cannot be separated from the economic situation of the society; student self-government cannot be separated from the social problems of self-government; the situation of the University from the situation of society..." (Susret, May 15, 1968). The following issue of the same publication contained a discussion on "the Conditions and the Content of Political Engagement for Youth Today" which included the following observation: "University reform is thus not possible without reform or, why not, revolutionizing of the entire society, because the university cannot be separated from the wider spectrum of social institutions. From this it follows that freedom of thought and action, namely autonomy for the University, is only possible if the entire society is transformed, and if thus transformed it makes possible a general climate of freedom and self-government." (Susret, June 1, 1968.)

* * *

In April, 1968, like their comrades in capitalist countries, Yugoslav students demonstrated their solidarity with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front and their opposition to United States militarism. When Rudi Dutschke was shot in Berlin as a consequence of the Springer Press campaign against radical West German students, Yugoslav students demonstrated their solidarity with the German Socialist Student Federation (S.D.S.). The Belgrade student newspaper carried articles by Rudi Dutschke and by the German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. The experience of the world student movement was communicated to Yugoslav students. "Student revolts which have taken place

in many countries this year have shown that youth are able to carry out important projects in the process of changing a society. It can be said that these revolts have influenced circles in our University, since it is obvious that courage and the will to struggle have increased, that the critical consciousness of numerous students has sharpened (revolution is often the topic of intellectual discussion)." (Student, April 23, 1968, p. 1.) As for the forms of organization through which this will to struggle could express itself, Paris provided an example. "What is completely new and extremely important in the new revolutionary movement of the Paris students — but also of German, Italian and U.S. students — is that the movement was possible only because it was independent of all existing political organizations. All of these organizations, including the Communist Party, have become part of the system; they have become integrated into the rules of the daily parliamentary game; they have

hardly been willing to risk the positions they've already reached to throw themselves into this insanely courageous and at first glance hopeless operation." (M. Markovic, Student, May 21, 1968.)

Another key element which contributed to the development of the Yugoslav student movement was the experience of Belgrade students with the bureaucracy of the student union. In April, students at the Philosophy Faculty composed a letter protesting the repression of Marxist intellectuals in Poland. "All over the world today, students are at the forefront in the struggle to create a human society, and thus we are profoundly surprised by the reactions of the Polish socialist regime. Free critical thought cannot be suppressed by any kind of power, not even by that which superficially leans on socialist ideals. For us, young Marxists, it is incomprehensible that today, in a socialist country, it is possible to tolerate anti-Semitic attacks and to use them for the solution of internal problems. We consider it unacceptable that after Polish socialism experienced so many painful experiences in the past, internal conflicts should be solved by such undemocratic means and that in their solution Marxist thought is persecuted. We also consider unscrupulous the attempts to separate and create conflict between the progressive student movement and the working class whose full emancipation is also the students' goal..." (Student, April 23, 1968, p. 4.) An assembly of students at the Philosophy Faculty sent this letter to Poland — and the University Board of the Yugoslav Student Union opposed the action. Why? The philosophy students themselves analyzed the function, and the interests, of their own bureaucracy: "The University Board of the Yugoslav Student Union was in a situation in which it had lost its political nerve, it could not react, it felt weak and did not feel any obligation to do something. Yet when this body was not asked, when its advice was not heard, action 'should not have been taken.' This is bad tactics and still worse respect for democracy which must come to full expression in young people, like students. Precisely at the moment when the University Board had lost its understanding of the essence of the action, the discussion was channeled to the terrain of formalities: 'Whose opinion should have been sought?' 'Whose permission should have been gotten?' It wasn't asked who would begin an action in this atmosphere of passivity. Is it not paradoxical that the University Board turns against an action which was initiated precisely by its own members and not by any forum, if we keep in mind that the basic principle of our socialism is SELF-MANAGEMENT, which means decision-making in the ranks of the members. In other words, our sin was that we applied our basic right of self-management. Organization can never be an end in itself, but only a means for the realization of ends. The greatest value of our action lies precisely in the fact that it was initiated by the rank and file, without directives or instructions from above, without crass institutionalized forms." (Ibid.)

With these elements — an awareness of the inseparability of university problems from the social relations of a society based on alienated labor, an awareness of the experience of the international "new left," and an awareness of the difference between self-organization by the rank and file and bureaucratic organization — the Belgrade students moved to action. The incident which set off the actions was minor. On the night of June 2, 1968, a performance which was to be held outdoors near the students' dormitories in New Belgrade, was held in a small room indoors; students who had come to see the performance could not get in. A spontaneous demonstration began, which soon included thousands of students; the demonstrators began to walk toward the government buildings. They were stopped, as in capitalist societies, by the police (who are officially called a "militia" in the self-managed language of Yugoslavia); students were beaten by militia batons; many were arrested.

The following day, June 3, continuous general assemblies were held in most of the faculties which compose the University of Belgrade (renamed The Red University Karl Marx), and also in the streets of New Belgrade. "In their talks students emphasized the gross social differentiation of Yugoslav society, the problem of unemployment, the increase of private property and the unearned wealth of one social layer, the unbearable condition of a large section of the working class and the need to carry out the principle of distribution according to labor consistently. The talks were interrupted by loud applause, by calls like 'Students with Workers,' 'We're sons of working people,' 'Down with the Socialist Bourgeoisie,' 'Freedom of the press and freedom to demonstrate!'" (Student, special issue, June 4, 1968, p. 1.)

Police repression was followed by press repression. The Yugoslav (Communist) press did not communicate the students' struggle to the rest of the population. It communicated a struggle of students for student-problems, a struggle of a separate group for greater privileges, a struggle which had not taken place. The front page of the June 4 issue of Student, which was banned by Belgrade authorities, describes the attempt of the press to present a nascent revolutionary struggle as a student revolt for special privileges: "The press has once again succeeded in distorting the events at the University... According to the press, students are fighting to improve their own material conditions. Yet everyone who took part in the meetings and demonstrations knows very well that the students were already turned in another direction — toward a struggle which encompasses the general interests of our society, above all a struggle for the interests of the working class. This is why the announcements sent out by the demonstrators emphasized above all else the decrease of unjustified social differences. According to the students, this struggle (against social inequality) in addition to the struggle for relations of self-government and reform, is of central importance to the working class and to Yugoslavia today. The newspapers did not quote a single speaker who talked about unjustified social differences... The newspapers also omitted the main slogans called out during the meetings and demonstrations: For the Unity of Workers and Students, Students with Workers, and similar slogans which expressed a single idea and a single feeling: that the roads and interests of students are inseparable from those of the working class." (Student, June 4, 1968, p. 1.)

By June 5, The Yugoslav Student Federation had succeeded in gaining leadership over the growing movement, and in becoming its spokesman. The student organization proclaimed a "Political Action Program" which contained the revolutionary goals expressed by the students in the assemblies, meetings and demonstrations — but the program also contained, as if by way of an appendix, a "Part II" on "university reform." This appendix later played a key role in putting the newly awakened Yugoslav student movement back to sleep. Part I of the political action program emphasized social inequality first of all, unemployment, "democratization of all social and

political organizations, particularly the League of Communists," the degeneration of social property into private property, speculation in housing, commercialization of culture. Yet Part II, which was probably not even read by radical students who were satisfied with the relatively accurate expression of their goals in Part I, expresses a very different, in fact an opposite orientation. The first "demand" of Part II already presupposes that none of the goals expressed in Part I will be fulfilled: it is a demand for the adaptation of the university to the present requirements of the Yugoslav social system, namely a demand for technocratic reform which satisfies the requirements of Yugoslavia's commercial-technocratic regime: "Immediate reform of the school system to adapt it to the requirements of the social and cultural development of our economy and our self-management relations..." (Student, special issue, June 8, 1968, pp. 1–2.)

This crude reversal, this manipulation of the student revolt so as to make it serve the requirements of the dominant social relations against which the students had revolted, did not become evident until the following school year. The immediate reactions of the regime were far less subtle: they consisted of repression, isolation, separation. The forms of police repression included beatings and jailings, a ban on the student newspaper which carried the only complete report of the events, demonstrations and meetings, and on the night of June 6, "two agents of the secret police and a militia officer brutally attacked students distributing the student paper, grabbed 600 copies of the paper, tore them to pieces and burned them. All this took place in front of a large group of citizens who had gathered to receive copies of the paper." (Student, June 8, 1968, p. 3.)

In addition to police repression, the dominant interests succeeded in isolating and separating the students from the workers, they temporarily succeeded in their "unscrupulous attempt to separate and create conflict between the progressive student movement and the working class whose full emancipation is also the students' goal." This was done in numerous ways. The ban on the student press and misreporting by the official press kept workers ignorant of the students' goals; enterprise directors and their circles of experts "explained" the student struggle to "their" workers, instructed workers to defend "their" factories from attacks by "violent" students, and then sent letters to the press, in the name of the "workers' collective," congratulating the police for saving Yugoslav self-management from the violent students. "According to what is written and said, it turns out that it was the students who used force on the National Militia, that they blocked militia stations and surrounded them. Everything which has characterized the student movement from the beginning, in the city and in the university buildings, the order and self-control, is described with the old word: violence... This bureaucracy, which wants to create a conflict between workers and students, is inside the League of Communists, in the enterprises and in the state offices, and it is particularly powerful in the press (the press is an outstandingly hierarchic structure which leans on self-management only to protect itself from critiques and from responsibility). Facing the workers' and students' movement, the bureaucracy feels that it's losing the ground from under its feet, that it's losing those dark places where it prefers to move — and in fear cries out its meaningless claims.... Our movement urgently needs to tie itself with the working class. It has to explain its basic principles, and it has to ensure that these principles are realized, that they become richer and more complex, that they don't remain mere slogans. But this is precisely what the bureaucracy fears, and this is why they instruct workers to protect the factories from students, this is why they say that students are destroying the factories. What a monumental idiocy!" (D. Vukovic in Student, June 8, 1968, p. 1) Thus the self-managed directors of Yugoslav socialism protected Yugoslav workers from Yugoslav students just as, a few weeks earlier, the French "workers' organizations" (the General Federation of Labor and the French Communist Party) had protected French workers from socialist revolution.

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Repression and separation did not put an end to the Yugoslav revolutionary movement. General assemblies continued to take place, students continued to look for forms of organization which could unite them with workers, and which were adequate for the task of transforming society. The third step was to pacify and, if possible, to recuperate the movement so as to make it serve the needs of the very structure it had fought against. This step took the form of a major speech by Tito, printed in the June 11 issue of Student. In a society in which the vast majority of people consider the "cult of personality" in China the greatest sin on earth, the vast majority of students applauded the following words of the man whose picture has decorated all Yugoslav public institutions, many private houses, and most front pages of daily newspapers for a quarter of a century: "...Thinking about the demonstrations and what preceded them, I have reached the conclusion that the revolt of the young people, of the students, rose spontaneously. However, as the demonstrations developed and when later they were transferred from the street to university auditoriums, a certain infiltration gradually took place on the part of foreign elements who wanted to use this situation for their own purposes. These include various tendencies and elements, from the most reactionary to the most extreme, seemingly radical elements who hold parts of Mao Tse Tung's theories." After this attempt to isolate and separate revolutionary students by shifting the problem from the content of the ideas to the source of the ideas (foreign elements with foreign ideas), the President of the Republic tries to recuperate the good, domestic students who only have local ideas. "However, I've come to the conclusion that the vast majority of students, I can say 90%, are honest youth... The newest developments at the universities have shown that 90% of the students are our socialist youth, who do not let themselves be poisoned, who do not allow the various Djilasites, Rankovicites, Mao-Tse-Tungites realize their own goals on the pretext that they're concerned about the students... Our youth are good, but we have to devote more attention to them." Having told students how they should not allow themselves to be used, the President of Self-Managed Yugoslavia tells them how they should allow themselves to be used. "I turn, comrades and workers, to our students, so that they'll help us in a constructive approach and solution of all these problems. May they follow what we're doing, that is their right; may they take part in our daily life, and when anything is not clear, when anything has to be cleared up, may they come to me. They can send a delega-

tion." As for the content of the struggle, its goals, Tito speaks to kindergarten children and promises them that he will personally attend to every single one of their complaints. "...The revolt is partly a result of the fact that the students saw that I myself have often asked these questions, and even so they have remained unsolved. This time I promise students that I will engage myself on all sides to solve them, and in this students must help me. Furthermore, if I'm not able to solve these problems then I should no longer be on this place. I think that every old communist who has the consciousness of a communist should not insist on staying where he is, but should give his place to people who are able to solve problems. And finally I turn to students once again: it's time to return to your studies, it's time for tests, and I wish you success. It would really be a shame if you wasted still more time." (Tito in Student, June 11, 1968, pp. 1–2.)

This speech, which in itself represents a self-exposure, left open only two courses of action: either a further development of the movement completely outside of the clearly exposed political organizations, or else co-optation and temporary silence. The Yugoslav movement was co-opted and temporarily silenced. Six months after the explosion, in December, the Belgrade Student Union officially adopted the political action program proclaimed in June. This version of the program included a Part I, on the social goals of the struggle, a Part II, on university reform, and a newly added Part III, on steps to be taken. In Part III it is explained that, "in realizing the program the method of work has to be kept in mind. 1) The Student Union is not able to participate directly in the solution of the general social problems (Part I of the program)... 2) The Student Union is able to participate directly in the struggle to reform the University and the system of higher education as a whole (Part II of the program), and to be the spokesman of progressive trends in the University." (Student, December 17, 1969, p. 3.) Thus several events have taken place since June. The students' struggle has been institutionalized: it has been taken over by the "students' organization." Secondly, two new elements have been appended to the original goals of the June struggle: a program of university reform, and a method for realizing the goals. And, finally, the initial goals of the struggle are abandoned to the social groups against whom the students had revolted. What was once an appendix has now become the only part of the program on which students are to act: "university reform." Thus the revolt against the managerial elite has been cynically turned into its opposite: the university is to be adapted to serve the needs of the dominant system of social relations; students are to be trained to serve the managerial elite more effectively.

While the "students' organization" initiates the "struggle" for university reform, the students, who had begun to organize themselves to struggle for very different goals, once again become passive and politically indifferent. "June was characterized by a burst of consciousness among the students; the period after June in many ways has the characteristics of the period before June, which can be explained by the inadequate reaction of society to the June events and to the goals expressed in June." (Student, May 13, 1969, P. 4.)

The struggle to overthrow the status quo has been turned away from its insanity; it has been made realistic; it has been transformed into a struggle to serve the status quo. This struggle, which the students do not engage in because "their organization" has assumed the task of managing it for them, is not accompanied by meetings, general assemblies or any other form of self-organization. This is because the students had not fought for "university reform" before June or during June, and they do not become recuperated for this "struggle" after June. It is in fact mainly the "students' spokesmen" who have become recuperated, because what was known before June is still known after June: "Improvement of the University makes sense only if it is based on the axiom that transformations of the university depend on transformations of the society. The present condition of the University reflects, to a greater or lesser extent, the condition of the society. In the light of this fact, it is meaningless to hold that we've argued about general social problems long enough, and that the time has come to turn our attention to university reform." (B. Jaksic in Susret, February 19, 1969.)

The content of "university reform" is defined by the Rector of the University of Belgrade. In his formulation, published in Student half a year after the June events, the Rector even includes "goals" which the students had specifically fought against, such as separation from the working class for a price, and the systematic integration of students, not only into the technocracy, but into the armed forces as well: "The struggle to improve the material position of the university and of students is our constant task... One of the key questions of present-day work at the university is the imperative to struggle against all forms of defeatism and demagogy. Our university, and particularly our student youth, are and will be the enthusiastic and sure defense of our socialist homeland. Systematic organization in the building of the defensive power of our country against every aggressor, from whatever side he may try to attack us, must be the constant, quick and efficient work of all of us." (D. Ivanovic in Student, October 15, 1968, p. 4.) These remarks were preceded by long and very abstract statements to the effect that "self-management is the content of university reform." The more specific remarks quoted above make it clear what the Rector understands to be the "content" of "self-management."

Since students do not eagerly throw themselves into the "struggle" for university reform, the task is left to the experts who are interested in it, the professors and the academic functionaries. "The main topics of conversation of a large number of teachers and their colleagues are automobiles, weekend houses and the easy life. These are also the main topics of conversation of the social elite which is so sharply criticized in the writings of these academics who do not grasp that they are an integral and not unimportant part of this elite." (B. Jaksic in Susret, February 19, 1969.)

Under the heading of University reform, one of Yugoslavia's leading (official) economists advocates a bureaucratic utopia with elements of magic. The same economist who, some years ago, had emphasized the arithmetical "balances of national production" developed by Soviet "social engineers" for application on human beings by a state bureaucracy, now advocates "the application of General Systems Theory for the analysis of concrete social systems." This General Systems Theory is the latest scientific discovery of "developed and progressive social systems" — like the United States. Due to this fact, "General Systems Theory has become indispensable for all future experts in fields of social science, and also for all other experts, whatever domain of social development they may participate in." (R. Stojanovic, "On the Need to Study General Systems Theory at Social Science Faculties," Student, February 25, 1969.) If, through university reform, General Systems

Theory can be drilled into the heads of all future Yugoslav technocrats, presumably Yugoslavia will magically become a "developed and progressive social system" — namely a commercial, technocratic and military bureaucracy, a wonderland for human engineering.

* * *

The students have been separated from the workers; their struggle has been recuperated: it has become an occasion for academic bureaucrats to serve the commercial-technocratic elite more effectively. The bureaucrats encourage students to "self-manage" this "university reform," to participate in shaping themselves into businessmen, technicians and managers. Meanwhile, Yugoslav workers produce more than they've ever produced before, and watch the products of their labor increase the wealth and power of other social groups, groups which use that power against the workers. According to the Constitution, the workers govern themselves. However, according to a worker interviewed by Student, "That's only on paper. When the managers choose their people, workers have to obey; that's how it is here." (Student, March 4, 1969, p. 4.) If a worker wants to initiate a struggle against the continually increasing social inequality of wealth and power, he is checked by Yugoslavia's enormous unemployment: a vast reserve army of unemployed waits to replace him, because the only alternative is to leave Yugoslavia. The workers still have a powerful instrument with which to "govern themselves"; it is the same instrument workers have in capitalist societies: the strike. However, according to one analyst, strikes of workers who are separated from the revolutionary currents of the society and separated from the rest of the working class, namely "economic" strikes, have not increased the power of workers in Yugoslav society; the effect is nearly the opposite: "What has changed after eleven years of experience with strikes? Wherever they broke out, strikes reproduced precisely those relations which had led to strikes. For example, workers rebel because they're shortchanged in the distribution; then someone, probably the one who previously shortchanged them, gives them what he had taken from them; the strike ends and the workers continue to be hired laborers. And the one who gave in did so in order to maintain his position as the one who gives, the one who saves the workers. In other words, relations of wage-labor, which are in fact the main cause of the strike as a method for resolving conflicts, continue to be reproduced. This leads to another question: is it at all possible for the working class to emancipate itself in a full sense within the context of an enterprise, or is that a process which has to develop on the level of the entire society, a process which does not tolerate any separation between different enterprises, branches, republics?" (Susret, April 18, 1969.)

As for the experts who shortchange the working class, Student carried a long description of various forms of expertise: "1) Enterprise functionaries (directors, businessmen, traveling salesmen, etc.) are paid by the managing board, the workers' council or other self-managed organs, for breaking legal statutes or moral norms in ways that are economically advantageous to the enterprise... 2)... 3) Fictitious or simulated jobs are performed for purposes of tax evasion... 4)... 5) Funds set aside for social consumption are given out for the construction of private apartments, weekend houses, or for the purchase of automobiles..." (Student, February 18, 1969, p. 1.)

The official ideology of Socialist Yugoslavia does not conflict with the interests of its commercial-technocratic elite; in fact it provides a justification for those interests. In March,1969, the Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists referred to critiques by June revolutionaries only to reject them, and to reaffirm the official ideology. The absurd contention according to which commodity production remains the central social relation in "socialism" is restated in this document. "The economic laws of commodity production in socialism act as a powerful support to the development of modern productive forces and rational management." This statement is justified by means of the now-familiar demonology, namely by the argument that the only alternative to commodity production in "socialism" is Stalin: "Administrative-bureaucratic management of administration and social reproduction deforms real relations and forms monopolies, namely bureaucratic subjectivism in the conditions of management, and unavoidably leads to irrationality and parasitism in the distribution of the social product..." Thus the choice is clear: either

maintain the status quo, or else return to the system which the same League of Communists had imposed on Yugoslav society before 1948. The same type of demonology is used to demolish the idea that "to each according to his work," the official slogan of Yugoslavia, means what the words say. Such an interpretation "ignores differences in abilities and contributions. Such a demand leads to the formation of an all-powerful administrative, bureaucratic force, above production and above society; a force which institutes artificial and superficial equalization, and whose power leads to need, inequality and privilege..." (Student, March 18, 1969.) The principle "to each according to his work" was historically developed by the capitalist class in its struggle against the landed aristocracy, and in present day Yugoslavia this principle has the same meaning that it had for the bourgeoisie. Thus the enormous personal income (and bonuses) of a successful commercial entrepreneur in a Yugoslav import-export firm is justified with this slogan, since his financial success proves both his superior ability as well as the value of his contribution to society. In other words, distribution takes place in terms of the social evaluation of one's labor, and in a commodity economy labor is evaluated on the market. The result is a system of distribution which can be summarized by the slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his market success," a slogan which describes a system of social relations widely known as capitalist commodity production, and not as socialism (which was defined by Marx as the negation of capitalist commodity production).

The defense of this document was not characterized by more subtle methods of argument, but rather by the type of conservative complacency which simply takes the status quo for granted as the best of all possible worlds. "I can hardly accept critiques which are not consistent with the spirit of this material and with the basic ideas which it really contains... Insistence on a conception which would give rational solutions to all the relations and problems we confront, seems to me to go beyond the real possibilities of our society... This is our reality. The different conditions of work in individual enterprises, in individual branches, in individual regions of the country and elsewhere — we cannot eliminate them..." (V. Rakic in Student, March 11, 1969, p. 12.)

In another issue of Student, this type of posture was characterized in the following terms: "A subject who judges everything consistent and radical as an exaggeration identifies himself with

what objectively exists; thus everything seems to him too idealistic, abstract, Quixotic, unreal, too far-fetched for our reality, and never for him. Numerous people, particularly those who could contribute to the transformation of society, continually lean on reality, on the obstacles which it presents, not seeing that often it is precisely they, with their superficial sense for reality, with their so-called real-politik, who are themselves the obstacles whose victims they claim to be." (D. Grlic in Student, April 28, 1969, p. 3.)

"We cannot allow ourselves to forget that democracy (not to speak of socialism) as well as self-government in an alienated and ideological form, may become a dangerous instrument for promulgating and spreading the illusion that by 'introducing' it, namely through a proclamation, a decree on self-management, we've chosen the right to independent control, which eo ipso negates the need for any kind of struggle. Against whom, and why should we struggle when we already govern ourselves; now we are ourselves — and not anyone above us — guilty for all our shortcomings." (Ibid.)

The socialist ideology of Yugoslavia has been shown to be hollow; the ruling elite has been deprived of its justifications. But as yet the exposure has taken the form of critical analysis, of revolutionary theory. Revolutionary practice, self-organization by the base, as yet has little experience. In the meantime, those whose struggle for socialism has long ago become a struggle to keep themselves in power, continue to identify their own rule with self-government of the working class, they continue to define the commodity economy whose ideologues they have become as the world's most democratic society. In May 1969, the newly elected president of the Croatian parliament, long-time member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, blandly stated that "the facts about the most basic indexes of our development show and prove that the economic development of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and of Yugoslavia as a whole, has been harmonious and progressive." The president is aware of unemployment and the forced exile of Yugoslav workers, but the problem is about to be solved because "Some actions have been initiated to deal with the concern over our people who are temporarily employed abroad; these actions must be systematized, improved, and included as an integral part of our system, our economy and our polity..." The president is also aware of profound critiques of the present arrangement, and for him these are "illusions, confusions, desperation, impatience, Quixotic pretensions which are manifested — regardless of the seeming contradiction — from leftist revolutionary phrases to chauvinistic trends which take the form of philosophy, philology, movement of the labor force, economic situation of the nation, republic, etc... We must energetically reject attempts to dramatize and generalize certain facts which, pulled out of the context of our entire development and our reality, attempt to use them for defeatist, demoralizing, and at times chauvinistic actions. We must systematically and factually inform our working people of these attempts, we must point out their elements, their methods, their real intentions, and the meaning of the actions." (J. Blazevic, Vjesnik, May 9, 1969, p. 2.)

Official reactions to the birth of the Yugoslav "new left," from those of the President of Yugoslavia to those of the President of Croatia, are humorously summarized in a satire published on the front page of the May 13 issue of Student. "...Many of our opponents declare themselves for democracy, but what they want is some kind of pure or full democracy, some kind of libertarianism. In actual fact they're fighting for their own positions, so as to be able to speak and work according to their own will and the way they think right. We reject all the attempts of these anti-democratic forces; in our society it must be clear to everyone who is responsible to whom... In the struggle against these opponents, we're not going to use undemocratic means unless democratic means do not show adequate success. An excellent example of the application of democratic methods of struggle is our confrontation with bureaucratic forces. We all know that in the recent past, bureaucracy was our greatest social evil. And where is that bureaucracy now? It melted, like snow. Under the pressure of our self-managing mechanisms and our democratic forces, it melted all by itself, automatically, and we did not even need to make any changes whatever in the personnel or the structures of our national government, which in any case would not have been consistent with self-management. The opponents attack our large social differences, and they even call them unjustified... But the working class, the leading and ruling force of our society, the carrier of progressive trends and the historical subject, must not become privileged at the expense of other social categories; it must be ready to sacrifice in the name of the further construction of our system. The working class is aware of this and decisively rejects all demands for a radical decrease in social differences, since these are in essence demands for equalization; and this, above all else, would lead to a society of poor people. But our goal is a society in which everyone will be rich and will get according to his needs... The problem of unemployment is also constantly attacked by enemy forces. Opponents of our system argue that we should not make such a fuss about creating new jobs (as if that was as easy as opening windows in June), and that trained young people would accelerate the economic reform... In the current phase of our development we were not able to create more jobs, but we created another type of solution — we opened our frontiers and allowed our workers free employment abroad. Obviously it would be nice if we all had work here, at home. Even the Constitution says that. But that cannot be harmonized with the new phase of our reform. However, the struggle for reform has entered its final, conclusive stage and things will improve significantly. In actual fact, our people don't have it so bad even now. Earlier they could work only for one state, now they can work for the entire world. What's one state to the entire world? This creates mutual understanding and friendship... We were obviously unable to describe all the enemies of our system, such as various extremists, leftists, rightists, anarcho-liberals, radicals, demagogues, teachers, dogmatics, would-be-revolutionaries (who go so far as to claim that our revolution has fallen into crisis), anti-reformists and informal groups..., unitarians, folklorists, and many other elements. All of them represent potential hotbeds of crisis. All these informal groups and extremists must be energetically isolated from society, and if possible re-formed so as to prevent their destructive activity." (V. Teofilovic in Student, May 13, 1969, p. 1.)

The Yugoslav experience adds new elements to the experience of the world revolutionary movement; the appearance of these elements has made it clear that socialist revolution is not a historical fact in Yugoslavia's past, but a struggle in the future. This struggle has been initiated, but it has nowhere been carried out. "For as Babeuf wrote, managers organize a revolution in order to manage, but an authentic revolution is only possible from the bottom, as a mass movement. Society, all of its spontaneous human activity, rises as a historical subject and creates the identity of politics and popular will which is the basis for the elimination of politics as a form of human alienation." (M. Vojnovic in Student, April 22, 1969, p. 1.) Revolution in this sense cannot even be conceived within the confines of a single university, a single factory, a single nation-state. Furthermore, revolution is not the repetition of an event which already took place, somewhere, sometime; it is not the reproduction of past relations, but the creation of new ones. In the words of another Yugoslav writer, "it is not only a conflict between production and creation, but in a larger sense — and here I have in mind the West as well as the East — between routine and adventure." (M. Krleza in Politika, December 29, 1968; quoted in Student, January 7, 1969.)

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May, 1969.



Down with the Red Bourgeoisie of Yugoslavia

An Analysis of the June Students' Insurrection in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1968)

Black & Red correspondents (1968)

Alert readers of the Western press may have noted short accounts of a "student rebellion" during the first half of the month of June in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Beyond a few journalistic expressions of admiration for Tito's handling of students, the press has been left dumb by the events; after all, one might expect a student revolt in Poland or Czechoslovakia, but in liberal Yugoslavia? As yet there exists no analysis of the events of June nor of their impact on Yugoslav society. In order to provide precisely such an analysis, let us begin by recounting what actually happened in Belgrade.

Chronology Of Events

The Explosion

A troop of actors was scheduled to perform free of charge on the second of June before an audience of "Youth-Action" workers camped nearby a large complex of student dormitories located in New Belgrade, a suburb of Belgrade. Student representatives had requested that the performance be held in a large open amphitheater so that those other than members of the Youth-Action could attend. Announcing that such free cultural events were the privilege of the Youth-Action only, the authorities scheduled the performance for a small theater. Angered by this, several students attempted to force their way into the theater before the performance, but after a short struggle were expelled by the police. News of the expulsion flashed through the student village and soon a crowd of over a thousand students gathered in front of the theater. -After only a few minutes of hesitation the crowd attacked the theater, breaking windows, ripping off the doors and fighting with those already inside.

Police reinforcements arrived quickly with a fire truck, but before they could use the hoses, the students captured and burned it. With this, the police attacked. The students responded with barricades made of overturned automobiles and stones. After several violent clashes the students retreated to their dormitory village to discuss further action.

March on Belgrade

Discussions lasting through the night produced a plan: the students would march the next morning in mass to a central square in downtown Belgrade. There they would place before the public the following demands: the immediate release of all students arrested in the previous day's riot, the resignation of the chief of police, and the withdrawal of all the police from the student village in New Belgrade.

On the morning of June third, three to four thousand students formed and began the ten kilometer march to downtown Belgrade. Approximately midway, they were met by a blockade of thousands of police gathered from all over the state of Serbia. As they neared the blockade, the President of the Parliament of Serbia and the President of the League of Communists stepped forward and invited the students to negotiate. But without warning, soon after negotiations had begun, the police opened fire with their pistols and charged the students. In the violent battle that ensued, 60 to 70 people were wounded, including the two government authorities who had attempted to negotiate with the students.

Mass Meeting

That afternoon, ten thousand students met in New Belgrade and decided to form an "Action Committee" to achieve their demands. While this meeting was going on, in downtown Belgrade a group of several hundred students occupied the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty of the University of Belgrade. Later that afternoon, groups of students distributed, in the streets and cafes, leaflets seeking:

(1) The rapid solution of the employment problem facing new university graduates, most of whom must go abroad if they want to find any sort of employment;

(2) The suppression of the great inequalities in Yugoslavia;

(3) The establishment of real democracy and self-management relations;

(4) The immediate release of all arrested students;

(5) The resignation of the chief of police;

(6) Convening the Parliament to discuss the demands of students;

(7) The resignation of the directors of all Belgrade newspapers, radio, and T.V. for having deliberately falsified the events of the 2nd of June.

On the evening of the 3rd of June, thousands of students in Nis, a large industrial center in Serbia, marched in the streets to demonstrate their solidarity with the students of Belgrade.

Occupation of the Faculties

As mentioned before, the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty was occupied on the afternoon of June 3rd. It was there that the organizational forms, the general assembly of all the students and professors, and functional action committees were born. The occupations of other faculties were organized at the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty. With a high degree of inter-faculty coordination, students established committees for the elaboration of their demands, for political agitation and Propaganda, and for the construction of student-worker unity. It was not long before the facades of the buildings were covered with posters carrying such slogans as: "students, workers and peasants unite against the bureaucrats," "tomorrow without those who sold yesterday," "down with the red bourgeoisie," "show a bureaucrat that he is incapable and he will quickly show you what he is capable of," "more schools, less autos," and "brotherhood and equality for all the people in Yugoslavia."

Isolation of the Movement

But as the students organized, the state began to act. At a special meeting of the City Committee of the League of Communists, the Mayor of Belgrade warned, "the enemy is active these days in Belgrade...we cannot allow demonstrations against our system." The meeting decided to take three actions. First, it filled the streets with steel-helmeted riot police under orders to prevent demonstrations. Second, it called on all Communist League cells in all stores, institutes and factories to prevent all contact between students and workers. Third, League cells in factories were instructed to organize armed workers' militias to prevent students from destroying social property. Thus, by the evening of June 4th, the League of Communists had tightened its grip and effectively isolated the "enemy" from the rest of society.

On the 5th of June, the second day of faculty occupations, the police began to encircle the faculty buildings. By mid-day it became obvious to all that the police were mobilizing for attack. Borba, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Socialist Alliance justified the attack in advance by printing, "If we would like our self-management democracy to develop normally, we must protect it by all means available against those who would impose their will by means of disorder in the street."

As if to dishearten the students, letters from workers' councils in factories in and around Belgrade began to flow in. Following the same formula, all the letters expressed complete faith in the leaders of Yugoslavia and attacked the students for their selfish impatience and for destruction of social property.

From the first day of the occupation certain professors, particularly those of the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty, joined the students. Other than these few professors, only groups of writers and artists made public their support of the student movement. But by mid-day of the 5th, many professors began to return to the faculties. These late-comers, most of whom were high ranking party officials, government ministers, economic, scientific or technical consultants as well as professors, warned the students of their total isolation, and advised that with the aid of the professors, the students would gain all their demands by means of existing party channels.

On the evening of June 5th, it was learned that Sarajevo students manifesting their solidarity with Belgrade students had been brutally attacked by the police.

Early on the morning of June 6th, the students decided to take the advice of the late-coming professors, and to frame a summary list of demands to be presented to the University Committee of the League of Communists. As printed in Student, the official student newspaper, the demands were as follows:

Political Action Program

"In order to make possible the most rapid and effective solution to the major problems facing our socialist society and our self-managed community of free and equal people and nations, we find the following to be necessary:

I.

(1) To adopt measures which will quickly reduce the great social differences in our community. In connection with this we require: that the socialist principle of distribution according to work be systematically applied; that criteria for determining personal income be clearly and exactly established; that a minimum and maximum personal income be determined; abolition of those differences in personal income based on monopolistic or other privileged non-socialist positions, action against the accumulation of private property in a non-socialist manner, and immediate nationalization of improperly-gained private property. Privilege in our society must be liquidated. Measures are necessary to progressively tax incomes above the determined maximum.

(2) In order to make possible rapid and effective solution to the problem of unemployment, a long-range development concept of our economy must be adopted, based on the right to work for all people in our country. Following this, it is necessary to adopt a corresponding investment policy in order that full employment be created along with improved material and cultural conditions for all our people. Measures must be taken to make possible the employment of young qualified workers. Honorary and overtime work must be reduced to a minimum or prohibited altogether. Unfilled work-places must be filled only by those possessing the necessary qualifications.

(3) Measures are required for the rapid creation of self-management relations in our society and for the destruction of those bureaucratic forces which have hampered the development of our community. Self-management relations must be systematically developed not only in working to organize unions but also at all levels of our society, communal and federal, in such a way as to make possible real control by producers over these organs. The essential point in the development of real self-management is that workers independently decide on all important conditions of work and on the distribution of their surplus value.

All self-management organs must be responsible for the completion of their particular tasks and must be held socially responsible in case they fail to complete these tasks. Personal responsibility must be given its full importance.

(4) Together with the development of self-management organs, all social and political organizations - in particular the League of Communists - must adopt democratic internal reforms. Most importantly, a basic democratization of the means of public communication must be carried out. Finally, the democratization must make possible the realization of all freedoms and rights foreseen in the Constitution.

(5) Decisively stop all attempts to disintegrate or turn social property into the property of stockholders. Energetically stop all attempts to turn private labor into the capital of individuals or groups. Both of these tendencies must be clearly made illegal by appropriate laws.

(6) The housing law must be amended immediately to prevent speculation on social and private property.

(7) Cultural relations must be such that commercialization is rendered impossible and that conditions are created so that cultural and creative facilities are open to all.

II.

(1) The educational system must be immediately reformed so as to answer the needs of development of economic, cultural and self-management relations.

(2) To adopt a constitutional guarantee for the right of all young people to equal education conditions.

(3) To write into law the autonomy of the University."

Rejection of Compromise

When the University Committee of the Communist League received the students' Action Program, it expressed its solidarity with the student movement and began negotiations with the City Committee.

On June 6th, the students addressed the following open letter to the workers of Yugoslavia:

"We do not fight for our own material interests. We are enraged by the enormous social and economic differences in society. We do not want the working class to be sacrificed for the sake of reforms. We are for self-management, but against the enrichment of those who depend on and control the working class. We will not permit workers and students to be divided and turned one against the other. Your interests and our interests are the same, ours are the real interests of socialism."

That evening several hundred workers attended the General Assembly at the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty and many spoke to an enthusi-

astic audience of students, workers and peasants. At that meeting it was learned that the newspaper Student had been seized by the state.

As negotiations between the University and City Committees of the Communist League were nearing a compromise agreement, the argument that the students had lost control of their movement by allowing themselves to be represented by the University Committee began to win majority support among the students. Thus, on the following day when the University Committee presented the compromise agreement it had reached with the City Committee, the students promptly rejected it.

The Crisis and Tito's Solution

On June 9th, events reached crisis proportions. All the newspapers were screaming for stern punishment of the rebellious students. The police closed in on the faculties and cut off all entry. A police unit stationed at the Faculty of Art entered the building and beat and arrested many students. That evening it was announced that the President of Yugoslavia would address the nation on the following day.

President Tito surprised the nation by supporting the students' Action Program. He found it to be a challenge for Yugoslav communists to turn words into deeds. Yes, he knew that there were extremists among the students and he also felt that he must condemn their use of violence. He praised, however, the new political consciousness of the students and declared it to be the fruit of socialist self-management relations. He called on all communists to make a reality of the students' program. Finally, he added that if he could not engineer the realization of their program he should resign from his position as head of state.

Learning of Tito's support of their program, the students stormed out of their faculties and paraded in the streets of Belgrade. The police were nowhere to be seen. The evening papers announced that they had misinterpreted the students' program and, after reconsidering it, found that they must agree with Comrade Tito. Suddenly, the students found that their movement had achieved a semi-legal status.

Revolutionary program

The immediate fruit of Tito's support was to de-activate the mass movement. Now, they were told, they had done their bit and should concentrate on problems within the university. In most faculties these instructions were, in fact, followed--the exception being the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty. Here, together with their comrades from all other faculties, students continued to construct a radical, critical position toward the society as a whole. They justified their claim for a new type of critical university linked to the working class, by disputing the role of the League of Communists as the vanguard of the working class. They claimed that the League of Communists was restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia.

Expulsion

With the growth of popularity of the General Assembly of the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty came severe attacks from high Party officials. In Tito's second speech -to the nation he stated that there was not room in the university for extremist professors like those at the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty. Finally, on July 20, the faculty was closed by the police and the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty Committee was expelled from the League of Communists.

Social significance of the June events

With summer vacations, the chronology of events ends. The question remains: what was the significance of the June events to the various segments of Yugoslav society? The most direct and informative way of answering this question would seem to be to simply allow representatives of the segments to speak for themselves. To make this possible, we have gathered the records of conversations and discussions with peasants, workers, students, professors and party functionaries.

Peasants

A middle-aged peasant woman selling tomatoes and peaches at a large open market on the outskirts of Belgrade was asked: "What did you think of the students' demonstrations in the city?"

Answer: "I don't know what those city kids are up to, but God knows my life is difficult enough without kids wrecking and tearing things up in the streets. The police will knock on their doors and shoot them down in their homes, mow them down in their schools. Those children better rest easy with what they got, because there is no playing around with THEM."

A man selling live chickens at the same market was asked if he had seen the posters calling for unity of students, workers and peasants?

Answer: "Yes, I saw a poster like that in front of that big school near the park. But I don't pay heed to things like that. All they want is power and if they get it, they'll be just like all the rest. Did you hear the story of the peasant kid who joined the partisans and after the revolution got a position as a communist functionary? Well anyway,

he went to one of those schools and got himself graduated, got a villa on the hill, fancy furniture, big car, and a summer house on the ocean. Well, one summer he comes back to his village to see his old mother. After listening to his bragging for a while, the mother says, 'Son, you have really done well. Live in a big house with fancy furniture. Got a big car. Even got a second house on the ocean... But son, what are you going to do when the communists come and take it all away?'"

Workers

In the evenings, workers fill the open air cafes under the large trees that line Belgrade's wide sidewalks. Here it is easy to meet workers as they drink slivovica and live the music of Slavic romances. It is also easy to engage them in conversation--that is, so long as political problems are not discussed: "Hell, that's politics, damn politics, that is all I need, more politics!" But this time it was different. They weren't listening to the music; instead they were discussing.

We asked a man in his 30's sitting alone across the table from us if he sympathized with the student demonstration. He answered, "Yes, I guess so. Sure--everyone does. But a lot of good that does them or us."

"Did you and your fellow workers ever talk about striking?" we asked.

"Yes, we have talked about it. But most of us could not last one week without pay. I heard that three factories went on strike during the demonstration. Don't know how they did it."

Later we met a group of workers from a tire factory. As they were expressing loudly and openly their opinions about a certain Yugoslav leader, we asked: "Have you spoken with any students since the beginning of the events in June?"

They answered, "Sure we have. After work we went to Students' Village. When we proved that we were not reporters they let us in. They wanted us to tell them how self-management really works. We told them that only the director and his friends self-manage the factory. Besides that, the workers' council meetings are so damn boring that we don't go unless we are forced to. We told the students that they had proved themselves to be part of the working class and that all us workers know it. We told them that it isn't possible to reform this bunch of leaders that we've got."

"What did they say to that?"

"They agreed!"

Students and Professors

Students of the Engineering Faculty were some of the most active during June. We recorded the following conversation with a group of students and their professor of mechanics. We asked the professor, "What is your estimate of the success of the student movement?"

Professor: "We really gave the old state a punch where it hurts. Perhaps I should not say 'we'; the students did it all. When I arrived a few days after they had already occupied the place, I found a group of young people I didn't know existed. It was as if they had all woken up at once. They didn't ask; they demanded. They told me to choose their side or get out of my office. That is what I liked best! Of course I chose to work with the students. We worked together in drawing up a set of demands which were found to be very close to those drawn up by other faculties. We faced and still face difficult problems. The students must realize that as engineers they cannot begin to fathom the details of social and economic policy. They cannot butt their heads against the system; instead they must strive to make it more effective. We all agree on this now. In fact, unity in the faculty and between faculties is stronger than it has ever been before. Now students from this faculty go to meetings in other faculties."

Student 1: What do you mean we cannot fathom the details of "social" policy? Damn it, we know what this society is all about; we live in it.

Professor: Yes, I know you have a general idea what it is all about. But the fact is your impatience shows you lack depth in economics. For instance investment policy: Can you begin to understand the sacrifices necessary for a rational investment policy?

Student 1: No. I cannot understand why a "rational" investment policy should amount to only so much unemployment. You explain that to us, prof.

Professor (laughing): It does sound absurd, doesn't it?

Student 2: We do not understand, and I don't think I want to understand that sort of rationality. We are naive if that's what you mean. But you were the same when you came to power. Now you

are rational and we are naive. Hell, professor, I think your rationality is shit. You've got a double rationality; one for yourself and one for us. You tell us that we really punched the state where it hurts to get them to double the minimum wage from 15 to 30 thousand dinars a month. Professor, I'll bet you make from 300,000 to 400,000 a month.

Student 3: That is our first job: to keep our movement from being captured by bureaucratic hands and from adopting a bureaucratic reform. Our second job is to organize with the workers. And our third job is to achieve real autonomy for the University so that not one cop can set foot inside.

Student 4: Yes, organize with workers. In Paris they can do that. I heard that they formed groups of workers and students. But here we couldn't begin to do that. All the factories were shut in our faces. There were police at the doors. They told the workers that we were sons of city-rich and that we were only interested in destroying the fruit of- their labor, so they would have to work harder to replace it. They even formed armed militias to attack us.

Student 1: That was the work of the communists in the factories. They told the workers that--like they tell the workers everything. Hell, I know a lot of workers that didn't believe a word of it, but they couldn't do a thing about it. They don't have a single opportunity to speak. They are paid so little that they cannot afford to strike. There are so few jobs that they are afraid if they speak up they'll get fired and never find another job. You know interviews were held for a position of doorman at Radio Belgrade. Hell, sixty university graduates applied for the job. The forced isolation of the workers, lack of voice, low pay, and lack of job security are all used by the League of Communists functionaries in the factories to divide the workers from themselves and from us and finally to control them. If you ask me, that is the real "rationality" behind what you call an "investment policy."

The focus of the student movement was beyond doubt located in the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty. The following is the record of a discussion held by the General Assembly of the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty on July 9th, 1968.

The General Assembly began by describing the extent of the enemy as "everyone who has something to lose through equality." Following this, during a discussion of the enemy's total. monopoly on the means of communication, it was noted that the most important reporter of the largest Yugoslav newspaper was present. As the reporter was one of the most vicious spokesmen for their enemy, they asked him to explain his opposition.

Reporter: Well, I'm afraid right now I can't remember all the remarks I've written and as I didn't bring any material with me...(jeering from the students)...you must realize... I'm not responsible for what is printed in the paper. The final decision is out of my hands (laughter). I guess if you like, I can give you my general opinion of what you people are doing. Essentially you are senseless agitators. You're not going to agree with that! You believe you've grounds for your movement, but the fact is you are only operating out of a petit bourgeois abstract humanism.

It is true that there are deformations in our socialist society, but these problems must be examined scientifically, and so they are by all our institutions. Already many new laws have been passed to correct them. But you simply skip lightly over these difficult problems that our leaders are presently facing in order to disqualify in total everything about our socialist self-management institutions together with our leaders.

Assistant Professor: Please, would you give us a more precise definition of what you mean by "abstract humanism."

Reporter: Abstract humanism, yes I can do that. One only has to glance at your literature to erase any doubt as to the nature of your ideology. The analysis -that you make of the real difficulties facing our society is based on a simple-minded confusion of the various social, economic and technological problems on the one hand with the nature of management of the means of production on the other. This forces you to overlook the basically socialist nature of our society and the socialist motivation of our leaders. Instead, you strike out blindly at technology, against commodity relations, and even at self-management. But out of this sort of abstraction comes nothing more than more abstraction. This is why the content of your movement is of no value, unless you consider interruption of normal social activity as being of value.

Assistant Professor: I thought you'd define abstract humanism in that way. For you, any analysis that concentrates on the interdependence of what you call "deformations" and the nature of management of the means of production is abstract, humanist, bourgeois. Of course there is no reason why we should expect that you would realize what you call abstract humanism is in reality the basis of Marxist analysis. (laughter) As a spokesman for the League, you are, of course, paid to attack Marxist social analysis.

Professor: You mentioned here, as you have often stated in your column, that we attack technology. No one among us has ever attacked technology as such. For us, the problem of technology cannot be abstracted from the level of development. In a country like ours where half the population scratch the land for a bare subsistence, where productivity of industry is so low that the vast majority of working people can hardly satisfy their basic human needs, where the problem remains to secure all children a school, and all schools teachers, where every fifth person is illiterate, and where every other person lives in a place where they don't even have a cinema, where, for the purposes of science are invested every year less than one-half of one percent of the national income, where the scientific organization of the technological process has only just now been born; in such a backward country the time and place for an abstract attack on technology would be completely out of place.

No, our basic problem is how to conquer primitivism and backwardness. For example, socialist politics in a multi-national country cannot tolerate the process of increasing the differences between developed and backward nations. It cannot allow the creation of new sharp social differences between groups. In general, it cannot ignore the interests of the weak, the insecure, the helpless, and the underdeveloped. Further, it cannot tolerate the development of a new managerial class or any other type of bureaucratic layer above society as a whole.

But all these negative phenomena which a socialist policy could not tolerate, may serve us as a realistic description of what has been in fact happening in our country. What is more, and here is the point, all of these differences are justified by the League of Communists as the necessary consequences of maximum technological progress. When our domestic technocrats speak of the necessity for an increase in the rate of technological progress in relation to the system as a whole, they conveniently ignore all the political, social, human values for which socialism stands. Or if you like, expressed in more precise terms, they forget that the system about which they speak--that is technological progress--is only one sub-system of the global social system which includes many non-technical and non-economic variables.

Or in terms that you may understand better (addressing the reporter), we don't attack technology, we only attack the rape of society that you justify in the name of technology. For you, democracy and human values are simply sub-headings under technological advance. For you, where technology is most advanced, there society is most advanced. For you, the United States is the most advanced society and it follows your model.

Student 1: You jump at the chance to attack our movement as non-socialist, as it attacks you and as you are by definition and membership and law a socialist, then of course we cannot be socialist --by definition (laughter). But I ask, if you stand for socialism then why have you ignored that last article by our ambassador to the United Nations on Vietnam published in your paper. In short, he said that the Viet Cong and the United States are equally guilty in Vietnam. I am insulted by that! A more reactionary view of the world revolution could not be imagined. Yet you have not jumped at the chance to attack this position. Is it because you were not paid to attack it?

Reporter: Listen, I'm a simple reporter. My powers are limited. It would have done no good to attack that article. I can't change All our leaders' views. I'm just a little man with little ideas.

Student 2: That sort of stuff doesn't go with us here. We don't rank people by their party functions, but by their contribution to society.

Reporter (angry now): I have defined for you abstract humanism in quite precise terms and you have nothing in reply but platitudes. You are now silent on commodity production; is it that you cannot defend your position?

Professor 2: Yes, you are quite right. We do attack commodity production and we find it diametrically opposed to socialism. But we may not be strong enough to move our society towards socialism. Nevertheless, we say that you are building capitalism. We demand Marxist criticism of the class you are building and the class which you represent. No, we don't want any more of this empty so-called socialist propaganda. You have systematically divided and neutralized the power of the working class and in so doing you have created power and privilege for yourselves. What you happen to find opportunistically convenient you call socialism.

Call what you have created what you like, but don't call it socialism. We here are for real power in the hands of the working class, and if that is the meaning of self-management, then we are for self-management. But if self-management is nothing but a facade for the construction of the competitive profit mechanism of a bureaucratic managerial--why don't I say capitalist--class, then we are against it. No, you are not socialist and you are not creating socialism. Perhaps we have no way to stop you. But we will attempt to build a truly critical university to help the working class to understand-What you are doing in its name. Yes, you are an avant-garde, but not of the working class. Print that if you like!

(Black & Red No 3, November 1968, Detroit)



Dissidents and Prison

(excerpt)

Jelka Kljajić-Imširović

In this autobiographical political text, the author writes about her experiences in the '68 student dissent milieu in Belgrade in the period after the '68 rebellions, and details the state repression through which she lives due to her affiliation with the milieu. The text was originally published in the newspaper Republika, while here we publish an abridged version.

Dissidents

The worsening of repression decisively influenced, in my opinion, within the student movement a rise of ideas, better said as thinking about the possibilities and strategies of resistance in the "long term." In the circles I was moving in, primarily those of students, but not only students, we thought of revolutionary social theory and the revolutionary workers party as two important assumptions and, at the same time, factors of transformation from the contemporary repressive class society into a true socialist society. What number of people are we talking about? By my recollection, and I admit that it may not be completely reliable, in that circle – I use this term deliberately, and not, for example, the term "group" – there were no more than about 20 people. Our ideological and theoretical standpoints were based on Marx's works and Marxism, creative Marxism, as it was called at the time, and also Marxism separate from Soviet, hardline "Marxism." It is understood that there were significant differences in perceptions, and around some important Marxian conceptual assumptions, between some Marxist theorists and revolutionaries. For example, I thought the works of Rosa Luxemburg were more relevant to understand and that the time in which she lived were more applicable to our contemporary life than the works of Leon Trotsky. For Pavluško Imširović, she was important as a revolutionary, but not as a revolutionary theorist. He was in line with Lenin's assessment that Rosa was "despite all her misconceptions, the eagle of the revolution."[1]

One topic which was discussed frequently in such a Marxist "circle" was the Praxis school. "The main stage" in discussions was held by us 5 to 6 then-young sociologists. For us, as for the majority of those who continued the rebellion of the student movement, Praxis critical philosophy was the most important Marxist critical thought in our society. However, it was a line of thought which, in our opinion, deserved serious criticism. Milan Nikolić and I brought out some of our own critiques and analysis of the Praxis school at the Korčula summer school of 1971. The essence of our critique was, first, that the majority of theoretical work of the Praxis group stayed in line with academic philosophy and, second, that their critiques of contemporary society, specifically Yugoslav society, were far too general, that is to say, lacked concrete criticism. That form of social critique, in my opinion, was the logical consequence of theoretical-methodological concepts which thought of revolution as defined by philosophy. It was just in that way that the journal Praxis (1964) defined the concept of revolution in their program. That which was ascribed to philosophy, i.e. that it should be "a ruthless critique of all that exists, a humanistic vision of a truly human world, and the inspirational power of revolutionary action," can be realized, I thought, only in the realm of critical social theory. I thought, primarily, of the insight of the critical social theories of Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse (1973 – *Traditional and Critical Theory*; *Philosophy and Critical Theory*).

The most prominent representatives of the Frankfurt School during World War II abandoned such a concept of critical theory. Their critical thought regarding contemporary society increasingly became critical philosophy. In that sense I drew a parallel between the Frankfurt School and the Yugoslav Praxis school. The Frankfurt theorists explained their abandonment of the original conceptualization of critical theory due to the fact that contemporary repressive society, in which the working class is integrated into the system, can no longer be explained in the categories of Marx's political economy. In the Praxis school, the importance of the critique of political economy is not explicitly denied, but the sphere of the economy is on the periphery of critical consideration. Some key economic phenomena and relationships, like in the later Frankfurt School, come through in the sphere of the philosophical theories regarding alienation and objectification. Similarly for Marx's thesis, and not only Marx's, regarding the proletariat as a revolutionary subject. I mentioned that I understand some positions of the Praxis school as the negation of this thesis. [2] In my Korčula critique of the Praxis school, I spoke of the differences which exist inside this current of critical Marxist thought in regards to the terminological and methodical categorization of societies in which political oligarchies invoke Marxism and socialism. Some authors wrote of administrative, bureaucratic, state socialism (R. Supek), some of "statist-socialism," "despotic socialism," an even "despotic communism" (Lj. Tadić). And other authors used, if more rarely, these terms: In critical texts distributed among the Praxis school, they spoke of "Stalinist socialism."

The term self-managed socialism was used with or without quotes (as primarily an ideological construct and a society towards which critical theory aims). For most authors, who published their critical works in the journals Praxis and Filozofija, and more and more frequently in Sociologija, these forms of designations – with reason, in my opinion – were unacceptable. Some decidedly insisted that there was no crisis of socialism today, but a crisis of the notion of socialism (D. Grlić, M. Životić…). S. Stojanović and M. Kangrga thought that one could speak of a new form of class society. S. Stojanović defined this new class society as statism. M. Kangrga defined it as a political (civil) society. When the question of a new class formation arises, I thought it logical that it could not be called socialist. Calling a society in which class relations are made and reproduced means denigrating the very idea of and struggles for socialism. In the end, I will mention one more objection I directed at the Praxis-ists that year, long ago. It is about the tying of Stalinism to Soviet society. They did this, in my view, explicitly and implicitly, both the Praxis-ists who thought of Stalinism as a negation of socialism, and those who, along with a sharp critique of it, nevertheless classified it as a form of socialism. Without an analysis of the Stalinism of KPJ [*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije – Communist Party of Yugoslavia*], I thought, there is no concrete critical analysis of Yugoslav society.[3]

1 In the 1968 student rebellions across the world, and for years after that, Che Guevara was the idol of revolutionaries, perhaps for many the biggest. In contrast to Western nations, neither Mao Zedong nor Castro were not revolutionary idols in Yugoslavia.

2 I specifically thought of, before all else, some beliefs of professor Lj. Tadić about humanistic intellect and social critique as the substitute for progressive social movements in societies where the proletarian vanguard became the conservative political elite, and where the workers' movement lost the vitality of being a historical subject.

3 My presentation at the Korčula summer school, titled *Contribution to the critique of the Yugoslav Praxis philosophy,* in written form, in Serbo-Croatian and in German, ended up in the SDB [*State Security Agency*] archives. The text was taken from me, along with many other things, during the arrest. I reconstructed my critiques from then using notes about the Praxis philosophy which were the backbone of my presentation at an Open University session (which, as far as I remember, happened in 1977). At the Korčula school and directly after that, reactions to mine and Milan's



What was the idea behind, and was anything accomplished with, the foundation of the Revolutionary Workers' Party? I already mentioned that one key slogan of the student protests, here and in the world, was "students – workers." For the rebelling students, and not only students, and after '68, there was an understanding and questioning and interest in the potential and preconditions of the revolutionary workers' movement. The critique of the ideological assumptions of the ruling assemblages, in which they, i.e. the ruling party, framed themselves as the real representatives in the interest of the "ruling working class" (already in that time it was more frequently added, "and the working people, and nations and nationalities"), was a "daily theme" for consideration and reflection in the sphere of an alternative, critical, public.

The party-state elite, who were qualified among the critical public most often as the core of the new ruling class (which was also called the managerial class, statist class, partocracy, bureaucracy…) often, in various forms, asked the questions: how do the members of the "ruling class" more frequently end up without jobs, why do they strike, why are they massively leaving for Germany and other wealthier Western nations, what right do the contemporary authorities have to ask for our workers to have more rights in those countries than the workers had or have in our own country?

presentations were varied. I will describe, without comment, some reactions. Rudi Supek, directly after our presentations, in the "official" part of the program, qualified our statements as inappropriate, unnecessary, and Stalinist in essence. Gajo Petrović, I can't remember whether the same day or the next day, evaluated our statements as a plea to dialogue regarding the open questions within critical Marxist theory and praxis. Outside of the "official" program of the Korčula school, Lj. Tadić had a distinctively negative response to, before all else, my presentation. In one smaller circle, that is a social circle, he said that the consequence of my insistence on concrete criticism of Yugoslav society reduces critical thought to action pamphlets and slogans. He learned on, at the same time, Adorno's responses to the rebelling students from the Free University of Berlin. His second objection (which really frustrated me) was that my and Milan's critiques were used by the authorities for yet another attack on the Praxis school. I'm pretty sure that I remember the name of the man who wrote a text for *Politika* which pretty much said that students attacked the Praxis professors in Korčula. But, I'm not completely sure I remember and thus I won't mention that then-young man's name. The majority of reactions were positive, either in the sense of agreement with some statements, or, more frequently, in the sense which G. Petrović spoke. The majority of my professors, the Belgrade Praxis-ists, thought that the conversation should continue in the Faculty of Philosophy associations, tribunes, etc.

I remember that at one tribune at the Faculty of Philosophy (…) all of the questions were asked to one city union official (Đorđe Lazić). Faced with a multitude of such questions and sub-questions, in one moment he began to explain economic migration as "a natural drive for pečalba." [*pečalba – an archaic term for seasonal wage work done by migratory workers, often abroad*] To that I asked, how is it that only workers "love pečalba" but not politicians, union officials… He claimed that strikes were not a form of class conflict in our society. His answers were confusing, like all other official explanations. [4] For me, like some other participants in the tribune, the increasingly larger number of strikes, increasing unemployment and the departure of our workers abroad showed the intensification of class relations in society and the sparking of the workers' movement.

Until around spring 1971, I saw revolutionary change first and foremost as spontaneous growth and revolutionization of worker's movements. Or, more precisely said, I thought that the working class, its social position, spontaneously leads towards the movement for radical societal change about which the rebelling students and critical social theorists spoke. Until then, I rarely thought about a new workers' party. And when I began to think about that more intensively, I was relatively skeptical. I had in mind the fact – in my perception a fact – that in the revolutions of the 20th century, all larger and/or more influential workers' parties had a particularly negative role, a role of suppression and stifling of workers' movements. I thought of Western social-democratic parties which, during World War I, voted in their parliaments for war credits, that is to say for war, I thought of the role of the German social democracy, specifically its leadership, in suppressing the November Revolution Councils and the murders of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, of the Bolshevik suppression of the Kronstadt uprising and the prohibition of the workers' opposition of Shliapnikov and Kollontai…

In the circle of people who thought that the Revolutionary Workers' Party was a necessary factor for revolutionary societal change, the problems I mentioned previously were discussed frequently and at length. Discussions of that nature were not secretive. That means, as well, for discussions regarding reform and revolution, revolution and power, the workers' movement and the party… In such situations the discussants did not concern themselves with, for example, whether roommates or guests entered a student dorm room. The discussions that took place took a "second turn" if before that there was a discussion about the Stalinist character of the SKJ [*Savez Komunista Jugoslavije – League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the new name of the Communist Party*], the relations between KPJ and SKP(b) [*The Soviet Communist Party*], the manner by which J. Broz came to be the head of the KPJ, the suffering of prominent officials of the KPJ in Siberian gulags. In all discussions, the most conspiratorial was, actually, the idea of the Revolutionary Workers' Party here and now. The concreteness of that idea, until the end of 1971, did not move far from theoretical conversations and debates about goals and possibilities, ideals and social situations in such an organization. Really, that idea was made "concrete" because it was thought that the Initiative Group for RRP (RWP) should be the first, small, step towards forming a new party. However, even that group did not exist. Unless we think of it so broadly as to understand it as the group of people who, in their own ways, strives, wants, and thinks about how to establish the RRP (RWP). Among those people there were those who thought about this systematically and "at length," as well as those for whom, for whatever reason, it was a "in the moment" inspirational idea. One version of the goals and organization of the form of the future RRP (RWP) was Milan Nikolić's paper, "signed" IG RRP. It was the only version in written form. There were also ideas and stances that were previously discussed, with which other people agreed, but, above all, it was Milan's text. Therefore, there was neither a written text under the authority of a "group," nor a text which was accepted as the political platform of the "group." [5] Instead of a

4 Politicians and party intellectuals avoided speaking about the strikes, which they usually, when they really did not have a way to get out of saying something about them, called work interruptions.

5 Milan showed me his text somewhere around fall 1971. I "scolded" him (I wasn't the only one) for "strolling" around the city with it, but I read the text and in the margins wrote (I tried to, advertently, "switch up" my handwriting) remarks and reminders in short, crude form, at times in the form of only a question mark. Some remarks were of an essential character. At that time I had already decided, i.e. broke it somehow within myself, that the formation of a revolutionary party were necessary. Some reservations persisted, and I still didn't know how, but – the decision was there.

group - as I mentioned - it is more correct to speak of a sphere or circle of people who, by their own intentions, were only then supposed to grow into an Initiative Group for the Revolutionary Workers' Party. Whether that would have happened, if the arrests hadn't occurred, falls within the domain of stories about "What would have happened if it had happened." Judging by the zeal, seriousness, and knowledge of some people in our "revolutionary debate club" I think that it would have happened in some foreseeable future, or at least would have started to happen. Most likely, by my estimation, without some larger success.

Arrest and Prison

The speech by Branko Pribićević, president of the UK SK BU [*University Committee of the League of Communists of the Belgrade University*], professor at the FPN [*Faculty of Political Sciences*], announced a new phase of clashes. Somewhere near the end of November or beginning of December, if I remember correctly, he presented a terrifying speech about the "Trotskyist Troikas" at the University of Belgrade. For the first time since the Second World War, Trotskyists were mentioned as a real danger, that is to say enemies of the state, system, self-management… In the first few years after the war, Trotskyism and Trotskyists were mentioned in political speeches and in various party documents, but as a thing of the past. Whoever knew the truth about the history of the party (KPJ) and further, Stalinism, knew that verbal attacks on Trotskyists foreshadow arrests. About that same time, there was a reprint of Proleter [*Proletarian*], the party newspaper which circulated between the two world wars. I only paged through it then (in prison I read it thoroughly) and it was more than obvious to me that those who the authorities suspect as Trotskyists will not be treated kindly. (B. Pribićević later "fallen" out of party functions under charges of being a liberal.)

I could have said, to myself and others, that I am not a Trotskyist, but, after Pribićević's speech, I knew that I could still be arrested. I had no illusions that the authorities who announced a pointed crackdown on Trotskyism had an ear for such nuances as to what it is to be a Trotskyist, treating Trotsky and Trotskyists as people who, entirely and/or partially opposed Stalinism. I additionally didn't have illusions that the authorities, due to their own needs, wouldn't pin the badge of Trotskyism to people who had no public stance towards Trotsky and Trotskyists. I didn't know, nor could I have known, how many "Trotskyists" the prosecuting authorities, according to political command, could fabricate. Nor was I sure why specifically the "Trotskyists" were talked about as Troikas. [6] Shortly after Pribićević's speech came the first apartment search and interrogations which more or less explicitly "circled" around Trotskyism. It was about one professor of Sociology. His name wasn't announced publicly, so I won't announce it either. It was somewhere around New Year's 1972. On the 7th of January in 1972, therefore on Christmas, Milan Nikolić and Pavluško Imširović were arrested. Svetlana Vidaković, then Milan's girlfriend, was also interrogated. From her I found out that my friends were arrested and that their chances of being released were nil. The next day it was confirmed that was the case. Namely, then, under the ZKP [*criminal proceedings law*], a person could be held in custody for 24 hours without a decision to initiate an investigation against them. Both Milan and Pavluško were charged with "reasonable doubt" that they committed crimes under Article 117, paragraph 1 of the criminal law of SFRY [ZK SFRJ] ("associating against the people and state") and Article 118, paragraphs 1 and 2 ("enemy propaganda," in layman's terms "ordinary," and "in conjunction with foreign interests"). At the time I didn't know much about the XV chapter of the KZ (criminal acts against the people and state), but I learned "on the fly" that there is no "enemy association" without at least three people. The conclusion was obvious – the arrest of at least one more, third, person was coming. A few days later, my and Pavluško's friend, a Russian exchange student,

6 Even today this doesn't make sense to me. It's possible that the narrative about the three was supposed to be the potential for a "deep illegal and conspiratorial character of our Trotskyists," i.e to frame them in the public eye as dangerous as possible. It's possible that those days' prosecutors were repeating some earlier (prewar) models of attack on Trotskyists or "Trotskyists." Maybe it was a self-projection, i.e. the attribution to "Trotskyism" of some forms of illegal activities of the prewar KPJ… But, it's possible that the leaders of the attacks on Trotskyism had in mind a fact, based on the intelligence of the SDB, that for the majority of people the charge of "enemy Trotskyist association" was difficult to "prove" in any believable way. And, I suppose, it must have been clear to them that the time of "Dachau show trials," for example, was a thing of the past. In support of this interpretation is the fact that the authorities failed, though they tried, to remove the second "Trotskyist Troika."

Vladimir – Volodya (whose last name I regrettably don't remember), was kidnapped in the Penezić student dorms. He was deported to the USSR. The KGB and SDB were, obviously, cooperating well. Volodya's poor mother, whose "ears they filled," without a doubt, with stories of her son's "enemy activities," came to Belgrade. However, they had already taken Volodya away. She left the same day. Volodya's colleague, a Sudanese student, told me how and what happened that day in not-quite-good Serbo-Croatian. I felt guilty and sad that I hadn't seen Vladimir's mother. Volodya, a student, as far as I remember, of the Mining Faculty, came to Belgrade as a Brezhnevist Komsomol member [*Soviet Communist youth organization*]. In the moment he was captured, he was, according to his convictions, a Soviet dissident. I don't know whether because of legal regulations or something else, Volodya wasn't linked to the "enemy Trotskyist Troika" here.

After Pavluško and Milan's arrest, and especially after Volodya's abduction, each day it became ever more clear to me that I was entering the increasingly narrow circle of "options" for the third defendant. Until I was arrested, I wasn't sure that I would be the third one. I found I was the "shortlisted candidate" from the intensification of my monitoring. From '68, I frequently listened to stories about monitoring and avoidance, i.e. escaping unwanted escorts. That's one of the typical dissident stories. Those, mostly "male stories," irritated me a bit. My stance was, "it's theirs to follow us; ours to ignore them." I know, it was easier for me to say that than for many people. Either, as I'm convinced, the DB [*State Security police*] did not follow me for long (I wasn't a "significant person" from their point of view), or it was quite easy for me, in view of my shortsightedness, to "ignore" what I did not notice. Two to three weeks before the arrest, despite my principled attitude, it wasn't easy to ignore the surveillance and spies. The Resident Assistant (RA) of the women's bloc at Penezić began to inform my friends and acquaintances that I wasn't in my room, and when I left. And he informed me about who came looking for me, sometimes with a name, other times with a description of the person (people). Until about a month before, he would have had to look at the book of residents to find out whether I'm there and which room I'm in. My two roommates' department colleagues began to come to our dorm room, when they never had before. And more or less these "colleagues" instigated conversations on political topics with me, and showed noticeable

interest in "my" books. I say "my" in quotations as there were also many of a friend's books whose apartment was the first to be searched, along with Pavluško's books which I brought to my room after he was arrested, and a few of Volodya's books which his colleagues gave to me. I did not think it was dangerous to have that many books and journals of that sort, as, in the end, the books had all already gone through police triage. It was obvious to me that the guests of my roommates were police informants. My roommates apologized to me after the visits. They were also aware of the purpose of the visits. I'm convinced that they were not involved in the informant work in any way. I couldn't force these "types" out of the room. How would you kick out your roommate's guest or guests? "The guests" came by a few times, in different forms. Had anybody I had known personally acted like these "guests" I would have chased them out of the room "just like that." [7] In the end, the monitoring took on the form of direct intimidation. Someone, while I was working at night in the dorm reading room, acted like a maniac. When I finally understood that the "commotion" I heard periodically wasn't coming from branches hitting the glass walls of the room, and when in the dark I saw some man outside, "my heart dropped to my heels." I gathered my papers off the table, better said grabbed, and rushed out. The Resident Assistant wasn't at the door. Someone ran after me up until the second floor. For a "long" time I heard tapping on the floor. Only when I, "as though without a soul," crashed into bed did I realize this didn't have anything to do with an "ordinary maniac." That was, I'm sure, either the RA-informant, or one of his "pals." He, whoever he was, didn't intend to do anything else but "properly" scare me. "Figuring this out" was a small consolation for the fear I experienced.

Two days after that, in the early morning, two DB [*State Security*] officers "fell into" my dorm room. With them, "my favorite" RA. That was on the 21st of January, 1972. The arrest, by custom, was preceded by an apartment search, that is, in my case, my dorm room. Despite being in a fog, I instinctively recognized one of the DB officers. In the student circles he was the "famous" Panta (Pantelić). Before that day, I had never seen him in my life. But, by others' descriptions, I learned that I was correct that one of the DB officers was indeed Panta. When I looked at my executioners, "my heart pounded like crazy," and in my stomach there was a "cold anxiety," but, I also felt a sense of relief. Relief because it was evident now that I was the "third man." There was no more uncertainty. The search was thorough. They separated and "confiscated" a bunch of books and journals. They seized the diaries from my high school and university days. Not one word from those diaries was used in the research process, but my diaries are gone. I assume that they are long recycled. I never journaled again.

After the search, Pantelić and Krivokapić (a law student, as he introduced himself as) took me to the SDB [*State Security Service*]. Immediately they tried to interrogate me. Panta aggressively, Krivokapić in a soft tone. Whether it was a division of roles or a difference of personality, I don't know. They asked me mainly about the books. They asked me questions, also, about Pavluško and Milan… To their questions I asked whether I was arrested. To that, they told me that it's uncertain and that much of it rests on me. They interrogated me and some others in other rooms. Similar questions – same answers. One irritable man – I concluded from the way his predecessor in the interrogation had behaved towards him that he was some significant "big shot" – yelled at me and with a threatening tone told me that I was arrested. I asked for a lawyer. He exited the office, screaming. For a long time, there was no one else. I fell asleep in the armchair. It was already nighttime when two people led me to the car and drove me to the City Police Station. I was there for at least an hour or

7 I openly told two of my colleagues from the sociology department, Marko Vuković and Duško Stupar, that I thought they were working with DB. After that, the socializing stopped. Duško Stupar "climbed up" to the position of Deputy Minister of Serbia's Ministry of Interior. He left that position because of "some indiscretions," allegedly giving some "confidential material" to Dragiša-Buci Pavlović during the time of the famous 8th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia [CK SKS]. Today he's, as far as I know, a businessman in Russia. Both, I can say with calm conscience, profited from the student protest in '68. I helped both of them prepare for exams until I "opened my eyes." Marko swore to me in every way, on multiple occasions during chance encounters, as he did the first time I "attacked" him, that he did not work for SDB. Stupar exposed him to me at the beginning of the 80s. And the Deputy Minister of the Interior of Serbia gave me his honorable word that there was nothing more to my arrest. Perhaps they really had no "connection" to my arrest, but their role, greater or lesser, in the repression that followed the student protests was undeniable.

two in some basement room. In the end, dazed from exhaustion, they took me to the investigating judge. That was Svetislav Stevović. He didn't even attempt to interrogate me. He asked me for my personal information – *generalije,* as it's said in the judicial terminology – and dictated them to his secretary. Two uniformed police "stuffed" me into a squad car and took me to the central jail. During the search, this time of me, they took my belt, shoelaces, coin purse… They gave me two disgusting rough blankets and "expelled" me to a solitary cell. In front of the cell, the policeman told me that I can bring in cigarettes, but not a match. He explained to me that a match is placed above the door, and that, during the day, a guard will come every hour to light a cigarette for smokers. That was the first rule of prison life that I was told. In the cold cell, without light, I barely found the bed, that is, in jail slang, "palace."

The first ten days in prison are the hardest. I couldn't eat for at least 4 to 5 days. I couldn't handle the stench of the ammonia which emanated from the open toilet. The solitary cells are designed to make the prisoner's life worse. There is no electric light in them. Nor a radiator. The daylight is weak. The cell window, a small opening near the ceiling, covered by some kind of wire, "looks" into the prison hallway, and the hallway onto the high walls of the prison yard. But, with time a person gets used to it. When my first packages arrived with bedding and clothes, and with that books, the cell no longer looked as scary. My friends even got a newspaper subscription for me. With the help of my lawyer, a delightful man and an extraordinary professional, I fought to get a pen. Discovering that my friends had not forgotten about me and that my parents support me meant a lot. My father's first visit was very painful. He and I barely fought back our tears. Mostly because we were on opposite sides of prison bars, he on the outside, I on the inside. The next visit was already easier. A person gets used to that as well.

I was in solitary a little more than three months, up until the indictment was filed. Later, for another ten days, but this time as punishment. As a woman I had the privilege to walk alone in the prison yard. I was, namely, the only woman in solitary, in a line of solitary cells spanning a

long hallway. I consider this a privilege as well. It would have been much more difficult for me had I been forced to hold my hands behind my back and someone followed me during my walks. Neither in solitary nor later, in a group cell, was I ever hit. A guard who had beaten a prisoner in the solitary cell next to mine because he had made his "bed" before it was time hadn't even waved his baton at me. That wasn't because I was a woman. In the group room I saw a woman who was "blue" from a beating. In my opinion, prison guards and supervisors were ordered not to beat "political" prisoners. There was shouting, threats of violence, but never physical assault. Of course, I am describing my thoughts and my experience.

From the arrest to the indictment – that is, while I was in solitary – the investigating judge and prosecutor, like the DB officers before them, were most interested in where the books and journals taken during the search came from. I understood, with reason I think, that that question was supposed to lead to a further "investigative narrative." But, it seemed like at that point that they didn't have any other charge against me other than the books.

In the decision to initiate the investigation for "proof" of my "enemy association and enemy propaganda," the confiscated books, brochures, journals and leaflets were deemed Trotskyist, with or without quotes… In a grievance against the decision, I noted that some of those texts qualified as Trotskyist were in fact anti-Trotskyist. That was the way they qualified one shorter text titled "The Truth About Kronstadt," a text I translated, and in which Trotsky, because of his role in the suppression of the uprising, is called, among other things, a murderer. Also, that was how one book, actually a collection of Russian authors titled "Anarchism, Trotskyism, and Maoism," which was translated to Serbo-Croatian around the end of the 60s was labeled. I even insisted on this during my first interrogation. The judge and the prosecutor looked at me "obtusely." It appears that by the time the indictment was brought against me I had managed to "convince" them that this other book was not Trotskyist. It wasn't mentioned in the charges nor the trial. But they did not give up on "The Truth About Kronstadt." Maybe because it would be very "convenient if that text were Trotskyist" – both because I had translated it, and because it was found during the searches on multiple occasions. The prosecutor's questions about where this or that book came from were aggressively pointed. My answer that having books is not an enemy act was replied with the insistence that the possession of enemy works is a hostile act, and that only a person who knows they are guilty would avoid answering such questions. In the moment, instinctively, I accepted his terminology and his "advice" and told him I would tell him where the books came from, if he could prove they were "hostile." (It's a good thing I didn't have the Mein Kampf.) The prosecutor hurried, with nervous movements looking for something "hostile." He snatched up some bulletin and told me "here, look, this is illegal." Whether the word "illegal" was used in the bulletin or not, I don't know. To my answer that illegal does not mean "hostile" as, I said, the KPJ was also illegal before the war, the prosecutor, the infamous Stojan Miletić, first went red in the face and stumbled on his words, and then, literally, jumped up and actually ran out of the courtroom into the hallway. Neither my lawyer, nor even the judge, could hide their snickering. I looked at the judge in astonishment. I wasn't scared of him anymore. S. Miletić was a small Vyshinsky, without the authority Vyshinsky had.[8] To the questions about literature, asked in a variety of ways during several interrogations, I answered roughly the same, leaning on the fact that books have nothing to do with the criminal charges against me.

Why was I that "hardheaded"? Between everything else, it was the fact that I couldn't give any, by my understanding, logical response without providing another person's name. I would have said that I purchased the books at a bookstore, but I knew they would easily "catch me in a lie." Actually, I could have done it that way and then made them prove that I didn't. But, plainly, I didn't think of that. Along with the questions about the literature, they also asked me about Milan's text (I wasn't told that it was Milan's) which was signed "IG RRP." But, they didn't push that. I told them I was seeing the text for the first time. It was my right to lie during the investigatory proceedings. The second lie regarded the question of my attendance at a large international conference, primarily of Eastern European dissidents, in Essen, at the beginning of June 1971. I think the investigative judge "read" me, but he couldn't prove that I was there. With that, the investigative proceedings were primarily completed. In sum, I think, 4-5 interrogations, and maybe even less. There was no confrontation with the accused in the "group." A charge followed which was an extended and systematic version of the resolution to move forward the investigation. I wasn't too excited about it. I was more worried that they, that is to say, immediately after the indictment, moved me to a group cell. While I read the indictment I felt, for the nth time, as though I was "thrown into" some sort of theater of the absurd.[9]

In the group cell there is light, the bathroom is closed. The beds have some sort of mattresses. But, I wasn't worried about "comfort," but because of the other prisoners. In the room there were usually 10-15 women. Never before that had I had close contact with people who were charged or convicted as "ordinary" criminals. Everything I had read thus far from the mass of prison literature, of the relations between "criminal" and "political" prisoners, told me I was safer in solitary than I was in a group room. And the other prisoners didn't, at first sight, give me much confidence. I liked only Zelenika, who at the door told me that I was "certainly not the type who stole, nor whored, nor killed," and thus I must be "a student." She figured that out, of course, from the books. Quickly I realized that for years she had begged in the Student City [*a block of student dormitories in Belgrade*]. I remembered her charming way of asking for money, right before the break, when she'd holler at the students "colleagues, should we go to mathematics." She was delighted when I remembered that. "The ice" was broken. The other prisoners looked at me like an "oddity," but not in an unfriendly way. Within a day or two, more or less, they all told me their stories. At least half of the prisoners, who I met over those 6-7 months, didn't even need to be in prison. "My" Zelenika ended up in prison because she was taking money for "palm reading."

8 Stojan Miletić, after our trial, was promoted to the position of deputy public prosecutor of the Republic.

9 The only thing related to the indictment that hit me was one article in NIN [*Nedeljne informativne novine*; "Weekly Informational Newspaper"] titled "the Secrets of Our Trotskyists." I'm not sure which journalist wrote it. I can't find him in my small "prison documentation." But, I still remember that the "Trotskyist Troika" was blatantly accused of "planning urban guerilla warfare." All of that was based on one book on the topic found in Milan's apartment during the search.

Another, also an older woman, because she stole 200 grams of coffee from a store. That poor woman barely walked – she had advanced tuberculosis. Some women were involved in prostitution, and along the way in pickpocketing, at the *štajg* [*sl. train station*]. Even if I was a sociologist by training, that was the first time I heard the term "štajg."

There were of course also women charged with more serious crimes. I was most afraid of Silvija, who was accused of killing an old woman. It turned out that Silvija and I would become the "soul" of the transformation of the group of prisoners in "our" cell into some sort of strange, even comfortable, prisoner "community." There were conflicts and arguments, but without serious consequences. I taught Silvija to read and write. She fell in love with Larkin's poetry. On other nights, at lights off, the women carefully listened to my quiet recitations of the poems of D. Maksimović, Larkin, Neruda… Silvija told, in an interesting and juicy folk dialect, "horror stories." For New Year's 1973, we sang songs like "*Ščepaj ga, ne daj ga, jer je muškarac*" [*"Grab him, don't give him away, because he is a man"*], the prisoners "hymn," "*Na Sing Singu zastava se vije*" [*"At Sing Sing the flag is flying"*], and, by my request, the *Internationale*. In the moment while we sang the *Internationale* one haughty guard who usually "couldn't stand to see me with his own eyes" flew into the room. Who knows why the singing of this international workers' "hymn" specifically irritated him. He hit the first woman he "ran into" with his nightstick. I stood between them. He yelled, threatening that I will "meet my maker" when the final verdict is given, but he didn't hit me. Not because I was some sort of "force," but, as I said earlier, because he wasn't allowed to. He managed to shut down our prisoner New Year's "celebration." But, not one woman judged me for our singing of the *Internationale.* We all condemned the guard. There, that's what our prison community was like. [10]

The Trial

The trial began at the beginning of July. Maybe it sounds pathetic, but I felt "super." The monotony of prison days was interrupted. I saw my accused comrades. Finally I could normally hug and kiss my father and sister. In some waiting room, some girlfriends managed to approach me. In the courtroom there were many familiar and cherished faces. From the perspective of the accused, only the attendance of such people at a trial means so much. That means that even in "freedom" there is still resistance, which is experienced as a concrete solidarity, as a sign of support and encouragement, at least in the terms of condemning the perpetrators of repression.[11] The presiding judge in our processing, within the five-member panel of judges, was Milivoje Đokić. The prosecutor, as is usually the rule in court proceedings, remained the same. M. Nikolić, the first to be charged, was defended by the most famous lawyer for "political delicts" in Belgrade, Srđa Popović. Imširović's defense was a distinguished old Belgrade lawyer, Savo Strugar. There was also my lawyer, Vitomir Knežević. As the third defendant, as court procedure required, I was "neglected" for a full two days. In the beginning of the process, I sat at the defendants' bench for a very short period of time. From the third day, I was a permanent member of the "group" on the defendants' bench. For two days, my father carefully followed the proceedings, yet my name was unmentioned. At the end of the second day of the trial, he intercepted the prosecutor in the hall and asked him why I was indicted at all, when no one is charging me for anything. S. Miletić snapped at my father that I am "actually the most dangerous, since I "destroyed evidence." The prosecutor was in "his element" during the whole trial. He threatened Imširović at least 5-6 times with new charges. He responded the same to his closing defense. That was at least to be expected from this eager state prosecutor. But, in that moment, S. Miletić "reversed" on himself: he accused that, all three of us, were, no more, no less, tied to Jelić's Ustaše. I cannot tell remember what "inspired" him to make such a proclamation, but the memory of that accusation stayed with me for a long time. For a some seconds, literally, I was left breathless. My lawyer broke the silence. The prosecutor didn't give a chance to "get through to him." He yelled at V.

10 One political prisoner, Ljubica Živković, told me, based on her experience in Požarevac prison that she had problems with "criminals." I am unsure how I would have gotten by in a huge space with 50-60 women just in the sleeping quarters. I probably would have felt like a "lost cause."

11 One consequence of a system of selective repression, and even mass repression, is that people directly attacked by repressive measures are never left without some kind of support. I am sure that for us, and not only for us, the sentence would have been far harsher had the courtroom been empty or, as it happened at the end of the 40s through the 50s, "filled" with plain clothes police officers.

Verdict (1972). Standing from left to right Jelka Kljajić, Pavluško Imširović and Milan Nikolić.

Knežević, using the informal "you" and calling him "Vanda" (Vanda was at that time a popular Bulgarian sibyl).[12] It wasn't easy for the presiding judge. But, I wasn't very concerned about him at the time. I only registered that he was more unbiased than the investigative judge.

For me personally the most painful moment during the trial was when one of my students arrived in the courtroom as a witness to the prosecution. He was the only witness in the whole procedure against "dangerous enemy groups." For some months, mainly because of money, while waiting for my University stipend, I worked in the Center for Professional Training of Workers PK "Beograd." At one lecture, after Milan and Pavluško's arrest, as it was ascertained in the trial, "I spoke of social inequality, and gave one concerned student a flyer about that, and invited other students to meetings and talks at the Faculty of Philosophy." The poor student gave his testimony in absolutely bureaucratic jargon. He said the words "enemy propaganda," "inviting," and "flyer"…

12 From this work it's evident that I am somehow "fascinated" by the prosecutor. I have already written some sociological remarks related to this type of character and role-playing. If I had literary talents, S. Miletić would be one of the key figures in my prison drama of the absurd. In relation to my prosecutor I'll mention only one more detail. When a friend of mine and I, at least 6-7 months after my release from prison, yelled "Booo, prosecutor!" he followed us through the streets of the Old Town for at least one hundred meters.

When he relaxed and began to speak with his own words, the impressions one could gather about my lectures were quite different. My reconstruction of the lectures I gave 6-7 months ago was more complete, it is understood, than the student's. But who was even interested in that in this surreal atmosphere of criminal proceedings? So that there is no confusion, I did mention at the end of a class, which I always thought of and conceptualized as a dialogue, that the students in the '68 protests were against social inequality, that that problem was one of the key themes around which students debated in their assemblies, tribunes, and which was written about in the student press. But, I did not invite students to come to any meetings. I did cite statistics from one text about social inequality, which was distributed at one of many student assemblies. I did give one copy of this text to just one interested student. And that was all. To say only one more thing, that that "flyer" contained primarily statistical indicators about social inequality in our society. If I had known that one of my students would be mistreated by DB officers because of my lecture, I probably would have "skipped" the whole lecture about social structures and class hierarchies. In the context of the key thesis of the indictment, that we were, the accused, an enemy Trotskyist group, my student's statement played a completely secondary role. Before the trial, the investigation, obviously, had problems with not only "placing me in the group," but with proving

that I was working with "enemy propaganda." The testimony of my student was one of the "more convincing" secondary evidence for hostile activity of the accused. The other "evidence" of a similar form and function were sentences, and often just words, from private letters, primarily Milan's, addressed to his girlfriend. The verdicts for the trial were – Milan's statement that he wrote the text under which was signed IG RRP and that he only showed it to Pavluško (who denied this), and that the margin notes of that text an expert determined were mine (which I did not admit to at the trial). And there, the case was, more or less, "closed."

Twenty-first of July, 1972. The District Court of Belgrade issued a verdict stating that the accused committed the criminal offense of associating against the people and state from Article 117, Paragraph 1, in conjunction with KZ [*criminal law*] Article 100. Milan Nikolić and Pavluško Imširović were sentenced each to two years of harsh prison [*a category of prison in Yugoslavia, "strogi zatvor"*], and I, Jelka Kljajić, was sentenced to one and a half years of harsh prison. In the verdict there wasn't, as in the indictment, an addition of enemy propaganda charges. In the charge of "enemy association," the group was not characterized as Trotskyist, but only as enemy. In the reasoning of the verdict, among other things, Trotsky, Trotskyists and Trotskyism were mentioned, but the convicted three [Troika] were not qualified as Trotskyist.

I didn't feel the sentences were long. Only in one moment, during the sentencing in the courtroom, when it appeared to me that the judge said Pavluško was sentenced to five years of harsh prison, I felt "stunned." I stayed quiet when the judge asked me if I understood the verdict. Why didn't I find the verdict horrific? Because I had thought that, in the social climate as it was, that the punishments would be even harsher. And not only because of that. For the crime of associating against the people and state the minimum sentence was five years of harsh prison. Both in the resolution to initiate an investigation, and in the response to my complaint regarding my detention, it was emphasized that is the minimal possible sentence, either as a statement in relation to one of the offenses attributed to me, or worse yet, as a key reason as to why I could not be allowed to defend myself outside of the prison during the trial. I did not regard myself nor my friends as mere victims of a repressive regime. I assumed that a person who in any way opposes such a regime should take into account that with that there is a high likelihood that they will be convicted. That is understood, if the regime is not changed. In the first ten days in solitary, I "pieced out" a sentence of 5 years for myself, and for my friends, 1 or 2 years more. I didn't even hope that those who arrested us would give up the charges, and it didn't occur to me that the judge can announce a sentence below the legal mandatory minimum. When my lawyer told me that the legal minimum sentence for specific crimes cannot be, by law, decided before the sentencing, I did not believe him. Not because I didn't have faith in him, but because I was convinced that he was only trying to comfort me. Even today I don't understand the logic of pronouncing a punishment under the written mandatory minimum. When I thought not from the perspective of the repressive judicial regime, but from the perspective of what I actually did and how much what I did was actually dangerous to the regime, the punishment looked exceptionally high to me. In solitary my thoughts frequently "screamed" about why I didn't at least write something the regime would have deemed subversive. When, after leaving prison, I found the "case" of Lazar Stojanović, that is, the fact that he was convicted for his film "Plastični Isus" ["*Plastic Jesus*"], I "envied" him.

Even if we didn't "emerge" as the Trotskyist Troika [three] in the verdict, we were still that in the regime's media. Just like the arrest and the trial, that too was by political orders. I don't think that was some form of direct orders in terms of "you have to write this and that," but authors have similarly unmistakably felt how one has to write about trials and convicts.

(...)

While I was in prison, in the period between the announcement of the verdict and the wait for the final sentencing, i.e. the sentence of the Supreme Court of Serbia, in October 1972, certain Party liberals were removed from political party roles. Others, sooner or later, resigned. I can't say that I felt for them, but I did not rejoice in this inter-party conflict. From my personal point of view, they were primarily executors of Broz's political orders. Inter-party differences obviously existed, but the "dirty" work, i.e. repressive measures against activists and social critics after the student protests of '68, all up until their fall from power, was carried out by liberals. I knew, that is, assumed, that after the expulsions of "liberals" it would be even worse. That was not hard to assume. Everyone who even barely followed what was happening in the political scene knew that behind all repressive measures stood a factually conservative party leadership headed by J. Broz.[13]

Translator Notes

The terms "enemy" and "hostile" were translated from the Serbo-Croatian word *neprijateljsko*, which translates very literally to "unfriendly". Within the socialist period, this term somewhat connotes "against the people."

The term Praxis-ists comes from the author's use of "Praksisovci." It may be also said as "Praxis theorists" or "those involved with or using the theories of the Praxis school."

The term "Troika" (Trojka in Serbo-Croatian) is sometimes used as a noun, but is a reference to "three of something," usually a group of three political organizers, and here referencing the three charged dissidents.

"Harsh prison" is translated from the Serbo-Croatian term "strogi zatvor." "Strogi zatvor" is meant for those serving 1 to 15 years in prison, under harsher conditions, for "more serious crimes".

Jelka Kljajić Imširović (1947-2006), sociologist, member of the Belgrade radical '68 circle, she called herself an anarchist sometimes, although her major influence was Rosa Luxemburg. She was a feminist and an anti-war activist. Author of the book: *Od staljininizma do samoupravnog nacionalizma* (*From Stalinism to self-managed nationalism*, Belgrade, 1991)

13 I didn't expect that the ousted liberals would become the opposition. Barely anyone expected that of them. After Đilas, barely anyone from the head of the party became a dissident. As far as I know, only D. Ćosić. Not even A. Ranković, nor Slavka Dabčević-Kučar, nor Luka Tripalo became that. Nor M. Nikezić, L. Perović, K. Popović…

Three Years In Yugoslavia

Lorraine Perlman

The warm welcome we received from numerous Yugoslavs in September 1963 made our move to Belgrade definitive. Within a few days we had found a room in the home of a bus driver and family on the outskirts of Zemun, a large suburb and extension of Belgrade on the other side of the Sava River. Fredy was hired for a temporary job as "speaker" by a media enterprise which made documentary films about tourist attractions in Yugoslavia. Fredy recorded the texts describing the sites depicted in the films: parks featuring post-war sculpture, monasteries, or coastal villages. For a few hours' work, he received the equivalent of U.S. wages and this money solved our immediate financial problems.

We enrolled at a language institute and spent every morning attending classes and listening to tapes of Serbo-Croatian. Our fellow students were from central Africa, Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. It was a friendly group and sometimes we got together outside of class. One of the two Soviet students was eager to meet for discussions but it was clear that the other disapproved of this extracurricular contact. We were shocked by Viktor's suspicious reserve and perhaps did not sufficiently appreciate Dimitri's courage in coming to visit us on his own.

The Yugoslav innovation of worker self-management was highly regarded in the West and we wanted to get acquainted with its principles and operation. Zemun had a number of factories and we had no trouble finding informed people to answer our questions. We quickly learned that Yugoslavs did not share the Western enthusiasm for worker self-management, considering it largely a public relations gimmick to camouflage conventional worker-vs.-management relations. We were surprised to learn that strikes were frequent. Although never reported in the press, the occurrence of this authentic worker-managed activity was common knowledge. Unions are an arm of the government (the "boss") so any strike in Yugoslavia necessarily occurs outside an institutional framework.

Even though we lived in their Zemun home for only two months, the Katić family introduced us to many Yugoslav customs and perspectives. The house was one of four or five units around a courtyard. Its design clearly originated in Serbian villages. There were no chickens in our courtyard, but we heard them in nearby enclosures. One outhouse served all the residents. As we had done in Paris, we went te public baths once or twice a week for showers.

When we moved into our room at the Katić's, our language skills in Serbian were almost none-existent. One of the neighbors, a toothless elderly man, took it upon himself to help us with vocabulary whenever he saw us; he would point to an object and name it. He taught us the numbers and was pleased with our progress. Unfortunately, the version of a word we learned from our toothless friend did not always correspond to the conventional pronunciation.

In addition to our language deficiencies, our working class hosts considered us backward in culinary skills. Local stores were quite unlike Danish and French ones and we sometimes were hard put to find ingredients for meals we knew how to prepare. We didn't know to ask for meat in a butcher shop and were unfamiliar with outdoor markets, where most people in Zemun shopped. One day when we opened a can (of tuna, maybe), the entire Katić family stood around the table and watched. (The can opener was part of our camping gear; such a gadget would not have been found in their kitchen.) It wasn't that they had never seen canned goods, but they scorned unfresh food which came preserved in metal; nevertheless they were curious to see what emerged from the container and if we would eat it without further preparation. Once we became official students at the language institute we usually ate at student restaurants in Belgrade where we had a copious, if not a gourmet, midday meal.

During our three-year stay in Yugoslavia we ate extremely well. We found most of the Yugoslav dishes delicious. Two memorable meals were with the Katić family. One was on a Sunday in late September soon after our arrival. Mr. Katić had made it clear that we were invited to eat with them but we didn't know what the occasion was. We put on our Sunday clothes and waited. In late morning a 1arge pig and a butcher arrived, and the afternoon was spent cutting up the carcass. A number of people took part — none of them wore Sunday clothes. They rendered lard, washed intestines for sausage casings, prepared the hams for smoking. In late afternoon we all sat down to a feast where pork liver was the principal dish.

Another Sunday we accompanied the Katić family and many of their friends and relatives to a wedding in a village about 75 miles from Zemun. Mr. Katić arranged for the use of a city bus of which he, naturally, was the driver. I can't remember if it was mechanical failure of the bus or if the road was in bad condition, but at one point the twenty or so wedding guests were obliged to get out of the bus and climb the hill; the men pushed the bus to the summit.

The wedding celebration consisted of eating, dancing and drinking. The ceremony itself must have preceded or followed the afternoon events. We ate outside, at long tables; roast pig — the highlight of the meal — was prepared over an open fire. Fredy, who never liked meat, was more appreciative of the *gibanica* (a pasta and cheese dish) and other delicacies than of the roast pork.

Music was provided by local musicians who, as the festivities continued, received generous donations, usually in the form of bills which were affixed to their foreheads (and which sweat kept there until the end of the piece). The dances were line dances and men, women and children of all ages took part, even Fredy and I. The elderly executed every step and turn, but in miniature, so to speak. They hardly raised their foot off the ground, twisted their torso only slightly, reserving their strength. But the rhythm was flawless and every nuance observed. We had been told that dances give an opportunity for young women to display their endurance and for village bachelors to judge the vigor of potential brides. I hope the dances served a less crass function, but, it's true, the bride (although already chosen) danced exuberantly from beginning to end. And she was not the only unflagging woman dancer among the celebrants.

Fredy Perlman, Velimir Morača and unknown student of University of Economy in Belgrade, 1964 or 1965

In Belgrade, young people had other, less exhausting, criteria when seeking a spouse. Getting acquainted often took place in a well-defined downtown area during the afternoon promenade. On a street (closed to vehicles) leading from Terazije to Kalemegdan Park, one saw crowds of people every afternoon.

At all hours of the day there were also crowds of people at the train station — most of them were coming to the city to live. Fredy observed that we were seeing the migration from the countryside to the city. Zemun was hardly the countryside, but in November we joined the influx to Belgrade, taking a room in an apartment with modern conveniences. Fredy enrolled as a graduate student at the Economics Faculty and I found two jobs in music — one playing, one teaching.

It was our responsibility to secure a visa; since our situation had few precedents, various authorities quoted widely divergent rules. The bureaucrat in one office assured us we had to return to the United States and apply for a visa from there. After trying to communicate the absurdity of this proposal, we left and continued our search at another office which, conveniently, was nearby. Here we were immediately given one-year visas. We wondered if this was the Yugoslav self-managed economy at work.

Most of our Yugoslav friends and associates had been born and raised in Belgrade, but almost all of them had relatives who still lived in villages. The rural ties were part of our friends' self-definition. Fredy and I were often invited to go with them to visit their parents, grandparents or aunts and uncles. In the course of numerous visits, we traveled to villages that had no roads connecting them; we had a view of Spring as a season of mud; we slept on straw mattresses and helped shell corn by hand. The meals served us were always delicious (sometimes an animal was slaughtered in honor of our visit). It was obvious that our peasant hosts worked long hours doing by hand heavy tasks that a machine could accomplish in a fraction of the time, and it puzzled us that there was not more interest in labor-saving techniques. Though acknowledging that both men and women took great pride in their work, Fredy judged peasant life to be difficult and unrewarding.

As a student of economics, concerned with flow charts which showed the transfer of goods on a national level, Fredy had a patronizing view of the average peasant's undertaking. The efforts they expended and the time it took (which they never "counted") to bring their products to city markets made him scornful of their form of distribution and exchange. We were not well informed about collectivization efforts, but when he saw peasants hoeing in the long "ribbon" fields on which tractors would have been very efficient, Fredy felt justified in criticizing the peasants' reluctance to relinquish control over their private plots.

His later studies of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet)[1] softened this view somewhat and he became more sympathetic to peasants who resisted plans imposed by bureaucrats. In the summer of 1965, Fredy went with a friend and fellow student, Velimir Morača, to visit the latter's family and village in Montenegro. His stay there impressed him. First because of the isolation: the walk from the train station was ten miles uphill. Then by the self-sufficiency of these peasant-herders: the only thing they bought was salt. Finally, by the fierce independence: Morača's uncle refused to use a plate when eating, even though there were guests from the city. Fredy quoted this man's vigorous rejection of modern utensils: "Horse shit! What do I need a goddam fucking plate for?"

Urban Yugoslavs, too, were free with their criticisms, although they generally were not too specific, at least in public, when it came to government policies and individuals. Dissidents ran a very real risk of becoming political prisoners. Morača, who became close friends with Fredy, had spent eight years in jail because of his beliefs. People often explained to us that backwardness and social problems were due to "the three hundred years the Serbs lived under the Turkish yoke." Another semi-serious explanation for the county's difficulties was presented in the form of a frequently quoted joke: Question: "Who invented scientific socialism?" Response: "Marx and Engels." Comment: "Shouldn't they have tried it on rats first?" Newspapers rarely attacked official policies but did criticize certain aspects of them and often printed indignant letters from readers. At the theater we heard more profound, albeit more abstract, critiques. Few of our Yugoslav acquaintances hesitated to criticize the government, but all were wary of the authorities' power.

Fredy's only critique which reached the mass media was a letter he wrote to the Belgrade papers expressing his indignation at finding a nail in a package of dry soup mix. By then he was familiar with the conventional clichés used to praise Yugoslav socialism and he used them to good effect.

Neither Turkish occupation nor socialism were cited as sources for Yugoslav notions of male supremacy; it presumably had more indigenous roots. Fredy, always sensitive to the practice and verbalization of discrimination, observed that although Yugoslav men vigorously defended male prerogatives, they accepted a large share of domestic responsibility, especially if they had a wife who worked outside the home. Fredy pointed out this gap between principles and practice to some of his male friends. They explained that the situation in *their* home was different, that *their* wife needed assistance, still insisting that the tasks of marketing, child-rearing, cooking and cleaning really were a woman's obligation. A few years later, in texts written in Kalamazoo, Fredy examined other gaps between ideology and practice. One of these was the example of workers who, while verbally denouncing rebellious actions in one breath, take drastic, vigorous steps to protect their own interests in the next. Another example furnished a theme that remained central to all his later writings (in this case, admirable principles are belied by reprehensible practice): the political agitator whose goal is freedom, but who, once in power (and sometimes even before), justifies coercion in the name of a higher good.

1 An autonomous region within Serbia whose capital is Pristina. The majority of Kosmet's inhabitants are Albanian who retain tribal bonds, speak their own language and practice the Muslim religion.

Before the end of his first year in Belgrade, Fredy already spoke fluent Serbian and was able to read the textbooks for his classes. In the two subsequent years he learned to speak even better, although never without grammatical faults. People from certain regions in Yugoslavia ignore rules of declension, and new acquaintances often assumed that Fredy was from one of those regions.

To each other we spoke English, however, and some of our friends were English-speaking. Once or twice a month we read plays with John Ricklefs, Paul Pignon (who worked in Belgrade as a technical translator and who composed music when not working), Paul's wife Jasna and an Australian woman (who was spending a year in Belgrade to get acquainted with the country her parents had left). We had many opportunities to attend excellent concerts of world-famous artists (Kogan, Richter, Ricci) and Fredy heard many of the opera performances in which I participated as an orchestra violinist. One of Fredy's undertakings which remained unfinished was a translation into English of a history of Serbia. He worked on this project with a friend; I think that too much time of the weekly sessions was spent on eating and discussing and too little on translating. Between 1963 and 1966, we did some traveling outside Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1964, we spent five weeks in Italy, visiting Venice, Ravenna, Rome, Naples and Florence. In 1965 when the Belgrade Opera made a tour of East Germany, Fredy traveled with the company; we spent a week in both East Berlin and Leipzig. He and I made independent visits, mostly short, to Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest. In the summer of 1965 when I went to the U.S., Fredy traveled in Yugoslavia; in Sarajevo he had a brief reunion with Living Theatre friends (who were performing throughout Europe that year). He also went to Paris to renew friendships there.

For most of the stay in Belgrade, Fredy devoted himself to his studies and was a conscientious student. At the Economics Faculty at least two of his professors were high in governmental circles. One was president the national bank; he came to class in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes. The other was the wife of the country's vice-president. Both professors appear in *Letters of Insurgents*.

In his first year of study, Fredy took courses which presented Marxist principles of economic analysis and which used this analysis to study the Yugoslav economy. In the second year the courses were more specialized. Two foreign professors came to lecture: one, a Hungarian mathematician, taught the students how to construct and use input-output matrices; the other, a Soviet economist, discussed the latest management techniques. The textbooks for both classes were by U.S. academics.[2]

Fredy's master's thesis, "The Structure of Backwardness," which he completed in the spring of 1965 was a statistical-economic analysis of certain factors in a number of countries at various levels of industrial development. He used flow charts to study consumption, exports and reinvestment in five basic sectors. In no way does this work foreshadow Fredy's later, critical, views on industrialization. One of its assumptions is "that a developed economy is a backward economy's image of the future... There may be various 'roads to socialism,' but there is only one road to industrialization: it is a broad highway which may be followed in the freshness of April or the heat of August; one may walk it, ride a horse or go by bulldozer; if he cannot follow it he will not get where it leads" (page 97). The destination itself goes unquestioned in this work.

The panel of professors to whom he presented his thesis was satisfied with its quality even though, at the public defense, some of them quibbled about certain of Fredy's observations about Yugoslavia. The academic panel's chief, wife of the country's vice-president, commented on Comrade Perlman's remarkable fluency in Serbian.

Fredy found the bland, "official" analyses offered by the Economics Faculty less and less interesting and was pleased to follow courses of and get acquainted with Miloš Samardžija, economics professor at the Law Faculty. This former consultant to the national government had a profound knowledge of Marx and Marxist theoreticians, and was an unequivocal proponent of industrialization. He did not question the goals of the Yugoslav government, but his pragmatic observations combined with his discerning Marxist perspective resulted in trenchant, critiques of the Yugoslav system.

The doctoral thesis which Fredy presented to the Law Faculty where Samardžija was his advisor, was more controversial than the earlier thesis. In this one, Fredy attacked specific economic practices of the Yugoslav government, investment decisions which related to Kosmet.[3] He used Preobrazhensky's analysis of the primitive accumulation of capital to study prospects for Kosmet's development and concluded that the other Yugoslav republics should build industrial plants in Kosmet. Failure to do this would heighten the backwardness. Fredy worked hard on this study and gathered much material to defend his conclusions: a statistical study of Yugoslav per capita income since 1945; a documentation of the transfer of the labor force from agriculture; intersectoral comparisons between republics. He thought that the proposals he made were reasonable, that the data he had assembled and carefully analyzed with modern mathematical methods should convince rational people interested in the economic development of all parts of the country. He was disturbed by the warning he got from the more worldly-wise Samardžija not to dwell on the implications of his thesis when he defended it in front of the other professors. Samardžija suggested that these men did not welcome dissertations — no matter how well documented and how closely argued — whose conclusions called on the country's leaders to change their policies. In June 1966 Fredy defended his "Conditions for the Development of a Backward Region" and was awarded a Ph.D. from the Belgrade University Law Faculty.

During his last year in Belgrade, while still a student at the Law Faculty, Fredy was also a

2 The use of American textbooks did not upset Fredy when he took these courses. But after returning to the U.S. where he met Western partisans of scientific socialism who insisted that Soviet economic principles and practices were superior to those in the West. Fredy cited his Yugoslav experience to counter their claims. Fredy maintained that contemporary scientific socialists unreservedly advocate American management principles.

3 See note 1.

member of an economic planning commission hired by the regional administration in Kosmet. The task of the commission was to propose a program for development. Samardžija was head of this commission; other Law Faculty graduate students also participated. Fredy made many trips to Priština but he did not get a close view of daily life in the region nor did he get acquainted with non-administrative Albanian residents, since most of his time in Priština was spent in offices.

Fredy found this "job" (for which he was well paid) interesting but not particularly satisfying. He realized that the commission was concerned mainly with words, abstractions, and that the situation of Kosmet's population did not change as a result of his and his colleagues' proposals. A few years later Fredy would criticize the legitimacy of planning commissions as such.

Most of Fredy's fellow students were preparing for a career in the Yugoslav bureaucracy and had little interest in initiating changes in economic policies. One friend (who was not a participant in the Kosmet commission) was already employed by a Novi Sad enterprise; he had pursued graduate studies at the request of his superiors. Six months after his graduation we visited Miša in his new office. Except for the handsome furniture surrounding our friend, the room was empty. As we drank the Turkish coffee brought to us by the woman hired by the enterprise to make and serve coffee, we asked Miša to tell us about his job responsibilities. With only a trace of sheepishness, he explained that as yet his duties were undefined; he assured us, however, that before the end of the year the enterprise directors would undoubtedly assign him some projects. When we left, he took the newspaper from a desk drawer and resumed his on-the-job activity.

The experiences of Velimir Morača gave us a more somber view of Yugoslav reality. Although at least one of his close relatives was a famous World War II partisan, the young Morača's views concerning Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union (in 1948) brought him prison sentences totaling eight year. During his incarceration, he read all of Marx's and Lenin's works and exercised his photographic memory on these and other texts. In the mid-1960s Morača was out of prison. He lived and worked in Subotica, but commuted to Belgrade to study at the Economics Faculty.

This ex-political prisoner who was trying to understand the society in which he lived was the model Fredy took for Yarostan in *Letters of Insurgents*. The disorientation Yarostan described inhis letters to Sophia was all too familiar to Morača. The experiences of Yarostan's daughter Vesna closely follow the history of Morača's daughter of the same name. This intelligent and patriotic ten-year-old was confused by the ambiguous position of her father: what could he have done to warrant his being jailed by the authorities of a country based on such admirable principles? The real Vesna's death occurred after we had left Yugoslavia so Fredy's depiction of her death in *Letters* was hypothetical. Morača himself was rearrested in the 1970s and died in prison. This friend's history — especially the tragic events which occurred after we left the country — played a great part in determining Fredy's over-all estimation of the Yugoslav system. Morača's uncompromising nature, his commitment to economic equality and his outspoken critiques were intolerable to the authorities. With absolute clarity, Fredy saw in Morača the individual destroyed by the State.

Our departure from Yugoslavia in 1966 was rather precipitous, but not related to political repression. Yugoslav doctors advised me to return to the United States following an illness and surgery. Had I not been ill, it is likely we would have remained another year in Belgrade. But contestations and anti-war actions made the U.S. seem more interesting than it had four years earlier, and it is probable that we would have returned soon after Fredy finished his studies at the University of Belgrade. We had been welcomed and appreciated in Belgrade and when, after a three-year stay, we bid farewell to our friends, activities, the city itself, we already felt nostalgia and loss.

From: Lorraine Perlman, *Having Little, Being Much: A Chronicle of Fredy Perlman's Fifty Years*. Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red, 1989.



Praxis: an attempt at ruthless criticism

Juraj Katalenac

Yugoslav socialism was a unique political experiment, not just because it said 'no' to Stalin in 1948 and implemented a system of workers' self-management, but because of the uniqueness of the 'left opposition' and the critique of the political elite that emerged there. Unlike countries behind the 'Iron Curtain' Yugoslavia had a higher level of tolerance for political criticism – especially when it came from intellectual circles or opposition within the League of Communists.[1] When Aleksandar Ranković, head of state security service and prominent unitarist retired the space for free expression expanded, allowing cultural movements such as Yugoslav Black Wave cinema[2], and the new wave and underground music scenes to flourish[3]. There were obviously limits to this tolerance though. The League did not tolerate movements and initiatives that emerged in response to the realities of work life, such as workplace and other class-based struggles.

The emergence of the philosophical journal *Praxis* (1964-1974) and the Korčula Summer School (1963-1974) was an important political development as it was effectively the 'left opposition' within Yugoslavia. It was seen by some in 'the west' as exotic because few of its essays were translated and published in English. For this reason, a lot of 'mist' surrounds it. For example, Wikipedia and Marxist Internet Archive contain a lot of misinformation. The Memory of the World archive[4] tried to rectify this by uploading most issues of *Praxis* and other miscellaneous material. However, the language barrier remains as their 'international editions' did not include the vast bulk of the content produced and published by them.

In this essay I will present their story and explain why they were and remain an important devel-

1 The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was the name of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after its Six Congress in 1952. Name was changed because of new narratives of workers' self-management and an emphasis on withering away of the state.

2 Yugoslav Black Wave is an umbrella term for Yugoslav moves made between late 60's and early 70's that were characterized with dark humor and critique of Yugoslavia. For those who are interested more I would recommend book Surfing the Black: Yugoslav Black Wave Cinema and Its Transgressive Moments by Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulić and Žiga Testen (Jan van Eyck Akademie, 2011).

3 Yugoslav punk and new wave music was well known for its critique of Yugoslavia. For example, punk band Paraf made a song called "Goli Otok" after Yugoslav gulag for Stalinists and songs which were making fun of Yugoslav slogans and police, while hardcore punk band UBR made song called "Revolution is a whore" with the lyrics: "Revolution is a whore / dictatorship of the proletariat is lie and Utopia."

4 www.memoryoftheworld.org

opment in history of Yugoslavia and their successor states.

What was Praxis?

Praxis was an academic journal published by Croatian Philosophical Society (HFD). Its founding members were: Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Danilo Pejović, Gajo Petrović, Rudi Supek and Predrag Vranicki[5]; all members of HFD and professors at Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zagreb. Danilo Pejović left the Editorial Board in 1966 because he joined the Croatian nationalist fraction within the League, and in the years that followed the Editorial Council expanded. The first issue of *Praxis* was published in 1964 and the last one in 1974.

In the first issue they explain their positions and set out their goals. This issue focused solely on the concept of practice/praxis, through which they elaborated their critique of Yugoslav socialism, statist dogma, and the lack of an academic and/or political critique. In their introductory text, "Why Praxis?", they stated how they want a journal:

"that would not be philosophical in the sense according to which philosophy is just one of the special areas, one scientific discipline, strictly separated by the rest of them and from the problems of everyday human life. We want a philosophical journal in the sense that philosophy is the thought of the revolution, ruthless criticism of all that exists, a humanist vision of the human world and as an inspirational force for revolutionary activity."[6]

What lay behind the notion of "ruthless criticism" was the idea that nobody has the right to a monopoly of criticism and thought. Or in other words they should be willing to freely and openly criticize socialist development, or the lack of it, in Yugoslavia. For them, it was primarily the task of Marxists to critically discuss the problems of their country, with an emphasis on socialist internationalism, and a strong rejection of nationalism of any kind. To this end, they stated that the:

"problems of Croatia today cannot be discussed separately from the problems of Yugoslavia, and the problems of contemporary Yugoslavia cannot be isolated from the big questions of the contemporary world. Neither socialism nor Marxism are something strictly national, so Marxism cannot be Marxism, or socialism – socialism, if we enclose ourselves in narrow national frames."[7]

They stated, they were not interested in "preserving the truth" and "conserving Marx", but in a broader discussion that would enable non-Marxists to participate too.

Right away in their introductory text, "Why Praxis?", they state that the positions presented in articles published in the journal belong exclusively to authors and not to editorial staff as a whole as they were not an ideologically homogenous group.

In his book, *Practice/Truth* (1986), Gajo Petrović wrote that the mission of Praxis was to liberate Marx from "Stalinist silts" to reveal and revive, and to further develop his authentic thoughts. For them the concept of praxis was a central concept of Marx's thought, which is why they refer to it as a philosophy of practice. The primary concern of this philosophy was the human as a being of practice. According to Petrović, when talking about practice, Marx did not think about man's economic and political activity, politics of some 'socialist' government or political party, but rather:

"Practice as a specifically human way of being that distinguishes man from any other being. It is through free creative activity that man creates and shapes himself and his human world and the historical activity that results from this force."[8]

Furthermore, Petrović states in several places in their introductory text that Praxis see Marx's thought as the "thought of the revolution." According to which they understand the meaning of revolution in the right way – revolution is not just the highest form, but the essence of the practice.

Korčula summer school

Aside from the journal they also organized the Korčula Summer School. The idea for both, the journal and the summer school, originated in a symposium, 'Progress and Culture', held in Dubrovnik in 1963, where Western academics, such as Erich Fromm, Henri Lefebvre, and Lucien Goldmann participated. The following year the first issue of *Praxis* was published and the first Summer School was held. Important contributions to the summer schools ended up in *Praxis,* and some would appear in its international edition.

5 Milan Kangrga. Šverceri vlastitog života: Refleksije o Hrvatskoj političkoj kulturi i duhovnosti. (Split: Kultura & Rasvjeta, 2002), 31.

6 "Čemu Praxis?" Praxis 1, 1964, 4.

7 Ibid. 5.

8 Gajo Petrović. Praksa/Istina. (Zagreb: Kulturno-prosvjetni sabor Hrvatske "Kulturni radnik", 1986), 33.

Students at Korčula Summer School (Korčula, 1968)

The international members of *Praxis*'s Editorial Council and permanent participants of the Korčula Summer School were: Kostas Axelos, Alfred J. Ayer, Hans Dieter Bahr, Zygmunt Baumann, Norman Birnbaum, Ernst Bloch, Thomas Bottomore, Umberto Cerroni, Robert S. Cohen, Marvin Farber, Eugen Fink, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, André Gorz, Jürgen Habermas, Erich Haeintel, Agnes Heller, Leszek Kolakowski, Karel Kosik, Henri Lefebvre, Lucio Lombardo Radice, György Lukacs, Serge Mallet, Herber Marcusce, Stefan Morawski, Enzo Paci, Howard L. Pasons, David Riesman, Ivan Varga, Marx Waroffsky, Kurt Wolff, Georg Henrik von Wright, Aldo Zanardo and Julius Strinka.[9] Obviously others also participated in the summer school and wrote for the journal too. This is not intended as an exhaustive list.

Luka Bogdanović explained in his paper, "Why Praxis? Or about historical origins of Praxis journal" that "*Praxis* and Korčula Summer School became a place of meeting, confrontation and exchange between philosophers from the East and the West."[10]

Korčula Summer School was conceived as:

1. "The professional training of people employed in high and middle schools, various institutes and social organizations as well as in journalism, in the disciplines of philosophy and sociology.
2. The exchange of scientific experiences and thoughts in all areas of activity in the country,
3. The exchange of thoughts and experiences between foreign and domestic scientists and experts in the domain, and the trends, of philosophical and sociological thought in Europe and the World, so that everyone would be in step with the substantial flows of thought in the world and aware of the newest literature in that field of work."[11]

Thus, the Korčula Summer School had an academic character from the outset. We can see this in the themes of the Summer School, too:

"1963 – Progress and Culture (Dubrovnik), 1964 – The Point and Perspectives of Socialism, 1965 – What is History? (…), 1967 – Creativity and Enlightenment, 1968 – Marx and Revolution, 1969 – Power and Humanity, 1970 – Hegel and Our Time (…), 1971 – Utopia and Reality, 1972 – Freedom and Equality, 1973 – Essence and Boundaries of Civil World, 1974 – Art in the Technological

9 Kangrga 86.

10 Luka Bogdanić. "Čemu Praxis? Ili o historijskom porijeklu i mjestu Praxisa". in: *Aspekti praxisa i refleksije: Uz 50. obljetnicu*, ed: Borislav Mikulić and Mislav Žitko. (Zagreb : Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu, 2015), p. 26.

11 Kangrga 347.

The first public appearance of the entire editorial board of Praxis (Student Centre, Zagreb, end of 1964). From left to right: Rudi Supek, behind him (obscured from view), Branko Bošnjak, Gajo Petrović (editor-in-chief), Danilo Pejović (editor-in-chief), Predrag Vranicki, Milan Kangrga, Danko Grlić; far right (with back turned): the director of the Student Centre, M. Heremić, next to him, Antun Žvan.

World."[12]

After 1974 the Summer School was banned by the "Stalinist bureaucracy".[13] According to Kangrga, the Council of Korčula received a decree from the 'state level' to ban the summer school, and not allow any further activity of this type in their town. The Council accepted this decision even though they expressed their concerns, through private not public means, about the loss of out of season tourists.

1964-1968

Even before the first issue of *Praxis* was published, the individuals that made up its core constituted an 'opposition', within Yugoslavia, and especially the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Many of these people were involved in writing for and publishing the *Views* journal (1952-1954), edited by Rudi Supek. This journal published a number of interesting and noteworthy texts, such as Gajo Petrović's "Philosophy in USSR from October Revolution to 1938" (1952), or Milan Kangrga's "Problems of Ideology" (1953) – which outlined many of the ideas that would define *Praxis*. The early seeds of *Praxis* can be seen in Bogdanić's use of Kangrga's quote: "Praxis (…) is not just industry, experiment, economy, production, but the totality of human existence, totality of his manifestation, his substantially determination."[14]

The first issue of *Praxis* set the agenda for what would follow. It warned about the discrepancy between the proclaimed theory and existing practice. It said that philosophers need to engage in practice and criticism instead of just writing about purely abstract subjects.

Texts published in the second issue of *Praxis* were attacked during the 8th Congress of the League in 1964. In particular Miroslav Pečujlić along with Gajo Petrović, Mihailo Marković, Boris Ziherl and Maks Baćae came under fire for their comments in a discussion about role of the philosopher-communist in criticizing politicians. And when 1968 happened, as it did elsewhere, it gave birth to a critical and radical student movement.[15]

The 1968 student protests in Belgrade were the biggest revolt against the government in the history of socialist Yugoslavia. On 2 June 1968, students, who were trying to reach the city assembly to give them their demands, clashed with the police. In their document, "Resolution of student protests", they stated that the problems they wanted addressed were "social inequality, unemployment, existence of strong bureaucratic forces and bad situation on Yugoslav universities."[16] Their demands were "firm action against enrichment in un-socialist way, reduction of managerial cadre without adequate qualifications, and the employment of young experts, the democratization of all social and political organizations, especially the League, equal participation of students in university bodies, and free access to university."[17]

Events in Zagreb were inspired by events in Belgrade. Students started to gather in, student dormitories on 3 June to express their support for what students in Belgrade were doing and demanding. The movement in Zagreb culminated with a protest on 5 June at the Student Centre. League members, as well as professors, such as Vanja Sutlić, Gajo Petrović and Milan Kangrga addressed the protest. Students demanded to hear the opinion of the latter two. In his autobiographical book *Smugglers of their own lives* (2002), Kangrga recalls that he appealed to the students to behave in a 'civilized' way and in accordance with their social status because "we are not a rabble, we are the academics."[18] He urged the students not to protest outside but to stay within the walls of the Student Centre and discuss. He was afraid that if students go outside they would get beaten up by the police. He stated that their demands were fully justified.

Svetozar Stojanović, *Praxis* member from Belgrade, spoke about in 1968 Praxis had to decide whether it was going to live up to its theory and put it into practice.[19] Unfortunately most of members of *Praxis* remained uninterested in these events. In Zagreb, only Petrović, Kangrga and Mladen Čaldrović showed some interest, but that was not enough, especially when you consider the role Petrović played in pacifying students on behalf of Pero Piker, the Secretary of the City Council. We can say that in Zagreb, *Praxis* was on the same side as the League: against the rebellious students. Unlike them, *Praxis*'s Belgrade associates were equal participants and they participated on their own initiative.

To conclude, in the heat of 1968 *Praxis* decided to put its theory before political practice, even though their ideas, criticisms and demands were in line with those of the students and they had tried to put them into practice. In the pages of *Praxis* in the next few issues they tried to avoid conflict with the government by analyzing student movements and the 'New Left' around the World, by not mentioning what happened in Yugoslavia.[20] This was a pragmatic move. According to Klasić, if they had participated in the student movement or advocated its ideas it would have meant the end of their journal. Also, there was one incident that year at Korčula Summer School which demonstrated a chasm between the students and the professors. A group of students, led by Šime Vranić, visited Korčula Summer School and decided to write revolutionary slogans on the walls of Korčula's houses. This angered the town council, and they threatened to cancel the Summer School which resulted in Praxis condemning the students.

Critique of Yugoslavia

A Croatian nationalist movement known as 'the Croatian Spring' emerged in 1971 demanding greater liberalization of the economy and the political system. This movement occupies a central place in contemporary Croatian nationalist identity and mythology.

From the outset *Praxis* took a strong anti-nationalist stance and this is why they did not support the 'Croatian Spring' movement, or any other nationalist movement within Yugoslavia, nor did they support unitarian/centralist forces. This episode pushed *Praxis* to deepen their critique of Yugoslav society and socialism. In *Praxis* #3-4, published in 1971, they explored what they called the 'Moment of Yugoslav socialism', in which they present a multifaceted – economic, political, cultural and philosophical – critique of Yugoslavia. Some of the essays in this issue were also published in issues 5 and 6 that year, and some were translated into French and Eng-

12 Ibid. 349-50.
13 Ibid. 350.
14 Bogdanović 31.
15 See Fredy Perlman's "Birth of a Revolutionary Movement in Yugoslavia" for an interesting take in English. Published in this issue of Antipolitika.
16 Hrvoje Klasić. *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968.* (Zagreb : Ljevak, 2012), 123.
17 Ibid.
18 Kangrga 142.
19 Klasić 208.
20 In fact, Praxis in 1968, initially published a double issue which was a collection of documents from the rebellion of that year, but after they got a taste of state repression, they retreated and disctanced themselves from the rebbelion.

Herbert Marcuse, Korčula, 1968.

lish, and published in the 'international edition'.

Praxis did not have an 'ideological line' that they all agreed on and defended. Different writers adopted different perspectives and attitudes to the questions and topics of the day. The diversity in opinion and freedom of expression was a defining feature of the journal. Thus, we will examine the most representative and important positions staked out in 'their' multifarious analysis and critique of Yugoslavia.

Rudi Supek wrote that self-management along with the Non-Aligned Movement[21] proved to be the most efficient instruments of Yugoslav socialism. He presented a critique of statist socialism that was simultaneously minimalist and maximalist. Minimalist in that he points to the 'way of socialism' in Yugoslavia, in distancing itself from the negative aspects of socialism in other countries; and the pluralist approach to Marxist analysis of political and social affairs. The maximalist critique centered on the claim that statism is rooted in Marx's theory of the withering away of the state and his theory of alienation, which is in reality workers' self-management. That the principle of self-management is not wrong in itself but what is wrong is the fact that it is not developed enough and integrated into the wider social system. It is not Marxist, according to him, but democratic-liberalism or Proudhonism.

According to him, workers' self-management became the "theme of the day" in the movement, with left intellectual circles and amongst the 'progressive' liberal bourgeoisie because: a) the development of modern sociology and social-psychology led to discovery of the "human factor" in the production, and by extension without Marxism it came to the conclusion that workers' should participate in the decision making process at the enterprise level; b) the trade unions have through collective agreements got a right to participate in decision making processes in their enterprises; c) the creation of an "intellectual proletariat" through the growth of the third sector, and "enterprise unionism" and self-management became a vehicle for democratization and "normalization" of economic management; d) there is a need for an alternative to statist socialism; e) highly developed countries with a strong tradition of statism and centralization need to find a 'way to socialism' via participatory and direct democracy; f) the idea of workers' self-management is a threatening and offensive force in developed countries that calls for action instead of waiting for liberation to come via the Second and Third World, and; g) the Marxist or socialist intelligentsia quickly became aware of the power of self-management.[22]

The contradictions of Yugoslav self-management, according to Supek, were: a) it allowed some self-managing organizations full autonomy, which in a market economy led to inequality in income and other inequities; b) the total freedom of market commodity money relations (there was an ideology about "socialist commodity money relations" and "socialist market"); c) a spirit of bourgeois liberalism – individualistic and "atomistic" understanding of social organization – prevailed; d) this type of political democracy shaped the economic life of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia combined horizontal self-management in the economic sphere with vertical statist power structures, which is why the system of self-management was dependent on the authority of the state.

Ljubomir Tadić, on the other hand, emphasized the ambivalence of the workers' movement and revolutionary socialist theory toward the state, which he saw as deeply rooted in Marxism itself. He pointed out that unlike Marxism, anarchism had a clear anti-statist attitude from the beginning.

The problems of Yugoslavia, according to him, were: a) the internal organization of society and state, i.e., the relationship between centralization and decentralization, and; b) the classical question of state form. In addressing the latter point he made use of the writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Aristotle. Tadić's response to this was federalism, with its principle of freedom. Central to this principle was the belief that more freedom ought to be reserved for that smaller collectives than the larger ones.

Tadić concluded that Proudhon's theory of "workers' democracy" is only possible in a decentralized society. Proudhon developed the idea of mutualism, i.e. the idea of justice understood as mutuality, exchange, a middle point with a balance.[23] In a "workers' democracy" politics is a consequence of the economy.

The political consequence of mutualism is federalism. A political federation arises out of industrial and agricultural association, which is why workers have no need for the state and ought to accept the principle of competition. In this schema competition is an expression of the spontaneity of the society, a sign of its dynamism. It should not be destroyed but balanced. The "power of decentralization" is founded on the principle of ownership, according to which the principle of justice (mutuality), which conflicts with the power in the state in the form of "monopolies and the concentration" of capital.[24]

In an essay entitled, "Bureaucratic Socialism", Gajo Petrović distinguishes between three different conceptions of socialism. The first one sees socialism as a social system that negates capitalism. Linked to this understanding of socialism is a second conception that sees it as the movement that creates socialism. The third conception is distinguished from the previous two in that it is a theory that probes the possibilities for advancing socialism.

Herbert Marcuse, Korčula, 1968.

In this way, it is a theoretical accompaniment to the first and second conception. "Bureaucratic socialism" only understands the first conception, and for Petrović a bureaucrat is a "man who independently of his own 'subjective' beliefs and individual characteristics belongs to the social layer whose 'objective' social position is defined by his relationship to the 'bureau.'"[25] Petrović points out that the bureaucratic view of socialism is systematized in Stalin's "canonization" of socialism as the "lower phase of communism", that ought to come into existence after a period known as the "dictatorship of the proletariat." This "canonization" provides us with the following 'scheme':

capitalism → dictatorship of the proletariat → lower phase of communism (socialism) → higher phase of communism (full communism)

The roots of this 'scheme' laid out in Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and later developed by Lenin and others. Petrović critiques this theory for singling out the dictatorship of the proletariat as a period between capitalism and socialism:

"[The] Dictatorship of the proletariat is indeed a dictatorship of the proletariat, only if it is already the beginning of socialism and communism. (…) If the dictatorship of the proletariat is understood as a special transitional period, which is neither capitalism nor socialism, it can be understood as a period of unlimited terror and violence."[26]

What is the essence of communism? Petrović wrote, according to Marx, communism is the "creation of practical humanism." For Petrović, com-

21 Non-Aligned Movement is the name for group of states that stood against block division during the Cold War up to the present day. It was formed in 1961 in Belgrade and Yugoslavia played a leading role in its creation and politics.

22 Rudi Supek. "Protuvuriječnosti i nedorečenosti jugoslavenskog samoupravnog socijalizma"; *Praxis* 3-4 (1971): 350.

23 Ljubomir Tadić. "Radnička klasa i država"; *Praxis* 3-4 (1971): 449.

24 Ibid.

25 Gajo Petrović. "Birokratski socijalizam"; *Praxis* 3-4 (1971): 487.

26 Ibid. 484.

munism is a transitional society from capitalism to humanism. Communism is as communist as it is humanist:

"According to Marx communism is the 're-integration or return of the man to himself', [the] 'abolition of man's self-alienation'. And the abolition of alienation means 'the return of man from religion, family, state to a human, i.e. social, existence'. Communism, therefore, is not just another socio-economic formation, it is the abolition of the primacy of the economic sphere and catches human life in its fullness."[27]

In his presentation of 'communism', he mentions Lassalleau who thought that distribution according to "work" is "just". He compares it to the position of Marx and Engels, who thought that the principle of distribution according to work done belongs to bourgeois society, in its search to impose a universal measure on the different types of work done, so that despite its formal equality it represented a violation of rights and inequality. Moreover, Petrović is perfectly aware that in the first phase of socialist development it will be impossible to abolish the injustice that is distribution according to work, but he believes later the conditions for transcending narrow bourgeois right and the fulfilment of principle of distribution according to needs will be realised.

In comparison to Tadić and Petrović who theoretically and philosophically criticized the 'present state of things' in Yugoslavia, Veljko Cvjetičanin tackled the concrete problems of Yugoslav socialism. The Yugoslav economy experienced a gradual slowdown in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the growth of all shapes of consumption and unemployment (the economy needed to grow by 9% per annum in order to absorb the new work force). The pressures this placed on the economy risked crashing, especially when you consider the role debt played. Income derived from work fell in response to this, as more than 30% of income was accrued outside of work time. All this led to greater social stratification; the ruling middle class that occupied positions in the administration of the society were on the rise, while the working-class was in decline. The situation was even worse for the rural population that made up 45% of the population.

The gap between economic performance and social reality caused an ideological crisis. It was harder and harder for Yugoslav socialism to perform the integrative role it once did, once commercialization started to take root. The resulting erosion of Yugoslav socialist ideology and identity allowed nationalism to emerge in the creeping void created by this.

Praxis put a lot of faith in self-management as a process that could develop socialism in Yugoslavia, and in the rest of the world too. If we go back a little bit to *Praxis* 2, from 1964, Mihailo Marković wrote that:

"True self-management presupposes the existence of rational, socialized, humane personalities that understand the wholeness of the social process, and are aware of the relative connections of personal, group and general interests and adhere to certain ideals of human purposefulness."[28]

Furthermore, he claims under-developed societies do not possess such a population, which is why a revolutionary elite is needed to motivate the masses (even by force), to ensure "progress". That same elite should shift its attention to the realization of self-management and slowly abolish itself. It is worth noting here that Svetozar Stojanović also had a conception of a 'statist class' in the sense of a ruling class that opposes the working class.[29] However, in case of Yugoslavia, Stojanović had no problem admitting that "there is no real evidence that the historical process of the withering away of the state and the transcending of politics as an alienated power dominated by professional groups started"[30], and continued, "it is really naive to believe that the state would die out while the Party ruled."[31] The political crisis of 1960s and 1970s was rooted in an inability to radically "destalinize".

Praxis also published a critique of this issue of the journal written by Stipe Šuvar, a prominent Croatian politician, and it appeared in *Praxis* 5 (1971). Šuvar wrote that the reform of the League could not come to fruition if self-management did not function as a relationship of production.[32] According to him, self-management had conquered minds, but failed as a relationship of production. This was, of course, because of the limits of the self-management: an under-developed material basis; the lack of a self-managed structure for productive workers and others; the failure to integrate self-managed economic units; the tendency for the rule of elite instead of the rule of the masses; and the discrepancy between self-management in work organizations and in the political system[33]:

"In our country the working class still does not have economic power, that power belongs to these social forces and social layers, which are according to their way of life, place in the social division of labor, share in division of social wealth, not only separated from the class but often objectively opposed."[34]

All that Yugoslavia needed was to push self-management harder, and system would correct all its flaws.

The League did not look kindly upon the critical issues of *Praxis* published in 1971, especially not with the political changes that were happening in the background – such as the growth of nationalism. After long philosophical and political debates, media attacks and 'conversations' with prominent local leaders of the League, *Praxis* had to give up and stop publishing. However, they retained their university jobs, they were not prosecuted, or imprisoned. They stopped publishing the journal because the League stopped funding it – which was until then funded out of public funds.

Fallout of… everything

There is a lack of information about the activities of certain members of *Praxis* after they stopped publishing it. We do know that on April 1981, *Praxis International* was published in Oxford. This was mainly the work of the 'Belgrade faction'. Only Supek supported it. However, the rest of the Praxis, with Kangrga being the most vocal about it, disagreed with publishing the journal with the same or a similar name because it reduced the chance of *Praxis* being published again, anytime soon, in Yugoslavia.

The 'core crew' of *Praxis* in Zagreb mostly re-

Jürgen Habermas, Korčula, 1968.

treated into everyday life, once their financial support was withdrawn, and got on with their university jobs. Some of them continued to write for other publications, but not in the way they wrote for *Praxis*. Petrović and Supek died in 1993. Kangrga remained politically active in the 1990s. In 1997 *Feral Tribune* published a book of his essays and newspaper columns called *Outside of historical events: documents of one epoch* in which he openly criticized the authoritarian regime of then president Franjo Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). *Feral Tribune* also published his autobiography *Smugglers of their own lives* in which he presented the story of *Praxis* journal, but also his own sharp criticism of both Yugoslav and 'post-Yugoslav' (i.e. Croatian and Serbian) political elite, nationalism and his ex-colleagues and comrades. Of course, just like every autobiography this book ought to be taken with a 'pinch of salt', as it descends into the rants of an old man at times. In the book he also states that he was a supporter of the Socialist Workers Party (SRP), a tiny party led by Stipe Šuvar, based around Yugonostalgia. However, it is important to emphasize *Praxis* vanguard status as an intellectual force that promoted pro-European Union (neo)liberalism, as opposed to Croatian nationalism. This is especially true of the second generation of *Praxis*, with authors such as Žarko Puhovski.

Unlike Kangrga who remained a strong critic of both Croatian and Serbian nationalism, Serbian *Praxis* members went in other directions.

Ljubo Tadić was one of the founding members of Democratic Party (DS) in December 1989. His son Boris Tadić served as Serbian president from 2004 to 2012. On February 3, 1990s, Mićunović, another founding members of DS, and he were in-

27 Ibid. 485.

28 Mihailo Marković. "Socijalizam i samoupravljanje"; *Praxis* 2 (1964): 172.
29 Marcel Van der Linden. *Western Marxism and the Soviet Union*. (Leiden-Boston : Brill, 2007), 202.
30 Stojanović, Svetozar. "Od Postrevolucionarne diktature ka socijalističkoj demokratiji." *Praxis* 3-4 (1972): 385.
31 Ibid. 386.
32 Stipe Šuvar. "Tri riječi o 'Trenutku jugoslavenskog socijalizma'" *Praxis* 5 (1971): 678.

33 Ibid. 679.
34 Ibid. 680.

stalled as its president. In 1996, he formed another party – Democratic Centre. Trivo Inđić was the Assistant Federal Minister for Education and Culture of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia[35] from 1992 to 1994, and the ambassador of the FR Yugoslavia to Spain from 2001 to 2004. He became the political advisor to Serbian president Boris Tadić in 2004. Mihailo Marković was one of co-authors of the notorious 'SANU Memorandum'[36] and was one of the main supporters of the Serbian nationalist politics of Slobodan Milošević. Svetozar Stojanović served as a special adviser to former FR Yugoslav president Dobrica Cosić (1992-1993). He was one of the main critics of Milošević's politics and participated in October 2000 overthrow of his regime. Later on, Serbian president Vojislav Koštunica appointed him to the Council for Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia.

A sad, but not so unexpected, end to this story.

Although, it should be mentioned that, from the Belgrade group of Praxis, Miladin Životić, Zagorka Golubović and Nebojša Popov were active participants in the anti-war and antinationalist movement during the 90s, and that Popov, after 2000. supported worker's struggles against privatization. They participated in all of this from a left-liberal standpoint though.

Final words

So, "why is Praxis important?"

For me, personally, they were a really important discovery in my intellectual 'coming of age', opening a lot of doors. Their discussion and writing styles were different and unique to each author but they all shared a common characteristic: intellectual curiosity, openness, respect and the ability to 'agree to disagree'. Furthermore, all of them were authentic intellectuals that were not limited to their contributions to *Praxis* but also numerous other publications, academic and non-academic, numerous books, and translated and edited the most important authors of their time. They were a bridge between the East and the West and kept the flame of intellectual life and discussion alive. A flame which has long since been extinguished, with mediocrity taking its place. They also presented their own critique of Yugoslavia, a 'left' one, that is incredibly important.

However, they suffered from various contradictions and problems – like we all do.

First of all, they limited themselves to an abstract critique and academic activity. Despite Stojanović's call for them to "put their theory into practice", *Praxis* sided with the League in 1968 in order to secure its existence, and this fear of their own existence pushed them away from a wider political engagement. This was partially because they viewed themselves as a 'socialist intelligentsia' and did not see potential for change without their involvement as such – as an 'intelligentsia', an elite. Which is why they took care not to jeopardize their own social position.

Furthermore, while their critiques were a 'thorn in the side' of a lot of Yugoslav politicians and the League itself, they were really outdated and shallow at the level of Marxist-Humanism. Here I have no intention of getting drawn into the most overrated and useless discussion of Marxist academia, Structuralism vs. Humanism, but I just want to compare the works of *Praxis* with the works of the more well-known Marxist-Humanists such as Raya Dunayevskaya and C. L. R. James. While Praxis criticized Yugoslavia for being 'statist and a bureaucratic socialism', following the theories developed by Bruno Rizzi, whereas the work of Raya Dunayevskaya developed around the same time probed deeper and paved the way for a more rigorous and Marxian critique. Once again, it is not really important what theoretical interpretation of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia you subscribe to, it is more about the fact that their analysis did not go as far as others of their period and remained loyal to the economic and political co-ordinates of workers' self-management developed by Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič following the 'Tito-Stalin split'. Of course, *Praxis* was aware of Dunayevskaya and James' works as they corresponded with them and exchanged books, and Dunayevskaya even wrote for *Praxis*. Furthermore, she even developed a kind of a friendship with Marković, a friendship which ended with his nationalist turn.

Their theoretically limited and shallow critique of Yugoslavia advocated similar solutions from different standpoints were published in *Praxis*. These included calls for a multiparty system and political liberalization, and to deepen workers' power within the system of self-management. However, they never questioned the nature of self-management as such, or the nature of Yugoslav economy which was characterized by market relationships and exchange value.

Their calls for a multiparty system were a product of their own limitations, i.e. them being 'socialist intellectuals'. They were university professors, and the majority had a deep and abiding interest in German classical idealism. This fascination with philosophers such as Hegel brought them to the Marxist-Humanist camp, but also helps explain their theoretical limitations and the policy solutions they advocated as well as the emphasis they put on the individual rather than social class. Or in Stojanović's words: "In the center of Marxist-Humanism is not the man (realist and collectivist deformation of Marxism) but the individual."[37]

These limitations shaped their political lives in turbulent 1990s. Since they were opponents of nationalism, a majority joined the (neo)liberal camp, some of them remained loyal to the left in the shape of modernized Western European social-democracy, while some of them embraced the nationalism of their new state out of a fear of 'the nationalism of others'. An outcome that is incredibly tragic when you consider they were left wing intellectuals in a 'socialist' country that sought to grasp the issues of their day. They provide an important window into the intellectual and political discussions of their era.

Praxis was an attempt at 'ruthless criticism', a critique that was destroyed by its own limitations.

Korčula 1968.

35 The Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is the name that Serbia and Montenegro used after the breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Later, the country was renamed Serbia and Montenegro (SiCG).

36 *The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* (SANU Memorandum) was a draft document produced by a 16-member committee of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts from 1985 to 1986. Document protested against decentralization which was leading to disintegration of Yugoslavia and discrimination of Serbs by the new Yugoslav constitution. It also claimed that development of Serbia was eroded by support of other parts of Yugoslavia. This document was denounced for its Serbian nationalism and many authors and scholars see it as key moment in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

37 Svetozar Stojanović. "Sloboda i demokracija u socijalizmu" *Praxis* 2 (1964): 204.

How [not] to do a critique

Demystifying the anti-imperialist narrative of the collapse of Yugoslavia

Our baba doesn't say fairy tales – Athens

"Facilis descensus Averni: Noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis; Same revocation gradius superasque escape ad auras, Hoc opus, hic lab or est"

The following text is an attempt to evaluate the events of the Yugoslav dissolution. Its scope and content are related to issues that we have seen occupy the Greek public sphere. It does not claim to deliver the "truth" - a long-lost stumbling block - but a specific version of what we think is more lucrative in drawing up examples or questions that may be useful to us today. When claim to be meaningful today, we are talking about the stakes of communism as a theoretical exploration and practical process, that is, the total abolition of value as a social relationship[1], its social homogenizing and dominating function and the capitalist state. Also, from the same point of view and with the same aim are the questions of historiography, history and logic. The concept of history is directly related to the meaning and form of the subject who reads this history, and in turn, with the social forces that shape the subject itself: the forces of capitalist society and its contradictions.

History is a retrograde thing. Historical events are the irrational cry of events which are retrospectively interpreted by the subject of today. The story is child-shaped and produced as an entity-within today's symbolic field which looks backwards and gives meaning to the cries of the past. Historical material itself is chaotic, it has no coherence. If the term "rhizomatic" of Deleuze and Guattari is anywhere useful, then it is definitely here. History is reborn. A logical path of the thousands of logical paths of its differences and connections is chosen on the basis of a logic that is already now formed. History is always a narrative that ends at its highest point, the nowadays, but it is not the end of it, but in fact its beginning. The story is a paradoxical mountain that starts from the top and spreads to the foot. What history chooses to read in historical material says more about the historical process than about the story about it. History is not just the story of class struggle. Historiography is a class struggle in itself.

1 Here the concept of value is used in a quite different way that the general a-historical anthropological concept by the same name. Value here denotes a historical specific social relation, that occurs when everything in a society has been mediated by money relations. These money relations don't just function as a mediation, but create specific "automated" dynamics that dominate society as a whole, even if each group is effected in different ways. Our critique is of Marxist origin and targets not just class,but money relations per se.

1. Back to a Marxism of Class struggle

Almost all bibliography, and especially journal articles, attribute the division of Yugoslavia to national tensions or external interventions. Obviously, each analysis has a piece of truth, as "truth" is a strange thing. External interventions, that is true, have occurred – e.g. NATO and Russia – and internal nationalistic tensions. However, these analyzes forget the long course of Yugoslavia towards collapse, its internal contradictions in the organization of production and its ultimate outcome. And here, by the term 'production', we mean not just as an economic dimension but the reproduction of state capitalism and the class struggle within it. Most analyses, based on nationalism or external interventions, overlook Yugoslavia's long course towards dissolution and the dominant role of class struggle in the evolution of every social formation. They fail to explain, for example, that national tensions until 1971 were virtually minimal. If the Yugoslav wars were indeed wars of national formation and national conflict, it must be answered: what constitutes and what disintegrates a national community? For that is why these narratives have reappeared. What does it mean to "want" a nation-state?

A. General trends of the Yugoslav economy

Yugoslavia was the paradoxical case of many factors. Usually, for example, the question of the increase in external debt since the 1970s is already underestimated. What is firmly absent from the Yugoslav issue is the contradictory course of class struggle in Yugoslavia. This is usually the case because in Yugoslavia - as a socialist country[2] - the working class is considered to be emancipated, and the country generally and indefinitely "as a free country." They therefore forget that class *struggle is not the clash of two sociologically defined groups but, on the contrary, a persistent*

2 We follow here the analysis of Moishe Postone in "Time, Labor, and social domination." There Postone argues that socialist countries were indeed market economies just lacking some of the market mechanisms. So they were in fact capitalist countries of a strange kind, subject to "value" relations and dynamics but without the "automatic" market mechanisms of the west.

characteristic of the monetary relationship that gives access to the social product and at the same time appears as an obstacle to it. Class struggle therefore appears as a contradiction of money itself, and the reproduction of capitalist relationships is also part of the class struggle on the basis of whether the struggle attempts to dissociate access to the social product from labor and money. The eight hours, fixed wages indifferent to the productivity of the business, were gains of the movement based in this logic. What we want to say is that class struggle is not just from below - it goes both ways dialectically, meaning that capitalist and monetary relations are relations of exploitation; they need coherence. Capitalist relations are class struggle relations *par excellence*. Class struggle is not just on the streets during protests, it is in the morning when you wake up to go to work, it is when you run out of money, or when you have to work to have access to the social product. That being said, class struggle is not *a priori* something good, but rather the way that capitalist relations are reproduced.

In Yugoslavia, since 1965, due to its notorious "self-management," workers have been able to reduce working hours, avoid significant investment in productivity, and increase in their own. Since 1965, already in Yugoslavia wages had tripled.

Since 1968, when the average wage in US Dollars was $88, in 1979 it had reached $318. Wages grew faster than labor productivity, consumption of services and products also grew while Yugoslav products lost their competitiveness on the international market. The negative import-export balance in the 1970s steadily increases. From $660 million in 1969 to $7.2 billion in 1979. This situation - coupled with the dynamism of the working class within Yugoslavia - created a chain reaction: external debt grew sharply, and together inflation and workers' pressure on self-managed firms for wage increases that would balance inflation. So, steadily, foreign debt rose from $0.5 billion in 1970 to $15 billion in 1981. Its course remained stable until 1989. At the same time, salaries maintained a steady 5% above the rise in inflation each year. Also, the increase in agro-economic productivity worldwide led Yugoslavia, among other things, to the introduction of more competitive and cheaper agricultural products, which caused mass unemployment in rural areas. The overall economic global climate - the gradual decline of the world's "value of total production" - and the oil crisis led the Yugoslav economy to wither and fail to re-invest. Young farmers were hard-pressed to find work, wages were pushed down, but the class struggle - the power of workers in factories and institutions in general - kept them at relatively steady levels. Unemployment ranged from 5.5% in 1961 to 14% in 1979. As a direct consequence, external debt rose as sharply as inflation did. The "average profit" process crippled the Yugoslav economy as it was heavily dependent on the import of goods and fuels purchased on the basis of hard currency. The Yugoslav government had attempted in 1978 to halt this path by re-establishing central planning in the economy. However, the reintroduction of such measures did not change much as what influenced the course of the economy was combining class struggle and production technology; factors that were reflected in the productive indices, the "international competitiveness of Yugoslavia," and in the international economic climate of the recession. This situation eventually led to a reversed situation in the 1980s. Although nominal wages continued to rise, real wages had fallen to $20-30 a month in 1988. The cost of living, precisely because of the inflationary trend of the dinar in the 1980s, grew by 74.8%. Inflation was in the order of 203%. The growth rates of the Yugoslav economy in the 1980s collapsed to negative levels with short breaks of 0.5%. The combination of these factors with the austerity measures of 1980 which attempted to contain the collapse of the economy - mainly cuts in health - eventually led to worse problems as they led to weakness in the internal market.

B. Local differences

We should also look at the individual local economic inequalities in the country. The federal republics had different growth rates within the general trends we listed above. In general, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia were in privileged positions within Yugoslavia, while Montenegro, Bosnia and Macedonia were 4 times poorer than the average. Slovenia and Croatia, with 1/3 of the total population of the federation, accounted for about half of the economic activity. Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia, with an equal population, economically lagged, primarily in terms of rural development. As each federal economy had a different position in the economic division of labor, it therefore faced different problems. The over-industrialized Slovenia and Croatia had little agricultural output relative to the whole, and highly developed industry for both exports and the internal market (56% of the Yugoslav industry in total). So, they did not face any particular problems from the pressure of the rural population in the cities. Unemployment in Croatia and Slovenia remained at a relatively low level throughout the 80's in the 5-6% average, while in other areas such as Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia, mainly rural unemployment increased on the order of 25% and in some cases it reached 50% (Kosovo). These factors were more or less average in Serbia. Serbia also had a large industrial output (about 34% of the total) and significant agricultural production (52.6% of the total), while during the 1980s, unemployment was in the category of high-unemployment democracies, in the 20+%. Serbia also received the pressure of the unemployed from neighboring rural republics, while it had 41% of the federation's population. In general terms, Serbia's macroeconomic situation reflected the general trends of the Yugoslav federation.

Nationalist narratives in the 1950s and mid-70s were largely absent from Yugoslavia. However, since 1970, when inflation began to rise, local authorities began to reduce economic activity among the provincial areas which tried – within the limits imposed by Belgrade – to maintain local control of the economy and a relatively autonomous foreign policy (it is worth here to note that in the context of decentralized economic planning, local governments had autonomous banking systems since 1965). In the absence of other ties to social reproduction in stable economies, nationalist narratives replace them and at the same time bring them back.. Trade between the republics had fallen to 20% compared to total commercial activity, while at the same time the tax system was unified. In particular, Serbia sought to resolve its own problems, both through the raising of financial resources from the richest countries through taxation and the containment of its rural markets.

As continuing dissatisfaction accumulates in the most economically robust federal republics, they remove themselves from the troubled federation. That is why the motives of the war in Slovenia and Croatia were to leave the federation and then to enact the project of national cleansing inside them; the Serbian population was “the enemy" and was believed to be causing potential problems for the future. Conversely, Serbia's motivation was to keep the federation united, so its ethnic convictions were made with a parallel war that was trying by force to retain the republics in Yugoslavia. Croatian ethnic cleansing had basically a displacement character (see the massive displacement of at least 200,000 Serbs in the Croatian "Storm Operation" against the Serbs) - without apparently circumventing incidents sadistic executions. On the other hand, Serbian nationalists - with the massacre of Srebrenica - precisely because of the different characteristics of individual national fantasies, had a profoundly aggressive character: they did not want only to predominate or occupy but were aimed at breaking the morale of local supporters of rival nationalisms. They aimed at fear, surrender, disintegration (e.g. rape of women) of the opponents' social fabrics. Slovenians, Croats and Bosnians believed that Serbia "oppresses" them, while, Serbs say, "everyone else wants to break Yugoslavia." One fantasy here fed the other, and so they both appeared as self-fulfilling prophecies. These fantasies precisely structured the wider ideological strategy of the individual parts that defined the wider moves, but above all the behavior on the ground. The hatred of the single soldier on every side where we cannot and should not seek pure “economic readings” to account for the hatred of every single soldier on every side. On the contrary, while capitalist relations sparked the conflict and *formed* national fantasies, they acquired - as always - a molecular character. Disseminating rumors among the subjects, and each murder, lynching, or rape sparked new fantasies that seem to act as a "direct response" to the actions of the "other.” The violence there - within the bounds

of the general strategy - *acquires an autonomous character*.

C. Class struggle and historical responsibility

To blame the class struggle for the division of Yugoslavia, rather than imperialism, is probably something of a *prima facie* absurdism for some. However, the careful reader will see that there are a number of parameters here. First of all, class struggle is an obstacle and at the same time a means of reproduction of the particular capitalist class relationship of exploitation. In this sense, they obviously did right to keep their wages high enough to cause a crisis in Yugoslav state capitalism itself, and to bring it to a point of collapse. On the other hand, the working class, as a class, is always within the social relationship of capital and its abstract dynamics, and ultimately it is determined by it and the wage relationship reproduced by it. When this relationship reaches the point of collapse, precisely because of its internal contradictions, the working class as a living class makes demands, but because they are inside the capital relation, the working class has two choices: *either* the "salto mortale," meaning the risk of building communist reproduction relationships *or* retreating into the capital relation, again as the only known example of sociality and redefining the parameters there. There happens *a violent redefinition and resolution of the previous contradictions*. The working class in Yugoslavia failed to build these new relationships. The setback in this case was more than a simple setback: it was complete decimation.

But who is to blame for this social inability of the working class to even experiment with new forms of existence which can overcome wage/monetary/commodity relations. This great blame belongs to the same "socialist regime" as the holder of long-term theoretical hegemony and political/social paradigm which provided it, considered communism only as a form of state, communist relations only within the state, mediated by state money, and a directly designed controllable economy of rational actors, whether officials or workers' self-managed enterprises. The whole horizon of discussions was already defined by state and monetary frameworks. The only different example - negatively outlined in general - was that of the capitalist West. Again, state, authoritarian, and "liberal" in the capitalist sense to its full extent. No theoretical or more grassroots experimentation has ever existed as a mass experience. This was the theoretical and cognitive social base that the average Yugoslav had in 1991 to build a fantasy of both "what the problem is" and "what's the solution." That was his cognitive horizon, his episteme. All his theoretical and social examples, all "proto-ideological elements," were immediately dipped in capitalist fetishism, in some form of state or monetary relationship. The Transitional Socialist State has proved to be the most important obstacle to the much-needed transition to communism itself, and this is something that left-wing ideology has barely digested until now for the entire socialist bloc. Yugoslavia is another example of the historical and practical limitations of the socialist workersstate within the borders of one nation, and the working class as a class for which revolution means emancipation in the form of its total reproduction. The reproduction of the working class implies always wage relations, and with them all the categories of capital. The revolution is self-abolition, not emancipation of something already existing. It is a total break with the present world.

2. Comments on the reproduction of capital and national ideology

Reproduction of capital through national ideology takes place indirectly and is therefore usually difficult to analyze. In literature, the relationship between the two is either completely straightforward to be considered linear and immediate, that is, the nation serves the interests of the "bourgeoisie" and is reproduced by the "content" of national ideology, or that nationalism is a completely separate state of mind, distinct from the "economic interests" which, at best, have some small commonality. What needs to be answered is a question in two strands: What are the processes that form national ideology, its function and its content, and why does national ideology, even when it does not directly capture class interests or economic positions and is instead a cross-class formulation [3], reproduce capital relations?

The above question should be answered on the basis of the dual nature of capital in *relation* to the rigid social representations that constitute a community, in short, the symbolic proto-ideological elements (habitus) that constitute all its common direct experiences, which *in a secondary process after normalization / organization* they constitute the culture, the classification system of this community.

The capital relationship should not be perceived only by "economic terms." What sets it apart is its dual character, that it is specific to us with specific and tangible forms of appearance such as money, commodity, labor power, capital to be invested etc. - but also abstract, that is, it is governed by wider dynamic contradictions which operate at a macro level that far outweigh the control, time periods and perceptions of individuals [4]. So, the general contradictions and problems caused by the dynamics of capital appear to be specific problems requiring urgent solution - poverty, economic instability, unemployment, etc., while the causes of these problems can only be perceived in an abstract theoretical time and space level, and even then, their practical control is impossible. Capital is therefore a relationship that confronts us with the results of its activity, without ever being able to influence its causes. This weakness lies not only in the two dimensions of the relationship itself but also in the fact that the relationship itself is produced by the participants in it and there is no point outside it that functions as its "point of view."

On the other hand, capital functions as a community building force. Traders and financial capital owners face a network of mutual exchanges that are supposed to be "fair"[3]. Within this community, various characteristics are consolidated and homogenized by division of labor, but also by the more generalized production of forms of sociality produced within the community of capital but "outside of work." They are the characteristics and experiences of "directly living life" (or habitus / proto-ideological elements), situations that appear to be obvious and self-evident. These are all organized by the normality of capitalist circulation. These are considered "community features" - language, religion, habits. We would say that these characteristics are positively invested in desire, they are therefore considered "good" by our, familiar, "understandable characteristics" [5]. These features are consolidated in a number of ways: through their repeated affirmation, the social division of labor, by the state and its ideological mechanisms, or intellectuals and opinion makers representing the entire bourgeois commu-

3 Capital relations are fair only in formality and as long as the "economy" functions "well." When capitalist competition or the exploitative character of labor are brought to light, even in a non-organized way, usually ethical objections to capitalism appear in the public discourse. The reason why these objections have usually an ethical, so ineffective or even reactionary, character, is out of the goal of there text.

nity of the society. These mechanisms organize and re-encode these characteristics *of the directly living life* into structured ideologies, here in this case, into national ones. [6]

In Yugoslavia, we had a process of collapsing of collective identity and then replacing it with an "individual" narrow one. While the individual cultures had survived and blossomed within the federation, as long as there were no problems in reproducing capital, and as long as these dynamics had not put the subjects under conflict - by the middle of the 70s, nationalist events were essentially meaningless, and a wider identity has been shaped and dominated as an ideologized habitus, above the national ones: that of Yugoslavia[4]. But this habitus, as it was thought to correspond - and was formed - within the framework of a particular form of political and economic organization, when it appeared not to work and not correspond to emerging contradictions, *and in light of precisely these contradictions within the federation in the 70*'s, was abandoned by the subjects. *In this way, the social subject was reassembled in narrow national terms - in a collapsed world - as a sense of self-stability. However, this reorganization radically changed the subject. It transformed it – and, retrospectively, historically reinterpreted it at the level of national history.*

What, therefore, we support here is that the individual components of national ideology are produced by the movement of capital and the formation of a homogenous community, but are *transformed into a national ideology* in itself when they *are called upon to substitute and interpret* the fetishistic character of social capitalist conflicts and (dys)functions [7]. Therefore, the relationship of capital is reproduced through national ideology, *through the absence of a direct imprinting of its logic on it, whereas ideology is constantly shaped and fueled by the different forms of the manifestations of capitalist socialization and the division of labor that are interpreted post factum (Nachträglichkeit) within a particular articulation around a "central meaning" [8]*. Some basic elements like the "obvious" organizing coherence of individual state formations became the new axes that the scattered habituses organized into a fundamental fantasy-national ideology. We see that these axes are already mystifying pieces of capitalist fetishism, concealing the causes of capitalist dynamics while being derivatives of it. So, the discourse that was built was "if there is "individual responsibility" then someone is guilty of things going wrong, someone controls the 'system', we will find him, *we will also eliminate him.* We will take over our own power and economic relations. " Here, the national fundamental fantasy acquires its own relatively autonomous dynamics from the conditions that gave birth to it, and it has a real impact on material relations. *It is itself a material relationship* [9]. National ideology is not language or religion but a specific articulation of these characteristics in certain symbolic systems that derive from *specific social events / social ties*

So, they give an incentive to wipe out anger and frustration, the thirst for filling the desire against the enemy who appears as an obstacle: Bosnian, Muslim, Croatian, Serbian. The fact that the opaque capitalist dynamic pushes the conflict produces the following sequence schematically:

-> the formation of heteronomous and unequal groups-> the homogenization of the characteristics within the groups and at the same time the definition / identity of these characteristics in heterogeneity with the characteristics of the "Other" -> *nationalism, racism and the normalization of the difference as an ideological interpretation and at the same time as a solution to the problem of Conflict* -> nationalism and racism constitute each community inevitably in a rival community, so national and racist fantasies become strategic with actual historical results, they are as we said

4 Here, on the one hand, Yugoslav identity can be said to be just another form of nationalism. At some point this is true, thus romanticization of the Yugoslav past as lacking national characteristics should be avoided (as we often see on hipster internet portals). But on the other hand careful distinctions should be made not to justify Yugoslavian state but to exactly examine its problematic aspects: national ideologies in general tend to homogenize completely their internal space. Something like that didn't happened in Yugoslavia, on the contrary local cultures, with specific national narratives flourished. Here we found the central contradiction and the soft spot of the Yugoslav but also of the Soviet project: on the one hand they were not national states, on the other hand they were supporting local national narratives, with typical bourgeois criteria - the nation as an ahistorical cultural entity. The problem was that Yugoslav state was in a strange way neither anti-national nor national, in a similar way that socialist countries were not typical capitalist countries but also not non-capitalist. This contradictory structure certainly contributed in the long run, to the collapse of the whole project.

Self-fulfilling prophecies because they force opponents to behave in an antagonistic way.

3. Hatred against the Bosniak

Serbian hatred against the Bosnian population cannot be attributed to simple sociological categories such as "religious" or "economic" differences. These categories either do not provide adequate explanations, or they use the results of the processes as tools for interpreting the process itself.

The Bosniak population has been the biggest victim of the Yugoslav wars. Hate against it can be explained, as we showed earlier, by the relative autonomy, and the particular material consequences and dynamics that the habitus acquires – the direct experience of being placed into an organized national ideology. Then these dynamics self-reproduce in an exponential way. It is based in itself. The fundamental fantasy of Serbian nationalism was that opposing nationalisms want to destroy Yugoslavia, which was interwoven with national Serbian interests. Serbian nationalism wanted – under its custody – to keep Yugoslavia united. This expectation, initially shaped by historical and economic factors, soon gained its own dynamic during the war. The Other became *the personification of the obstacle* of satisfaction, the fulfillment of the desiring vision of Serbian nationalism. This vision, meanwhile, even if this vision had been shaped as a desire [10] precisely because of an inability to fulfill it caused an initial lag, resulting from the dynamics of capital. This lag represented *foremost the economic crisis, and then the war,* which became the central sign around which reality was organized. In this context, frustration with the level of social well-being and instability, and responsibility for war, created a hunger for 'restoring' social equilibrium and prosperity. That is, satisfaction with the state / economy by the subjects in new / national contexts. To say it in layman's terms: Someone is stealing our future – and we have to figure out how to deal with this "Other." The manner of dealing with it has to do with the material habitus, the historical reservoir of knowledge, which is aggressively reorganized into the fantasy of national ideology around the new central axes of meaning.

In the case of Bosnia, the image seen by the average Serbian nationalist of the time was little different from what he saw for the Croatian. However, this difference played an important role in the outcome. Croatia, through Serbia's eyes, was an enemy, but an "other" in the lowercase. Croatia may want to break up Yugoslavia and be a national enemy, but it was an "equal" enemy, an enemy understood. It was previously considered as a separate nation, with its own history, its own tradition and therefore within the broader national narratives with a "place in history, with the right of being." The Croat was an enemy, but he was not worthy of extermination. "He was a worthy enemy, an "other," but like us."

On the contrary, in the Serbian narratives that circulated in Yugoslav society, although initially they were not perceived as hostile - the Bosniak never had the status of an autonomous subject. On the contrary, the popular impression was that they were "Muslim Serbs" of inferior and marginal status. But when the capital dynamics under conditions of scarcity led to bloodthirsty desires and social fantasies, the Bosniaks became *more than an enemy.* They were an incomprehensible enemy, capable of everything, traitors – a mysterious other of whom "we" don't know much but he knows about us, because he was once like "us." The Bosniak was transformed into a "mystery": Serbian nationalists convinced themselves about how Bosniaks want to destroy Yugoslavia, while they do not even have "their own nation." The Bosniak characterization thus begins to resemble the Jew of the Second World War. In an absurd manner, the category becomes extremely miserable ("don't even have a nation") and, on the other hand, extremely capable and hostile to everything. The fact that, so far, we have not understood their "intentions" indicates their "cunning", that is, their ability to hide their intentions. The national fantasy here is now constituted *as a pursuit*: the opponent must be exterminated, or at least completely subdued.

Every national fantasy starts from what gave birth to it – the contradictions of the capitalist relations – and brings in its initial tendencies: Serbian nationalism sought to keep Yugoslavia united but to do that, those who destabilized it had to be - in this context of discourse – exterminated. If not exterminated, their enemy social networks had to be completely fragmented. That is, not to be destroyed as a neutral individual, but as a community. That is why we did not have displacements in Bosnia, but cleansing and rapes. The rival here was at the same time a sub-people and a super-people, who could only be faced by extreme measures. [11]

4. Criticism of the modern anti-imperialist subject or ' the non-critique'

One vital point of criticism is the critique of modern anti-imperialism. It is the subject of stormy talks on why anti-racist, anti-fascist and anarchist organizations choose to stand side-by-side with people at the other end of the political spectrum. The answer here cannot be that they "have a wrong analysis" as it precedes the question "why do they have this analysis?" What is also interesting is the obsession with it

Already by 1980, every fixed point of reference, in the Western world at least, collapsed. The world, in the light of late capitalism, where capital and social changes - both on a personal and social level - are now accelerating, every fixed point of reference of social meaning is lost. This continuously leads to a relative liquidation – if not collapse - of symbolic and cultural representations. In a nutshell, we lose the means by which people have been understood so far. [12] This feeling was intensified after the collapse of the USSR and the chaotic changes that followed in the period 1991-2014 worldwide. The grand narratives were lost. The modern fragmented symbolic field becomes the crisis of the nation. On these contradictions the *present impulse* for a necessary fantastic restoration of the *grand narratives is* formed. The anti-imperialist obsessive subject is a facet of today's subject: the terrified subject of regular psychosis, the subject that tries to find an imaginary stability in a world unstable. The main characteristic of this process is the appearance of phobias and obsessions, both basic features of nationalism.

In an attempt to restore stability, a certain number of subjects tried to cope, *not with changes in material relationships, but above all in their imagination.* It is, therefore, adapted at the present time, not mainly through a material interaction but a fantasy that then *becomes material power*. Subjects try to recreate a grand narrative in the symbolic field in order for them to exist inside of it – in order to find their own position in the great narrative. The Subject thus imprisons both the thought and the historical process with a dialectic stuck in the past-present which is never released in the future. Anti-imperialism is a conservative revolution against the "process" of capital, and this is repeated across the political spectrum.

Modern anti-imperialists are trying to restore narratives such as "glorious national independence, and the strong class within it." They do not simply re-create new combinations of narratives or theories of the past, instead they adhere to the imaginary Past and then interpret it retrospectively based on their own imagination about it, resulting to a vicious circle of no end about revolutionary thought. Thus, publications and the "social media pool of knowledge" are inflated with a new interpretation of the past adapted to their contemporary needs of fundamental fantasy, which initially claims that "nothing has changed," a fantasy that is dipped in the fetishism of capital because it misses its critique of its own present form. This logic eliminates the historical *moments of ambiguity and danger - as Benjamin described them boldly* - when we can see dreams of a radical "other society" as it interprets the past through a capitalist axis of meaning (of the national-Keynesian state). So, any real revolution of the past – those moments when utopia cracked and came into the reality of the world temporarily – disappear. Every criticism that has appeared in the root of the historical process is lost and, in its place, appears a capitalist-national, anti-imperialist interpretation of history that flattens the dead of the revolution within their own castle as it does not appear as a sovereignty of capital but as discourse of Revolution, but a revolution that "does not save tradition from conformism" but rather infuses it with it. Together with those moments of the past that utopia appeared embryonic, the material of the future is also lost. The desire is bound forever to a vicious circle with the past. The future becomes an agonizing eternal repetition.

Thus, they refocus not only their thinking but overall the knowledge of *a today that wants to remain the same, the vision of the future is projected as a return to a past. Anti-imperialist criticism opposes the stability of earlier forms of capital as fantasy in the modern mobility of capital and the fragmented world. In this way, anti-imperialist criticism is neo-conservative: it is not only its content but also its function. It conveys the thought in its past, adapts the past to the imaginary present and the present in the past retroactively and mutually.* Anti-imperialism is on the side of the capitalist notion of history, not only because of its content but also because of its function: it reduces the real critique, that is, the thought that tries to break through its preconditions, and thus encroaches on it. These preconditions are none other than the social relations of capital - past or new - that affect thought in every historical period.

This is precisely why the anti-imperialist left-wing and right-wing meet; as well as trying to bring back a similar great narrative of the nation, the fragmentation of late capitalism has led to judgment in all the narratives, not just the anti-imperialist.. On the other hand, however, the anti-imperialist left and anti-authoritarians of this type refuse to really stand next to those with whom they meet politically as they still retain the habitual imagination for themselves that they are radicals *[13]*- that they are the forces of progress, Communism and "change." A meeting with those who really support the same aims with them

would bring to judgment the only pillar they now have to make their world with some meaning, as it would make the contradiction apparent: many of the anti-imperialist projects are now common among extreme left and right. Fantasy must be kept at all costs against either its denial in practice or the theoretical criticism it faces.

We also want to remind that history is not based on one person. The great personalities in which the "Idea" of the historical course is condensed, as Hegel imagined, apparently do not exist. Individuals are derivatives of social macro-historical processes. Therefore, the issue for us is not that Milošević or Franjo Tuđman are individually found guilty by an international court. But on the contrary, it is also important that they not to be acquitted, since their defenders and their audience are part of a field of discourse that they consider that the nation, its history and the national narrative, and, are actually personalized to them, so through their personal acquittal also comes the acquittal of the nation and its fundamental crimes (this discourse clearly emerged in Serbia itself after the supposed acquittal). Precisely because they believe that history is driven by personalities, and what the subject bears *individual responsibility*, a possible acquittal would enable them to write that whatever crimes were done were personal "deviations" of someone else. There, the bourgeois view of an "individual-individual who is the absolute master of his actions" is the hegemony and the nation can be acquitted. Criticism is not exhausted to the utmost in condemning a political personality for the crimes of the nation. However, non-acquittal ensures that the discussion of crimes, nation and political form remains open and, on the table, and thus leaves open the scope for further criticism.

PS. Bosnian poet Izet Sarajlic wrote at his home in Sarajevo during the bombing

"It is of course very difficult to write poems
In this cell
But while shells explode around you
It's even harder not to write poetry."

Endnotes

[1] The gates of hell are open day and night. Easy to pass, sweet to their descent. But to go back and see the blue skies. This is great struggle. -Virgil - Virgil book 6th p.128. Those who defend a case dipped in blood, without trying to see beyond it, without even trying to see what deeper dynamics established parties and camps, remain within of the questions raised by the alienated momentum of history. In this sense they stay within the capital and its ideological world, they treat the world as a given and have no share in the utopia vision. So, before we defend a case, we must think better what we are getting ourselves into. It is difficult to return from the abyss.

[2] Yugoslavia was known as a federal state, i.e. several individual state entities united to a larger state entity. By federal entity we mean here the individual states that formed the federation. These states were all subordinate to the central government, but they also had some room for local government and the ability to influence the central government. The federated entities of Yugoslavia were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia and from 1978 to 1988 practically federal subjects were also the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

[3] In the battles we see - amongst others- and proletarians in massive waves to declare themselves volunteers many times. In the end. It is not the case that proletarians have no nation, on the contrary the proletarians have a nation, and therefore they have to fight and against it.

[4] Making it more understandable, and using the definitions of Annales, we can say that capital is a relationship that works equally in *all 3 historical dimensions of time*: its abstract dimension in the Long Time, its macro-socialism in the Medium, and the directly living conditions to the Short. However, the three times here are bridged into a single structure. That of the capitalist totality.

[5] In general we make use of WF Haug's *Project Ideologykritik, Breigi and Gellner* for national ideology as a set-up of ideological systems from first-ideological elements , P. Bourdieu and creative habitus , the reading of Hume, and Freud (especially the extension of the notion of Nachträglichkeit as a memory of the subject but which constitutes the subject in time as a projection in the past) by G. Deleuze, the Lacanian approaches of the subject as a structure *Which is constituted* by Social events , and the concept of the fetishism of the capital - and not the commodity - of Marx. Here we do not claim that the analysis is exhausted in experience, but that the basic form of assembly of the subject is the experience. His analysis and deconstruction go beyond empiricism. A more general and more extensive analysis of memory and subjectivity is very difficult to do here.

[6] The two axes of analysis and normalization of the ideology (horizontal and vertical) used here are from Bourdieu and WF Haug. As both emphasize, these two axes should not be considered as two distinct social situations but two dimensions of the same relationship. They are primarily analytical categories and then sociological.

[7] Here to be clear: the malfunctioning of the capital we are talking about is not a substantial dysfunction. On the contrary, the need to restructure capital appears to be malfunctioning in the subjects reproduced through it. Here is the alienated character of the relationship where the reproduction passes over the dead bodies of its constituent parts.

[8] Memory should not be understood as a past moment, as such, stored in the mind, but as something that is revoked by it and reformed *in the present and re-emerging in the past, thus homogenizing the contradictions of today.* The thought here is trapped in itself.

[9] Here we recall W.I. Thomas' saying that "if people consider a situation to be true then it has real implications." This sentence very well summarizes the way in which habitus normalizes into organized ideology, transforms into fundamental fantasy through a series of social energies, and becomes the way in which we look *and do in the world becomes material power.* Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this type was Serbian mania against Bosnia.

[10] Here we follow the ontology of the desire of Deleuze and Guattari, where desire is constantly being shaped by social events.

[11] Differences in the numbers of the victims are obvious to prove the truth. In Bosnia, executions were made by thousands

[12] Here, if we combine the concept of habitus with that of super-accelerated capitalism and the notion of symbolic field, then we conclude that symbolic fields are no longer stable nor fantasy. The only thing that becomes more and more constant is the rate of their collapse.

[13] Bourdieu emphasized the fact that habitus also has a conservative aspect, and at this point its analysis can be identified with Deleuze's instrumental reason or "common sense" These three concepts, although not totally identical, have great proximity and in different combinations may be particularly useful in criticizing the subject of everyday life.

For the economic history of Yugoslavia we used: Viachaslau Yarashevich, Yuliya Karneyeva: *Economic reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia*, Predrag Rajsic: *The Economy of Tito's Yugoslavia: Delaying the Inevitable Collapse*, Leonard Kukic: *Socialist growth revisited: Insights from Yugoslavia*

„Nisu to bajke, nego istina“[1]

A critical appraisal of Roma politics in SFRY's 'golden era'

Ferdi

Was the 'golden era' of Yugoslav socialism also the golden era of Roma political life? In some ways, perhaps, though with some very substantial caveats. It is true enough that that certain achievements, however problematic, in the fields of Roma nationalism, ethnic rights, and legal protections were all fostered under the Communist Party's regime, we cannot allow ourselves to be complacent with what is essentially a liberal appraisal of history. Firstly, we should recognize that these gains were fought for and won due to the political labor of people in the Roma rights movement, not gifts from the State, and secondly, the condition of the Roma in Yugoslavia was truly abysmal regardless of its relative superiority to the absolute deprivation and mass violence suffered by the Roma in neighboring countries. Finally, it is possible to trace many of the troubles currently endured by the Roma of the former Yugoslavia to the misguided efforts of the 'socialist' period. To be clear, it is not my intention to demonize the SFRY under which many people lived markedly better lives than they would have under the current post-socialist regimes, but to establish that the State, socialist or otherwise, cannot but reproduce exploitative hierarchical relations with its subject populations; in the case of the Yugoslav Roma, this relation was one of racism just as it remains today.

While Roma enjoyed a generally positive image as loyal partisans in the reconstruction period, Roma activism in the middle period of 'market socialism' was highly productive, though largely from a cultural angle. The theater *Romano Phralipen* opened in Skopje in 1970 and quickly became a center point for Roma voices in Yugoslavia, as was the newspaper *Romano lil* first published in Belgrade that autumn. The president and co-initiate of the First World Romani congress a year later, partisan hero Slobodan Berberski, was himself a celbrated poet. Under his leadership, the Congress was first encouraged to view Yugoslavia as a model State in its handling of Roma issues. The red color of the wheel on the Roma national flag is credited to his commitment to socialism[2]. The Roma had long-ago carved a cultural niche for themselves in the Balkans and it was from here that they launched their political interventions. In fact, sixty Roma organizations were founded in the 1970s, perhaps culminating in the "Listen, Roma!" radio broadcast of 1981. The visibility of Roma culture, especially Roma music, in this period was instrumental in the effort of Roma activists to transcend the vaguely defined republican category of "ethnic group" and reach recognition as a "nationality", a murky political category that implied both representation on the federal census as well as stronger constitutional protections[3]. As respondents increasingly identified themselves as speakers of the Roma language in federal surveys, their developing identity as a nationality became increasingly legible to state bureaucracies.[4] Such distinctions were not academic to Roma activists in the republics, they were seen as a conduit to State power; nationalities, like the Albanians and the Hungarians, were essentially held in equal standing with one another from a federal perspective, equipped with full language rights, educational autonomy, and, theoretically, a stronger representational presence in the Party. A prominent question in this period was related to the possibility of an autonomous Roma province or State, the elusive "*Romanestan*"[5]. This question may have been fueled by Tito's own public consideration in 1946 to giving Macedonian land to the Roma in appreciation for their "fanatical devotion to the partisan cause"[6].

Slobodan Berberski at first World Roma Congress

The efforts of Roma activists in the socialist period were borne from genuine oppression and precarity. By 1976, the supposed golden era

1 This title is borrowed from a statement made by the iconic Roma singer Šaban Bajramović, "Inspiraciju za pjevanje nalazim u temama iz svakodnevnog života, našeg romskog. Ja pjevam tu istinu i onda ta istina pogađa. Nisu to bajke, nego istina. Jer, kada pjevam, naši Romi plaču i pjevaju i vesele se." In English, "I find inspiration for singing in themes from everyday life, our Roma life. I sing that truth and that truth is striking. They are not fairy tales, but the truth. Because when I sing, our Roma cry and sing and rejoice."

2 Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov. The Roma – a Nation Without a State? Historical Background and Contemporary Tendencies. Mitteilungen des SFB 586 „Differenz und Integration“ 6. Page 80.

3 With the exception of Bosnia and Montenegro, who had no such definition, 'ethnic group' was "reserved for disperse minorities like the Roma who were perceived as lacking strongly constructed external national homelands". (Sardelic, Julija. "Romani Minorities and Uneven Citizenship Access in the Post-Yugoslav Space" *Ethnopolitics,* Vol. 14, 2015.

4 Crowe, David. 1996. *A history of the gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p.226

5 The idea of an independent territory for Roma and Sinti might have originated with a letter to the editor in an 1868 issue of the Ottoman Balkan newspaper, *Macedonia*, where a writer called Ilia Naumchev advocated for Gypsies, as an "ancient people" to join the nationalist drive of the era and develop their own society (Marushiakova and Popov. *Ibid.* Page 72.). This matured in the 1920s and '30s among the so-called 'gypsy kings' of diasporic groups settling in Poland who asked the UN for land in Namibia for this purpose (*Ibid.* 76.). Failing this, a delegation was dispatched to Mussolini asking for land in occupied Abyssinia (*Ibid.* 77.). Given the fascist connection, perhaps it is not so surprising that Heinrich Himmler may have been the most prominent proponent of this idea; he argued that "pure blooded gypsies" should receive land where they can live "according to their customs and traditions" (Eric Ames, *et al*. *Germany's Colonial Past*. 2005. Page 177). This mini-State was to be in Burgenland, between Austria and Hungary (Marushiakova and Popov. *Ibid.* 77.). Himmler's interest, of course, was more zoological than political, though it should be noted how similar fascist ideas of 'racial states' are to liberal ideas of 'nation states'. Tito's suggestion of a "Gypsy autonomous area in Macedonia" (Crowe. *Ibid.* 222.) differs both in spirit and intention from Himmler's proposal, but the logic of natural cohesiveness of a discrete people, be it an "ethnic group", "nation", or "race" remained relatively unaltered.

6 Crowe, David. 1996. *A history of the gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p.222

of gypsy equality in Yugoslavia, one in sixty Roma made it all the way to secondary school and most remained completely uneducated[7]. According to a 1978 study, Roma children suffered a fifty-percent mortality rate, eighty-percent of Roma adults failed to meet basic employment prerequisites, only one hundred out of the estimated half a million Roma in SFRY had been enrolled in university, and most Roma associations had no meeting spaces in the towns and cities where they operated[8]. Despite this, the president on the Council of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Serbia claimed that there was no "Gypsy question" because they "are all equal and enjoy constitutional rights"[9]. A 1979 commission on the "nationality question" identified 'gypsies' and Albanians as the only minorities suffering from active ethnic conflicts with majority populations[10]. If this was indeed the best place and time for Europe's Roma, and perhaps it was, this should not lead us to applaud the rulers of Yugoslavia, but to appreciate the genuine horror the Roma have long faced in Europe generally.

So what did the tireless efforts of Roma activists achieve in this supposedly sympathetic socialist State? Despite the opening of Roma language schools in the republics, most notably in Macedonia and Serbia, the distance between these schools and the networks of social and political power remained insurmountable. Even ignoring the dismal working conditions of these 'separate but equal' programs, students who did see their way to finishing the programs found themselves afloat in a political economy based on party-affiliation, consumer buying power, and kin networks, in other words, a system entirely inimical to a precarious Roma worker. As late as the mid-1980s, high school enrollment

7 Puxon, Grattan. *Gypsies: Blacks of Eastern Europe. The Nation.* 1976
8 Crowe. *Ibid*. 227.
9 *Ibid.* 228.
10 Jović, Dejan. 2009. *Yugoslavia: a state that withered away.* West Lafayette: Purdue Univ. Press. p. 187.

remained at the same levels as the previous decade, only two-hundred Roma could be considered "professional workers" (doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc.)[11], and Roma unemployment remained unsurpassed by any other group, excepting, perhaps, women in general[12]. What work they could find was in the lowest paying jobs, and the slums of precarious Roma laborers became more and more visible in Yugoslav cities. For his effort to speak out against these conditions, the Belgrade home of international Roma activist Rajko Đurić was "ransacked" by the State and, after numerous death threats, he was finally forced to flee the country in 1989[13].

Unemployment, unsurprisingly, was a tricky concept for a supposedly socialist state. Susan Woodward's unparalleled study on the subject shows how the SKJ re-invented the category in Yugoslavia, denying unemployment status to those with workable land or, in the case of women, families to take care of them[14]. While the fact that many Roma families became beneficiaries of land redistribution schemes in the 1970s and 1980s may seem positive at first blush, it can also be read as a subtle act of mass dispossession. Instead of developing the proletariat 'gypsy' into a modern socialist citizen as its ideological tenants should demand, the State re-invented a racialized peasantry in the country and a ghettoized precariat in the cities essentially indistinguishable from those in the capitalist West. This is should come as no real surprise if one considers Yugoslavia as part of the global capitalist system of the age and not exceptional to it. Given the country's endemic reliance on domestic commodity consumption and foreign capital, both in the form of high-interest loans from giant capitalist organs and a constant inflow of tourism, the ultra-marginal Yugoslav Roma, living in the shadows of the country with no buying power, became increasingly racialized negatively as urban vermin and criminals or positively as 'natural' musicians

11 Crowe. *Ibid.229.*
12 Woodward, Susan L. 1995. *Socialist unemployment: the political economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
13 *Ibid. 231.*
14 Woodward. *Ibid.*

Stevan Đorđević Novak, 1919 - 1943 partisan commander. Only Roma declared a People's Hero.

and 'nomads': myths still prevalent to this day. One must only watch Emir Kustarica's socialist-era films to see how effective the romanticization of this exploited social strata truly was.

In real life, this condemned proletariat of an ersatz socialism became both 'noble savage' and 'scapegoat' to a nepotistic ruling class[15] and an increasingly nationalist majority population. Suffering mass unemployment, poor education, urban ghettoization, little representation, and reliant on super-precarious sources of labor, the heavy burden of the Roma in Yugoslavia demands a referendum on Kardelj's frustrated drive to communism. Cultural rights and nationalistic politics may have created a Roma elite[16], an explicit State policy in at least one republic[17], but it did nothing to overcome the

15 For a study on the class composition of Socialist Serbia's ruling strata, see: Lazic, Mladen. Old and New Elites in Serbia. *Serbia Between Past and Future*. 85.
16 Sardelić, Julija. 2013. 'What's in a name?' The dilemmas of re-naming Yugoslav gypsies into Roma. CITSEE EU web magazine.
17 Sardelic, Julija. 2016. Roma between ethnic group and an 'underclass' as portrayed through newsparer discourses in socialist slovenia. Social inequalities and discontent in Yugoslav socialism., eds. Rory Archer, Igor Duda and Paul Stubbs. Abingdon; New York: Routledge.

class relationship at the heart of rising anti-gypsy racism in socialist Yugoslavia. How could it? Neither racism nor class-exploitation officially existed. Instead of confronting the logical impasses of "market socialism", that is to say, confronting the *raison d'etre* of the State itself, the 'gypsies' of Yugoslavia were naturalized as a racial 'Other'. Their precarity would be chalked up to their supposed 'nomadism' or 'work-shy' disposition, their increasing dependence on informal and extra-legal sources of income explained by their 'cunning nature', and their cultural ghettoization as entertainers of the majority population was just one more sociobiological marker distinguishing 'Them' from 'Us'.

If we do not accept that the Roma are somehow genetically predisposed to poverty, than we must accept the fact that they were actively oppressed in SFRY. The State did not merely fail to elevate the Roma, the State was an active agent in their precarity. This is not to say that the SKJ were somehow intentionally targeting 'gypsies' in the sense that their Nazi and imperial predecessors had, but as an etatist social movement, Yugoslav socialism was structurally predestined to reproduce the same inequitable relations as the capitalist macrocosm that fed it. From the perspective of a racialized minority, the difference between an ideologically socialist ruling class and an ideologically imperial or capitalist one is merely a matter of policy, not a radically different structure. Identical scapegoating and ghettoizing mechanisms reign in any social order that relies on the centralization of political power; legitimizing the rule of a few relies partially on naturalizing the subjugation of the many, as well as the hierarchical subdivisions of labor therein. While 'gypsies' absorbed the brunt of the 'market socialist' experiment in its 'golden era', all Yugoslavs would collectively confront its failures in its final bloody years, and along the same ethnic, nationalist, and racist lines as their 'gypsy' compatriots.

It might be objected at this point that the State should not be made culpable for the racism of its citizenry. To this, I urge the reader to avoid drawing too deep a distinction between the State and 'the People'; these are co-constructed entities. As much as the State is a reactionary assemblage of bureaucratic machinery and violence, it is also a popular social movement. A great number of people must agree to undertake the mission of the State, employing its enforcement mechanisms, relying on its direction, identifying as a constituent of it, and situating that constituency relative to its benefits and proximity to the apex of the State's conical power structure. The State is the face of the government, yes, but it is also the way we face each other[18]. As Yugoslavs constructed and reproduced the cultural category of 'gypsy', they moved closer to the center of power, stepping over their neighbors in the process. Likewise, the Yugoslav State, in the capitalist mode, reproduced the 'gypsy' by sublimating its crises into a racial/cultural scapegoat, externalizing its inability to employ or properly care for the people who allow it to rule. Thus, *beograđani* to this day chide one another for "acting like a gypsy" when they do something foolish or improper, culturally re-enacting this original sacrifice and imagining a clean 'Serb' against the counter-image of a dirty 'gypsy' – one who is part of the system versus one who is an outsider in it.

Given the necessity of such informal policing in the maintenance of 'the nation', it should be no surprise that nationalism is endemic to formal policing as well. The wars of the 1990s arrived, in each instance, under the auspices of nationalist police forces. One might be tempted to point out that post-revolutionary Yugoslavia never actually rid itself of the rank-and-file police that collaborated with the Nazis in the holocaust of Jews, Roma, and partisans[19], but by the 'golden era' we are dealing with an entirely new generation of forces. This is easiest to explain in the specific context of Serb nationalism. Despite having grown up 'under socialism'

18 This is written in the spirit of Gustav Landauer, who argued, "The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another … The absolute monarch said: I am the state. We, who we have imprisoned ourselves in the absolute state, must realize the truth: we are the state!"

19 Pisarri, Milovan. 2014. The suffering of the Roma in Serbia during the holocaust. p. 138.

as Yugoslavs, the rank-and-file *milicija* and special forces of Aleksander Ranković's sprawling security apparatus[20] established an overwhelmingly Serbian police state in Kosovo, though one that merely replicated police forces elsewhere in Serbia and traditionally Serbian regions of Yugoslavia. The effectiveness of his tactics on the consciousness of Serb nationalists was made undeniably clear upon his purging from the SKJ in '66 for spying on Tito and other party members. Dobrica Ćosić, whose coalition of intellectuals prefigured the nationalist takeover of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in the 1980s, turned Ranković into the "protector of the Serbs", arguing that the "peasants are on Ranković's side"[21]. While the overtly Serbian character of the police and their predecessors has been apparent since the Belgrade Čukur fountain incident of 1862, Ćosić's propaganda tied Serbian identity closer than ever to the police state. When we consider the already crushing prejudice and marginality of Roma life in Tito's Yugoslavia, it is not difficult to imagine how an openly nationalist police force could exacerbate both their exploitation and exclusion as a precarious Other well after Ranković was purged.

Perhaps even more sinister is the way in which the Roma, in this bleak condition, were made into quasi-mascots for a number of interests in the SFRY, especially among Serbs. I've already mentioned their depiction in Kustarica's films as noble savages, but the problem neither begins nor ends on the silver screen. Anthropologist Mattijs van de Port showed how gypsy musicians were employed for cathartic performances as the 'wild soul' of Serbs in Novi Sad as late as the early 1990s. "Gypsies represent what we are," claims one of his middle-aged Serb informants, "although we are not allowed to be it"[22]. These sentiments are echoed in earlier ethnographic works of the SFRY as well; Sharon Zukin's 1976 informants claimed that

20 Ranković's power came mostly from his tenure as the minister of the interior as well as founder of both the OZNA and UDBA.

21 Bešlin, Milivoj. The opening of the national issue. *Nacija kao problem ili rešennje*. 53.

22 Port, Mattijs van de,. 1998. Gypsies, wars and other instances of the wild: Civilisation and its discontents in a Serbian town. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 225.

Serbs and 'gypsies' were "soul brothers" and that many Serbs thought of themselves as "very close to gypsy temperament"[23]. Esma Redžepova, the celebrated Roma singer originally from Macedonia but later based in Belgrade, was crowned "Queen of the Roma" in India in a dual effort towards Roma nationalism and Non-aligned Movement diplomacy. Indeed, a simple search of the term "*cigan*" in the annals of Yugoslav popular music would reveal the ubiquity of the concept in the collective consciousness of the time. Even the ultra-nationalist war criminal Vojslav Šešelj applauded the contributions the Roma have made to Serbian culture in his Hague tribunal; in his trial, Šešelj twisted the supposed Serbian tolerance of the Roma to emphasize the racism of Croats and the longevity of the Roma ethnicity to argue for the arbitrariness and artificiality of the Bosnian nation[24]. Today, anti-ciganism has taken an almost entirely negative turn, but the positive racism of Socialist Yugoslavia played a role in the discourses of nationalism and ethnicity that were integral to the etatist politics of the 'golden era' as well as the period of crisis that followed it.

There is no State solution for racism. Despite nearly achieving legal equality in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the vast majority of Roma, those who were not celebrated as cultural elites, remained an invisible proletarian reserve of highly exploitable labor living in utmost deprivation and precarity. The stakes of power in etatist politics are exclusive; the dispossessed mass is a precondition of the existence of the State as well as its regenerative base. Roma in other 'socialist' states suffered targeted sterilization, pogroms, and the forced rupture of kin networks in an attempt to solve the "gypsy problem" by either eradication or assimilation into a larger national body. Yugoslavia went another route; the SKJ created a representational system based on ethnic and national identity, hooked it into the markets and debt structure of global capitalism, and produced a ruling State class with hegemonic power over the relations of production, and called this "socialism"[25]. Gypsies posed a conceptual threat to this system by their highly visible collective poverty, their reward for loyal partisanship. Thus, their suffering was re-branded as cultural exoticism and put to work attracting those vital tourist dollars and selling Yugoslavia as the tolerant socialist haven it, perhaps, never really was.

23 Zukin, Sharon. 1975. Beyond marx and tito theory and practice in Yugoslav socialism. New York: Cambridge University. p. 225.
24 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal. Šešelj (IT-03-67). Record 8301-8305. June 17.

25 See: James, C. L. R.. *State Capitalism and World Revolution*. 1969. and Woodward, Susan. *Socialist Unemployment*. 1995.

Contemporary History of Kosovo

Damjan Pavlica (2011)

This research focuses on the Yugoslav history of Kosovo in the 20th century, especially on the Serbian-Albanian conflict. I wanted to find out how Kosovo entered Yugoslavia and how it left. I endeavored to acquaint myself with the views of Serbian/Yugoslav, Albanian, Western and other authors and discovered that, as is usual with ethnic conflicts, the truth is never one sided. Dominion over Kosovo changed hands a few times, and the violence of the dominant group always bred more violence, often against the group that had lost its dominant position.

The goal of this work is to contribute to a greater understanding of the Kosovo problem in Serbia and shed light on certain lesser known aspects of its history.

Kosovo Vilayet of the Ottoman Empire

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Kosovo Vilayet was a province of the Ottoman Empire whose territory was significantly larger than the territory of today's Kosovo. It included the whole of Kosovo, Sandžak, Preševo Valley and Western Macedonia. The capital of the Kosovo Vilayet was Skopje. The majority in Kosovo were Albanians; Serbs were the majority in the Northern Kosovo, while they were a minority in other parts, especially in the South. The situation in Kosovo, like in other parts of Turkey, was especially difficult for the Christian minority.

The diplomacy of the Kingdom of Serbia began to portray the cases of violence and oppression against the Serbs in a way that would make the Albanians seem as savages which Serbia needs to subdue. In Serbia, people began to see the Albanians as usurpers of Serbian land, forgetting that the Serbs had moved massively from Kosovo during the Great Migration to Hungary. Serbia asserted its "historical right" to Kosovo because it was part of the Rascia State. From 1904 onward, Serbia began to send Chetnik units to Kosovo whose clashes with Albanians meant that the Serbs living there suffered. The representatives of Kosovar Serbs opposed the sending of armed troops, asking

the Serbian government to stop them as they were the cause of even more violence against their people. Serbia's Chetnik action also met strong resistance from Austria-Hungary which considered this policy as Great Serbian.

In the beginning of the 20th century, Kosovo was the center of the Albanian national revival and the fight for liberation from the Turks. From 1905 to 1912 Albanians organized a number of uprisings with the goal of acquiring cultural, economic and political autonomy. The Albanians' armed rebellions were regularly stifled in blood by the Turks, until in 1908, the Young Turk Revolution occurred. At first supported by the Albanians due to the promise of autonomy, decrease in taxes and improvement of general living conditions, the Young Turks eventually consolidated their power, established strict centralism, instituting Turkish as the only language of administration. This lead to an eruption of dissatisfaction and an armed rebellion in Kosovo in June 1909. The first armed clashes with the new authorities happened in the vicinity of Đakovica, and in the spring of 1910, an uprising of larger proportions happened in the Kosovo Vilayet. The rebels were also supported by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization which fought for Macedonian autonomy. Seeing that the rebellion was developing, the Young Turk authorities sent a punitive expedition from Skopje which stifled the rebellion with bloodshed in a 3-day battle from May 11th to May 13th in 1910, not sparing neither women, children or the elderly. Already in the beginning of 1911 there was a new armed rebellion in Kosovo as well as Northern Albania. The main demand of the rebels was the recognition of the Albanian nation, along with autonomy: economically, administratively, culturally and militarily. This rebellion was stifled in August 1911.

In the beginning of 1912 the Great Albanian uprising took place under the leadership of the General Insurrection Committee in the areas of Drenica, Peć, Đakovica and Northern Albania. The leaders of the rebels were Isa Boljetinac, Hasan Prishtina, Bajram Curi among others. The rebels sought the establishment of an autonomous Albania, the retreat of Turkish officers and the introduction of Albanian as the official language. They immediately took over many towns, including Đakovica, Mitrovica, Vučitrn and Prishtina in order to then quickly gain control of all of Kosovo, Northern Albania and Skopje. Due to the success of the Albanian rebellion, the Young Turk government decided to retreat. After the Albanian rebels reached Thessaloniki, the new government was forced to meet all their demands. An autonomous Albania was recognized on August 18th 1912 which included four vilayets: Kosovo, Skadar, Janjin and Bitolj. The neighbors saw this as the creation of a "Great Albania" as the inhabitants of these areas were not all Albanian. This threatened the national interests of the neighboring countries which held pretentions to these areas, and they quickly went to war with Turkey.

Before the war itself, on October 19th 1912 there was a meeting of the leaders in Skopje, the seat of the Kosovo Vilayet. It was decided that the Albanians would defend the territories they considered theirs in the upcoming was, fighting on the side of Turkey.

The annexation of Kosovo in the Balkan Wars

The Serbian and Montenegrin armies attacked the Ottoman state in October 1912, penetrating to Kosovo and Metohija. Albanians resisted the taking of their settlements and organized volunteer units which carried out an armed resistance against the actions of the Serbian troops. A bigger battle happened at Podujevo as 15,000 volunteers under the command of Isa Boljetinac stood against the Third Serbian Army without success. The Serbian Army then conquered Prizren and a larger part of Albania with the Littoral.

During the Balkan Wars, Serbia annexed the areas of Sandžak, Macedonia, Kosovo and briefly also Albania. Serbs didn't form the majority in these areas which posed a problem for Serbian diplomacy which presented the conquest of Kosovo as a liberation from Turks, disregarding the fact that the make-up of the population had changed over the ages. At the peace talks in London, Serbia refused to be satisfied with just Northern Kosovo, for which it would, by the irony of fate, be asking for a century later. After the end of the war, the Kosovo-Metohija areas came under Serbia and Montenegro, which Serbian historiography calls liberation and Albanian calls occupation. From the viewpoint of political science, the appropriate term is annexation, as it was done without the agreement of national representatives and without a referendum for the population.

"Houses and whole villages have been turned to dust, unarmed and innocent inhabitants have been massacred on a large scale, unbelievable acts of violence, pillages and cruelties of every kind – these were the measures that were taken and are still being taken by the Serbian-Montenegrin Army, with the goal of the complete alteration of the ethnic character of areas populated exclusively by Albanians." - From the *Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars.*

In those years there was plenty of talk on the "Kosovo Vengeance" for 1389 which was magically flown from the Turks to the Albanians. This policy met criticism from the European press which wrote about the crimes of ethnic cleansing done by the Serbian and Montenegrin troops during the occupation of Albanian settlements. According to reports, the suffering of the inhabitants of Prishtina, Ferizović (later Uroševac), Đakovica, Prizren and certain other towns was especially great. In Austria, the belief that Serbia had taken too much prevailed.

Serbian oppositionist Dimitrije Tucović warned that "an attempt at murder is taking place with the design against an entire nation" which is "a criminal act" for which "reparations must be made". Tucović was against the territorial expansion of Serbia and advocated that Kosovo enter the Balkan Federation with Serbia and other areas on an equal level. "The boundless hostility of the Albanian people against Serbia is the first positive result of the Albanian policy of the Serbian government. The second, even more dangerous result is the strengthening of two great powers with the biggest interests in the Western Balkans."

Tucović meant Italy and Austria-Hungary, and the latter, with a good motive, attacked Serbia in order to conquer it in 1915. The drastic worsening of the relationship with the Albanians was paid dearly by the Serbian Army and the columns of refugees during the tragic withdrawal across Kosovo and Albania, remembered as the "Albanian Golgota".

But, due to very unusual unfolding of events, Serbia found itself on the winning side at the end of World War I, and it was granted not only the territorial expansions from the Balkan Wars, but also the right to create a great Yugoslav state. And while Serbs had fought for Kosovo to become part of Serbia, it instead became part of Yugoslavia.

The colonization of Kosovo in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

"Serbia gained Kosovo, but also a millstone around the neck of its development." - Leon Trotsky, correspondent from the Balkan battlefield

After World War I, Kosovo became part of the newly-founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Kosovo became a Serbian colony, and it

was mostly governed by a military command. Serbian politicians had no plan whatsoever that would also include the interests of the Albanian population. The belief predominated that Albanians had to be relocated and Serbs moved in.

In the Inter-War period, the Belgrade government carried out a comprehensive plan of colonization with the goal of changing the ethnic structure of Kosovo in favor of Serbs. An advantage in moving was given to ex-soldiers and members of Chetnik units. By 1941, 60,000 colonists were moved there, often to properties taken from Albanians. Over 90% of the total number of colonists were Serbs from various parts of Yugoslavia (this also included Montenegrins then). Taking away the houses from Albanian peasants in order to give them to colonists caused a hatred towards the colonists, and left permanent consequences in the relations between Serbs and Albanians.

Colonization by counties

county	colonists
Uroševac	15.381
Đakovica	15.824
Prizren	3.084
Peć	13.376
Mitrovica	429
Vučitrn	10.169
ukupno	**58.263**

With the colonization, completely new settlements were also formed in Kosovo and Metohija, such as: Kosovo Polje, Obilić, Hercegovo, Orlović, Devet Jugovića, Lazarevo, Svračak, Novo Rujce, Staro Gracko, and many others.

In parallel with the Serbian colonization, there was also a process of forced relocation of Albanian inhabitants. According to the data of the Historical Institute in Prishtina, from 1919 to 1940, 255,878 Muslims were relocated from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 215,412 of which were Albanian.

Albanian rebels, the Kachaks, fought against the establishment of Serbian authority on territories populated with Albanians. There were plenty of them in woods and mountains, and they held actual authority over villages for years. Their political wing was the Kosovo Committee which advocated the secession of Albanian-majority areas from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and unification with Albania. The most influential of the Kachaks were Azem Bejta and his wife Shota Galica who became heroes for the Albanian population because of their fight against state terror. The Belgrade government carried out extremely harsh measures against the breakaway Albanians; their possessions were taken away and given to colonists, their relatives were interned, and whole villages punished if they had helped them. The taking of land led to rebellions of whole villages. The villages from which rebellion had erupted were taken by the Army with heavy artillery. According to the data of the Historical Institute of Prishtina, the Army set on fire and destroyed 320 Albanian villages between 1918 and 1938.

In the 1930s, the belief prevailed that the gradual colonization of Kosovo was ineffective. Vasa Šaletić, the commissioner for colonization, claimed that Albanians had to be moved to Turkey immediately and that "moving of Serbs into the midst of half a million Albanians had been a mistake." The Yugoslav authorities held a meeting of certain ministries and the General Staff in 1935 at which the project of "moving non-Slavic elements from South Serbia to Turkey" was planned. In the beginning of 1936, Turkey expressed the willingness to make a deal with Yugoslavia on the relocation of 200,000 inhabitants "who have a similar mentality to the Turks and would easily assimilate".

In 1937, the Serbian academician Vaso Čubrilović created a project of a quick solution to the "Albanian problem" with the massive ethnic cleansing of Kosovo for Stojadinović's government: "The Arnauts are impossible to repress merely by gradual colonization...The only method and the only measure is a brutal force of an organized state authority, in which we have always been above them."

Professor dr. Vaso Čubrilović planned in detail the methods of ethnic cleansing, which include the creation of a mass psychosis, giving weapons to colonists, sending armed Chetniks, state repression, arrests, unpaid labour, abolishing work permits, firing people from their jobs, cutting down woods, shrinking of cemeteries, burning settlements and similar.

From July 9th to July 11th 1938 a meeting was held in Istanbul between Yugoslavia and Turkey on the preparation of the agreement on relocation of Albanians. The sides agreed to relocate 40,000

Albanian families from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro into barren lands in Anatolia within 6 years. According to the agreement, families could have more than 100 members, so 40,000 families could technically mean millions of people. The article 2. of the Convention assumed a complete repatriation of Albanians from towns such as: Prizren, Uroševac, Prishtina, Kačanik, Gnjilane, Preševo, Peć, Istok, Mitrovica, Đakovica, Vučitrn, Drenica and others.

In January 1939, Ivo Andrić, the ambassador of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Nazi Germany created a project of the division of Albania between Yugoslavia and Italy for Milan Stojadinović. Andrić tried to prove that the assimilation and relocation of Albanian will be easier if Albania is abolished:

"By dividing Arbania, an attractive center for the Arbanian minority in Kosovo would disappear, and it would assimilate more easily in the new situation. We would eventually get 200,000 to 300,000 Arbanians, but they are mostly Catholics whose relationship with Arbanian Muslims has never been good. The question of relocating Arbanian Muslims to Turkey would therefore take place in new circumstances, as there would be no stronger action to prevent it."

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia opposed the relocation of Albanians to Turkey, taking away their land, and carrying out terror against them. The Communists believed that the annexation of Albanian places has created a conflict with them, and supported their right to self-determination.

The ratification and introduction of the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention was disturbed by financial problems, an Albanian campaign against relocation and the break-out of World War II. With the Second World War the results of decades-long colonization of Kosovo were annulled. The colonization with which the "historical injustice" of the ethnic loss of Kosovo was tried to be made right not only failed, but showed itself to be extremely harmful to Kosovar Serbs.

The ethnic division of Kosovo in World War II

"The Serbian population of Kosovo must be moved as soon as possible...Serbian colonizers must be killed." - Occupation PM of Albania Mustafa Kruja in 1942.

After the occupation and division of Yugoslavia in 1942, Italy joined the largest part of Kosovo with Albania, except the North which the Ger-



mans joined with occupied Serbia, and a smaller southwestern part which was taken by Bulgaria. The Italians portrayed themselves as liberators in Kosovo, introduced the Albanian language in administration and education, and allowed the use of the Albanian flag. They formed Albanian quisling formations. The persecution of Serbs, mostly colonists, was cruel. The Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were driven back to Montenegro and Serbia, many were killed, their possessions stolen, and houses burnt. The Chetnik units of Kosta Pečanac carried out retaliations for killed Serbs against the Albanian population of border villages.

In the beginning of the war, Kosovar Partisan units were mainly formed of Serbs and Montenegrins, as the Albanians didn't want the revival of the Yugoslavia into which they had been forced. The first Albanian Partisan units were formed in the fall of 1942. The Kosovar Partisans Boro Vukmirović and Ramiz Sadiku who died in April 1943 later became symbols of Brotherhood and Unity. In January 1944, the Buje conference is held at which the National Liberation Council of Kosovo decides to join Kosovo with Albania. In the middle of 1944 there is a mass Partisan uprising and 7 Kosovo-Metohija brigades are formed.

The decision of Kosovar Partisans to join Kosovo with Albania of course wasn't carried out. After the withdrawal of the German Army, Yugoslav Partisans enter Kosovo in November 1944. Ten days after Partisan units enter Kosovo, in December 1944, there is a massive uprising of Albanians who saw this as another "occupation" of Kosovo. The Central Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia sent over 30,000 soldiers to stifle the "ballistic[1] uprising". In putting down the Kosovar revolt, two brigades of the National Liberation Army of Albania also cooperated, due to a deal of Broz with Hoxha. The hardest battles took place in Drenica, and after that in Uroševac, Gnjilan and Mitrovica. Many Albanian Partisans saw the new annexation of Kosovo to Serbia as the annihilation of their fight and a betrayal by the leadership of the National Liberation uprising.

1 The **Balli Kombëtar** (literally *National Front*), known as **Balli**, was an Albanian nationalist anti-communist resistance movement and a political organization established in November 1942. It was led by Ali Këlcyra and Midhat Frashëri and was formed by members from the landowning elite, liberal nationalists opposed to communism and other sectors of society in Albania.The motto of the Balli Kombëtar was: "*Shqipëria Shqiptarëve, Vdekje Tradhëtarëve*" (Albania for the Albanians, Death to the Traitors). Eventually the Balli Kombëtar joined the Nazi established puppet government and fought as an ally against anti-fascist guerrilla groups.

Post-war (Ranković) period in FNRJ

On February 8th 1945 in Kosovo, a Military administration is established, in March the main resistance of Kosovar Albanians was broken, but fighting still continued over the next months. After the establishment of Yugoslav control of Kosovo, there was a chaotic return of the Serbian and Montenegrin colonists who were driven out, while vengeance and retributions were carried out. Because of this, the new authorities of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia on March 6th 1945 made the decision to temporarily forbid the return of colonists. This remained in effect until the implementation of the Law on revision of colonial relation in August of the same year, after which 3,352 "ex colonists" acquired the right of return to Kosovo and Metohija, while 306 settlers who lost the right of return, were directed towards Vojvodina.

On July 9 1945, the new Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija decided to declare the Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija Land, declaring that the population wishes that this land be annexed to "Federal Serbia" as its constituent part. Shortly after, at the third AVNOJ meeting on August 7 1945, Kosovo is annexed to the People's Republic of Serbia. Professor Jovan Đorđević claimed that Kosovar autonomy was not the creation of the People's Republic of Serbia, but had been a category of the constitutional law of Yugoslavia from the very beginning, which was assumed and guaranteed by the federal constitution. Between Kosovo and Serbia there had been no hierarchical laws nor has there been any twofold responsibility. All Kosovar government organs executed their rights independently and were responsible for their work only to voters, respectively the Provincial Assembly and the Regional Council.

Even after 1945, there were groups of ballists who wouldn't recognize the decision to annex Kosovo to Serbia. Against them, the units OZNA and UDBA were engaged; they held *de facto* authority over Kosovo. The situation of Albanians in the new Yugoslavia was drastically worsened after the Informbiro Resolution in 1948 when many Albanian intellectuals were locked up or liquidated on accusation of being Enver Hoxha's spies. In 1951 the question of relocation of Albanians was brought up again and new negotiations with Turkey took place. It seemed that the state security service pressured the Albanians to claim they were Turks at the census. Within only 5 years, there was a drastic increase in the number of people who claimed they were Turks in Kosovo, from 1,315 (in 1948) to 34,583 (in 1953).

The Kosovo state security service treated Albanians as a suspicious element, and it was mostly made up of Serbs and Montenegrins. In 1955-1956, the state security service with Ranković as its head carried out an action of taking away arms and systematic raiding of homes, the harshness of which went beyond every reasonable line and amounted to terror against the population. Under the excuse of seeking weapons, the organs of state security tortured thousands of people, of which about a hundred died. The repressive policy against Kosovar Albanians continued all the way until Aleksandar Ranković was replaced in 1966.

The development of Kosovar autonomy in SFRY

"During my youth, I believed that Yugoslavia could survive as a federative multiethnic state of equal nations. I was honestly a fan of the project of Yugoslavia according to the 1974 Constitution. We were somehow proud that Yugoslavia was different from all the countries with rigid communist regimes, with no freedom whatsoever, and with poor citizens. We citizens of Yugoslavia lived better lives in every sense. I thought that in the frame of such a project, my Albanian nation could also do well." - Kosovar politician Azem Vlasi

The chief of Yugoslav security Aleksandar Ranković was replaced at the Brioni Plenum in 1966. At the same time, the 1966 constitutional amendments recognized the provinces as "constitutive elements of the federation" with which Kosovo gained the elements of statehood. Despite the fact that Albanians were the majority population of the province, Serbs and Montenegrins held a disproportionately high number of state and party functions, including control over the local police and security forces. On November 27th 1968 there was a mass student demonstration in Kosovo which started at the Faculty of Arts in Prishtina. Only after that, Kosovar Albanians gained certain autonomy, including the right to schooling in their

own language. In November 1968 the name of the province is changed to Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, with which Metohija (a monastic occupancy) was removed from its name.

With the Constitution of 1974, Kosovo gained wide autonomy and the status of a federal unit of the SFRY. With the acquisition of real autonomy, Serbs and Montenegrins ceased to be the dominant minority. Albanians started taking over leading positions from many Serbs in political bodies, administration and labour organizations. With the principle of ethnic representation, by which the percentage of the employed members of a certain nation had to be in alignment with the ethnic structure, many Serbs and Montenegrins lost their jobs. At the same time, many Albanians who were deported during the course of the Kingdom period returned, while at the same time there was also immigration from Albania to a better life in Yugoslavia. Faced with losing their jobs, and often unfriendly environment, Serbs began massively leaving Kosovo. According to certain percentage data (New York Times, July 12 1982) during the 1970s around 70,000 Serbs moved from Kosovo. During these years, many Serbian monasteries complained about damage done by strangers, the illegal cutting of woods, and similar problems.

Protests of Albanians and demands for a republic

After Tito's death, among Albanians, who formed the absolute majority of Kosovo's population (77.4% according to the 1981 census), the fear started spreading that Kosovo could fall under Serbian administration again. There was a belief that the only way to prevent this was for Albanians to be granted the official status of a nation and their own republic which could never fall under Serbian rule again. Students of the University of Pristhina started peaceful protests in March 1981 which soon became nation-wide, demanding equal position of Albanians with the other, Slavic nations in Yugoslavia, which had their own republics. With the slogan "Kosovo Republika!" they wanted Kosovo to become the seventh republic of the Yugoslav federation and for the Yugoslav authorities to cease to treat them as a national minority (so-called nationality), but to recognize them as a nation.

The Yugoslav authorities responded to these demands by sending the Army to deal with the demonstrators. In the riots that followed, tens of Albanian pupils and students were killed, which the regime then hid from the public. After the bloody suppression of the demonstrations, there appeared a great division between Serbs and Albanians – Serbs demanded the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy while Albanians demanded statehood. A certain type of military administration was established in Kosovo, and Albanians were subjected to repression and mass arrests. Also, there was violence against Serbs.

In the following years, many Albanians are sent to prison for numerous years, mostly because of expressing the demand for Kosovo to become a republic.

Protests of the Kosovar Serbs and a campaign about genocide

After the Albanian demonstrations, Kosovar Serbs in 1982 (led by Kosta Bulatović, Miroslav Šolević and others) started to complain about "perfidious pressures from the positions of the state", and the center of the movement became Kosovo Polje, which used to be a Serbian colony. At the same time, an anti-Albanian campaign started in Serbia whose central theme was "genocide" against Serbs in Kosovo, and which portrayed the migrations of Serbs as planned ethnic cleansing carried out by the province's leadership. In April 1982, 21 priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church, among which were certain future bishops (Anastasije Jeftić, Irinej Bulović, Amfilohije Radović) appealed to the highest church and state organs with the "Appeal for the protection of the Serbian population and its holy objects in Kosovo and Metohija", which spoke of the "planned genocide against the Serbian nation" and actualized the Kosovo Myth[2]. In 1983 the church newspaper *Pravoslavlje* (*Orthodoxy*) publishes a feuilleton by Anastasije Jevtić called “From Kosovo to Jadovan” which describes cases of “brutal and bestial rapes of Serbian women, girls, elderly women and nuns by rampant Arbanians”, and compares the suffering of Serbs in Kosovo with their suffering in the Independent State of Croatia. Writing about the Albanians, the clerics mostly describe them as rapists, desecrators, and violent people.

2 The Kosovo Myth, or the Kosovo Cult (Serbian: Косовски Завет / Kosovski Zavet) is a belief asserting that the Battle of Kosovo (June 1389) symbolizes a martyrdom of the Serbian nation in defense of their honor and Christendom against Turks (non-believers). The essence of the myth is that during the battle, Serbs, headed by Prince Lazar, lost because they consciously sacrificed the earthly kingdom in order to gain the Kingdom of Heaven. Since the 19th century Kosovo Myth became an important constitutive element of nationalist identity, as well as cultural and political homogenization of Serbs. The basic elements of the Kosovo Myth are vengeance, martyrdom, betrayal and glory.

In 1985, representatives of the "Serbian resistance movement" from Kosovo hand in a petition to the state organs, which was also written with the help of Anastasije Jevtić and Dobrica Ćosić, in which they claim that the province is being ruled by "Greater Albanian chauvinists" who have "occupied a part of Yugoslavia" and are committing genocide against Serbs. The Yugoslav authorities didn't see these accusations as benevolent, but as the inflaming of Serbian nationalism. Serbs held protests around various towns in these years, but on February 26th, 1986, 100 of them went to the federal assembly, demanding the proclamation of the state of emergency in Kosovo and the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy.

In 1986, the influential SANU[3] Memorandum is published, which describes the demonstrations of the Albanian students as "neofascist aggression" and claims that there is a "physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serbian population" being carried out in Kosovo. No one except the Serbian authors called the problems genocide. The SANU Memorandum was later described by a professional commission of the UN as "a method of spreading anti-Albanian sentiment". According to the findings of the Human Rights Watch, Serbian media in the 1980s were deliberately spreading disinformation about the wrongdoings against Serbs in Kosovo, including regarding rapes of Serbian women, and were leading a campaign of hatred with the goal of spreading a negative portrayal of Albanians.

3 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Serbian: Српска академија наука и уметности/Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, abbr. САНУ/SANU)

The rise of Milošević and the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy

"The situation in Kosovo, which is not being improved as quickly as desired and promised, is creating a dangerous atmosphere where anything that is said against Serbian nationalism is understood as nationalism. Passionate things can only bring flames." - Dragiša Pavlović

In April 1987 Serbs organized a meeting in Kosovo Polje against "anti-Serb discrimination" carried out by the Albanian-majority leadership of the province. On this wave of ethnic conflict, Slobodan Milošević rose to the top, expressing support for the Kosovo Serbs during a pre-planned conflict with the province police ("No one should dare beat you!"), winning both the sympathies of the Church as well as nationalist circles of Serbia. Seeing where the wind is blowing, Milošević switched his communist rhetoric for a national one. Thanks to the problem of the Kosovar Serbs, Milošević shortly takes over control in Serbia, eliminating the more moderate competition, Dragiša Pavlović and Ivan Stambolić from the League of Communists of Serbia.

After connecting to the movement of the Kosovar Serbs, Milošević uses them as a political protest force for his "anti-bureaucratic revolutions" with which he carried out a certain sort of annexation of provinces and centralized his power. In the beginning of 1989, Milošević violently abolished Kosovo's autonomy. The Yugoslav People's Army established martial law, while police units suppressed the general strike of Kosovar miners who opposed the abolition of autonomy. Hundreds of people are arrested and the Kosovar leadership was replaced by force. During the time of voting on amendments, the Kosovar Assembly building was surrounded by tanks. On March 23rd 1989 the Kosovar Parliament in an atmosphere of martial law, and often without a quorum, agreed with the constitutional amendments with which Kosovo lost its autonomy. During the demonstrations that followed on March 28th 1989, according to the information of Human Rights Watch, 24 people were killed by the police.

Milošević's triumph was confirmed on June 28th 1989 at Gazimestan, on the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle. In his speech, Milošević called Kosovo the heart of Serbia which later became a widely used political rhetoric. There, in front of 300,000 gathered people he claimed that "armed battles are not out of the question yet" which is today often interpreted as a pronouncement of the Yugoslav Wars: "Again, we are before battles and in battles. These are not armed, but that is not to say that armed battles are out of the question."

Milošević's speech marked the end of the Yugoslav idea, and he turned from the communist leader of Serbia into the national leader of Serbs. After Milošević's Gazemistan triumph, Rugova (1989) uttered just about prophetic words: "Gazemistan is a chauvinistic manifestation. Not only the Serbs fought against the Turks, but Albanians, and Croats, and Bosnians also took part in the battle. This is an event of all Yugoslav nations. My impression is that there are certain powers which want terrorist actions in Kosovo. I can only warn Serbs that whenever a small nation, and Serbs are a small nation, wanted to achieve domination in the Balkans, this always ended with that nation's tragedy."

Passive resistance and the development of parallel institutions

As a response to the counter-constitutional abolition of autonomy, on July 2nd, 1990, the Kosovar parliament passed a Constitutional declaration with which Kosovo declared itself a republic, equal to the other Yugoslav republics. Serbia reacted to this by abolishing the Kosovo parliament on July 5th, and replacing the editors of the main Albanian media in Kosovo. Financing for Kosovar institutions was cut, among others the Academy of Science and Arts (in July 1992). Kosovar Albanians began building parallel institutions. On September 7th the MPs of the abolished Assembly met in Kačanik in secret and created a new Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. A shadow government and an Assembly were chosen. In Sep-

tember 1991 Kosovar Albanians also held an unofficial referendum on independence. On the basis of the referendum, the unrecognized Republic of Kosovo declared itself independent from Yugoslavia. In reality, it didn't function as an independent state but as a parallel system of government. Throughout the whole of the Milošević period, the institutions of the Republic of Serbia called "Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija" and the institutions of the Kosovar Albanians called "Republic of Kosovo" functioned in parallel.

In the 1990s, Kosovo became a police state under the administration of Belgrade. After the Belgrade authorities took over the provincial authorities, hundreds of thousands of Albanians were fired from state institutions and state companies. Milošević's authorities closed down the majority of Albanian-language schools and quit paying salaries to Albanian high school teachers. The internationalization of the Kosovo question appeared. Kosovar Albanians started to build their own parallel institutions such as education, health care and others. Albanian pupils and students spent their times in private homes, empty companies, and abandoned school buildings. Milošević's government wouldn't allow the development of parallel institutions in Kosovo, and the Serbian police constantly raided the educational and other institutions of Kosovar Albanians. Members of the security forces routinely harassed and beat the teachers, students and managers of the Albanian schools. The police constantly broke basic human rights, and arbitrary arrests and torture became regular occurrences. Kosovar Albanian suffered the terror of Slobodan Milošević more than all the other citizens of Serbia.

The leader of the Kosovar Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, was known for his support of a nonviolent opposition to Milošević's regime, as a result of which he is called the "Balkan Gandhi". During 1991 and 1995, when war was raging in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mostly Albanian population of Kosovo supported a passive resistance, refusing to take part in the political structures of Serbia, boycotting elections and censuses. During the times of armed conflicts, Rugova's Democratic Union of Kosovo refused the offers of the Croatian and Bosnian leadership to open up one more war front against Serbia.

Up to 1995, Rugova's strategy of non-violent resistance had the wide support of the Albanian population. But after the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, a nonviolent strategy was brought into question, and the number of those Albanians who supported armed resistance was increasing.

The Kosovo War and the eviction of population

In 1996, the thus-far unknown Kosovo Liberation Army started committing terrorist acts against the Serbian authorities in Kosovo and their Albanian associates. The attack on the Serbian police and civilians continued in 1997. The KLA criticized the "passive" approach of the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians, promising to fight for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian rule. In the end of 1997, Kosovar Albanians declared the region of Drenica "liberated territory" due to the strong presence of KLA forces.

During the 1998, the KLA became stronger and started to engage in guerilla warfare against the Serbian security forces. In the regions of the conflict, the Serbian police and security forces non-selectively and cruelly acted against the civilian population. On March 5th 1998, the special police units, during the chase after KLA leader Adem Jashari, in the village Donji Prekaz, leveled the house of the Jashari family, killing 20 fighters, several elderly men, 18 women and 10 children younger than 16 years. The massacre in Prekaz and other non-selective killings committed in those days in the Drenica area radicalized the Kosovar Albanians and strengthened the KLA which grew into a mass armed resistance movement against the Belgrade government. Many of those who had until then supported Rugova's policy of non-violence decided for armed resistance.

The battles between the Serbian special police units and the KLA which had under its control a significant part of Kosovo were transformed into the Kosovo War in the middle of 1998. From August 1998 onwards, the Serbian security units started a massive campaign against the KLA. During these conflicts the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police used "excessive force" (according to the International Crime Court), which resulted in the destruction of villages, relocation of population and death of civilians. The excessive use of state violence, massacres against civilians and the ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbian forces were the motive for NATO bombardment of Serbia in March 1999. In essence, Milošević had no choice but to either hand over or not hand over Kosovo to its inhabitants.

Milošević chose to change the population of Kosovo. After NATO had started the bombing, Milošević engaged all available forces in order to drive out Kosovar Albanians. During the NATO strikes, from March 24th to June 10th, the Serbian police, military and paramilitary began an "all-encompassing campaign of violence" (ICC) against the Albanian population of Kosovo, carrying out forced relocation and massive persecution on an ethnic basis, committing mass murders, pillages, rapes, destruction of religious objects, and whole settlements. Serbian police tried to conceal the killings of Kosovar Albanians by carrying the corpses into Central Serbia, where they were thrown into the Danube or buried in mass graves. During this brutal action of ethnic cleansing 862,979 registered Albanian refugees left Kosovo in a short period of time (data from UNHCR). While they were driving them out, the authorities also illegally took away the IDs from these citizens and destroyed them, carrying out a systematic deletion of identity.

"Results of the action: The last big groups have been broken. Around 2,000 liquidated, many more than in the previous operation. 900,000 have left the land. 1,000 terrorists remain, 300,000 civilians remain." - War Journal of the general Obrad Stevanović.

Despite the seeming "final solution" of the Kosovo problem, Serbia was forced to withdraw from Kosovo after 78 days of NATO bombardment. In those days, the Albanians returned to Kosovo, and about 100,000 Serbs left the area. Many Serbs who remained were attacked by the furious Albanians who returned while their possessions were destroyed and pillaged. In the following years the number of Serbs and other non-Albanians who moved from Kosovo was about 200,000. Those who remained became easy prey for the KLA which carried out kidnapping and killings of Serbian civilians, and one of the vilest crimes they are accused of (still without a legal epilogue) is the killing of people for organ theft, and sale of it on the black market.

The UN Administration and the declaration of independence

"Had Serbia been smarter, it would have agreed to the demand for Kosovo Republic in 1981 already. Had Serbia done that, perhaps there would be today a democratic and confederal Yugoslaviam state in which all Serbs would live." - Slovenian political scientist Anton Bebler

After the end of the bombing, Serbia lost control of Kosovo. According to Resolution 1244, Kosovo remained part of FR Yugoslavia, but under control of the United Nations, meaning the KFOR forces. The Serbian minority in Kosovo turned from a privileged minority into a dispossessed minority. In March 2004, violent riots broke out

during which Albanian demonstrators attacked Serbian communities in Kosovo. In two days of ethnic conflicts, 19 civilians were killed (11 Albanians and 8 Serbs), hundreds of Serbian homes destroyed and around 35 Orthodox churches. More than 4,000 were driven out, during which certain settlements were left with no Serbs at all.

In February 2006 negotiations began on the status of Kosovo. The international arbitrator, the Finnish politician Marti Ahtisaari recommended the plan of "controlled independence" which the Serbian side rejected, but the Albanian accepted. Serbia suggested that the status of Kosovo be regulated similarly to that of Hong Kong in China or the Oeland in Finland, but the Kosovar Albanians rejected any proposition that would put Kosovo inside Serbia.

In a deal with Western powers, the Assembly of Kosovo on February 17th 2008 unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo, with all 109 present MPs, while 11 Serbian MPs boycotted the vote. This decision was in the same night declared illegal by the Government of Serbia, and from then on Serbian diplomacy has worked intensely against Kosovar independence.

Whether Serbia likes it or not, the majority of European states today recognize Kosovo as the youngest European state. Kosovar institutions control most of Kosovo, except for the north which is under the control of Serbs. While I am writing this (2011), there are barricades on the north of Kosovo; Belgrade and Prishtina still cannot reach any sort of deal.

Summary

After due to the Balkan Wars Kosovo became part of Serbia for a short period of time, the First World War broke out. After World War I, Kosovo became part of Yugoslavia, its permanent problem, and one of the major reasons of its break-up.

The Yugoslav period of the Kosovar history was, unfortunately, rather violent. During the majority of the Yugoslav period, Kosovo either had a state of emergency or martial law. Everything taken into account, there was the least violence in the period of the development of Kosovar autonomy, from the removal of Ranković in 1966 to the 1981 riots. And even the period of the genocide propaganda in the 1980s seems relatively mild compared to what happened later when the mass killing really began.

The main demographic tendencies in the Yugoslav period were the planned migrations of the Serbs in the period of the Kingdom, and the chaotic movements in the period of SFRY. There are a lot less Serbs today in Kosovo statistically than 100 years ago. As a majority, Serbs now only exist in the North of Kosovo where they were also the majority in the beginning of the century. They even became the minority in the towns that were founded by colonization like Obilić and Kosovo Polje. From many towns, they have completely been driven out.

How to proceed?

As we have seen, the problems with Kosovo didn't come into existence today or yesterday, they have existed since Kosovo entered Serbian/Yugoslav state. Many Serbs with whom I have talked to would love for the problem to be solved by all the Albanians there disappearing. I think that is not realistic, and most importantly, not humane.

Is the solution another conquest of Kosovo? That has been done for too many times already (1912, 1918, 1944, 1989, 1999), but we simply didn't know what to do with it. Belgrade has tried all the violent methods in the 20th century: gradual relocation, expulsions, martial law, colonization, etc… It was because of these policies, that Kosovar Serbs always suffered. As if by a rule, every instance of Belgrade violence caused a worsening of the situation and the migration of the Kosovar Serbs.

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On going to the Partisans

Vlado Kristl

I lived underground for a long period of time before I got a connection to go, I had to hide, it was not easy, someone would get caught every now and then... In the last high school I was in, Ustashas were organising some celebration, it was some anniversary or liberation, they all call their thing liberation. All high school students had to stand in line, it was winter already, it was getting dark early, I took out all electricity fuses, so all was in complete darkness, they had to cancel all their events. They would shoot me if I got caught. So, that's the kind of thing I was doing, a bit cocky, not very careful, but when you are young, it's easy to get angry. And then small kids say no. And then my friend was shot on the stairway, so for me that was a sign not to do anything, but to hide and try to get a connection to go to the Partisans. You had to be against things, you had to know each other, and stuff like that. So I was hiding, and one day we were told we are going, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, signal will be that and that, and then we went. All familiar streets in the middle of the night and then you are out of Zagreb, then hiding at this or that person's place, then through Turopolje, through the vineyard to the right, all the way to Banija, where we were hiding the whole day in the bushes. Every few minutes some patrols passed by, cars, armed Germans, this or that army, and we didn't have the connection to continue further. After that we didn't know where to go, maybe that connection was arrested, those people killed, so until the next day we did not know what's going on, we thought we are left on our own, but then suddenly, whistle... An owl does not sound like that. And that was one guy... And then he said, three in a group, there was eleven of us there. That was the greatest miracle for a young person, daylight was brighter and brighter, we were walking through the forest, but in small groups, so we don't get caught... And suddenly there they are... Even now tears come to my eyes. Around fity, sixty armed Partisans, standing in the forest very quietly... they heard someone coming, they are waiting...

That's how I got into another world. Suddenly I was in another world and there was no return. But those people, some of them were with me all the way, or I was with them, we slept together in snow, but later they became patrons and bosses, and they throw me out on the street. Those so-called partisans, that bunch, just when it was bad for them, they were good, when they needed someone to keep them warm, I also needed to keep myself warm when we slept in snow, I didn't even know you can sleep in the snow, like dogs pressed against each other, holding each other. You are healthy in the morning, nothing is wrong with you, you are just hungry as a wolf. But

Don Kihot, animated film by Vlado Kristl, Zagreb, 1961.

those same people betrayed me. Or, as they say, I betrayed them. Now they are in power, they are ruling and now they will liberate the world. Liberate? From what? I can see what you are doing. That cannot be freedom.

I could not find understanding with anyone in the world anymore, so in one poem I wrote when I got back from the Partisans, I wrote, that we killed one Hitler and we returned with a few hunderd Hitlers. A few hundred Hitlers returned with me. That's terrible, knowing that you risked everything and realising it was all for nothing.

One of the worst experiences was Bakarić, that low bastard, he killed people with his own hands... Partisan Gestapo, he organised the secret police, blood-thirsty, but soft, low bastard... That guy became President of Croatia. He killed... what was the name of that professor of Croatian language... Hebrang.

That black soul is all that is left to me. I can't be joyful anymore. When I see someone, I see black behind it, there's always, not death, but an abbys in which everything that we are against in this world is happening. Behind everyone there is that basement or attic, ok, attic is good, but basement... full of bad, rotten people who are abusing each other. Why there's no sense that I'm a human being. If you are joyful, there is no real reason to be joyful. When I got children I always asked myself how to raise them so they don't have the kind of life I had. To save them from what I lived through...

I don't know if I can still change, that would have to be through painting. If it's not in my paintings, why am I painting anyway? That's what scares people off when they see my paintings, they can't bear it in their own room or flat, house, that dissapointment which is inside my paintings.

There is no human, there is no friend, you have to come to your own conclusions, looking inside yourself and others, and no one can help you with that. That's what makes you human. If you are not doing that, if you are not interested, you cannot do anything.

But that painting from before, when they are all grey shadows in the first daylight... how they stood there, living people who are standing against this huge powerful world that is a terrible threat to all of us, and anyone can be shot dead any day... that's how they stood. That means that there are still some people... and then, all of them betrayed, betrayed if they didn't die.

Most of us, even back then when we started entering cities, most of them said that sentence which I will never forget: "Why didn't I fall, why didn't I die..." That's how strong the feeling of shame was... Because others also felt what we were doing, and what we thought, and why after all we are here. And all that was sold, right away, in one moment... When you have a chance, you sell your ideals. Make your era out of that, obey those who are now in power.

Those images of illusion, that's what I can't paint now. If I was a different person, maybe I could paint that great painting when I saw those grey shadows, those people in the first daylight, that was a world which suddenly opened up, new posibilities! You are not sentenced to death and we are just waiting for the right moment!

That is where one new world grows, one which still does not have a color, still doesn't have anything, but it's almost here... That one moment of illusion, but that passed later. But one who got a good political position from that illusion, or who became Director of the Academy of Fine Arts, that one could paint that painting. And everyone would say, my God, that is a great painter!

He could paint that, not me.

(extract from: Ana Marija Habjan: *Umjetnik otpora – razgovori s Vladom Kristlom, Munchen 2003, 2004*, Petikat, Zagreb, 2007.)



Against Every Yugoslavia

On the ideology of the transition from capitalism to capitalism, through capitalism

Nina Simonović

1.

In the not-so-inspiring imagination of the post-Yugoslav Yugonostalgic left, a specific style of writing about "socialist" Yugoslavia persists, one that entails the use of a specific vocabulary. This vocabulary is dominated by ideological constructs that always emphasize the supposedly "contradictory" character of the Yugoslav society, such as: "complex class logics that collided and confronted each other"; "contradictory political and economic phenomena"; "social dynamic that was simultaneously centripetal and centrifugal" and so on.

In this sense, the publication "Gradove smo vam podigli" ("We Raised Cities for You") is characteristic (the subtitle is "On the Contradictions of Yugoslav Socialism"), recently published in Belgrade, as supplementary material for an exhibition of the same name. In fact, all of the above-mentioned ideological phrases are taken out of the introductory text from this publication. Along with this text, I will also briefly take into account the text "Contradictory Reproduction of Socialist Yugoslavia" from the same publication. This exhibition and publication gathered a number of leftists from the Yugoslav area and represent a very good and fresh example of the ideological articulation of this type.

In the mentioned introductory text we also encounter the ascertainment that a "socialist revolution led by a communist party" took place in Yugoslavia, that this was "an emancipatory endeavor (…) that spread itself through the ideas of self-management, structurally democratic participation in the political life, social ownership of the means of production…" and it is stated that in this period "Yugoslavia for the first time in its history secured a real independence in relation to the global dynamics of the political and economic centers of power."[1]

Besides this, there are statements about the consequences of the breakdown of Yugoslavia, so we can read "that all of the states created after the destruction of Yugoslavia are nationalistic and capitalist" and that the agendas of local regimes are submitted "exclusively to the logic of capital." The expressed sorrow seems especially painful because today "the interests of the working class are represented by hardly anyone," and because the lack of "educational and socio-political activities directed at the workers" and again the lamentation for the absence "political representation of the workers." This post-Yugoslav period is always, and self-evidently, characterized as the "restoration of the capitalist system."

To put these ideological phrases in question you don't have to look far away. It is sufficient, for example, to look at the text "Contradictory Reproduction

1 We are left to wonder where was this "real independence" between the period of Stalinist loyalty and the period of Yugoslavia as a *de facto* member of NATO.



of Socialist Yugoslavia" from the same publication. The authors of this text strived to write a balanced text that would, as they explicitly state, avoid the trappings of, on the one hand, approaches that portray Yugoslavia exclusively in a negative light, as well as those that refer to it only in a positive way. So, unlike the introductory text, that was probably intended to explicitly explain the ideological point of the whole project, the praises of Yugoslavia in this text are carried out in a more "sober" way. In that fashion, they point out the "construction of infrastructure that provided the satisfaction of the needs of the widest social strata"; "intensive development of education"; "extraordinary progressive social principles, such as equal pay for the same work (for men and women), voting rights (for women), full equality in marriage, divorce by mutual agreement and the right to abortion"; "large state investments in the construction of hospitals, education of medical personnel, modernization of infrastructure of the health institutions and the implementation of the effective scientific achievements in the treatment and suppression of diseases"; "accelerated industrialization"; "development of the electric power network, the railroad, shipbuilding, machine building, steel factories, chemical factories," which all entailed an "increased work productivity and modernization of the production process." Then it is stated that "such a social progress resulted in a large rise in the living standard of the wide population strata, which was reflected in the quality of nutrition, clothing, and supply of homes with infrastructure that provided a comfortable living, such as heating, electricity, indoor plumbing, furniture and home appliances of better quality, and so on."

The authors, in their evaluation of Yugoslav society, use the thesis of Canadian economist Michael Lebowitz, who deems that the "condition and categorical imperative of socialism" consists of: 1. social ownership of the means of production; 2. social production organized by the workers; 3. the satisfaction of common needs and intentions. The authors immediately state that in the "social reality of Yugoslavia it is impossible to locate the implementation of all of the three sides of the triangle, adding immediately that "this could be" the consequence of the fact that this was really a "system in the making, a system which was not finished up to the level at which we would speak about a reproduction of an organic regime of social production of a socialist type." We could, rather, say that none of the sides of the triangle could be located, except formally.

Despite this, in order to characterize the Yugoslav system as "really existing socialism" it is necessary to invoke again the quasi-Hegelian rhetoric of "contradictions," this time in the form of Lebowitz's concept of "contradictory reproduction" which suggests that "during socialism, there were different logics in place, that functioned in a contradiction to each other." These were the logic of capital (embodied in managers), the logic of the vanguard (embodied in the Party) and the logic of the working class. These logics were contradictory to each other, so according to Lebowitz, "exactly because there existed a contradictory reproduction between different sets of productive relations, the interaction of the system can generate crisis, inefficiency and irrationality that cannot be found in any system in its pure form."

From this, a claim about a socialist character of the Yugoslav system is deduced, about the time when "socialist ideas came down to reality in an attempt to build a different world," despite the survival of the harmful "logic of capital," today we can find in an "open horizon of opportunities" a "renewed vision of a socialist future," exactly "thanks to a precious experience of the socialist past." Besides this, it is claimed in the text, enthusiastically and incorrectly, that: "The idea of the construction of new socio-economic system wasn't imported from the Soviet area of influence, but was indigenously developed under the decisive contribution of the People's Liberation Movement in the destruction of fascism."[2]

2.

This vocabulary, in fact, represents a revival of the (post)Stalinist ideological vocabulary of the Yugoslav ruling class. The contradictions on which this class insisted were the contradictions of the "transitional period."

So, we can see that the high-ranking SFRY functionary Mijalko Todorović – Plavi (People's Hero and Hero of Socialist Labor[3]) advocated for a view according to which (as he stated in the 1965 book *Liberation of Work*) "the law of value is the general objective law of the transitional period." He saw socialist self-management as a system which "automatically" provides better efficiency, productiveness of work, and living standards, which, according to him, is proven by the structure of personal consumption and indicators such as the number of individuals with high education, circulation of books, attendance of theatrical plays, and so on. The rise of the standard of living is reflected in the "diversity provided and imposed by the free initiative of direct manufacturers and by the direct willful influence of consumers and other beneficiaries and interested parties." According to Todorović, the wish to abolish the law of value immediately "as soon as we took power" is romantic, idealistic, and even religious. On the contrary, this law needs to be conquered and used, until objective circumstances for its disappearance are built:

> *"As we will see later, our new socialist relations in the conditions of commodity production, contain this contradiction, that can give birth to, as a by-product, various negative phenomena, antagonisms, political, and other conflicts. Because of this, the identification and existence of the law of value and its use in progressive efforts entails a simultaneous identification of corresponding organic weaknesses, also born from the law of value and the new relations developed in the given conditions. The law of value is not new but has a typically socialist phenomena and quality (some almost brag about it as socialist attainment). But, it is reality – one which cannot by bypassed or denied. Furthermore, it can very efficiently be harnessed for the socialist cause, under the condition that all of its qualities are known, bad as well as good ones!"*

Another high ranking member of the Yugoslav ruling class, Svetozar Vukmanović – Tempo (also People's Hero and Hero of Socialist Labor), in 1966 spoke similarly about workers strikes and their demands:

> *"Even less justified is if some work collective demands higher pay regardless of the results of the business. Such demands are in their basis a demand for the state to, by taxation, take a part of the earnings of a more successful company and give it to another. And would therefore be a wage-leveling („uravnilovka") with all the negative consequences on further economic development. Collectives would then be interested not to make efforts in work, but for the state to provide the pay for them."*

Writing about the same theme ("distribution according to the individual quantum of work") in 1961, sociologist Dragomir Drašković pointed out that the Yugoslav system is such a social system "in which self-management and direct socialist democracy achieve increasingly perfect and humane forms," but that in itself it contains a "contradictory

2 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) went through a period of intensive bolshevization and Stalinization, which also included the physical destruction of the leadership and membership of the party, in which the leadership from the WW2 period also participated. In this process, hundreds of communists and other Yugoslav revolutionaries were killed. The period of NOB (People's Liberation Struggle) was also not free of these kinds of activities, for example during the existence of the "Užice Republic" Živojin Pavlović, a functionary of KPJ, who became a fierce critic of Stalinism, was tortured and killed.

3 Honorary titles in Yugoslavia.

process in which forms of alienation of consumers are expressed" …nevertheless, self-management represents a first step towards dealienation, which "doesn't mean that social ownership of the means of production has abolished alienation, nor that the first appearance of self-management has liberated humanity from wage relations." According to him, workers ("producers") are now managing the surplus value, but in an indirect way: "Rewarding, that is, social distribution of income, according to the individual quantum of work, represents the abolishment of wage relations and opens the process of dealienation in the work place." This process "resolves the dialectical contradiction of alienated work and represents the beginning of economic dealieanation which, in the system of worker's self-management, increases opportunities for the affirmation of free work and a free man as producer."

3.

Along with the (post)Stalinist ideological vocabulary of the ruling class, which remained in the tradition of "dialectical materialism," in Yugoslavia there existed a suppressed and marginalized critique of the Yugoslav system that was sometimes based on libertarian socialist foundations.

Jelka Kljajić Imširović (1947-2006), who was active in the radical current of the '68 student movement, wrote the following about her critical views from that period, not only regarding the Yugoslav system, but also regarding what she considered the insufficient criticisms of that system by the group Praxis[4]:

> *"In the case of the new type of class society, I was of the view that it is logical not to call it socialism at all. To call a society in which class relations are created and reproduced [socialist] meant rendering the very idea and struggle for socialism meaningless. Finally, I will mention only one more objection that I made that year, a long time ago, to the members of Praxis. It was about tying of Stalinism to the Soviet society. They did this, in my view, explicitly and implicitly, both the Praxis-ists who thought of Stalinism as a negation of socialism, and those who, along with a sharp critique of it, nevertheless classified it as a form of socialism. Without an analysis of the Stalinism of KPJ [Komunistička partija Jugoslavije – Communist Party of Yugoslavia], I thought, there is no concrete critical analysis of Yugoslav society."*[5]

Fredy Perlman (1934-1985) who in the sixties lived in Belgrade[6], and who after that experience radicalized his perspectives and separated from orthodox Marxist views, wrote at that time very clearly about Yugoslavia:

> *"The principle 'to each according to his work' was historically developed by the capitalist class in its struggle against the landed aristocracy, and in present day Yugoslavia this principle has the same meaning that it had for the bourgeoisie. Thus the enormous personal income (and bonuses) of a successful commercial entrepreneur in a Yugoslav import-export firm is justified with this slogan, since his financial success proves both his superior ability as well as the value of his contribution to society. In other words, distribution takes place in terms of the social evaluation of one's labor, and in a commodity economy labor is evaluated on the market. The result is a system of distribution which can be summarized by the slogan 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his market success,' a slogan which describes a system of social relations widely known as capitalist commodity production, and not as socialism (which was defined by Marx as the negation of capitalist commodity production)."*[7]

In the book from 1991, *Od staljinizma do samoupravnog nacionalizma* (*From Stalinism to Self-managed Nationalism*), Jelka Kljajić Imširović analyzed the development of the ideology of KPJ/SKJ. In the following way she summarized the pro-work essence of this ideology, as it was presented at the Fifth Congress of KPJ: "As the ruling one, the working class has to radically change – and according to the party's evaluations it is most of time doing just that – its relation towards work and the state. Now it needs to lead in work, in the mobilization of all of the workers for the constructive

4 For a newer critique of Praxis, from a left-communist perspectives see Juraj Katalenac: *Praxis: an attempt at ruthless criticism*, in this issue of Antipolitika.

5 Excerpt from the text *Dissidents and Prison* by Jelka Kljajić Imširović, which is included in this issue of Antipolitika.

6 Concerning this, see the article by Lorrain Perlman: *Three Years in Yugoslavia*, included in this issue of Antipolitika

7 An excerpt from the text by Fredy Perlman: *The Birth of a Revolutionary Movement in Yugoslavia*, also included in this issue of Antipolitika.

efforts, for the increase of production, for the increase of labor productivity, for the development of the productive forces, for the, as correct as possible, implementation of the policy of the Party in economic and organizational questions. Work and only work, competition in work, work discipline, shock work [*udarništvo*[8]], struggle against non-work, unconscientious work, non-implementation of work assignments and quotas, cooperation with the management of companies, with constructive pointing out of mistakes in order to achieve even better and more efficient work, work enthusiasm in the implementation of economic plans adopted and developed by the Party and the State – these are the only ways and guarantees, along with the support for the Party and State in the struggle against the class enemy, for the ruling position of the working class (and working people) to become in the material and social sense better and better." The ideology of work did not solely remain a means of increasing production, but also a manner by which to affirm loyalty to the Party and the leadership. Thus, the representatives of work collectives in this congress announced that the quotas and plans would be exceeded as a sign of solidarity with Tito and the Party, and in honor of the congress, work was organized into competitions.

Yugoslav sociologist with a libertarian-socialist orientation, Laslo Sekelj (1949-2001), stated in his 1990 book *Jugoslavija – struktura raspadanja* (Yugoslavia: the Process of Disintegration), that, although official Yugoslav ideology always invoked Marx, "the concept of socialism in the ideology of the Yugoslav and real-socialist parties was always reduced to the Leninist notion of socialism as delayed communism." Such an understanding of socialism was, according to Sekelj, completely foreign to Marx who, although he rarely used the term, by socialism meant the lower phase of communism, in which the market is already abolished and there is no money, but in which there still remains the rule of reward according to work: "Individual share in the distribution depends on the number of work hours based on the principle of equal reward for different concrete work. The basic ideological principle of Yugoslav self-managed and every other real socialism is completely the opposite: different reward for the same quantum of work, depending on the kind of concrete work, that is, market results, which is the ideological principle of liberal capitalism."

8 An udarnik, also known in English as a shock worker or strike worker (collectively known as shock brigades or a shock labour team) was a highly productive worker in the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia. The term derived from the expression "udarny trud" for "superproductive, enthusiastic labour".



4.

Robert Kurz (1943-2012) thought that[9], in some way, the Mensheviks were right when they were pointing out that the revolution in Russia had an "objectively bourgeois character," according to him in a logical, not in a historical or empirical, sense. The task of bourgeois modernization in Russia could not be fulfilled by the agent that fulfilled it in the West – the "liberal bourgeoisie" – which in the Russian revolution played only a secondary role. This could be done only by a worker's party clearly differentiated from western capitalism, which was the only one capable of implementing a program of catching up with the capitalist development ("catch-up modernization"). The Bolsheviks were, in that sense, right about the "practice": they had to implement a program of ideological deceit. So, communism became a "proletarian" ideology for the legitimization of a forced late bourgeois modernization.

Kurz stated that the presentation of this program of "socialist capital accumulation" – which has a completely capitalist character – can clearly be seen in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin glorified German state-capitalism as a model for development, and in doing so he defined state capitalism quite obtusely, very imprecisely differentiating it from "socialism." Stalin clearly described the logic of accumulation in the system of commodity production, which produces abstract "profits" in the form of money, where this whole process is not considered capitalist because the "parasitic class" of old "capitalists" is expropriated. A statist regime of accumulation was named socialism, and such a regime was, more or less successfully, realized in other places too.

One of the variations of such a system was Yugoslavia. Historic aberrations from the Soviet model haven't made the Yugoslav system any less capitalist than the original model was.

"To make things even clearer, let us first of all take the most concrete example of state capitalism. Everybody knows what this example is. It is Germany. Here we have "the last word" in modern large-scale capitalist engineering and planned organization, subordinated to Junker-bourgeois imperialism. Cross out the words in italics, and in place of the militarist, Junker, bourgeois, imperialist state put also a state, but of a different social type, of a different class content—a Soviet state, that is, a proletarian state, and you will have the sum total of the conditions necessary for socialism. Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organization, which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution." (Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*)

"While the revolution in Germany is still slow in "coming forth", our task is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare no effort in copying it and not shrink from adopting dictatorial methods to hasten the copying of it. Our task is to hasten this copying even more than Peter hastened the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, and we must not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism." (Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*)

"Clearly, construction work on so large a scale would necessitate the investment of thousands of millions of rubles. . . . But we were then a poor country. There lay one of the chief difficulties. Capitalist countries as a rule built up their heavy industries with funds obtained from abroad, whether by colonial plunder, or by exacting indemnities from vanquished nations, or else by foreign loans. The Soviet Union could not as a matter of principle resort to such infamous means of obtaining funds as the plunder of colonies or of vanquished nations. As for foreign loans, that avenue was closed to the U.S.S.R., as the capitalist countries refused to lend it anything. The funds had to be found **inside** the country." (Stalin, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks))*

"And they were found. Financial sources were tapped in the U.S.S.R. such as could not be tapped in any capitalist country. The Soviet state had taken over all the mills, factories, and lands which the October Socialist Revolution had wrested from the capitalists and landlords, all the means of transportation, the banks, and home and foreign trade. The profits from the state-owned mills and factories, and from the means of transportation, trade and the banks now went to further the expansion of industry, and not into the pockets of a parasitic capitalist class. . . . All these sources of revenue were in the hands of the Soviet state. They could yield hundreds and thousands of millions of rubles for the creation of a heavy industry." (Stalin, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*)

5.

So, we saw that the rhetoric that emphasizes alleged contradictions of a "transitional period" or "socialism" is in reality the ideology of the ruling class of a state-capitalist system; that is, the rhetoric of a class war waged against the proletariat. Orthodox Marxism (that is, the mainstream of the historical left, represented by the line First International – Second International and later derivatives) is one of the consciously most pro-capitalist ideologies that ever existed – that's why it has such a clearly defined exploitative and pro-work character reflected in the warnings addressed to the Yugoslav proletariat, that pointed out the necessity to "change the relation towards work."

This is completely in the spirit of Lenin's warnings from 1918:

> *"The Russian is a bad worker compared with people in advanced countries. (...) The task that the Soviet government must set the people in all its scope is - learn to work. The Taylor system, the last word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements in the field." (The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government)*

In the class war waged in Yugoslavia, the ruling class articulated its interests through this rhetoric with the help of its basic instrument, state repression, while the proletariat attempted to resist it through different rebellions – workers strikes, peasant uprisings, student demonstrations – which appeared more or less throughout the whole period that Yugoslavia existed.

According to the available data, the first strikes in Yugoslavia appeared in 1958, among the miners of Trbovlje and Zagorje ob Savi in Slovenia. In Trbovlje all of the 4000 miners and other employees were on strike. The cause of the strike was low wages, and before the start of the strike the workers tried negotiating the work conditions with the authorities for almost a year. The miners were also demanding better work protection. Then, about 1200 miners from Zagorje ob Savi also started striking in solidarity with the miners of Trbovlje. The fact that some of the demands were that free clothing and footwear should be provided to all workers annually, as well as that overtime and Sunday work should be paid additionally, speaks a lot on the position of workers as the "ruling class."

The workers of Trvoblje were known as organ-

9 Robert Kurz: *The German war economy and state socialism*, libcom.org

ized and socialistically inclined workers since the period before Second World War, who didn't shy from physical confrontations with their enemies.[10] In general, it was characteristic of these early strikes in Yugoslavia that the older workers saw strike as a tool of workers struggle more clearly and were the ones who were most ready to use it.

After the strike ended, the organs of the mine (formally the organs of workers self-management) and the organs of local authorities demanded that "adequate measures should be taken against the individuals that have a negative and suspicious past" and the existence of enemy activities during the strike was pointed out. The mine's workers council adopted unanimously amongst its conclusions the following remark about the "irresponsible elements" that were active during the strike:

> *"We need to brand these people as the hostile elements to our socialist community and the interests of the working people. Because of this, the Workers council will, in the future, condemn all of the unjustified incidents of this kind and demand the organs of the authorities to deal with individuals like that according to our laws."*

Besides this, especially active was the Alliance of Women's Societies of Zagorje (Savez ženskih društava Zagorja), which adopted a resolution condemning the insidious actions of a few rabble-rousers, and expressed regret that "even some women were duped by the instigators and that they behaved as if the miners are striking in the conditions of a capitalist regime." The organization then reminded the miners that the working class "today has the power in its hands" and through its organs it can always express difficulties and justifiable demands: "Who acts differently is spitting on the heritage of the people's liberation struggle, on the heritage of the working class and on our socialist development. Such a person is the enemy of the working people."

Next year, in 1959, there were 150 strikes, and in 1964, there were 271 workers strikes. From that year until 1969, there were 869 strikes with 77.596 workers participating. The strikes were spreading more and more. At first, they appeared in the most developed areas of Yugoslavia and, in the end, in the poorest. The first strike in Kosovo was in 1968, 10 years after the strike in Trbovlje. Strikes mostly lasted for a short time, the authorities attempted to end them as quickly as possible by granting some of the demands. The media in most cases didn't report on the strikes, and if they did, they would report about them only after they were already finished and that situation was back to "normal." The workers' unions and the organs of workers self-management were completely passive during the strikes, so the workers were sometimes in conflicts with them as well. The workers were hiding who was in the "striking committees," that is, who were the organizers of strikes. In most cases the damage caused by the strike had to be compensated through additional work of the workers. In 80% of the cases, it was the workers in production who were striking.

The number of strikes was on the continuous rise, so in 1980, there were 235 strikes with 13.504 participants, in 1983, 336 strikes with 21.776 participants, in 1986, 851 strikes with 88.860 participants, and in 1987, 1685 strikes with 288.686 participants.

In the eighties, ideas of connecting workers on the level of Yugoslavia appeared – that is, of overcoming the practice of organizing isolated strikes, and even ideas about starting workers' unions that would be separated from the state. One of the workers active in this field was Radomir Radović (1952-1984). He was a union activist, close to the dissident socialist circles in Belgrade, and was pointing out the need for union organizing separated from state structures. Radović was fired because of his activities against one manager, and was under constant police pressure. During 1984, he was arrested repeatedly, and then was found dead under suspicious circumstances. The official version of the authorities was that he committed suicide, but his friends thought that he was murdered. His friend Jelka Klajajić Imširović thought that Radović was a victim of a police and political crackdown of their dissident circle, "specifically because he was a worker, and with that, educated and politically active within the union."

While the question of workers' strikes was problematic for the ruling class of Yugoslavia above all because of the ideological and propaganda thesis about proletarians as the real ruling class, for the peasants there was already a prepared ideological matrix in place, the one about the "hostile kulak elements." This matrix was often applied to poor peasants as well, that were often partisans, and sometimes it reached ridiculous proportions, like when, in 1945, Aleksandar Ranković accused kulaks that they trying to compromise new authorities, among other things, by "committing suicides by jumping through windows."

Pressure was directed towards the peasantry particularly in the 1946-1953 period, which also includes the period directly after the break with the Soviet union. This pressure was, in the first place, reflected in the obligatory buyout of agricultural products as well as in the collectivization which was implemented and modeled on the one in the Soviet Union. Sometimes the obligatory amount of a specific agricultural product that the peasants had to sell to the state was greater than the average produced amount of that product in that year. This kind of pressure led to several attempts of organized peasant resistance.

On May 6th 1950, after preparations, an attempt of an armed insurrection of peasants started in the region of Cazinska Krajina in Bosnia, and in Kordun in Croatia, two areas that border each other. A big majority of rebels in the Bosnian part of the insurrection consisted of Bosniaks, but they chose as their commander an ethic Serb. This was a partisan fighter from '41, Milan Božić. At the same time the leader of the Kordun part of the insurrection was Mile Devrnja, also a partisan fighter from '41.

That year the peasants were struck by a catastrophic drought, so they were not able to fulfill the imposed, and already unrealistic, obligations towards the state. They were subjected to brutal pressure, which included police harassment, confiscation of property and mobilization for enforced labor (logging, construction and factory work). Starting an armed insurrection was therefore a move of the desperate that were unable to rebuild their homes, which were destroyed during the war, and feed their families.

After the insurrection broke out, the peasants burned down several archives of the local authorities (similar to the way the partisan insurrection started in '41), disarmed several cops (the police commander was later shot by the authorities, because he didn't put out an armed resistance to the rebels, despite being confronted by a force one hundred times stronger than his own), took down telegraphic pylons, confiscated several cooperative storage rooms and captured several political functionaries.

This poorly organized and ideologically confused insurrection of the desperate was quickly and easily suppressed by the state, when it sent several hundred soldiers against it. In the action of capturing of the rebels, about 15 of them were killed, and more than 700 were arrested. Eighteen were condemned to death, and six of them were shot (Milan Božić, Ale Čović, Hasimbeg Beganović, Stojan Starčević, Mile Devrnja, Nikola Beuković), while the rest had their sentences converted into long prison terms. Two hundred and seventy-five people were sentenced to long prison terms including life sentences, only a small number got sentences below 10 years. As a consequence of the hard labor in the Zenica mine, several of the convicts died and some of them committed suicide.

Following this, the families of the Bosniak rebels were forcefully displaced to Srbac.[11] That is how approximately 70 to 100 families were moved, who were forbidden to carry belongings with them, and were moved in cattle train cars: "Train cars were locked, there was not enough water even for the children, and all [bodily] needs were done in the train cars. The stench was everywhere. No one asked us if the children had anything to drink or eat." (testimony of Bejza Čalić). In Srbac, the elderly exiles were engaged in begging, and the children cared for the cattle of the richer locals.

According to Svetozar Vukmanović, another high ranking official Jovan Veselinov (is there even

10 The clash of the workers of Trbovlje with the members of fascist Orjuna in 1924, in which there were dead and wounded, is well known.

11 A town and municipality in Bosnia with an overwhelming Serbian majority.


Protest after the murder of Patris Lumumba, Belgrade, 1961

a need to mention: Peoples Hero and Hero of Socialist Labor), said the following about the conflicts with the peasants from this period: "Thousands of peasants were arrested and convicted. Some are also dead. People defend the little wheat they have with axes. There are some kulaks, but the majority is our people! In the people's liberation struggle they were on our side, now they've become the enemy. Not because they are kulaks, but because the buyout was set too high. Our activists that are pushing the buyout have separated themselves from the people. They are the same people who were the most popular during the war, and have now become the most hated."

The rebellions of students and the youth against the new authorities started very early on. Already in the end of the '40s there were sporadic arrests of young people, even pupils, because of political activities against the authorities. One such group was, for example, a group of schoolgirls from Belgrade (Nađa Poderegin, Leposava Milošević, Milana Ilić) who distributed flyers accusing the authorities of betraying the goals of communism, and that those authorities were beginning to get rich.

Two students of the Civil Engineering Faculty in Belgrade spoke in 1952, at a student gathering, against the new economic measures that were making the position of poor students even worse. The next year, those same students were in court, and the trial transformed into a student demonstration which included a physical confrontation with the police.

The first bigger student demonstrations happened on the 29th October 1954, in Studentski grad[12] in Belgrade. The reasons were connected to the low standard of living for students, especially in regards to accommodation and food. During the whole year the atmosphere in Studentski grad was charged, with frequent conflicts with the police. When the demonstration started, around a thousand students headed from Studentski grad towards the center in Belgrade. They were stopped by the police, which applied brutal force and arrested many students. The students shouted slogans against the government and threw stones at the cops.

For the same reasons, student demonstrations started in Zagreb and Skopje in 1959. In the demonstrations in Zagreb between 1000 and 3000 students were in the streets. When the protests started in Skopje, the local students connected them with the ones in Zagreb. The Zagreb demonstrations were quickly stopped, after the arrest of a smaller number of students. In the same year there was a student strike in Rijeka.

In the sixties, a few demonstrations were at first organized with the support of the authorities, but then transformed into confrontations with the police. In 1961, in Belgrade, demonstrations were held because of the murder of Patrice Lumumba, and then they became a clash with the cops, in which there was also an attack on the Belgian embassy. In 1966, in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo there were demonstrations "in the support of the people of Vietnam." In Belgrade, around 3000 people participated, and this protest too transformed into a clash with cops. The police used tear gas, water cannons and batons against the demonstrators, and a number of them were arrested.

The best known example of a student rebellion in this period, which was at the same time the most massive, organized and politically articulated, was the one from 1968. In Yugoslavia in that year student demonstrations were organized in Belgrade, Zagreb, Priština[13], and other cities. In Belgrade, again student riots started in Studentski grad, in the beginning because of the low student standard of living, and then they developed into demonstrations against the new class society and the "red bourgeoisie." Already on the first day of demonstrations, on the 2nd of June, a fierce conflict with the cops broke out in which firearms were used. The student rebellion lasted for seven days, during which students occupied the Faculty of Philosophy, and proclaimed the establishment of the "Red University Karl Marx," regularly held assemblies (which they called "convents," after the French Revolution), published their newspaper, and gained the sympathies of public personalities and society in general. This movement also contained a more radical wing, which negated the socialist character of the Yugoslav society and tried to develop a radical critique of it. With a skillful maneuver of Tito himself, this protest was "supported," along with isolating "counter-revolutionary elements," meaning the radical wing of the movement. Members of this circle continued to be submitted to state repression in the following years. One example of that was the trial of Jelka Kljajić, Pavluška Imširović and Milan Nikolić from 1972, after which they were sentenced to prison terms.

A characteristic representation of the radical content of the student demonstrations from 1968 in Belgrade is contained in the text "Down with the red bourgeoisie of Yugoslavia," by anonymous authors[14], which is a report on the events in Belgrade, published in the same year in the anarchist magazine Black&Red from Detroit:

> *"Call what you have created what you like, but don't call it socialism. We here are for real power in the hands of the working class, and if that is the meaning of self-management, then we are for self-management. But if self-management is nothing but a facade for the construction of the competitive profit mechanism of a bureaucratic managerial – why don't I say capitalist – class, then we are against it. No, you are not socialist and you are not creating socialism."*

12 Large student dormitory in Belgrade (Novi Beograd) consisting of several blocks. It accommodates more than 4.000 students.

13 Only in Priština was the army used against the demonstrators – which speaks about the position of Kosovo within Yugoslavia. The army was again used in 1981 against the demonstrators in Priština - this time the Army shot at them.

14 The authors signed themselves only as "Black&Red correspondents," the text is included in this issue of Antipolitika.


Protest after the murder of Patris Lumumba, Belgrade, 1961

6.

The priests promise to those who suffer, eternal bliss after death, but suffering today; socialists promise prosperity somewhere in the far future, and patience today. So, will we, as well, dumb down people with one more faith in the future society? If we know that faith is a need of only those who suffer, so that they wouldn't rebel, and to more easily bear their unbearable life of slavery. If there wasn't faith, which still today keeps people in slavery, they would rebel, free themselves of their false beliefs and the chains that burden them.

Newspaper *Anarhija*, Belgrade, 1911.

I have based my affair on nothing.

Max Stirner

In the Belgrade newspaper *Politika*, surrealist (and communist) Marko Ristić[15] published a text in 1971

15 Marko Ristić (1902-1984), one of the founders of the Belgrade surrealist group. Early on, he began correspondence with Andre Breton, and published surrealist translations (in the 1920s). The Belgrade group was formed in 1929 and, in the following years, some of the prominent members of the group joined the Communist Party. After


Rudolf Hercigonja, 1938.

where he explained his persuasion for Yugoslavia, or as he put it himself, *FOR THIS YUGOSLAVIA*: "If we were not living right in this moment, on this Planet, as it is today, in this world that is divided into blocs, this violent, militarized, racist, nationalist, neofacist world in which there is no survival for us, the peoples of Yugoslavia, outside Yugoslavia, outside yugoslavism – and no republican statehood can, nor will it, save us – I would perhaps, consistent with internationalism, declare myself a "citizen of the world," that is, of Utopia. But, as this is not the case, Yugoslavia seems to me to be our only hope, and that it will be this for a long time, simultaneously a minimal and maximal, unavoidable and unavoidably relative reality."

This was a smooth-spoken, abandonment of the Impossible[16]. The abandonment which is today sometimes romanticized and glorified as kind of an almost-cosmopolitan principle, even though it represents its negation.

More than 50 years earlier, another Yugoslav communist expressed a completely opposite feeling towards Yugoslavism. This was Rudolf Hercigonja[17], who only a few years before this statement considered himself to be a Yugoslav national-revolutionary, and committed to the cause of the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the creation of a Yugoslav state. When he was, with the creation of Yugoslavia, freed after a four year imprisonment, he realized that the warden of Lepoglava, the prison where he was held, stayed the same, that the system of state repression stayed the same, and it was now carried out only under the robe of the so-called free state of the south Slavs. In a pamphlet from 1919[18], Hercigonja concluded his indignation and rejection of a system such as that with the statement that those who were "tortured, murdered and abused for the sake of that Yugoslavia (…) are today again hunted animals, without any rights or protection (…) Which means that the whole Yugoslavia is one large Lepoglava (…) And all of our reaction is one horrific old cellar in which they suffocate, torture and murder innocent people (…) Oh, give us dynamite, lots of dynamite, to fill up all of the terrible hollow places of the old cellar, and to blow up whole of Lepoglava into nothing."

In this period, Hercigonja became one of the founders of the communist movement in Yugoslavia, and participated in the faction of this movement that was opposed to parliamentarianism, and was, for this reason and others, called an anarchist faction[19]. Because of his commitment to the militant methods of struggle, he had to emigrate, and in the end he settled in the Soviet Union. This man, who disowned Yugoslavism, in the beginning because of the real meaning that state repression of revolutionaries and poor people had to him, embodied in the prison system, ended his life in a Soviet dungeon, where he was murdered in 1938.[20]

***

Authors of the exhibition and publication "We raised cities for you – On the contradictions of Yugoslav socialism," took this title from the revolutionary song *Padaj silo i nepravdo* (*Fall, oh, force and injustice*), written in the 1920s and dedicated to the Hvar rebellion[21].

However, although they took a verse from this song for the title for their project, they failed to provide, at least, the whole stanza where that verse is contained:

WW2, Ristić was the Yugoslav ambassador in Paris.

16 *Nemoguće/ L'impossible* - the title of the Belgrade surrealist magazine published in 1930.

17 Rudolf Hercigonja (1896-1938) belonged to circle of the Yugoslav nationalist revolutionary youth of Zagreb in the period before WW1. He assassinated the Ban of Croatia in 1914, after which he was imprisoned. After the war he became one of the founders of KPJ and SKOJ (the communist youth organization). He belonged to the radical wing of the communist movement, and was one of the founders of the group *Crvena pravda* which in 1921 assassinated Milorad Drašković, the Minister of Interior of Yugoslavia.

18 Rudolf Hercigonja, *Lepoglavski vampiri*, Zagreb, 1919.

19 The circle that Hercigonja belonged to was in contact with the radical magazine *Die Aktion* from Germany. This group from Zagreb was for a time active outside of the party, under the name Communist Youth.

20 The torture of Yugoslav and other communists in the Soviet Union, by the Stalinist regime, included not only the physical destruction of people, but also moral – one in which they were forced to prove their loyalty by ratting out on their friends. Hercigonja asked for permission in 1936 to leave for Spain as a volunteer, which was not allowed to him.

21 The rebellion on the island of Hvar in the 16th century, which then grew into a civil war (1510-1514). The rebels were in conflict with the aristocracy and Venetian authorities.

We raised cities for you,
Built keeps and towers.
We have always been slaves,
and we labored for you.

Continuous reference to the supposed contradictions of the Yugoslav system directly continues the ideology of the Yugoslav "red bourgeoisie," who similarly pointed out the contradictions of the so-called "transitional period" and completely ignored the perspectives of the radical critics of that system who, in it, clearly saw a capitalist character.

This mystification had a clear goal: to justify the class war waged against the proletariat which was managed by the "red bourgeoisie." Therefore, it is logical that, today, those who rely on this ideology and this mystifying view of Yugoslavia, are those who want to be managers of our enslavement and misery, and who have the ambition to enclose us in the eternal limbo of the transition from capitalism to capitalism through capitalism, calling this, at the same time, the road towards our final liberation, which will of course never come. This is a perspective that always and again expects new sacrifices and toiling, and in return it promises sometimes little-better conditions of enslavement (depending on how much this is allowed by the market – the only true capitalist manager) and the glorification of our work and sacrifices.

Nationalist and capitalist states which became independent after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and about which the leftist complain – as well the "logic of capital" which dominates them – have all been established and, as states, defined in the context of the Yugoslav federation (with the category of "constitutive nations" included). Meanwhile, the logic of capital – that is, the logic of "socialist accumulation of capital" – was in the core of that system which contributed to the development of the contemporary capitalist society more than any previous regime in this region.

All the variations of the Yugoslav idea were in their character, above all else, statist – and further carried with them all of the power relations, tensions, expectations and conformisms that follow every hierarchical and authoritarian organization of the human sphere. Statist frameworks always

carry self-devastating and degrading relations between people, as well as brutal repression, which is a necessary condition of capitalist development. The examples of the repression led by the Yugoslav state in this text are only hinted at, and a framework is offered for the understanding that repression as a necessary condition for the development of modern productivist mass society, that is, for the "socialist accumulation of capital".

Yugoslavia is a spook whose purpose of existence is the justification and further continuation of a system based on our misery. All of the Yugoslav ideas, in all of their variants, be they of national-romantic or of "real-socialist" character, have that same, mystifying, reason for existence.

Against Yugonostalgia and Yugofuturism, against every Yugoslavia.

For life and anarchy.

Used and useful books (in addition to the all already mentioned texts):

Branislav Dimitrijević, *Potrošeni socijalizam* [*Consummated Socialism*], Fabrika knjiga, 2016.

Milinko Đorđević, *Sedam levih godina* [*Seven left years*], Naš Dom, 2000.

Jelka Imširović, *Od staljininizma do samoupravnog nacionalizma* [*From Stalinism to self-managed nationalism*], Centar za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 1991.

Neca Jovanov, *Radnički štrajkovi u SFRJ 1958-1969* [*Workers' strikes in SFRY 1958-1969*], ZAPIS, 1979.

Neca Jovanov, *Dijagnoza samoupravljanja 1974-1981* [*Diagnosis of self-management 1974-1981*], SNL, 1983.

Neca Jovanov, *Sukobi* [*Conflicts*], Univerzitetska riječ, 1989.

Vesna Kržišnik-Bukić, *Cazinska buna 1950* [*Cazin Rebellion 1950*], Svjetlost, 1991.

Miodrag Milić, *Rađanje Titove despotije* [*The birth of Tito's despotism*], Naša reč, 1985.

Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija: Struktura raspadanja* [*Yugoslavia: Structure of disintegration*], Rad, 1990.

Živojin Pavlović, *Ispljuvak pun krvi* [*Spittle Full of Blood*], Dereta, 1991.

Nebojša Popov, *Društveni sukobi – Izazov sociologiji* [*Social conflicts – Challenge to sociology*], Službeni glasnik, 2008.

Nebojša Popov, *Contra Fatum*, Mladost, 1988.

Antisemitism in SFRY

Laslo Sekelj

Jews make up a tiny segment of the former Yugoslavia's ethnic mosaic. According to the estimates, there are between 5,000 and 7,000 Jews in (former) Yugoslavia. These are the figures following three waves of communal emigration to Israel in the period 1948-51 (around 8,000 left, including individual migrants). Local communities, members of the Union of the Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia (until 1991), have altogether less than 5,000 members of which 15 per cent are closely related to Jews (mixed marriages) but were not born as Jews.[1]

From the time the Communists came to power until the final disintegration of the Yugoslav state (1945-89), three different stages of antisemitism can be distinguished: (1) 1945-67, a period characterized by its lack of any public display of antisemitism; (2) 1967-88, a period of antisemitism disguised as anti-Zionism; (3) 1988 to date, a period of 'republicanization' and the manipulation of Jews.

1945-67 the Yugoslav idyll

During the two first decades of its existence, the renewed Yugoslav state went through an idyllic phase of 'brotherhood and unity'. Nationalism and subsequently antisemitism were latent phenomena, but under authoritarian Communist rule all such tensions had to be eradicated. Yugoslavia's version of socialism was characterized by an official rejection of every form of ethnic intolerance. True, there were many cases when antisemitic prejudice and feeling were expressed on an individual basis and all were tried in court in keeping with the Law on the Prohibition of Incitement of Ethnic, Racial and Religious Hatred and Dissension. In all the cases, antisemitic feelings were expressed verbally and were based on personal intolerance. While researching the archives of Belgrade's Jewish Historical Museum, I came across twelve such cases recorded in the territory of Vojvodina and Slavonija.[2]

Within the framework of a UNESCO project, a special committee examined Yugoslav history textbooks for schools in 1954; it made no negative comments at all.[3] Combing archives and other sources in search of antisemitism in the public domain, I came across the following cases: a theatrical performance of a troupe in Sombor (1946); the Czech film *Nikolay Shuhay;* and a newspaper article published in *Ljubljanski dnevnik* on 24 September 1951.[4] All the cases I

1 Marko Perić, 'Demografska *istraživanje', Jevrejski pregled,* nos. 11-12, 1972; nos. 1-2, 1973; nos. 3-4,1973; *Demographic Survey of the Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia 1986,* unpub lished manuscript (Belgrade 1986).

2 Jewish Historical Museum, Belgrade, founds 54, 58, 103,110,126, *HO; Jevrejski bilten,* vol. 4, nos. 1-2, 1953 and no. 5,1953; vol. 6, nos. 1-2, 1955; vol. 7, nos. 9-10, 1956; vol. 9, no. 3, 1958; *Jevrejskipregled,* vol. 11, nos. 10-11, 1960.

3 *Jevrejski bitten,* vol. 5, no. 5, 1954.

4 Jewish Historical Museum, Belgrade, founds 103,110; Albert Vajs, *Jevrejski bilten*, vol. 2, nos. 9-10,1951; vol. 5, no. 5,1954.

Husein Đozo, 1943.

came across were relatively insignificant given the facts that the Union of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia was free to operate in this period, that the state enabled three large groups of Jews to emigrate to Israel, that it allowed individual emigration later on, and that the Union, un like Jewish organizations in other Communist countries, took part freely in all activities of international Jewish organizations, except the World Zionist Congress.

1967-88: 'Non-aligned' anti-Zionism

Together with the member states of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967. Moreover, it became the leading advocate of anti-Zionism in the non-aligned movement and was practically the loudest critic of Israel outside the Arab-Muslim world. Antisemitism appeared on the political scene under the guise of anti-Zionism, but it was of limited importance. Despite the fact that anti-Israelism practically gained the status of a state ideology at the time when this policy was at its peak, efforts were regularly made to issue warnings about antisemitism.

Unlike the countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Jewish community in Yugoslavia was not required to follow state policy. Local Jewish communities and the Union maintained relations with Israel and Jewish organizations. Occasionally, however, there were problems with local authorities regarding group visits to Israel. In addition, some individuals did come across problems due to their pro-Israel or 'pro-Zionist' stands. On the other hand, antisemitic articles in the press under the guise of criticism of Israel and 'anti-Zionsim' did not reflect the official viewpoint—as it was verbally stressed by political representatives. In this period, however, no criminal charges against persons or institutions in relation to antisemitism were ever brought to the courts.

There were three types of antisemitic activities in this period: first, Muslim-Arab propaganda; second, Freemason-Jewish conspiracy charges inspired by *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion;* and third, traditional Christian anti-Judaism.

A. *Muslim-Arab antisemitic propaganda.*

During this period, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was the focal point of interest in all public manifestations of antisemitism in Yugoslavia. Muslim-Arab propaganda relating to the Six-Day War and the Palestinian question paved the way for the reprinting and dissemination of this bible of antisemitism. The Muslim antisemite, Hadži Husein Đozo, wrote, in the Muslim magazine *Hrvat* (The Croat), published in 1943 in the Ustasha state: 'Throughout history, Jews were the greatest threat to the human race.[56] A quarter of a century later, this 'expert on the Jewish question' spoke in the name of Yugoslav Muslims at the world conference of Ulemas in Cairo, proclaiming the *Jihad*—'holy war against members of the Jewish tribe wherever they may be'. As editor-in-chief of the Muslim magazine, *Preporod* (Renasence), he made his contribution

5 'A Muslim "anti-Zionist" in Yugoslavia', *Patterns of Prejudice* (London), vol. 6, no. 2, 1972, 20-21

6 Husein Đozo (1912-1982), Islamic theologian and member of the SS Division Handschar. After a five year prison term, after WW2, he continued theological work and became a figure in the official organization of Yugoslav Muslims. Friend of a pro-Nazi Mufti of Jerusalem Al-Husseini, with whom he cooperated also after the war. In 1970. He started the magazine *Preporod*. Used by the state in the period of the development of the non-aligned movement, because of his knowledge of Arabic language and connections in the Middle East. (Antipolitika)

to the *Jihad* by publishing Lutvo Kurić's article 'Jewish Justice'. This text was identical to Đozo's earlier writings of 1943: 'It is difficult to list all the atrocities of the Jewish people ... All the reactionaries and the powers of evil in the world have arisen to assist and defend the Jews.[7]

Husein Đozo with ef. of Jerusalem

After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, thousands of Palestinian students came to study in Yugoslavia. Their associations published various propaganda pamphlets, including a translation of the Arab version of *The Protocols.* One particular pamphlet, published in Zagreb, found its way into Novi Sad student's magazine, *Index,* under the title 'Just Struggle of the Palestinian People'.[8] At the same time, in the Yugoslav version of *Reader's Digest,* the review *Izbor,* an article from the arsenal of Soviet antisemitism was published: S. Milin's 'They Were Brought Up on Zionism'.[9] Apart from these clearly antisemitic articles published within the framework of the anti-Israel campaign and following instructions received by journalists, a series of anti-Israeli texts—spiced with elements of antisemitism either on purpose or out of ignorance—were carried by the most influential daily and weekly newspapers, as well as radio and television.[10]

Anti-Israelism controlled from above and disseminated by the press had all the characteristic features of Communist authoritarianism but, unlike in Eastern Europe, efforts were made from the same side to avoid triggering anti-Jewish feelings. The fact that there were relatively few antisemitic texts and that there was nothing which would indicate coordinated action in their production indicated the main difference with anti-Israeli campaigns elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It is also important to stress that many of them, unlike in other countries, provoked critical public reaction.[11] The entire Yugoslav press, including the official gazette of the Communist Party, *Komunist,* and professional associations, unanimously condemned the antisemitic campaign in Poland in 1968. Nevertheless, none of the criminal charges brought by the Jewish Union against those inciting ethnic hatred yielded results, not even those brought against one of the products of the widely condemned Polish antisemitic campaign: Janus Pialkevitch's book, *The Long Hand of Israel* (Zagreb: Alfa, 1978), i.e. against the author of the preface ('All Jews Are Agents of Mossad'), R. Vukad-

7 Lutvo Kurić, 'Jevrejska pravda', *Preporod,* 15 February 1972.

8 'Udruženje arapskih studenata', *Index,* no. 218,24 March 1971.

9 S. Milin 'Uzgojio ih je cionizam', *Izbor,* no. 11,1970,27-32.

10 This primarily applies to the period immediately following the Middle East wars and to the leading newspapers and television stations in all the six republics of former Yugoslavia. The authors of these texts were journalists who specialized in foreign relations and, in one case, even a diplomat (Faik Dizdarević in Sarajevo's *Odjek* of 1 January 1969). Fifteen or twenty years later, and this is part of the very nature of the Communist regime, some of these authors (like, recently, the editor-in-chief of Belgrade's *Polittka,* Aleksandar Prlja) appeared in the very same newspapers as authors of pro-Israeli texts.

11 On 26 February 1969, the official gazette of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, *Borba,* reacted to the declaration of the *Jihad* made in the name of Yugoslav Muslims. *Preporod's* editorial board issued a 'correction' and an apology for Kurić's anti semitic article (1 March 1971). In its following issue, *Index* published three stinging reviews of the article, 'Association of Arab Students'. Faik Dizdarević's text triggered a number of reactions in the magazine *Odjek.* The weekly *NIN* (V. Miletic's article, 'Five Stories about Hate') and *Student* ('Antisemitism in the Yugoslav Press') in 1971 reacted to the above-mentioned texts as well as to the promotion of *The Protocols.* A. Novak criticized Soviet antisemitism in Ljubljana's daily *Delo* ('Message to Soviet Jews', 12 December 1970).

inović. On the other hand, no one reacted when—during the authorities' organized anti-Israeli rally after the massacre in Palestinian camps in Beirut—an effigy bearing the sign 'Jude' was burned and displayed with the slogan 'Sons of Judas, we shall revenge Beirut.[12] It is worth noting that a group of Belgrade intellectuals, who at the same rally expressed their support for Poland's Solidarnosc, was arrested immediately and sentenced to imprisonment through a summary procedure

B. *Revival of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

In early 1971, for the first time after almost forty years, the bible of antisemitism, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* appeared on the Yugoslav public scene. Aleksandar Lončar's article, 'Regarding New Attempts to Publish the Complete Works of Lui Fernando Delush-Celine', published by Titograd's literary magazine, *Ovdje,* claimed 'the power of Jews' to be the main reason for the 'unfortunate' fate of two great antisemitic authors: Celine and Ezra Pound. The author spoke of the 'high documentary value of the facts presented in *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion'.* The writer Danilo Kiš reacted very critically to this article.[13] Lončar was not the only one to promote *The Protocols:* he was followed by Dragoš Kalajić[14] in Belgrade's literary magazine, *Delo,* proclaiming them the authentic documentary source for evaluating the Jewish religion.[15] (Even today, Kalajić writes on the 'Jewish-Freemason conspiracy' in various reviews and magazine articles.) The author and painter, Miro Glavurtić[16] also belongs to this circle. In 1978 he used private funds to publish his book, *Satan,* in which he paraphrased *The Protocols;* it was criticized in the principal Serbian daily, *Politika,* by M. Stanisavac (8 February 1979). The Jewish Union pressed criminal charges but in vain. The same happened four years later when Glavurtić launched another private publication, *Hounds,* in which he wrote about the Jews in the same manner. This time it was attacked by I. Mandić in *NIN* (8 August 1982), while the Union pressed charges once again with no result. At the same time, the journalist N. Višnjić claimed in a television news broadcast that *The Protocols* were the work of a council of five rabbis seated in New York. Later, the television station (Beograd) apologized for this incident. Finally, in December 1983 and January 1984, Belgrade's *Ilustrovana Politika* published, over a period of six weeks, feuilleton about Freemasons. The text incorporated parts of *The Protocols* which were, naturally, claimed to be the 'truth about Jews'. After much haggling, arguing and political intervention, the further publication of M. Popovski's feuilleton 'The Mysterious World of Masons', was halted by the editorial board of *Ilustrovana Politika.* But, in 1984, a book published by Nova knjiga under the same tide appeared in Belgrade. It was banned after one year but appeared eventually in Macedonia—and was prohibited again. In the late 1980s, the original version appeared again in Belgrade bookshop windows, and was banned for the third time.

12 Two months later, unknown persons removed the tablet at the entrance to the Split Jewish Town Hall (18 September 1982), and unknown persons daubed a slogan at the entrance to the Zagreb Jewish Town Hail, 'Down with the Jews' (22 October 1982); see *Jevrejski pregled,* vol. 34, nos. 1-2,1982.

13 Danilo Kiš, 'Otvoreno pismo glavnom i odgovornom uredniku', *Ovdje,* no. 23, April 1971.

14 Dragoš Kalajić (1943-2005), painter, ideologue of the intellectual neofascist circle New Serbian Right. Already during the end of the sixties he started publishing texts written under the influence of Julius Evole, who he knew personally. (Antipolitika)

15 Dragos Kalajic, 'Individua i licnost', *Delo,* no. 6,1971, 677.

16 Miro Glavurtić (1932-), member of the Belgrade art group Mediala, founded in 1953, whose members were close to reactionary and mystical trends. (Antipolitika)


Dragoš Kalajić

C. *Traditional anti-Judaism, stereotypes and prejudices.*

The Serbian Orthodox Church has not stopped accusing the Jews of deicide to this very day. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the magazine *Pravoslavni misionar* published a series of articles of this type.[17] In newspapers at that time, the usual stereotypes and prejudices about Jews could occasionally be found, but they were published without deeper political connotations.[18]

The 'republicanization' of antisernitism and the manipulation of Jews

The final disintegration of Yugoslavia started in the second half of the *1980s.* Political activity was reduced to the pursuit of aggressive and chauvinist national interests, while federal units, i.e. the republics, began acting as individual states. As a sovereign state and united political community, Yugoslavia ceased to exist well before its formal disintegration in June 1991. At the height of nationalist skirmishing, even Jews were manipulated politically for the benefit of the different Yugoslav nationalist elites. As Yugoslavia experienced bloody disintegration, antisemitism appeared once again. But an entirely new phenomenon appeared: the (mis)use of Jews for the nationalist purposes of the communities of the former Yugoslavia.

Slovenia.

The first manifestation of the misuse of Jews for nationalist agendas emerged in Slovenia. The rally held in Cankarjev Dom (February 1989), which served to strengthen Slovene national identity, took place under the Star of David. This Jewish national symbol served to promote the nationalist coalition and was misused in an anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian campaign which claimed that the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, together with Slovenes, were suffering the fate of the Jews in Yugoslavia. The Jewish Union, unsuccessfully, pressed charges against the organizers for the abuse of the Star of David and lodged a public protest as well. The criminal

17 Nikola Antić, Po kome je zakonu Hristos osuden na smrt', and 'Kaine, gde ti je brat Avelj?", *Pravoslavni misionar,* no. 2,1971 and no. 6,1971; see also articles in no. 2,1976, no. 2,1979 and no. 1, 1980.

18 For example, *Vjesnik,* 19 January 1971 (article announcing the film, *The Pawnbroker,* ap pearing on television; *Politika,* 28 October 1973 (B. Dikić, 'Stammering Moses'), Sarajevo's *Svijet,* November 1984 (Zlatko Dizdarevic, 'Operation Moses'); and in various letters to the editor published by *Telex* (Maribor) and the Slovenian Catholic review, *2,000,* published in the 1980s.


ŽIDOVI MORAJU NOSITI ŽIDOVSKI ZNAK

OBAVIJEST ISPOSTAVE USTAŠKOG POVJERENIŠTVA — ŽIDOVSKI ODSJEK

Pozivaju se svi Židovi, koji su obuhvaćeni židovskim zakonom br. XLV. — 68 Z. p. od 30. travnja 1941. god. muškog i ženskog spola bez razlike godina starosti i bilo koje vjeroispovijesti, da odmah nakon primitka židovskog znaka, prikopčaju taj znak na lijevu stranu prsiju i lijevu lopaticu.

Svaki arijevac dužan je svakog Židova ili Židovku, koji se ovom pozivu ne odazove prijaviti ispostavi Ustaškog red. povjereništva, židovski odsjek, Bogovićeva ul. br. 7, I. kat.

Židovski znakovi primaju se u Bogovićevoj ul. br. 7 od 8 sati u jutro ovim abecednim redom:

U petak 23. svibnja 1941. g. od A do D.
u subotu 24. svibnja 1941. g. od E do H.
u ponedjeljak 26. svibnja 1941. g. od I do N.
u utorak 27. svibnja 1941. g. od O do S.
u srijedu 28. svibnja 1941. g. od Š do Ž.

Tko se ne odazove pozivu i ne prikopča znak na određenom mjestu, bit će najstrože kažnjen.

U ZAGREBU, dne 22. svibnja 1941.

Povjerenik:
BOŽIDAR CEROVSKI v. r.

charges were dismissed. The formal organizer of the gathering was a youth organization which later on evolved into the Liberal Democratic Party. Commenting on the Union's protest, a magazine close to the youth organization asked: 'Why have the Jews pressed criminal charges? Because they want money, of course.[19] Eventually, another youth magazine announced that in Slovenia the closed season on antisemitism was over. After all, antisemitism used to be a component part of Slovenian nationalism. Ljubljana University's magazine, *Tribuna,* published *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* from August 1988 *to* March 1989, and it was impossible to secure the suspension of its publication. This was the first straightforward publication of *The Protocols* in Yugoslavia since 1945. Nobody protested and it in no way tarnished the democratic image of the leading secessionist republic of the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia.

Before the Second World War and during the existence of the Fascist Independent State of Croatia, this former Yugoslav republic was clearly the most antisemitic region in Yugoslavia. However, since 1945 and up until the election campaign in 1990, Croatia had been, in this respect, a quiet region. It is no coincidence that the re-emergence of Croatian separatist nationalism occurred alongside the beginning of inter-ethnic tensions with Serbs and the emergence of antisemitism. Antisemitism and anti-Serbism are (and used to be) constituent elements of Croatian anti-Yugoslavism and secessionism.

On the eve of the election campaign, Matica Hrvatska published Franjo Tudjman's book, *The Wasteland of Historical Reality.* In this book, the future father of Croatian statehood portrayed Jews in the Jasenovac concentration camp as assistants of the Ustasha, who were in charge of 'selecting prisoners for execution and [who] sometimes even carried out those executions themselves'. In another chapter, he wrote that 'there is a small historic step from Nazi-Fascism to Judeo-Nazism[20], having in mind the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the election campaign, the three leading figures of the winning Croatian Democratic Party—Franjo Tudjman ('My wife is, fortunately, neither Serbian nor Jewish'), Vladimir Šeks ('Evil Jews') and Šime Djodan ('Serbs and Jews are conducting a campaign against Croatia abroad')—made antisemitic statements and even then the main object of their attacks was the Serbs." The interview given by Ivo Omračin during the election campaign was also explicitly antisemitic. (During the war-time Ustasha state, Omračin was charge d'affaires in Berlin.) Among other things, he accused Jews of crimes committed by the Ustasha. He denied the very existence of Jasenovac, the only death camp that was not run by Germans, and claimed that the mass executions in this concentration camp (hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Gypsies and Jews) were perpetrated by Jews. In this interview they were also accused of spreading Bolshevik propaganda and poisoning everything around them.[21] Criminal charges were pressed against Omračin by the Jewish community in Zagreb and by the Jewish Union, but without success. At the same time, the Jewish cemetery in Split was once again desecrated by vandals.

After the election victory, Franjo Tudjman made a series of statements to Jewish leaders from abroad that antisemitism would not be tolerated in Croatia.[22] However, at the same time, Ustasha propaganda literature against Serbs and Jews was being distributed in Zagreb's central square. In August 1991, the most serious incident in Yugoslavia since the Second World War took place: the Jewish community building and the Jewish cemetery in Zagreb were blown up. This act was publicly condemned by all but, even today, the culprits are still unknown. When civil war broke out after the secession of Croatia, unlike in Serbia, the crisis headquarters of the Jewish communities of Croatia became part of the Croatian propaganda machine.

Macedonia

In Skopje in the end of the '80s a Macedonian language version of book *Secretive world of the free-masons* by Mihalo Popovski appeared. The book was previously, in 1985, banned in Belgrade. The official Jewish community reacted



and the decision was made in Skopje to ban it.

Serbia.

In 1989, a photocopy of the 1934 Serbo-Croat edition of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* appeared in bookstores without any indication of the publisher. At the Jewish Union's request, all copies found were confiscated, but no serious investigation into the publisher's identity was ever undertaken.[23]

In 1991 the Serbian Orthodox Church organized the transfer of Bishop Velimirović's remains from abroad, paying him the respect worthy of a saint. Velimirović, a prominent theologian and anti-Communist, was a notorious antisemite as well. This is obvious from his *Collected Works* published in 1991, but especially from his book written in Dachau where he was interned during the war.[24] The only reaction which acknowledged his antisemitism came in the opposition magazine *Vreme* (29 July 1991). The same issue included a letter to the editor from a reader who protested an antisemitic inci-

19 *Jevrejski pregled,* vol. 40, nos. 1-4,1989 and nos. 9-12,1989.

20 Franjo Tudjman, *Respuca povijesne zbiljnosti* (Zagreb 1989), 160, 316-20

21 'Antisemitism in Central and Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia', *IJA Research Report,* nos. 4-6, 1991; *Slobodni tjednik,* no. 3, 14 March 1990.

22 *Borba,* no. 1,2 February 1992.

23 *Jevrejski pregled,* vol. 40, nos. 5-8,1989.

24 *Reč srpskom narodu—Kroz tamnički prozor* (Himelstir 1985 and Valjevo 1991).



dent in the Serbian Parliament.

On one February morning in 1992, graffiti ('Death to the Jews') appeared in Belgrade's Jewish cemetery. The incident was hushed up. Articles written by D. Kalajić, who already had the reputation of being a Fascist and antisemite, are regularly published by the yellow press. However, the official organ of the Serbian Orthodox Church, *Pravoslavlje,* which is certainly not a magazine of that type, published an article in its February 1992 issue under the title 'Jews Are Crucifying Christ Again'. The editor-in-chief, after the discreet intervention of the Jewish community, was publicly dismissed.

Several days later, the Tanjug news agency released a text written by its Moscow correspondent, Šaranović, saying that 'the Jewish lobby in the Russian Foreign Ministry has helped Croatia and Slovenia get their diplomatic recognition from Russia'. Tanjug did not retract this report. Recently, the Serbian nationalist press and state-controlled television have been sympathetic towards the 'patriotic coalition' in Russia because of its opposition to UN sanctions imposed against Serbia and Montenegro. The antisemitism of the groups is being hushed up. There was also no reaction to the public rehabilitation of the leader of Serbian Fascism, Ljotić, the Chetnik leader, Draža Mihailović (who killed Jews as Communists) and of the Serbian quisling, General Nedić, who ordered and organized the deportation of Serbian Jewry to German-run camps in 1941-42.

The founding of the Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society in 1987 was an example of the political manipulation of Jews. This society was established by a group of Serbian nationalist intellectuals and it has become part of the propaganda machine in the internal wars in Yugoslavia—the consequences of which Jews in Serbia have yet to experience. It is important to note that the society, which has very few Jewish members, believed that reference to classic antisemitic slogans (such as 'Jews control the press', 'Jews control the world's business', 'the Jewish lobby rules America') or to stereotypes (such as 'Jews look after each other')—as examples of positive behaviour—was a contribution to the promotion of friendship with the Jewish people.[25]

Antisemitism is the litmus test of nationalist chauvinism. Independently of the political will of the protagonists, antisemitism appears even when it is not wanted, as is the case in Croatia. In the former Yugoslavia, antisemitism was not of major importance, unlike in Poland, the former Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Since the former Yugoslavia is plagued by the highest degree of irrational nationalism and chauvinist hatred, there is a latent danger of antisemitism. Southern Slavs have each other to hate, they do not need Jews as an object for their hatred. However, all chauvinists and Fascists have an additional need for hatred; and, as we know, throughout history, this need has been satisfied by Jews.

Laslo Sekelj (1949-2001), sociologist, published the following books: *On anarchism*, 1982; *Communism and the State*, 1989; *Revolution is not a party affair: communist critiques of bolshevism*, 1987; *Yugoslavia: the process of disintegreation*, 1990; *The time of dishoner: essays on the rule of nationalism*, 1995.

25 An election held in the Jewish community of Belgrade in May 1992 resulted in a complete collapse of the list supported by the Serbian-Jewish Society; nobody from that list was elected.

Mladen Stilinović, an anarchist

on language → on pain → I like dirty → on the colour red → mladen stilinović anarchist

On language

"*I want to have this language of politics and how it influences me.. and then, I am not innocent anymore because I use this ... and today also, we are not innocent. We cannot be. When you talk you are not innocent*."

The art of Mladen Stilinović is not a critique of the Jugoslav society. It is rather a critique of representation which is at the same time political and epistemological. By being a critique of representation, it also encompasses a critique of language. However, it does not fall into dualisms of dividing between the signifier and signified, of dividing between words and a reality that they fail to represent adequately – a signified, an authentic reality over which power has been exerted through language which would then be affirmed and give back her power. It recognises that language itself is domination, but that authority must rely on speakers, listeners, institutions, communities, individuals in order to embody its language and ensure a respons (illustrations 1, 2, 3, 4).[1]

Mladen's work does not escape into a hermetic silence. By being part of a community, we all use and respond to orders (tell me how are you / you think you will not, you must / courage, patience, prayer! /sing!). As soon as we speak, we are not innocent. Through all speech, we produce generalisations and abstractions that dominate others and ourselves. Besides that, all the complexities of our relations and feelings we formulate with the logics of grammar[2] – linearly, successively. We put some order into the space, leaving a lot in the air. But how then to convey ourselves to those with whom we share our life?

On pain

However you take it, there is pain (illustration 5). If we manage to escape hunger, we have the slavery of wage labour. Sometimes it is hunger, sometimes it is labour. And we always have something to sacri-

1 *"...when I say power I do not mean the power of the state and the institutions but rather on hundreds of different powers that intertwine and come from different sides. They come from the state and the individual from the East and the West from "friends" and the administration. These powers are everywhere: in the newspapers, in the language, in the art, in the "given freedom", in the truth and in my fear. I always wanted to write how power is subtle. And I did. Power is cynical, sometimes subtle (is this possible) but more or less harsh and open. A characteristics of power is that it ignores the other. This cynicism of power comes from an ignorance about things, even from a will for ignorance."*

2 "*I fight for the destruction of the system, of grammar*."



image 6. Auction of the Red,, 1976.
I held the auction of the painting „Auction of red" in the galery SKC in Belgrade 18.IV.1976. The starting price was 5 new dinars. The Painting was sold to B.T. for 100 new dinars. Mladen Stilinović


image 7. My red, 1976.
(my red refers to Mladen's blood. The photograph shows him cutting himself)

image 5. Game PAIN, 1977. For one player, a die is rolled when one wants to, the game lasts seven minutes.



image 1. It Must Be Done, 1980.



image 2. We Have to be Awake, 1980.

image 3. Ritualistic Authoritarian Language ho-ruk,1981.



image 8. Reselling the Red, 1975.



image 4. Sing!, 1980.

fice for – for the people, for progress, for socialism. If we are not enslaved by god or by other people, we are enslaved by language. Without god, pain becomes part of the "human nature". Without "human nature", pain become inherent to society. Pain is the only certainty, permanent, the only constant from the past to the present.

Pain is a constant subject in Mladen's work from the seventies. For years he used to add the word pain to his signature. People with an experience of life in Yugoslavia say that his exhibitions provoke anxiety, pain and pessimism.

I like dirty

"…in that time the conceptuals refused to give any emotion. They want to be strict and tautological whatever. And emotion is excluded from art. You know you have this minimalism that is very clean and then very aseptic. No emotion. And here is everything dirty. … I like it dirty you know. … I know that I cannot do this very expensive minimalism, but I don't care, I don't like monuments"

In order to be able to communicate, art must get dirty with "reality", with the everyday, and ditch its aestheticism. Regardless of all the obstacles posed by the everyday and all the limitation posed by language, Mladen longs for communication. Art often creates statements, gives her own analyses and presents strict ideas. Makes monuments. Mladen's art


slika 9. Eksploatacija mrtvih, detalj,1984. - ...


image 10. Exploatation of the Dead, detail,1984. - ...


image 11. Exploatation of the Dead, detail,1984. - ...

image 12. Work is a Disease (Karl Marx), 1981.

image 17. Bread – Tito, 1996.

is rolled in the mud of everyday speech, of the street and ideology. And it does not run away from it.

On the colour red

When referring to the praxes of contemporary western conceptual artists, he said that in Yugoslavia there is no possibility for tautology with the colour red. He wanted to desymbolize the colour red, but he never succeeded (illustrations 6, 7, 8). Even today, red is not desymbolized. In the nineties when my family fantasized about getting a new car and what colour it should be, my dad said “anything but red!”

Mladen Stilinović anarchist

He gave up school during gymnasium. He did not attend college nor worked. He got by on his own and thanks to the help of friends and family, he travelled Europe by hitchhike. He says he is an anarchist. He thinks we should celebrate lazy birthdays because when we are lazy there is more time, so years are subtracted and not added. He uses the methods of theft, sabotage, montage, appropriation (illustrations 9, 10, 11, 12) and experimental video. He organises exhibitions on the streets and in the

image 16. Cakes, 1981.

image 13. On labour, 1980. – 1984.

image 15. What Squeezed me Between my Legs, 1981.

image 18. Artist at Work, 1978.



image 14. An Attack on my Art is an Attack on Socialism and Progress, 1977.

image 19. Group of six authors, exhibition-action, A Walk Through the City, Zagreb, 1976.

hallways of buildings, he talks to the passers-by. He rarely makes new pieces for galleries but rather exhibits old stuff. He makes fun of the state, the flag, money and labour (illustrations 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). He and the Group of six authors (illustration 19) with whom he works are considered terrorists by art critics[3]. They are criticised and do not get benefits like studios and public commissions, but are not persecuted. Mladen is a melancholic humourist. He throws a cake in the face of a painting (illustration 20).





image 20. A Cake in the Face of the Painting. ???? „What are paintings doing at an exhibition? Where are the cakes?"

Sources of quotes and pictures:

MLADEN STILINOVIĆ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-G9Pa2XNv8
Mladen Stilinović – Lazy Birthdays - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftyMMPgdi0s&t=9s
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Meri Leanemets: Soba Novca, u: *Mladen Stilinović - Nula iz vladanja = Zero for conduct*, Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, Zagreb, [30.11.2012. - 2.2.2013.] / uredila Branka Stipančić

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Raoul Vaneigem, *The Revolution of Everyday Life*, Rebel Press, London, 2001.
Mišel Fuko, *Riječi i stvari*, Nolit, Beograd, 1971.

3 For instance in the text *'Between Terrorism and Destruction'* by Zrinka Novak published in Oko on the occasion of the 10th Paris biennale of young artists where Mladen exhibited white paintings *Hand – bread* and five books: *I want to go home*, *Time*, *Now*, *Dissorder* and *Written in blood*.

Branko Ćopić

A *Heretical Tale*

(1950)



This satire written by a famous Yugoslav writer Branko Ćopić (1915-1984), who was a partisan and a Communist, took for its target the formation of a new ruling class in Yugoslavia, which would later be called "red bourgeoisie ". Published in 1950, it caused a scandal, as well as a very harsh verbal condemnation of Ćopić, that came directly from Tito. After this, Ćopić was under pressure from Yugoslav police and political structures until the end of his life – in the end he committed suicide for this reason.

A villa of considerable size, surrounded from all sides by a wall and open only to the sea, lies along crumbling and steep rocky outcropping. I can barely see it among the pine and cypress trees. It was built during the time of the old, the rotten, the elitist...etc. Yugoslavia.

In front of the villa is a small terrace in the shade of ivy, bordered by a brass fence. Below it, some ten steps lower, is a miniature beach, a swimming pool, and a shallow dock.

To the right of the villa, around a hundred meters away, begins the arc of a large sandy beach. There behind it, through thick greenery, roofs, and walls of numerous resorts are peeking through and glimmering.

On the shady terrace of the villa, a small gathering is silent and bored: minister Štef Jovanović, his sister-in-law, the minister's assistant with his wife, general Stevo Navala, some big shot from a big institution, another unspecified hot shot whose line of business no one can quite guess (and who is wisely and solemnly silent the whole time), a few old women and men and, finally, a supervisor of the personnel department, who is sternly and suspiciously observing the cypresses, the sea, the boats, and a small cloud overshadowing the villa.

The minister's sister-in-law (a student who goes to university by car) and the assistant's wife have just returned from town. They took a dignified walk, honoring the old town and the sun above it and, with their hair blowing in the breeze they raced back in their car, scattering the trudging pedestrians (their little noses up in the air, naturally). Now they are both sitting in the corner, not far away from the minister, and going through their morning adventures.

"And who was that ugly fat guy who said hello to you by the fountain?" inquires the sister-in-law, an old candidate for marriage, by the way.

"What fatso?" the assistant's wife raises her eyebrows. "Why, that's a certain colonel and he's still a bachelor."

"Ah, fine fellow, very nice." The sister-in-law stretches her mouth and asks further: "And that handsome young man? Remember? He waved to you from the fortress?"

"That guy?" mumbles the assistant's wife sourly. "Some student-- my brother's friend."

"Bah, what a rude guy," frowns the sister-in-law. "He has such an insolent expression and he is so...Some people are so boorish. They give themselves too much freedom."

"Way too much," agrees the assistant's wife.

Not far away, the large beach is humming, splashing, and screaming. General Navala silently walks down the stairs, carelessly swims behind the wall, then casts a careful glance at the villa and splashes quickly towards the large beach. There he is recognized before he's even out of the water and he's showered by cheerful shouts:

"Ah, here he is, here he is!"

"Man, where were you? Over here!"



Already after a minute, this distinguished and ill-tempered general from the terrace turns into a gleeful and talkative fellow. He laughs from the heart, squints in the sun, and asks a swarthy boy, his former courier:

"Listen, Milojica, would there be a place available at your resort? I don't feel like sitting there across the wall."

"In fact, there will be. Some people from our company are leaving tomorrow."

It's still silent on the terrace. Every conversation quickly dies away and glorious boredom rules again.

"Have you dropped by the big bistro?" the assistant asks his wife.



"Ah, the hell we did. It was so crammed by common folk that we couldn't find a free spot."

"Ah, and such a lovely terrace they have there, it looks right over the sea," sighs the sister in law.

"They should only let people in if they have a special pass, like in that place of ours, remember? It wouldn't be so crowded then, not just anyone could go there."

"What can you do!" shrugs the assistant.

Comrade minister is deep in thought. On one hand, his heart is pulling him there, to the large beach, amongst the people, and on the other, he fears he would lose some of his own importance if he mixed with the masses.

Isolated like this, he seems to himself so much more significant and wise, like he's one of the select few, but still there's emptiness in his soul as if he is somehow misplaced.

Swiftly and gently, slightly swinging in the hips, a director of a big hotel approaches the minister. He's been in the villa for a few days now, half as a guest and half as the main supplier and adviser. He's acquainted with almost all of the ministers, generals and other "big men", as he refers to them.

"Comrade minister, there's a splendid billiard lounge at one of the resorts, and you, as far as I know, love..." he starts with a quiet and discreet whisper.

"I suppose the comrades from that resort love it too" says the minister without thinking and, as if he was trying to unburden his own conscience, he says decisively: "No, no need."

"No need!" like an echo, indulgently, the director repeats and then, trying to push the right buttons with the minister, again leans to his ear and tells him sweetly:

"But the way you swim!" the director puts three fingers in a cluster and kisses them.

"Aha, did you see?" the minister lights up and comes to life. "And it hasn't even been a week since I learned how to do it."

"You've lost a lot of weight, too, your stomach is almost completely flat" continues the director.

Jovanović is not quite convinced as he tries to asses his own large figure, but when the director repeats his claim, it seems to him that his stomach is truly gone.

"Well, I did get thinner."

The director, very pleased, sails back towards the kitchen while the minister looks at himself with a satisfied smile.

The babbling sister in law restrains her tongue for a moment, stretches her long neck and, as if she suddenly woke up, spins her squirrel head around.

"And where's the general, where are they?"

"I guess they're over there," the fat assistant's wife distorts her lips and with her thumb, across her shoulder, points to that place "over there" which pulls away, "swallows" and irreparably spoils yesterday's fine people.

"They sure found themselves some company! You can even hear grunting from there!"

"Who cares," says the girl grudgingly and mumbles ironically, more to herself "Perhaps it's fashionable to court workers at the seaside."

"Well, probably. And the actresses and ballerinas are being saved for the winter season" adds the assistant's wife meanly, referring to who knows who from their company.

Beneath the small beach, there's a sound of splashing water and someone loudly and barbarically hissing.

A wet snout with bright, insolent eyes--which probably flew over from the large beach-- curiously peeks at the secluded gathering, climbs the terrace and, slapping his swimsuit, stretches his neck towards the small buffet under the balcony.



The company is awkwardly silent and they're pretending not to notice the intruder. At last, the supervisor gets up and approaches the stranger.

"What are you looking for, comrade?"

"You got somethin' cold to drink here?" asks the newcomer and jangles the coins in his wet pocket, assuming that the supervisor is the hospitable host of the villa.

"Here it's forbidden..." begins the supervisor seriously , but the conniving rascal, not listening, is already stomping his wet feet towards the buffet and cheerfully shouts to the waiter:

"Come on, give your buddy here a spritzer, and make it strong"

Suddenly, a memory strikes the minister and he quickly peeks at the unknown visitor, who is already coming back after being inhospitably served at the buffet.

"Yes, it's him"

He recognized the famous *udarnik*1 and *novator*2 to whom he personally handed an award and a medal last summer, and like he got caught in bad company, he turns red and lowers his head so the heroic worker wouldn't recognize him.

"Hell, what will the man say if he saw me, too?!"

Meanwhile, his sister-in-law, bored to death, turns her head while sitting in a rocking chair and asks:

"Why don't you bring the music from that big hotel in town over here? Sometimes in the evening, I get such an urge to dance."

The minister is consumed by anger:

"But, please, hundreds of people go there every night. How would you snatch the music from them and trap it here in this...this?..."

The sister-in-law raises her eyebrows in wonder:

"My god, there are respectable comrades here."

"Comrades. So what?" Štef Jovanović says angrily, but the sister-in-law stands her ground and interrupts him:

"You sure arranged for me to get some rest. Anyone can barge in here anytime they want. And do you remember when we were here for the first time?"

"Well, yes, I do... It was two years ago, during baćuška's3 course."

The sister-in-law bites her tongue and, ill-disposed, turns to her friend, who indulges her in a whisper:

"It's not all bad in the baćuška's line. I think I prefer this: today you can get a scolding from any grandma at a conference on account of the minister's storeroom."

"Well yes, socialist democracy," ironically nags the student. "You arrive at college in a car and already everyone is bursting with envy: these days it's best, they say, to be the minister's sister-in-law."

"There, you see."

Above the concrete edge of the beach, someone's mocking face emerges from the water. The newcomer shouts a notch too loudly, above the regular decent tone of this terrace:

"Hey, over here, minister. Let your brother see you swim."

The minister jumps to his feet, happy to get a chance to show off. The sister-in-law is confused and she turns to the assistant's wife:



"And who is this now?"

"Ah, what do I know, we met somewhere once. He's some artist, a sculptor or a writer, I forgot...What's that guy?" she asks her husband.

"What is he? He's a money grabber, that's what he is!" the minister's assistant gives a disdainful and grumpy response in a cutting tone.

"And what do our comrades think of his worth?" Inquires the sister in law with her eyes still glued to the guest. And this look, analytical and undefined, seems to say it all: "Hold on a minute till I figure out who you are and I might even give you a smile."

Štef plunges into the water and already his arms are flailing. His friend is grinning:

"You swim badly, my brother, like a pensioner."

"You were always a nag. Others tell me my swimming is great."

"They're lying, I swear, don't trust a thing they say. You've also gained too much weight, it's not good for you."

"Listen to this guy!" The minister is confounded, but the face of his comrade is so frank and bright that he had to laugh too.

They were swimming like that for a while, along the shore, until the minister finally started to earnestly complain:

"Buddy, I've had enough of the stale environment up there. All I can do is go to the common beach every day, with you guys, or to move to some syndicate's resort."

"And you don't fear, perhaps, for your authority?" cunningly jests the artist.

Štef arrives to the shallow water, straightens up and, with the gesture of a man who is finally shaking off his still unbaked beliefs about his own greater value, hits himself on the chest angrily:

"I was never afraid of open criticism from the people and I won't be now! Here, let people look me in the eyes, from up close, just one step away."

While the two of them are melting into the noisy crowd at the large beach, there at the small terrace of the villa, the assistant with a mild expression on his face, is listening to the director explaining something to him as if he is suddenly the oldest on the entire terrace:

"You know, everybody scattered, and you are now the oldest one here, so you give the orders..."

"Alright, alright, fine."

"The oldest!" The assistant is looking around the nearly deserted terrace, sinks deeper into the wicker chair and starts dreaming big. First he imagines that his wife had died, so he married the minister's sister-in-law, and then he became a minister himself, and then the prime minister, and then...

Apparently, the two men next to him are having similar reveries. Only in their imagination the assistant finished his career long ago, so he became an industrial worker, and they are now climbing higher over the assistant's old position, which is only the first step.

The pretty sister-in-law is dreaming a little as well, only she can't settle down and decide who would be her husband. The myriad of choices are so tempting, and she is, unfortunately, just one person.

And the large beach is freely humming, shouting, singing and, while disturbing their grand plans, wildly expressing pleasures and desires in everyone's reach.



POEM UNDERGROUND THE TRIBUNE OF YOUTH NOVI SAD[1]

1.
THE UNDERGROUND
comes in three forms
(those are the three that I am interested in
maybe there are more of them but I don't know about them because information here is so
scarce
or I didn't think about them
because they don't interest me
for this poem)
the commercial underground
the intellectual underground and
the underground
this first one
the commercial
in its commercial nature is not different
from the second listed
the intellectual
both are not within the same category simply because the first one does not have any other side
it is the broadest spread and it is consumed around the clock by different
generations of consumers
it is not creative
it (is) should be said that it is the bee gees tease
gather[2]
and shit like that
the intellectual underground besides the commercial which is secondary
also has an important intellectual dimension it is a rebellion
it is (the) quality
it is the hope of the bright future of electronic communism in essence
it is the elite directly juxtaposed against
the destructive forces of civilization
it is a departing avantgarde
leaving behind masses of young followers
confused, drugged and dead
it is an honorable loneliness nevertheless undermined by the consumer nature

1 *Student*, the periodical review of the Student Alliance of the Belgrade University, special edition, dedicated to the underground, banned by the court, captured in the print house and never entered mass distribution and made available to public. December 1971.
Slavko Bogdanović was sentenced to eight months in jail by the Novi Sad District Court (Case no. 77/72,
12 May 1972) for violating Article 292a of the Criminal Code and article 116. of the Law on press and other forms of information. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court of AP Vojvodina had found that Slavko Bogdanović, in his text Poem Underground Tribune of Youth Novi Sad, published in the *Studen*t, had presented false news and false claims regarding many events and issues.
2 Tease (*Čik*) and Gather (*Susret*) were in the times public periodicals ("yellow print") , controlled by the public authorities.

of this world
it is CAGE
JARY AEBY ANGELA TIM and other friends
THE STUDENT TRIBUNE PROBLEMS UJ SYMPOSIUM[3]
the underground
is a totally non-legal thing which evolves spontaneously
in a narrow circle
(of friends)
it carries an immediately recognizable quality of the underground
like when I say L.H.O.O.Q. No. 7
&
9
the underground periodical for developing of interpersonal relationships
which I produce for my friends
the underground
an armed rebellion that we dream of the underground
like my bro boško[4]
like WITH THE UNIVERSE
privately

2.
TRIBUN-ČIK

if the tribune[5] is in the ownership of the official organization of youths
(henceforth: the association for safe keeping of development of the young consumers)
then it's social purpose
has been clearly determined by the character as the society for safe keeping…
the tribune of youth of novi sad:
non-elite programme
mass communication
acculturation of the youth population of the city to a consumer outlook
to the world
stifling of
all forms of creation
provincial ideology de-individualization
work fun
loyalty
preserving and protecting the tradition of the nor[6]
comrade isakov[7]

3 Tribune (*Tribuna*), the periodical review of the Student's ALliance of the Ljubljana University, Problems (*Problemi*) and Simposion (*Ús Symposion*) were at the time cultural periodicals published in Ljubljana (in Slovenian) and Novi Sad (in Hungarian), respectively.
4 Božidar Mandić.
5 Tribune of Youth (*Tribina mladih*), the cultural institution of the Youth Organization of the City of Novi Sad.
6 National Liberation War (*narodnooslobodilački rat, NOR*).
7 An officer of the Youth Organization of the City of Novi Sad

comrade čanadanović[8]
the tribune is a place where workers and high school students come
by foot or not at all
to listen to domestic pop music
to listen to the speeches of their politicians to listen to the poetry of their colleagues
to watch the paintings of their colleagues
to watch domestic neretvas and sutjeskas[9]
to comfortably and carelessly spend free time consuming coca- cola and a sandwich
the pace of life is getting faster and time is all the more expensive the tribune thus needs to *create those forms of entertainment*
which will help (the) consumers (to)
start the next day ready for work and efficient work creations
the tribune is a place respectable in every way the tribune is a trustworthy place
at the tribune no one will get fucked over at the tribune no one will smoke hashish at the tribune no one will complain
the tribune is a safe and dependable meeting place for the youth of our city
the tribune of youth of novi sad is faulty because it attempts to be something
that the youth in our city gives a fuck about and that
the adults in our city do not give a fuck about because they are afraid
because there is not a lot of fun within indoctrination of socialist ideology of bačka[10]
assets of the tribune of youth are disco-club polja[11] and super-intendant laza
a good vision of a good generation will remain a vision even when the tribune becomes a producer of mass entertainment and
commercially independent
just hollow air and always in novi sad
just commercialized underground and political speeches

3.
BEGINNING WITH DEJAN POZNANOVIĆ TO THE RECENT BANNING OF THE ÚJ SYMPOSION IN NOVI SAD
young men with delicate fingers run with bugged out eyes
already out of breath and behind them relentlessly with clenched fists stalin comes

8 Mirko Čanadanović, Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Alliance of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
9 The reference is made to the two movies *("The Battle of Neretva"* and *"Sutjeska")*.
10 Bačka is one of the three geographical areas of Vojvodina (other two are Srem and Banat). The reference alludes on the political provinicialism.
11 Fields (*Polja*), a cultural periodical published by the Tribune of Youth.

speaking through the words of jaša zlobec[12]: you could imagine this
in russia but not in novi sad!
but I am
here! but i am here! but I am here! but I am here!
and then at the congress of cultural action: to shield of you under my roof
now it is clear that in this fucked up city everyone who wants to think of something smart and honest and then only tries to do it
gets fucked over
and the only real chance for guys at the tribune is
like boško ivkov[13]
in polja
to nurse kitschy socialistic-realism and
commercial underground surrealism
and nothing more because afar (the) people will be killed
because this horrible city meticulously reveals it's dark soul
the tribune of youth will never become an elite stronghold

of the avantgarde thought because this damned city does need that
and also
because (of that) the tribune is not a real chance but just some (a) cowardly bullshit
the feeling of social recognition — feeling like I ate shit
A MESSAGE TO THE FRIENDS AT THE TRIBUNE IF THEY EVEN EXIST THERE
listen carefully in novi sad to the "underground footsteps of the revolution"
carefully to the guerrilla
carefully to those who won't stop and wait you won't be saved by jerking off
you need to fuck
you need to live the rebellion not the surrogate to rebellion and not
for dirty money and strict censorship in the grey house on the corner

slavko bogdanovic
29 11 71 bosut

12 One of the members of the *Tribuna* (Ljubljana) editorial Bord.
13 Novi Sad writer, member of the Editorial Bord of *Polja*.

(((A SEMI-AUTOMATIC) UNFINISHED) COLLAGE (OR)) AN INTRODUCTION TO SLAVKO BOGDANOVIĆ)

Marko Paunović

BETWEEN POLITICS AND POETICS

writing must go beyond the dominant or the expected discourse.
the language must be rough and distorted.
the language must be venomous and gentle.
written in off and, first off all, full of contradictions.
subversion cannot be present at the level of a theme, but has to be conveyed
through different aspects, functions and potentials of language.

a morning descending. the mansard and the whole boulevard tremble with a seismic sound.
obliquing, it comprises a multitude of potential voices.
>>> the melancholy and the secret of the street. the transfiguration of language.
>>> in the beginning there was the formula of the deoxyribonucleic KÔD.
>>> a deafening noise of the buzzing of language,
a roar of an avalanche of signifiers, an echo of bells or an explosion?
I remember, one time,
one of the protagonists of the neo-avant-garde scene of novi sad
told me about slavko bogdanović >>> he is interested in politics and power; these are controversies.
the subject is the object. the active >>> the passive.
the question 'who speaks'
is posed as a challenge to the observed and imposed model of power
and the structures of power that it models.
however, the range >>> is an illusion, a worldview.
where we expect art, we find politics,
where politics is promised, formalism and radical aestheticism arise.
even if the 'swampy' analytical materiality of language erupts on the surface (of language),
not only the deconstruction of the aesthetic but also a step into horror of the political power inside and behind language.
is there anything less dividable in language than the act of dividing, analysis, separation, reduction?
micro-Shifts bring about micro-changes.
in a tight amplitude of words, across sets of meaning with neW semantic values,
towArds the stage writing ground zero.
the signifier is the stage zero of the text,

a potential terMination of the text and a potential incePtion of all other texts.
>>> the search for the signifier, the writing ground zero, the performative voice and the dematerialised object of art had the function of reaching the origin (the stadium zero of culture), actually, the possibility for culture to be erected again, for symbolization to start from the very beginning.

it is midnight. from the terrace door
>>> din of the break between dream and morning
>>> the fresh night air splashes my face
with the echoes of the traffic, vanishes the fall mist.
>>> it is dark. no voices to be heard.
I think about the 'open work'.
the work which is completed with its performance by the interpreter or with reception by the spectator.
the processuality towards the act of looking, towards the completed product,
towards the very process of formation.
open to interventions and additions, a work of art that does not guarantee final solutions for reading,
but it is rather a world in which the perceiver is a responsible participant which must move forward with hypothetical and changeable suggestions.
>>> his works (artworks, not pieces), because of its multidimensionality and poly-genre indeterminateness, challenged the ideal of the autonomous modernist artwork, and through its intertextual nature (according to kristeva and solers, a text exists only insomuch as it is given through its relations with other texts) it established interactive relations in art, culture, politics, spirituality, sexuality, esotericism.
however, bogdanović's entire opus vibrates inside the amplitudes of poetics and politics.
because of its sidedness, this text in formation is wrong, arbitrary and does not aim at the core.
the medium is the massage. the content is the structure. that is why it is unaccomplishable. that is why it is unattainable.
that is why it is inscribable, in an abundance of a surplus of meaning.
the becoming of a text introduces into marginal distinctions.
>>> I reside in words, I am made of words, words of others.
obliquing, it comprises a multitude of potential voices.
the habits of reading strive to construct the content even of a text written in fragments.
on a first encounter with nailed books
I asked myself if they represent the symbolic act of the murder of the father.
It is understood, the 'father' of culture, the weight of a collective experience, the politics of oppression…
his attitude has an utopic aspect of the sixty-eight optimism which talks
about a spreading of the world of art into life, into one concrete dimension
which sees the text and the readers as accomplices inside the interpretative community,
where the term 'interpretation', however, refers to the transformation of the primary text.
>>> bogdanović's attitude towards the ideas of the new left can be exemplified with the following instances: art is revolutionary, which does not mean it is in the service of the current bureaucratic party apparatus of that time, but in the sense of a transformation of the actual world through an individual or microsocial praxis of art and the bonding of art with inartistic social processes, structures and effects; art creates a new sensibility (a sense of time as the time of progress and prosperity, freedom); art is built of fragments of reality which are placed in art as 'ready-mades';

works of art are symptoms or causes used to provoke the typical status quo of a moderate modernist culture (ideology, values and a metaphysical sense of existence).

to demonstrate that the alliance of communists (ac) with its violent activity works against its program, against freedom and progressive thought, in summary,

especially because the fate of future yugoslavia depends on a great extent on the conditions in the ac,

we must be outside of it, on the street, in the revolution,

because the ac is not capable to reform itself to an extent that is necessary (not even to speak of a revolutionising of the ac),

for a long time now, the ac is not the revolution, to live art 'now' means to live the revolution…

>>> a total revolt against order, labour and peace.

>>> a dominant conception of culture did not exist in yugoslavia, and there was also no significant framework for a coherent and aesthetical thought. a system of theoretical thought that defines culture in an autochthonous way like critical philosophy defines british culture, like pragmatism and empiricism or greenbergian modernism define american culture, like structuralism defines french culture, like phenomenology defines german culture, cannot be singled out. at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies in yugoslavia, marxism (real-socialism and self-management socialism) was the external framework of the current culture, but it was firstly the state-building mechanism of authority, and not a spiritual productive context of culture. in these circumstances artists of a new sensibility had to form a starting framework for work on an eclectic base. a radical questioning of various artistic, existential and political contents and modes of expression, representation and behaviour appeared as a provocation in a milieu of a rigid bureaucratic social-realist system which sees art as a moderately modernist superstructure of the interests of the party, and therefore, the interests of the society. pointing out the effect of the political in art discourses (discursive analyses) lead to an interruption and disabled any kind of transfer from the margins to the centre of culture.

... I do not know how much to insist on the facts related to the prison.

that is a picturesque detail of a personal fate, which is relevant,

but I am, however, not sure it deserves special attention.

It can serve as an illustration of 'hard times'.

>>> the ground beneath us is slightly twisting

some people are insisting very much on these kinds of facts lately (explicitly and implicitly, that is, unknowingly),

which seems to me to be at least of bad taste (marauding).

this kind of fact is put into a context

of some operationalised political interests.

I would never ever want that, because, besides,

in that way, my story and the story of my work would come onto a level

in which hatred is the fuel, and urges those

about whom werner herzog made the movie 'aguirre, the wrath of god'

presenting a modern ship that is taking us into spaces of non- existence.

I do not posses the feeling of hatred.

I think that all things are in their place…

the afternoon. on the horizon, the last black sun on the zenith of the fall.

and on top >>>

of a drawing of a black flag in the index

like the reflexion of a text by Marie-ThérèseBaudour

regarding the black flag: from the chants of moldoror to magnetic fields

and above >>>

in order to defeat his greatest enemy – the state

man must

be in constant action

very mobile

and ready

not only to react to the actions of the state but also to provoke them (...)

I do not know if we can speak of a neo-anarchist destruction of reality.

>>> the western neo-anarchism of the late sixties and early seventies has critically and excessively confronted the aesthetics of high modernism which is based on the political autonomy of art.

it is rather a subverted political actionism

which, carried by the spirit of a new sensitivity, strives to implode

inside the fixed conventional norms.

they are rather transgressions

>>> behind the line of the horizon, an incandescent strip of a stake flashes

carrying the smell of smoke into the starry sky

inside / from the illusive spaces of civil (artistic) freedoms.

>>> the horizon of the 'horizon of events'

all the decay coincided with the defeat of utopia.

the defeat of utopia is only possible with the acceptance of defeat!

after the descent from the stage of the spirit of historical avant-gardes

>>> living on the ruins of an old patriarchal civilisation

>>> images about which he was always told represent the world

>>> are decomposing before his eyes >>> before our eyes. >>> here, >>> on the ruins >>> in the dump, >>> faced with threats of hard-patriotic messages from all sides >>> he rummages

bogdanović continues illuminating:

>>> endeavours to dilute the rhetoric

>>> endeavours to relativize the horror

a nuance of difference in relation to interpretation.

making the eruptions burst from thin fissures.

>>> behind the line of the horizon,

the alive and the dead are sorted alternately

there is no reading, no writing without struggle.

the symbol is the substance of language. always a replacement. always a pallid notion of something which is in hands reach, which presents itself by itself, directly.

>>> the problem of the individual in consumption that interests me

is firstly a cultural problem

the need to consume which appears in societies with a market economy

became real violence

in no strange land. (in)stability is embodied with an interrupted frame.

I think of the materiality of language, that is, its manifestation.

the text as the politics of narrowing, of minimizing the latitude. and a transgression, to sublimation.

the subject is most often shifted, but like a trace in disappearing, present by being absent.

In any case, a trace is always a trace of absence, a trace of the 'other'.

therefore, presence is not, not even remotely, as it is believed, what the sign means,

what the trace indicates, the presence is the trace of the trace, the trace of the erasure of the trace.

>>> the entire production is actually >>> a refreshing / a makeup / a disguise >>> of ancient

>>> wormholed read images >>> of a triangular (patriarchal) >>> oedipal downfall into immovability / an impossibility of progress >>> in a hard-stalinist edition >>> (what would be the 'east' behind the iron curtain) >>> or in a soft-stalinist version >>> (which could be said for the ex-yu)

although >>> !
it is necessary to follow the line >>> to walk the horizon of events
not to assent to banal interpretations >>> especially of stigmas
because at the sole mention of prison in the sfry >>> today
it is easy to fall into the trap >>> of a frame without a dialog box
in which the story imposes itself >>> like more than adequate
for an illustrated lubrication of discourse >>>
which supports a deep disorder >>> that exists from the mid IXX century in serbia

>>> we were interested in the principles on which cultures are based.that is the reason why this piece (I am not talking about my work, but about the activities of (conceptual group) KÔD and other avant-garde groups and individuals in yugoslavia at that time) reflected the spirit of the time in which we lived. I believe that we belonged to the global village. we were its inhabitants and we knew it, but we knew other inhabitants as well (from other hamlets) who also knew that they belonged to the global village and that knew that we know that we are its inhabitants. we were connected to them and, perfectly consciously and peacefully, we were building a more noble global utopia. on the other hand, nationalism (it implies that it also refers to other supranational phenomena – chauvinism, national socialism etc.) has no friends. one nationalism, with its being, suppresses another nationalism. it preys on its weaknesses. strives to destroy it. nationalist leaders are actually conductors of the national train to nowhere. the national train for myths. for the black hole. the national train as a space of implosion of being. nationalism is always against the 'outside' and always endlessly for the 'inside'. Nationalism is against civilizational integralism. etc. is there any sense to absorb ourselves into this any further?

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